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Abstract  
 
[Key Words]: China, societal forces, institutional transformation, behavioral change, policy 
adjustment 
 
Ever since the Reform and the Opening-up, China has undergone fundamental 
transformations with its decision-making discourse, structure and process. One of the major 
changes is the increasing involvement of societal forces. Three-layer development has made 
societal involvement and participation in decision-making possible: at global level, 
internationalization of domestic politics has kept China’s political decision-making under 
intensive international scrutiny, the CCP is reluctant to use repressive means to settle 
challenges from the society; at party-state level, CCP’s identity has evolved from a 
proletarian party through the three representatives to rejuvenator of the Chinese nation; 
economic growth, better governance and social participation have become new sources of 
legitimacy. Generation change and factional politics not only created sort of check and 
balance among top leadership but also brought greater social autonomy; at society level,the 
burgeoning middle class and their growing political consciousness have created a “critical 
realm” for strong societal forces as well as a limited “public sphere” typical for Western 
civil society. 
Institution, government behavior and policy are three criterions to evaluate a political 
process. This research examines how societal forces interact with the government during six 
major public incidents and evaluate in what form and under what conditions they can bring 
institutional, behavioral or policy changes. The study is based on the author’s close 
documentary studies, participatory observations, and in-depth interviews on six public 
incidents between 2002 and 2012: the Sun Zhigang case where rational and decentralized 
involvement of mass media, professionals, social activists and scholars forced the 
government to abolish the Custody and Repatriation system (2003); the Bobai County 
family planning protests where limited societal involvement, in a centralized yet irrational 
manner, failed to lead to institutional changes to the family planning policy (2007); the 
Xiamen PX protest where concerned middle-class dwellers, supported by new media 
scholars, professionals and social activists interacted with the Xiamen government in a 
centralized and rational and even constructive manner, and changed the behavior of Xiamen 
government from irresponsive to more responsive, from repressive to democratic, and from 
block-box to democratic decision-making. Societal engagement also forced the PX program 
out of Xiamen (2007); the Qian Yunhui case where intensive involvement of rural villagers 
(stakeholders), new media, professionals, scholars, and social activists, in a rational yet 
decentralized manner, failed to figure out the truth of the suspicious death of a village 
headman who had organized villagers to protest against the local government’s land seizure 
while the government’s behavior remained repressive, arbitrary and uncooperative(2010); 
the Wukan land protest where protracted and resolute protest for Wukan villagers, supported 
by new media and international media, NGOs and social activists, and in a centralized and 
rational manner with controllable confrontation, successfully forced local and provincial 
government to change their policy on social organizations, village autonomy, and market-
oriented land policy, and ensured and supervised election (2011); and the Dalian PX protest 
of middle-class dwellers, supported by traditional, new and international media, social 
activist and scholars, in a rational and centralized manner, urged the government to 
undertake to suspend production and relocate the PX program, while the government failed 
to fulfill its commitment four years after the decision of relocation (2011). 
The six cases presented the general picture of China’s ubiquitous social conflicts and 
features of China’s societal involvement. They took place in Chinas’ under-developed inland 
countryside of Bobai in Guangxi province, middle-class city of Xiamen and Dalian, rural 
village of Wukan and Zhaiqiao (Qian Yunhui) in coastal Zhejiang and Guangdong 
provinces, as well as Guangzhou metropolis. The cases partially identified the relationship 
between economical development and active political participation. In terms of policy 
issues, the six cases respectively covered social injustice, environmental crisis and 
economical-political rights repression, which are exactly the three major sources of China’s 
social conflicts. Societal involvement was successful in three of the six cases (Sun Zhigang 
sase, Xiamen PX protest and Wukan land protest), while in three other cases unsuccessful. 
The six cases, in a linear order of social, environmental, economical and political aspects, 
revealed the ever-deepening involvement and expanding role of China’s societal forces. 
This research examines the components of societal forces that are potentially 
reshaping the decision-making process. Findings are that mass media and public opinion, 
social activists, professionals, and scholars had emerged as the most influential societal 
forces. NGOs have a minor and insignificant role. Among these societal forces, media and 
public opinion proved to be vital: before the news was released via media, early 
involvement by stallholders was hardly fruitful. In the three successful cases (the Sun 
Zhigang’s case, the Xiamen PX protest and Wukan land protest), media involved 
intensively. Dalian PX protest was successful at first because of media disclosure. Bobai 
family planning protest failed partially because of lack of media exposure, including new 
media. Reports and comments by central media is a major benchmark for the solvation of 
incidents, positive exposure by central media can bring good (Sun Zhigang case) or bad 
effect (Qian Yunhui case). New Media, such as blogs, BBS, Internet-based communities, 
messages played very important role in the Xiamen PX plant incident and the Wukan 
Incident, while in early case of Sun Zhigang, traditional media played a key role because 
China’s Internet industry was still underdeveloped during the early 2000s.  
The role of professionals is important since many cases resulted from or involve loss 
of human life. Expertise in law and Legal-medical autopsy often constitute major evidence 
to define who should be responsible. In Sun Zhigang’s case, the autopsy result served as the 
initial evidence for societal involvement; in Wukan ptotest, the death of a protest leader in 
the police station worsened the tension, however the family member of the social activist 
gave up the autopsy for some reason. Autopsy report of Qian Yunhui’s death and technical 
report of the truck failed to provide major evidence, partially because the agency was 
designated by police and therefore the reports may have not been convincing. In 
environmental issues, professional review, test and report, Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) for instance, proved important as in the case of Xiamen and Dalian PX 
protest. Given that the mistrust between the government and society have been very strong, 
professionals may have provided reliable evidence based on which the society and the 
government could negotiate for a compromise.  
The role of social activists was clear and indispensible for their organizational and 
coordination role. However, their role was insignificant compared with other societal forces. 
The role of scholars was very special. Scholars played a leading role in the Sun Zhigang’s 
case and Xiamen PX incident. Scholars were deeply involved in the Qian Yunhui case but 
failed to bring positive result because of the very sensitive nature of the issue; role of 
scholars was basically absent in the Bobai case and Wukan land protest, though they pushed 
for the adjustment or abolishment of the family planning policy and land policy. Scholars’ 
participation may not lead to immediate results of settlement of incidents, but often lead to 
long term and significant institutional changes, as in the Sun Zhigang case. The case of 
Xiamen PX incident also indicated that within-regime or official scholars might bring better 
result for societal involvement.  
Different from western societies where civil society organizations serve as major 
agent between state government and individuals, NGOs were almost absent in four of the 
cases while visible yet insignificant role were discerned in the Wukan land protest and the 
Qian Yunhui case. In the Wukan land protest, the Temporary Representatives’ Council, 
decision-making body of the protest was once announced as illegal; women’s organizations 
and advocacy NGO (the New Enlightenment Institute) were active instead. In the Qian 
Yunhui case, scholars, lawyers and social activists formed investigation teams that were 
actually NGOs, but failed to make a difference.   
All three cases are large-scale group incident, the research did not find direct 
relationship between the scale and effect of the societal involvement, though one can assume 
that the larger the scale, the greater the pressure upon government and the more will be 
achieved. The writer also assumes that societal involvement would be more effective in low 
politics areas such as economic right maintenance or environmental protection, but the study 
does not show a consistent relationship between the effect of societal involvement and issue 
area.   
In terms of rationality, societal involvement in the Sun Zhigang case, the Xiamen and 
Dalian PX protests, and the Qian Yunhui case were rational, with two of them successful and 
two others unsuccessful. Societal involvement in Bobai family planning protest was violent 
and irrational while rational with antagonism in the Wukan land protest as analyzed before, 
indicating that there was no lineal relationship between rationality of the engagement. 
However, the Xiamen PX incident proved that rational and constructive engagement was 
most effective. The Wukan land protest revealed that controllable confrontation and even 
violence was sometimes tolerated under condition of protracted, large-scale resistance of 
societal forces.  
The pattern of interaction also matters. Exception can be seen in the Qian Yunhui 
case and Sun Zhigang where societal forces involved the government in a fragmented (Sun 
Zhigang case) and divided manner (Qian Yunhui case). Societal forces in other four cases 
seemed quite coordinated and well organized. General analysis seemed to support 
centralized involvement of societal forces which may have brought better result, since they 
created stronger pressure for the government. 
The study proved the importance of the level of leadership intervention for the 
success or failure of societal involvement. In all three successful cases (Sun Zhigang case, 
Xiamen PX incident, and Wukan protest), the intervention of leadership from higher-level 
government proved to be vital for settlement and success of societal involvement. Unlike in 
two out of three of unsuccessful cases, namely, the Bobai County family planning and Qian 
Yunhui case, decision-making was mainly made by county level government without real 
intervention of higher-level government. 
As one of the major findings, the emerging interest groups are potentially the 
greatest barriers for societal involvement which include, the police station and civil service 
workers at the C&R stations in the Sun Zhigang case, family planning department in the 
Bobai County protest, the Taiwanese investor of the PX program, the Yueqing Power Plant 
in Qian Yunhui case, several Hong Kong and private investors in Wukan village and the 
Fujia Dahua company in Dalian PX protest. Societal involvement, on the otherhand, was 
more fruitful when the interest groups were less powerful (the Wukan case, Sun Zhigang 
case), and less fruitful or unsuccessful when interest groups were more powerful (the 
Yueqing Power Plant in Qian Yunhui Case and the Fujia Dahua Group in Dailian PX 
Protest). Societal involvement was more successful when the interest groups were related to 
foreign (Xiamen PX, Wukan) or private investments (Wukan) meanwhile societal 
involvement was less successful or unsuccessful when the interest groups involved large 
state-owned cooperation (Yue Qing Power Plant in Qian Yunhui Case) or larger cooperation 
with strong governmental or official background (Fujia Dahua PX program in Dalian PX 
protest).
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Introduction 
 
1. China Politics: All roads lead to democratization? 
 
 For decades, scholars studying China have been entangled in discussion of whether 
or not sustained economic development will lead to political liberalization and 
democratization. 1   China’s protracted delay in political reform after the violence in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 has invited wide international skepticism about China’s 
democratic prospects, while China’s surging social problems in recent decades have led to 
increasing scholarly pessimism. Many scholars now assert that China will collapse 
following a trajectory similar to that of the former Soviet Union and other Leninist states in 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 There are competing or even contesting ideas about China’s political prospects. A 
large proportion of the scholars just mentioned are overseas Chinese, especially from 
Taiwan or Hong Kong. 2  The “China’s collapse” approach has gained an international 
audience late in the last century and at the beginning of this one. Even one of the leading 
China scholars, David Shambaugh, has converted to this school.3  The evidence for the 
“China collapse” school are clearly visible: stalemated political reform, economic slow-
                                                        
1 John F. Copper. National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (review). China 
Review International 3, no. 2 (1996): 415-417; Zhao, Suisheng. (ed.) China and Democracy: 
Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China, Routledge, 2000; Gilley, Bruce (2004), China‘s 
Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead, New York: Columbia University 
Press; Zhao, Suisheng, Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization, 
Routledge; annotated edition, 2006; Chen, Jie. A Middle Class Without Democracy: Economic 
Growth and the Prospects for Democratization in China, Oxford University Press; Reprint edition, 
2014; Cheng Li, China's Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010; Helen H. Wang, The Chinese Dream: The Rise of the World's Largest Middle 
Class and What It Means to You, Create Space Independent Publishing Platform; 2nd edition, 2010; 
Andrew J. Nathan (Editor), Larry Diamond. eds., Will China Democratize? (A Journal of Democracy 
Book), Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1st Printing edition, 2013. 
2 Besides the references of the footnote n. 1, for more details, see: Keating, Joshua. Prominent China 
Scholar Says the Communist Party Is Near Death. China Says He’s Crazy. Who’s Right? The Slatest. 
March 13, 2015; Chang, G. The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition. Foreign Policy. December 
29, 2011. Tao, Xie. Why Do People Keep Predicting China's Collapse? The Diplomat. March 20, 
2015. 
3  Shambaugh, David. China’s Coming Crackup. Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198, 2015-08-12. See also: 
Chang, Gordon. The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition. I admit it: My prediction that the 
Communist Party would fall by 2011 was wrong. Still, I'm only off by a year. Foreign Policy. 
December 29, 2011. 
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down, rampant corruption, wide-spread dissent, environmental degradation, a faulty social 
welfare system, systemic financial problems, and various other factors. In a quite influential 
article published in the Wall Street Journal in early 2015, Shambaugh listed five facts that 
led to his prediction of the Chinese Communist Party’s collapse: disappointment and flight 
of China’s economic elite and elite party officials; the deep anxiety and insecurity felt by the 
party’s leadership as evidence by the party’s intensified repression of media freedom, the 
internet, intellectuals, dissenters’ movement and ethnic minorities; ineffective ideological 
appeals; the limitations on Xi’s anti-corruption campaign; and systemic traps inherent in 
China’s economy. However, the adaptability and resilience of Chinese Communist Party 
(hereafter the CCP) has been demostrated by China’s sustained economic growth and 
structural reform. And the party’s power to motivate the people and control China’s 
economy, political process and society has been used stringently and effectively. The CCP’s 
adaptability is well displayed by its evolving decision-making. It is increasingly 
decentralized, professional, and even democratic. 
 Meanwhile, a greater number of scholars in political science and international 
relations believe in the democratic prospects of the world’s largest autocracy.4 Based on 
their academic interests and propensities, supporters of China’s democratization can be 
divided into three streams: the first emphasizes the traditional political economy approach; 
the second, the congressional democracy approach; and the third, the consultative 
democracy approach. 
 The largest body of the pro-democratization scholars favor the first approach. 
Traditional political economical thinking tends to believe that economic growth will help 
cultivate a powerful middle class who will eventually pursue their liberal political rights and 
push the entire country towards democratization. Among these scholars, Andrew Nathan 
(1976) stands out by contributing more than most. His studies range from cultural to 
institutional, empirical to theoretical, and from modern to contemporary China. In 1976 
when China was still in extreme turmoil, Nathan investigated the aftermath of the 1911 
revolution against the monarchy, asking whether Chinese culture formed under a kind of 
nepotistic factionalism must ruin democratic breakthroughs. 5  In the early reform period 
when political reform seemed to be on the “right” track, Nathan evaluated the positivist 
                                                        
4 See note n. 2 and the following references of the introduction. 
5  Nathan, Andrew J. Peking Politics (Michigan Studies on China), New York: University of 
California Press; 1st Edition edition,1976. See also from the same author: China's new rulers: the 
secret files. New York: New York Review of Books, 2002. 
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nature of the late imperial China’s constitutionalism (after 1898) applying textual analysis 
and gathering interview data. He concluded that, “China's obsession with political order and 
national strength” blocked democratic mobilization after the constitutional reforms that 
began in 1898. 6   Nathan’s belief in China’s democratic future (1990) remained quite 
consistent even after the repression occurred of June fourth 1989. At that time many Western 
scholars turned somewhat pessimistic, but Nathan continued to propose the possibility of a 
Chinese style of “democracy” driven by political reform among the elite and a resurgence of 
pressure from increasingly self-organized grassroots society.7 
 Understandably, a cultural instead of purely political science approach should also 
help explain political structure and processes, especially for old civilizations such as 
China’s. Nathan’s cultural review of China did not alter the consistency of his findings. By 
exploring insightful abstract concepts such as "cultural relativism," "conservative 
modernization," and "hermeneutic versus positivistic approaches to distinctiveness" in 
explaining China’s past and present political practices, Nathan found nothing inherent in 
Chinese culture that renders it incapable of evolving into a democracy.8 
 The congressional democracy approach, on the other hand, focuses on China’s 
existing People’s Congresses and the People’s Political Consultative Conference, usually 
with the conviction that the evolving (if not just increasing) roles of these political organs 
will finally develop into a Chinese version of the congresses of other nations. Western 
democratic practice, however, is usually based on the separation of powers, with the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive each independent of the others and restrained 
from encroaching on their domains. Based on their own experience, Western scholars have 
been keeping an eye on the role of the National People’s Congress (People’s Congress or 
NPC) as the key to evaluating China’s power structure and the decision-making process. 
Generally speaking, scholars are somewhat disappointed by the progress so far, 9  since 
China’s prospects as a major power and the severe challenges it faces call for a reinforced 
role for the People’s Congresses to make them more representative and more responsive to 
people’s rquests (congressional democracy).10  
                                                        
6 Nathan, Andrew J. Chinese Democracy, Knopf; 1st edition, 1985. 
7  Nathan, Andrew J. China’s Crisis, New York: University of California Press; 1st Edition 
edition,1990. 
8 Nathan, Andrew J. China's Transition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
9 O’Brien, Kevin. Reform with Liberalization: China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics 
of Institutional Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
10 Zheng, Yongnian; Li, Jinshan. The National People’s Congress and Its Electoral System, in John 
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 As a major legal and institutional channel for social participation, the People’s 
Congresses have shown transformated decision-making with respect to some major events 
such as their bill in favor of the Three Georges dam. The dam was a major project originally 
proposed by China’s modern revolutionary pioneer Sun Yat-sen and later by Mao Zedong, 
but both failed to get it going financial and technological reasons. It has been controversial 
projects due to its massive environmental, economic, and social impacts. 11  Therefore, 
research organizations (China’s Academy of Social Sciences and Tsinghua University, 
among others), experts and professionals, were intensively involved in feasibility studies 
which were later submitted to political leaders and to the National People’s Congress, which 
finally approved the project. Yet 177 delegates opposed it in the final vote, and 644 
abstained from voting. It was approved by 1,767 delegates only after heated discussion. So 
more than a third of the delegates did not support the project. There have subsequently been 
a few cases of provincial government’s budgets being votoed by the provincial congresses, 
but the development of those too has been far from satisfactory. People either criticize them 
for dysfunction, calling them “rubber stamps” since they often just go through the due 
procedures just to confirm a decision pre-decided by the party.12 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Wong (ed.) China After the Ninth National People’s Congress: Meeting the Cross-Century 
Challenges, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing House, 1998. 
11 The most authoritative research on the effects of the Three Gorges Dam was done by China 
Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences; members of the research team include 
experts on water recourses, geography, earthquake, hydropower, biology environmental protection, 
etc. A similar research was conducted by Tsinghua University. China Academy of Social Sciences of 
1988. Environmental Impact Statement for the Three Gorges Project. Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
Nanjing Geography Institute. Chinese Academy of Sciences. 1995. Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Yangtze Three Gorges Project, (A Brief Edition). Environmental Impact Assessment 
Department, Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Research Institute for Protection of Yangtze 
Water Resources. Beijing, China: Science Press. See also Peter H. Gleick, Three Gorges Dam 
Project, Yangtze River, China, Water Brief, The World’s Water, 2008-2009. Among the two 
researches report by the China Academy of Social Sciences, the first (1988) concluded that the 
negative effects weigh over the benefit. The Academy was required to do another research to serve 
the political will that favor the construction of the Dam, and most members who objected the project 
were excluded from the team. The China Academy of Social Sciences processed technically by 
stating the negative effects and the benefits respectively without concluding whether benefits or risks 
weigh more. Political propensity in pushing the dam was apparent. 
12  Zhang, Qianfang, Introduction: Supremacy by Rubber Stamp, Democracy with Chinese 
Characteristics: The Role of the People’s Congress, in Zhang. (ed.) The Constitution of China: a 
Contextual Analysis, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012. BBC: How China is Ruled: the 
National People’s Congress. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/government/html/7.stm, 2015-06-16; 
and CNN, “China's rubber-stamp parliament: 3 things you need to know”, which is available at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/04/news/economy/china-national-peoples-congress/，2015-06-16；
Kawase, Kenji. “China to rubber-stamp its 'new normal', Nikkei Asian Review”. Available at: 
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 Wu Bangguo, then NPC chairman, stated in March 2009 that, “Western models of 
democracy, which emphasize multi-party competition for power, the separation of three 
branches of government, and bicameralism, are not suitable for China.”13 Wu’s perception of 
Western democracy represents that of the majority of China’s political elite. China’s 
President Xi Jinping has said on many occasions that multiparty democracy and the 
development models of other countries do not suit China and would lead to catastrophic 
consequences if once adopted.14 
 The consultative democracy approach also focuses on the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), another institutional channel for participation which has 
been regarded as relevant to revising China’s decision-making and its democratic future. 
Instead of the representativeness of the NPC, the CPPCC works through “consultation”. In 
fact, the CPPCC was the predecessor of the People’s Congresses between 1949 and 1954. 
Chairman Mao was fully aware of the importance of united front work during the 
revolutionary period and early years of socialist construction, so he kept a platform for the 
participation of non-party elites in the hope they would be encouraged to contribute to the 
socialist construction cause. 
 The CPPCC consists of representatives of the CCP and 8 other democratic parties 
(min zhu dang pai), along with non-party cadres (dang wai gan bu), intellectuals, important 
figures from the non-public business sector (fei gong you zhi jing ji jing ying), and 
representatives of people's organizations (ren min tuan ti), ethnic minorities and various 
social strata. The representatives meet regularly to discuss important issues and submit 
policy suggestions to the CPPCC’s Standing Committee, in theory helping to reshape policy. 
Because of the representatives and the quasi-democratic nature of the conference, 
participation via the CPPCC is called “consultative democracy” by the CCP and some 
scholars. At a recent conference, President Xi Jinping stated that “through consultation with 
the people, various voices can be heard and consensus reached on decisions and work, and 
demands of different interest groups can be incorporated into decisions smoothly.”15 Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/China-to-rubber-stamp-its-new-normal, 2015-06-
18. 
13 People’s Daily, March 10, 2009, p. 1. Chan Jiagang and Yu Keping, Consultative Democracy and 
Political Development, Beijing. 
14 Xi, Jinping. Why China’s can’t practice Western democracy, Sept 11, 2014, Available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/11/c_126976574.htm, 2015-6-12. 
15 Xi, Jinping. China Focus: China hails consultative democracy on 65th anniversary of political 
advisory body. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/21/c_133660577.htm, 
accessed on: 2015-08-12. 
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scholars have also studies intensively about “consultative democracy”.16 
 Used in this way, however, the meaning for “consultative democracy” is rather 
limited. First, unlike the People’s Congresses whose representatives are supposedly elected, 
the members of CPPCC are appointed by the CCP (whose members constitute a major 
proportion of the delegates). Those proposed by other parties, people’s societies or civil 
groups (such as the All China Federation of Industries & Commerce) need CCP approval. 
They all tend to be political, economical and intellectual elites, so the CPPCC’s 
representativeness is not as wide as that of the People’s Congresses. Many public figures are 
or used to be member of the CPPCC. Congress membership is appointed by the CCP’s 
United Front Work Department. The delegates tend to be active professional people, but 
their lack of independence would be expected to drastically reduce the effectives of their 
participation. Though nominally a major channel for expression, influence and participation, 
all of the CPPCC’s advice and suggestions go to the People’s Congresses and the top 
leadership. Still, many ordinary citizens, scholars, and social activist convey their ideas to a 
member of the CPPCC who might submit them to the conference. Social activist Xiong Wei, 
for instance, has been submitting bills via CPPCC members condemning illegal trafficking 
of children and woman, as well as to limit smoking in public places.17 But in general the 
regime is promoting limited participation by certain elites instead of the grassroots. And in 
the end the CPPCC is an advisory body. Consulting it is not a compulsory for anyone. It has 
no power to make decisions, but just raises approaches for participation in the Chinese 
system. 
 China scholars favoring the congressional and consultative democracy approaches, 
have clearly been influenced by institutionalism and its later version, neo-institutionalism 
popular in the last three decades. Their analyses have mostly been based on Western 
experience of democratic practices. But more importantly, all three approaches 
overwhelmingly concentrate on the elite level of China’s political process, and therefore fail 
to track the latest changes in Chinese society. Emerging societal forces have been actively 
                                                        
16 Gao, Jian; Tong, De Zhi; Zhu, Bian. Consultative Democracy, Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishing 
House, March 1, 2010. Chen Jiagang, Consultative Diplomacy and National Governance, Beijing: 
China Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 2014; Lin Shangli, Zhao Yufeng, The Logic of 
China’s Consultative Democracy, ShanghaiL Shanghai People’s Press, 2015; Cheng Jiagang and 
Yukeping, Consultative Democracy and Political Development, Beijing: social sciences academic 
press, 2011; Li Junru, Consultative Democracy in China, Beijing: People’s Press, 2014. 
17 Xiong Wei is head of a civil organization New Enlightenment Research Institute (Xin Qi Meng Yan 
Jiu Suo). He has also been very active in grassroots level elections. He had been engaged in the 
Wukan Land Protests in Guangzhou. 
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involved in decision-making and have made tremendous differences. 
 This research was therefore designed to analyze the role of emerging societal forces 
in China’s political liberalization and democratization. It aimed to evaluate the implications 
of societal involvement in China’s political decision-making in terms of institutions, 
government behavior, and policy output. The research was be based on analysis of the 
interaction between societal forces and China’s political decision-making bodies over major 
public incidents to see what kind of interactions were displayed and what they mean for 
decision-making and China’s overall political development.  
 
2. Research Framework 
 
2.1. Overview: Reasons for Adopting this Research 
 
 This was an empirical study aiming to elucidate the evolving relationship between 
the Chinese state and its society. China is geographically large, populous, diverse, and 
fragmented. Therefore any study of its society is inherently quite ambitious. And of course, 
Chinese society is quite different from that of the U.S., Western societies or even those of 
China’s close neighbors such as Japan and Korea. This research set out to delineate the 
patterns of interaction linking societal forces with their implications. In particular, the 
effectiveness of involvement was assessed along with its implications for China’s decision-
making institutions, government behavior, and policy output. 
 As has been explained, Western approaches of Chinese democratization via political-
economic (such as market liberalism and middle class-driven), congressional (via People’s 
Congress), consultative (via Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, CPPCC), 
and intra-party approaches have all proved to be of limited value and the future chances of 
progress are slim. At the same time, the collapse of China or the CCP through a bottom-up 
revolution is most unlikely in the foreseeable future. This has left China scholats rather 
disappointed and has somewhat exhausted their enthusiasm for exploring new approaches to 
explaining China’s latest political and social changes. But perhaps they have been 
concentrating unduly on the elite level of China politics while neglecting major societal 
transformation that have taken place over the past decade or more. The rise of societal forces 
is apparent, discernable, and increasingly predictable. Failing to see those significant 
changes in Chinese society may lead to overlooking the larger picture of China’s political 
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future.  
 This research was based on the writer’s keen interests in and field experience with 
institutions in China such as religious groups (through a program on state-religion relations 
commissioned by the state goverment), local elections, lower level government consultation 
pratices (especially in Wenling county, in Zhejiang province), domestic NGOs (including 
ones heavily involved in protecting human rights, promoting democracy, citizenship 
education, and environmental protection), and the media. Those institutions have had an 
important role in many major public incidents over the past decade, and familiarity with 
them generates awareness of what they might mean for China’s decision-making and 
political development. This study set out to study their behavior, what constitutes societal 
participation in China, how much progress such institutions have made through their 
involvement, and the limitations on their involvement and participation today. 
 
2.2. Incidents and Crises 
 
 The CCP is of course highly sensitive to any social tensions, conflicts, or unrest. The 
frequent social protests have drawn intensive scholarly and journalistic attention. The CCP’s 
focus is on maintaining its power, and it interprets protest as a portent of future popular 
uprising. This study represents one of the few academic 18  attempts to review in-depth 
China’s ongoing evolution from a political science perspective and to establish a theoretical 
framework that can properly explain China’s present relationship between the party-state 
and society and its future trends. Its focus on the societal-government interactions in 
decision-making thus requires treating times of public incidents and social crisis when that 
interaction is at its most intense. But can this approach reveal the real interaction patterns of 
the political decision-making process? Will the decision-making thus analyzed be more a 
matter of crisis management than of regular decision-making? 
 As public and group incidents have become more frequent, meeting their challenges 
has become a routine task for the political system. Quick response and decision-making 
                                                        
18 Some of the works can be raised: Cai, Yongshun. Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular 
Protests Succeed or Fail. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. O’Brien, Kevin J. (ed). Popular 
Protest in China. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Perry, Elizabeth J. Patrolling the 
Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2007. O’Brien, Kevin J., Li, Lianjiang. Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Tang, Wenfang. Public Opinion and Political 
Change in China. Stanford University Press, 2005. 
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constitutes a severe test for the decision-making system.19 Governments’ decision-making 
during such incidents is intense and concentrated within a relatively short period of time, 
unlike their usual prolonged bureaucratic procedures. Meanwhile, group or public incidents 
often attract media coverage that arouses public concern by exposing society’s involvement 
and government decision-making to the public in a way that is relatively easy to track and 
observe. This is especially notable given China’s usual strict media censorship. Incidents 
often force a kind of temporary transparency. More importantly, they present opportunities 
for institutional and political innovation which can lead to conceptual, behavioral changes 
and policy changes. At its most extreme, this was evident in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria 
in the Arab spring. In Chinese history too bold reforms and policy shifts have often occurred 
after a major incident.  
 Along with its fast economic growth and its social transformation, China has entered 
in a phase of frequent social crisis. Such incidents are very sensitive, and they were 
originally described in official statistics as “mass contingency events”. This later become 
“group incidents” in official discourse. Land and other legal disputes, environmental issues, 
corruption, and forced unemployment caused by restructuring constitute the main reasons 
for urban group incidents. The “Sun Zhigang Case” in Guangzhou, the PX plant incident in 
Xiamen as well as the Wukan land protest in Guangdong are well-known examples, but in 
fact most large scale and violent group incidents take place in rural areas. The Weng’an 
protest in Guizhou , 20 the Bobai protest against the family planning policy in Guangxi, and 
the Shishou protest in Hubei. But they can also arise in less developed rural areas of 
generally developed coastal provinces, as exemplified by the Wu Kan group incident  in 
Guangdong as well as the Qian Yunhui case  in Zhejiang province. 
 Yu Jianrong, a leading rural studies expert, holds that large-scale conflict is more 
likely to erupt in rural area rather than urban areas (Yu, 2007). This is primarily due to the 
central government’s inability to control the vast remote areas of China combined with the 
                                                        
19 Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining during Superpower Crisis, Princeton University 
Press, 1968; Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, 
1976. 
20 A riot occurred on June 28, 2008, which involved tens of thousands in Weng'an, a rural town in 
remote Guizhou Province of Southwest China, to protest against police conclusion of “suicide” of 15 
year-old schoolgirl, Li Shufei, since rumors came that she was murdered and that the conclusion of 
“suicide” was drawn because of corruption. The protests displayed the lost credibility of government 
and grassroots’ lack of trust in government officials. This kind of protests is quite common in 
underdeveloped inland rural west. A similar case also happened in Shishou of Hubei province in June 
2009 when the death of a male cook led to a major riot attended by several score thousand of people.  
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lack of a clear set of common interests among the highly diverse rural population.21 In the 
recent decades, China has reported a growing number of group incidents and social protests. 
According to government statistics, the number of group incidents increased from 8,700 in 
1993 to 58,000 in 2003, and the numbers of participants increased from 0.73 million to 3.07 
million.22  The number of “mass contingency events” (incidents involving 100 or more 
people) rose to 7,400 in 2004, an annual increase of at least 9%. The figure further increased 
to 8,700 in 2005, a 6.6% increase from the previous year. 23  According to the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, from 2000 to the late 2013 China witnessed 871 group 
incidents that involved 100 people or more.24 Among them were 10 incidents (1.1%) which 
involved more than 10,000 people, 271 (31.1%) involving between 1,000 and 10,000, and 
590 cases (67.7%) involving between 100 to 1,000 people. The most frequent were in the 
period between 2010 and 2012, when 163 cases in 2010, 172 cases in 2011, and 209 cases 
2012 arose.25 
 The largest number of incidents which attracted media attention took place in South 
China, with Guangdong province alone accounting for 30.1% of all the publicized incidents 
that involved more than 100 people.26 This is not hard to understand. Guangdong has been in 
the forefront of reform and development in China and was its most developed region. People 
in Guangdong have better sense of citizenry and liberal rights owing to the province’s 
history as a revolutionary capital since the Republic era and the early workers’ movements. 
Guangdong’s geographical proximity to Hong Kong and its television news in the local 
language make concealing events much more difficult, so the CCP leaders in Guangdong 
perforce tend to be more open-minded and rights-conscious, and they feel under greater 
pressure to address incidents via engagement rather than repressive means. This may 
encourage incidents as a tactic for the disgruntled. 
 According to Li and He (2015), incidents incited by tension between individuals and 
social organizations, or between organizations and government officials account for about 
40% of the total, indicating the tension between the state government and society despite 
                                                        
21 Yu Jianrong, Social Conflict in Rural China, China Security, Vol 3 No 2, 2007. pp. 2-17. 
22 Blue Book of China’s Society: Analysis and Forecast on China’s Social Development, Social 
Sciences Academic Press, China, 2005. 
23 A speech by Zhou Yongkang, disgraced former head of China Ministry of Public Security who 
later became member of the Politburo Standing Committee. 
24 Li Lin and Tian He (eds.) Blue Book of Rule of Law: Annual Report on Rule of Law (No 12. 
2014), Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2015. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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rapid economic growth. Environmental issues constitute a major reason for large-scale 
incidents (those involving 10,000 people or more), accounting for 50% of all such cases. 
Labor disputes are at the root of about 36.5% of the incidents that involve between 1,000 
and 10,000 people.27 
 Undoubtedly, environmental degradation has become a grave concern for all 
Chinese. Air pollution, water pollution, and even illegal industrial discharge into drinking 
water sources has affected the life and health of everyone. The air pollution in Beijing has 
aroused general dissent and hurt China’s international image as an emerging power. 
Compared with conventional air, water and soil pollution, or with deforestation, the potential 
danger of industrial chemicals tends to arouse greater concern. Local governments operate 
under strong incentives to promote growth. Attracting huge investment, including 
investment in petrochemical production, is a way to grow quickly. The incentives pay less 
attention to the consequences, creating tension between governmental officials’ pursuit of 
their bonuses and promotion and the people’s need for a safe and healthy environment. This 
is often intensified by disorderly pursuit of urban expansion. 
 The coastal cities of Dalian and Xiamen both planned major PX programs within the 
city. After organized and concerted protests, the Xiamen PX program was relocated to a 
town on the Gulei Peninsula in another part of Fujian province, while the program in Dalian 
has kept a low profile via governmental maneuvering. The government deems the Dalian 
program a major step towards its ambition to build the country’s largest petrochemical base, 
and it further serves to help revitalize the old industrial base of Northeastern China, a 
national plan initiated by former Premier Wen Jiabao. The Dalian facility suffered a severe 
explotion and leakage later, but it remains in operation revealing how the government’s will 
can prevail in China, even under societal pressure. 
 
2.3. Overview: Public and Group Incidents 
 
 Much antagonism and many social protests result domestic tension, clan politics, 
land disputes, legal injustice and corruption in the lower levels of government. But a certain 
number reflect a xenophobia which may indicate government encouragment. Examples are 
anti-American demonstrations in 1999 after NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in 
                                                        
27 Li, Lin; He, Tian (eds.). Blue Book of Rule of Law: Annual Report on Rule of Law (No 12. 2014), 
Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2015. 
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Belgrade; protests in 1985 against the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, and in 2005 and 2012 against Japanese control of the Diaoyu (or Senkaku) Islands. 
If so, the government seems to be playing with fire, as such protests commonly show some 
dissent against Chinese government policies as well.  
 Political scientists classify protests as pressure politics where the grassroots hope to 
influence and reshape government policies. In China, what role have grassroots protests 
played in decision-making or foreign policy formation? Do they really lead to policy 
change? Weiss (2014) has traced China's management of dozens of nationalist protests and 
their consequences between 1985 and 2012, and he concludes that the diplomatic objectives 
China's leaders were pursuing were often a decisive factor, as protests can be tolerated to 
signal resolve, or blocked to signal reassurance.28 Weiss (2014) cites China’s active anti-
Japan movements in recent decades. In addition to those in 1985, 2005 and 2012, protests 
against Japan also took place in 1990 and 1996. Those, however, were banned. Weiss (2014) 
reveals how concerted popular protests, media distortion, and emotional public opinion 
impeded diplomatic negotiations between the two governments and interrupted economic 
cooperation. Reill (2011) has similarly depicted how the Chinese authorities responded to 
popular demands for political participation with a sophisticated strategy of tolerance, 
responsiveness, persuasion, and repression.29 
 Contentious politics is not new for China. China’s civil war and the Cultural 
Revolution are two momentous examples in the twentieth century, but popular upheaval 
dates back to the third century B.C., and it flourished during the Imperial and Republican, as 
well as the Communist eras. 30  The term contentious politics referes to all kinds of 
“collective political struggle” involving government and parties that are not officially 
institutionalized as political actors. The term can be applied to some industrial conflicts, 
ethnic mobilization, religious conflicts, worker-capitalist struggles, and even in some cases 
extreme nationalism.31 According to the McAdam and Tarrow and Tilly, “by contentious 
politics we mean: episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claim and their 
objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claim, or a party to the 
                                                        
28 Weiss, Jessica Chen. Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations. Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
29 James Reill, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy, 
Columbia University Press, 2011. 
30 Elizabeth J. Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China, 
Routledge, 2002. 
31 McAdam, D.; Tarrow, S.; Tilly, C. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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claim and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the 
claimants”.32 Social movements and collective actions both qualify. 
 Leading China scholar Elizabeth J. Perry (2002) has studied the role of working-
class militias in the Chinese Revolution. Her historical review shows the origins of urban 
militias in the late nineteenth century and how they can serve as a vehicle for analyzing the 
changing yet enduring impact of China's revolutionary heritage on subsequent state-society 
relations.33 Edward Friedman, on the other hand, is a leading expert on rural China.34 He has 
pursued decades of long-term field studies in rural Wudong village, in Hebei province, and 
shown how the village evolved during the civil war (before 1949), during the political 
campaigns between 1949 and 1978, and now during the reform era (post-1978) (Friedman 
1991, 2005). His depiction of the four clear-ups campaign (si qing yun dong), the Cultural 
Revolution, the “Four Goods”, the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, as well as 
the campaign to learn from Dazhai, gives a good general picture of contentious politics in 
rural China. That is, after all, where all the political activity of the vast majority of China’s 
population takes place. The campaigns provide insight into the nature and logic of 
contentious politics in rural China.35 It is a great pity that China’s antagonist movements 
have emerged only in the recent decades, and Friedman will not be able to cover the many 
more recent incidents whose dynamism and logic are diametrically different from the 
“resistance” he portrays. 
 The group incidents and social protests in China in the past few years can certainly 
be included within the framework of contentious politics. O’Brian for instance, has done 
detailed work on popular protest in contemporary China.36 Hurst has studied mass frames 
and worker protest in urban China and shown that due to the differences in regional political 
economy, different mass frames can be found in areas such as Shanghai, Liaoning, and in 
                                                        
32 Ibid, p. 5. 
33  Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern 
Chinese State, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007. 
34 Edward Friedman is one of the few Western scholars to do field studies in China’s rural villages in 
early reform era. The authors spent decades interviewing villagers and rural officials, exploring 
archives, and investigating villagers with diverse resources and cultural, traditions with an aim of 
figuring out how the world of the Chinese peasant evolved during an era of war and revolution and 
how it in turn shaped the revolutionary process. See Edward Friedman, et al. Chinese Village, 
Socialist State, New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991; Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz and 
Mark Selden, Revolution, Resistance and Reform in Village China, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2005. 
35 Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden, Revolution, Resistance and Reform in 
Village China, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005. 
36 O’Brien, Kevin J. (ed). Popular Protest in China. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
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North-central China. Hurst’s mass frames take in three categories: “market hegemony”, 
“Maoist moral economy” and “keep your head down and muddle through”. 37  Another 
insightful article is the outline of environmental campaigns and environmental NGOs by 
Yanfei Sun and Dingxin Zhao. They attest that environmental bodies have become an 
important type of protest group in China.38 O’Brien and Li (2006) offer a study of collective 
action not untypical of participation in democratic societies and large-scale social movement 
and protests in the Chinese countryside which fit into the framework of contentious politics 
developed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). O’Brien and Li also argue that the 
regularity of rightful resistance can lead to a political change and have implications for the 
national regime’s durability.39 
 Another volume that offers an excellent perspective on different levels of Chinese 
society, approaching from a bottom-up view, is edited by Perry and Merle Goldman (2007). 
Perry and Goldman identify different patterns of behavior according for each social group 
that can be distinguished by spatial division (rural and urban), economic activities or 
institutional or organizational considerations. The diversity of cases approached in that 
compendium suggests the complexity of small-scale mobilization within a dynamic context. 
It starts from the grassroots level, but may induce significant changes among the elite in the 
upper-level.40 
 Yongshun Cai’s work (2010), however, focuses on why some collective actions is 
more effective than others and more likely to result in political change. He analyzes popular 
protests in rural and urban areas of China between 1994 and 2007 and describes some which 
succeeded when they gathered enough participants in a forceful protest. He shows that they 
tended to be guided by those with better networks. Cai’s study focuses on small collective 
actions which mostly targeted local businesses anord local government. 41  According to 
Zhao, during the 1990s “…the lives of most Chinese were less determined by central state 
policies and more shaped by the performance of local government and business”.42 Cai’s 
                                                        
37 Hurst, William. Mass Frames and Worker Protest. In.: O’Brien, Kevin J. (ed). 2008. 
38 Yanfei Sun and Dingxin Zhao. Environmental Campaigns. In.: O’Brien, Kevin J. (ed). 2008. 
39 O’Brien, Kevin J., Li, Lianjiang. Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 116. 
40 Perry, Elizabeth J.; Goldman, Merle. (ed.) Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China. 
Harvard University Press, 2007. 
41 Cai, Yongshun. Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010. 
42 Zhao, Dingxin. Review of Collective Resistence in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed and Fail, 
Contemporary Sociology 40, (2), March 2011. 
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main argument is that, “the resister’s chance of success lies in their ability to exploit the 
constraints facing the government or to (re)shape the latter’s cost-benefit calculations in a 
way that suppressing or ignoring an act of resistance is not a feasible or desirable option”.43 
Cai applies the cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate the response from central and local 
governments by interacting with their citizens. He also identifies seeking intervention from 
upper-level official so as to gain information and support as well as media exposure as the 
resister’s primary strategy. Yet is not clear whether a good personal network can make a 
collective action more or less likely to succeed.44 
 This research examined the role of the media, opinion leaders, social activists, 
professionals, NGOs, and public opinion in general in the interaction between governments 
and social movements. It did not touch on military forces, the police, the court and other 
coercive institutions. However, that does not mean that force was absent in all the incidents. 
It certainly plays an important role in most of the protests that come to public attention. And 
as in may protests in Asian societies, forces are often decisive.45 
 
2.4. Hypothesis and Research Questions 
 
 Societal forces have strengthened in China in the recent decades, and they have 
induced increased participation in the decision-making process, whether institutional or non-
institutional. This research was therefore based on the following hypothesis: China’s 
political decision-making may have been affected by society forces arising from public 
opinion and expressed through the media as well as through statements from professionals 
and intellectuals. Further, engaging with the government in a constructive manner may lead 
to institutional, behavioral and policy changes, even in China. This hypothesis suggests the 
following research questions. 
 
1) What constitute societal forces that may potentially reshape the decision-making 
process (What)? 
2) How do those societal forces interact with each other and with the government 
(How)? 
                                                        
43 Cai, Yongshun. 2010, p. 2. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Terence Lee, Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia, 
Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. 
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3) What are the implications of societal involvement for China’s decision-making 
institutions (especially the CCP), government behavior and policy output (What 
would be the next)? 
 
 
2.5. Objectives 
 
 Exploring these questions was adopted as a means of examining the effects and the 
effectiveness46 of societal forces in influencing political decision-making. The aim was to 
establish cause-and-effect relationships between the involvement of societal forces and 
institutional transformation, behavioral change or policy output.  
 Moreover, this dissertation can raise specific objectives that complement and bring 
susceptible answers to this research: 
 1) Presents the theoretical aspect of the societal forces so as to better understand the 
topic in its entirety. 
 2) Analyzes he historical events and their relationship with the current Chinese 
political environment. 
 3) Describes the main successful cases as well as approaches cases with ineffective 
results. 
 4) Compares successful and unsuccessful cases in an effort to elucidate under what 
conditions, in what circumstances, with respect to what issues and with what kinds of forces 
and processes societal forces are most likely to influence government decision-making in the 
desired direction. 
 
2.6. Methodology 
 
 This qualitative research involved a comparative analysis of a few cases in which 
societal forces tried to influence government decision-making process in China between 
2002 and 2012.  
 Why did the writer choose the period between 2002 and 2012? 
 That period was chosen because it saw many transitional conflicts, group incidents, 
                                                        
46 Effectiveness means the degree in which the involvement of societal forces leads to institutional 
changes, behavioral change and policy adaptations. It is measured against the common goals of the 
involvement as well as other unexpected achievements. 
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and social movements, almost none research of which have previously received scholarly 
attention. It was a period of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and the two trends 
brought serious problems. Reforms restructured the economic landscape, leaving not all of 
the people happy. This was especially true for what China terms its “peasants”, for the 
jobless and migrant people as well as for others whose interests were harmed during the 
many waves of reform. 
 At the same time, China’s continuing opening-up changed its relationship with the 
outside world, and that too brought far-reaching domestic consequences during the same 
period. Greater international exchange, diplomatic engagement, increasing international 
pressure, as well as a growing number of students returning from studying overseas brought 
knowledge about international norms, conventions, values, and visions to both the 
leadership and some ordinary citizens. Cell phones, the internet, and new media all 
developed quickly during that decade. Societal involvement in the period was very 
distinctive compared with previous years. 
 Under China’s particular regime, the education, experience and personalities of the 
leaders may lead to very different approaches of governance. The supreme leaders between 
2002 and 2012 were Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. If there is to be any interaction, the attitude, 
behavior, policies, and priorities of the government are important factors determining the 
degree and scope of societal involvement. The governance approaches of each “generation” 
of leaders will, in principle, be different so the ten-year tenure of the Hu-Wen regime was 
chosen as a stable time frame for this research. 
 Why did this research choose six cases among others? 
 This study is based on analysis and comparison of six cases: the Sun Zhigang case 
that forced the abolishment of the Custody and Repatriation system (2003); the Bobai family 
planning protests that stopped a violent government campaign to strictly enforce family 
planning but which failed to lead to further discussion or any revision of the family planning 
policies (2007); the Xiamen PX protest that successfully pressured the Xiamen government 
to relocate the program to coastal Gulei Peninsula (2007); the suspicious death of Qian 
Yunhui, who had been leading protests against local government’s land seizures without 
positive results; the Wukan land protest in 2011 which forced the local (and by implication 
of provincial) government to change its policy on social organizations, village autonomy, 
and land seizures; and the 2011 Dalian PX protest that urged the government to undertake to 
suspend production and relocate the Dalian PX program, which failed to force relocation of 
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a chemical plant. 
 All six of these cases involved tens of thousands of people. They were joined by 
NGOs, intellectuals, and social activists, and had intensive domestic and international media 
exposure. This gives them national significance even today. The six cases involved legal 
injustice (Sun Zhigang and Bobai), environmental concerns (Xiamen and Dalian PX), and 
land disputes (in Wukan and Zhejiang). These same three areas have been the three major 
causes of social conflicts in the past ten years, so these cases can help to portray a general 
picture of China’s societal protests in the recent decades. 
          The six cases are geographically representative. Bobai family plan protest took place 
in China’s rural area of inland Guangxi province, where the economy is somehow less 
developed, and agricultural production as well as livelihood of the elderly highly rely on 
male labor force. Also, popular conflict just reflected the people’s needs for more children 
and the hardness of the state family plan policy. Xiamen and Dalian are both relatively 
developed coastal cities, and the protests displayed urban middle class’s pursuit for health, 
good environment and better quality of life. The way the Xiamen and Dalian societal forces 
(middle class-led) involving the government prove to be special. The Wukan land protest 
and Qian Yunhui case all took place in the less developed rural areas of the developed 
coastal provinces. 
 More importantly, the six cases led to disparate societal involvement, so comparing 
them promoted drawing meaningful conclusions. In three of the six cases (Sun Zhigang, 
Xiamen PX, and Wukan) societal involvement led to a positive result from the protesters’ 
point of view, while in the other three cases societal forces had no positive effect. 
Comparing the successful and failed cases again facilitates concluding under what 
conditions and in what way positive or negative results emerge. This too may shed useful 
light on the reasons behind contentious politics in China. 
 Institutions, government behavior and polices are three important facets of any 
political system, and also three major criteria for evaluating the sysem’s structure and 
processes. By evaluating the institutional, behavioral, and policy changes brought by 
societal engagement, the dissertation was designed to provide a general picture of the degree 
and scope of China’s political development, and also to clarify the implications of societal 
involvement for China’s political future. 
 How are the cases technically studied?  
 China’s political system explicitly requires a lack of transparency in decision-making 
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and strict information control. So, Chinese decision-making remains deliberately 
mysterious, even to the citizens. Scholars are certainly no exception, so a lack of previous 
academic studies should not be surprising. Accordingly, field studies, on-site observation 
and interviews with those involved were an essential part of this study. Because the study is 
based on selected cases of public incidents, the intensive news coverage, official news via 
TV programs, newspapers, internet, and broadcasting are analyzed. Foreign reports, 
commentaries, editorials, and interviews were also consulted. Since it has been years or even 
a decade or more since these events took place, there are academic research reports, 
memoirs, speeches, conference presentations, official statistics, and policy documents 
available. They are important literatures for this study. 
 Because of the interpretive nature of the study, questionnaires, interviews and 
observations were conducted accordingly. Data about each case were collected from 
newspapers through internet, reports by authorities, and previous researches. Material from 
internet wasr one of the important resources especially online polls results. Personal visits to 
the localities studied and interviews with organizations, government officials, and scholars 
were another important resource. Questionnaires were used to collect data for statistical 
analysis. In order protect the respondents, their identities cannot be disclosed. 
 
2.7. Analyzing Framework 
 
 Although the societal forces studied in this research were basically the mass media, 
well-known intellectuals, professionals, social activists, NGOs (in some way, local 
governments) and other shapers of public opinion, the dissertation did not examine 
respectively how each force worked in different situations or in each of the cases. Also, the 
analysis was not centered on the forces, but rather on the cases. The decision-making 
government (central, provincial, municipal or township, though all are deemed part of a 
unitary system) and societal forces were regarded as the two key players. The analysis 
treated the relationship of those two players without probing their inner structure. However, 
the respective roles and functions of each individual societal force were treated in the 
analysis of each case. 
 The dimensions used to analyze the interaction patterns between two players (the 
decision-making body and societal forces in this study) are very important, since they decide 
the effects of the societal engagement. The effects of societal participation vary from area to 
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area. Whether the incident is economic, political, or social in nature determines the result of 
the involvement. The pattern of interactions between the government and societal forces 
may be decentralized, centralized or centralized in a limited manner. Generally, societal 
involvement tends to be more fruitful if it is better coordinated than if it is separated or 
fragmented. Whether the interaction is rational or violent is also important. Though the 
government will have to be more responsive to highly contentious incidents, violence can be 
used to justify government repression, which can have unexpected results. And is the 
incident sensitive? The government may feel it easier to comprise if it is not. The degree of 
sensitivity (high/middle/low) matters to the result of the interaction. Scale matters too. A 
tentative finding is that the government will invest more resources in settling an incident if 
its scale is large (the scale is marked as large/middle/small). Not all societal forces were 
involved in all 6 cases, so the grouping of the participants sometimes also contributed to the 
effectiveness of the interaction.  
 
2.8. Intended Contributions  
 
 Unlike either the usual top-down decision-making in China studies or the bottom-up 
approach that assumes China is close to welcoming another revolution, this study assumed 
that China’s party-state will basically remain stable while societal transformation continues 
to take place. Technically, the research combined unit-level analysis of civil forces with 
strata on the system level to formulate a political-sociological interpretation which takes into 
account both the structure and the process. It focused on the interaction between political 
decision-making and societal forces and tried to establish an analytical model that portrays 
their interactions. Any such interaction allows Chinese society to communicate with, be 
more engaged in and have some influence over the authoritarian decision-making process 
which lacks sufficient legal and institutional channels. The results may be applicable beyond 
China’s particular situation, and may reveal how societal forces can interact with any 
authoritarian government without a fully-fledged civil society and an emerging middle class, 
and still make a difference. The findings may also shed some light on political decision-
making and the broader topics of governance and democratization from a political-
sociological perspective. The research evaluated the depth and limits of China’s political 
development which may have implications for further democratization in the decades to 
come. In practices, this dissertation may serve as guidance for future societal participation, 
 21 
yielding better results. 
 
2.9. Limitations 
 
 Governance is a broad topic. Civil forces in China still remain weak and loosely 
organized. This research derived its generalizations about interaction patterns through 
tracking weak social hints and studying a very limited number of cases. The mass media, 
think tanks, NGOs, enterprises, and interest groups all have different ways of interacting in 
the decision-making process. And each civil force studied is not a unitary actor working in 
isolation. Even the same player may function in different ways in different policy areas or on 
a case-by-case basis, making generalization (and standardization) very difficult. 
 Beyond that,it is usually difficult to tell which civil actor played the most important 
role in any observed result. Societal forces tend to work jointly to apply stronger social 
pressure which can lead to changed institutions, procedures and policy output, but their 
influence is intertwined. Unravelling this remains as a topic for future endeavors. 
 
 3. Concepts and Terminologies 
 
 Institutions, government behavior, and policies are three major facets of a political 
structure and its processes. Though the goal of societal involvement tends to be material in 
preference to institutional or behavioral, achievements in the latter two aspects are often far-
reaching and more telling in their implications for the regime.   
 
3.1. Political Decision-making 
 
 In China, political decision-making is the process by which the CCP selects a policy 
or set of policies over the alternatives. It usually implies an allocation of resources or, put 
simply, “who gets what, when and where” (Easton, 1953).47 It of course implies costas as 
well. In the general case, decisions are made by players who follow conventions or legal or 
negotiated procedures. Different participants, power structures or procedures lead to 
                                                        
47 Easton, David.1953. The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, New 
York: Knopf; see also David A. Welch, The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics 
Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 112-
146. 
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different decisions. Therefore, “who decides” and “how to decide” matter. Since interests 
and attitudes in society vary, interests must often be balanced, compromised or suppressed, 
which involves varying degrees of “pulling and hauling process” (Graham, 1971).48 
 In China multiple stakeholders do try to involve themselves in decision-making. 
Though social pressure not be regarded as “participation”, their role in decision-making has 
become more conventional and regular, and sometimes decision-makers can no longer 
neglect their voice. This research studied decision-making during major public incidents, 
which aroused national media coverage and national public attention, so the decision-
making was often at the national level instead local level. It is often the case that when a 
situation deteriorates to a certain point the national government, believes they it must settle 
matters directly or at least provide the settlement guidelines. The incidents studied here were 
therefore local incidents which grew into a national incidents in a chain reaction involving 
the whole political system. 
 There was no attempt to analyze the decision-making structure and process at each 
level of government. Instead, the whole decision-making system was treated as a unit. Each 
of the incident studied involved more than one level of government, but the policy output 
tended to be consistent and the product of collaboration among the different government 
levels. In most cases, final decisions were made by one level of government, and often one 
government agency, assumed the major responsibility. 
 
3.2. Institutions and Institutional Transformation 
 
 Huntington (1965) describes institutions as "stable, valued, recurring patterns of 
                                                        
48 In his most cited book, Graham has developed three decision-making models respectively: politics 
use is the rational actor model (Allison's "Model I"), which conceives of states as unitary and 
purposive, making consistent, value-maximizing choices within specified constraints (ED, p. 30); the 
organizational process model (or Model II), where he empathizes how governmental behavior is 
constrained by the routines of the organizations, and behavior of large number of individuals need to 
be coordinated through “pulling and hauling” (pp68-69, 79); and the governmental (or bureaucratic) 
politics model (Model III), where a leaders topped the organization is a player who bargain along 
regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government." Players "make 
governmental decisions not by a single rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics" 
(ED, p. 144) (deviations from ideal rationality by political gamesmanship behind them). See Graham 
T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); 
Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 689-718; see also Lawrence Martin, The Presidents 
and the Prime Ministers (Toronto: Doubleday, 1982), pp.196- 197; Graham T. Allison and Morton H. 
Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Tanter and Ullman, 
Theory and Policy in International Relations, p. 43. 
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behavior”.49 Because of the normative nature of the term, it could also be regarded as “a 
system of rules defining a possible form of social organization, such as capitalist versus 
Communist principles of economic exchange”.50 Turner (1997) makes a well-quoted and 
common definition of “institution” as 
 
[a] complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social 
structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to 
fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing 
individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment.51 
 
 Thus, broadly speaking, the term institution covers structures or mechanisms of 
social order governing the behavior of a set of the individuals within a community. 
Institutions can be classified in terms of layers. The core layer is the fundamental structure 
of a political and social regime. Institutions there are often described as repressive, 
authoritarian or democractic. Any institutional change on this level usually requires a 
fundamental change of regime. China’s present ideology does not allow an opposition party 
and mandates that the CCP control any social movement as well as economic development. 
Regime changes are of course fundamentally unthinkabl. 
 The second level of institutions accommodates, for example, an economy’s legal 
institutions. In China, governmental branches and functional working units often issue 
regulations and biding guidelines with only party acquiescence. 
 Level three of institutions is rather technological. It refers to managerial 
arrangements made by bureaucrats but aimed at promoting civil participation, bureaucratic 
professionalism and “scientific” decision-making. For example, China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) involved amending more than 140 laws, and repealing another 
more than 570 laws and regulations.52 Level three laws and regulations deal in detail with 
customs clearance, intellectual property rights protection, environmental protection, labor 
rights, etc. Apparently, these legal changes are part of China’s instructional changes in the 
                                                        
49 Huntington, Samuel P. (1965). "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, 17 
(3): 374, 386–430. 
50 Audi, R. (Ed). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. p. 48. 
51 Turner, Jonathan. 1997. The Institutional Order, New York: Longman, p. 6. 
52 Zeng Jianmin, speech at the Fourth Plenum sessions of the Ninth People’s Congress, March 4, 
2001; see also: China’s Foreign Trade Policy after WTO. Available at: 
http://ias.cass.cn/en/show_project_ls.asp?id=642 ; Accessed on 2015-08-01. 
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reform era.   
 
Table 1 – Examples of Institutional Transformation 
 
 Institutional Transformation 
Definition Any structure or mechanism of social order and cooperation 
governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a community.  
Facets 
(of changes) 
1. Regime: Repressive/authoritative/democratic 
2. Legal (enacting, revision or abolishment of laws, regulations and 
rules/administrative regulations/guidelines)    
3. Launching, reforming or banning organizations  
Examples  The Abolition of Compulsory Custody and Repatriation System 
(adopted); 
Bobai County Portest agianst Family Planning Policies (adopted)  
The Letter Visits System;  
The Public Hearing System; 
Grassroots level institutional innovation in Wenling  
 Note: based on studies developed by Huntington (1965), Turner (1997), and also by 
the observation of the writer. The table was elaborated by the writer. 
 
 China has been constantly reforming its institutions for more than three decades, but 
the basic CCP one-party and communist regime have not changed much along the years. 
This is especially true in the legal system with the myriad regulations adopted since 
economic liberalization. China even revised its constitution in 1982, considered remarkable 
since the CCP plays such an eminent role in the political process. The constitution and its 
supporting legislation hardly matter when the party’s interests are at stake, so any changes 
could be regarded as such legal and administrative changes.  
 
3.3. Behavior Changes 
 
 The important changes in government behavior usually relate to government actions 
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and mannerisms in dealing with other systems or individuals. 53  Recent research has 
demonstrated how government behavior should change normatively. Scholars suggested that 
the Chinese government should adjust its overemphasis on GDP growth and attach more 
importance to social security provision. It should move from pre-approval to real time 
inspection (exemplified by the State Council’s cancelling 87 items approved measures in 
August 2014). And it should move from management-centeredness to service-centeredness, 
from leadership to negotiation, and from a quantity to a quality-orientation.54 
 Government behavior is most clearly indicated by whether it responds to social 
stimuli in a repressive, coercive or persuasive manner. In reality, governmental response 
tends to vary from case to case. It is quite context-specific. In addressing to some crisis, 
officials tend to apply multiple means in its different stages and in dealing with different 
groups. 
 
Table 2 – Examples of Government: Behavior Changes 
 
 Behavior Changes 
Definition Governmental actions and mannerisms in dealing with other 
systems or individuals, as well as the physical environment. It is the 
government’s response to various stimuli or inputs, whether internal 
or external, conscious or subconscious, overt or covert, voluntary or 
involuntary. 
Facets 
(of changes) 
Instrument: Repressive/coercive/persuasive; 
Responsiveness; 
Interaction Pattern: centralized or democratic; elitist or populist; 
Motivation: people-centered or party-centered; 
Transparency: Open/transparent or otherwise;  
Decision-making Mobilization: Institutional/other 
Examples  Xiamen PX Protest (adopted)   
Qian Yunhui case in Zhejiang (adopted)  
 Note: based on studies developed by Minton and Khale (2014), Zhu (2015), and also 
                                                        
53 Elizabeth A. Minton, Lynn R. Khale (2014). Belief Systems, Religion, and Behavioral Economics. 
New York: Business Expert Press. p. 3. 
54  Zhu Qianwei, Behavioral Adjustments of the Chinese Government under New Normals”, 
Guangming Daily, March11, 2015, http://ias.cass.cn/en/show_project_ls.asp?id=642, 2015-08-11. 
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by the observation of the writer. The table was elaborated by the writer. 
 
 Secondly, responsiveness. It means how a government responds to the incident 
constitutes one major criterion to judge a government’s behavior. There are sub-criterions 
that may help us to understand what constitute government behaviors and what do not: 
Firstly, one can see whether there is a response? Since this research addresses major social 
incidents or crisis where the governments are supposed to take their respective 
responsibilities. Unable to do this shows lack of accountability of the government; Secondly, 
the timeliness of governmental response, namely, how fast do the governments respond to 
the incidents? Thirdly, if the manner of the governmental response is performed in a 
centralized or democratic manner? Does it follow an elitist or populist approach? And 
fourth, in a regime where the party-state relationship matters, sometimes the government 
need to take into consideration both guidelines from party leaders and the need to address 
the emergency based on bureaucratic logic which are not always consistent. 
 
3.4. Policy Adjustment 
 
 A policy is typically described as a principle or rule to guide action and achieve a 
desired outcome. The term does not normally denote what is actually done, which is 
normally referred to as a procedure or protocol.55 In this study, a policy is made by a 
responsible government branch in settling a major group incident by addressing societal 
appeals, leading and dominating crisis response, and conducting follow-ups, often under 
domestic and international pressure. It is often a principled guide based on which the 
administrative or executive branches of the state take relevant action.56 
 
Table 3 – Exemples of Societal Involvement in Policy Adjustment 
 
 Policy Adjustment  
Definition A policy is a principle or rule to guide action and achieve a desired 
outcome. The term does not normally denote what is actually done, 
                                                        
55 Anderson, Chris. What’ s the Difference Between Policies and Procedures, Bizmanuals, April 4. 
2005. 
56  Wolf, Robert; Halle, Mark. Process Matters: Sustainable Development and Domestic Trade 
Transparency. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2007. 
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which is normally referred to as procedure or protocol.             
Facets 
(of changes) 
Concrete policy output 
Examples  Multiple diplomatic cases such as the Chinese fighter plane’s 
collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in 2001 
South-North Water Transfer plan during 1958-1968 compared with 
that during 2008-2012 
Wenzhou train wreck 
Wukan land protest and democratic movement (adopted)  
Dalian PX protest (adopted)  
 Note: based on studies developed by Andersen (2005), Wolf and Mark (2007), and 
also by the observation of the writer. The table was elaborated by the writer. 
 
 A policy is different from an emergency response measure adopted at a particular 
time for a particular purpose. A policy attempts a one-fits-all pattern that is often adopted 
repeatedly and consistently, but indiscriminately. A policy often takes the forms of a 
comprehensive statement made in the form of a declaration, report, news release, or 
authoritative announcements (often by a responsible official) about the general goals and 
interests of a government branch. It can also involve very specific operating guidelines for a 
specific incident, such as for rescuing people, relocating people in a disaster, making 
compensation, or disclosing necessary information to the public. A policy is intedend to 
have a result, which can have positive or negative effect on different citizens. 
 
4. Strcuture of Dissertation  
4. Strucsertation4. Structure of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation will be developed into 4 major parts that are logically combined but 
analytically independent, complemented by introduction and conclusion. 
 The introduction provides basic background of the motivation of the research and 
what the writer intends to develop. Based on logically review of existing spectrum on 
China’s decision-making and governance (more broadly, Chinese democratization) and their 
absence of more conclusive position to account for the rise of societal forces and their 
increasingly active engagement with the political process. A basic review and evaluation 
will be made concerning the rise of social forces and the domestic and international drives 
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of their rise. The writer will also introduce the concept of contentious politics and how they 
correlate to the China’s public incidents at the moment. The writer will also make 
clarifications about definitions, research methods, and analyzing framework of this 
dissertation.  
 Part One is made up of five chapters. The writer will respectively review existing 
literatures (Chapter 1), outline China’s evolving discourse, changes and continuities of 
China’s political decision-making so as to indicate why global and domestic political 
development and the CCP’s identity and task changes favored social participation (Chapters 
2 and 3). The author will also review the development of China’s societal forces and their 
initial role in decision-making (Chapter 4). As a background, the author will also introduce 
the definition of group incident and societal forces and the analytical framework of this 
societal role in decision-making (Chapter 5).   
 Part Two comprises two cases that respectively illustrate the institutional 
implicaitons of societal engagement. To be concrete, the writer will based on the intuitional 
implications of societal involvement on the cases of the Compulsory Custody and 
Repatriation System as example of successful case (Chapter 6), and Bobai County’s protest 
against the Family Planning Policy as a failed case (Chapter 7). Discription and analysis of 
the two cases will be followed by comparisons between them so as to see what makes 
societal involvement successful and what makes it unsuccessful.   
Part Three comprises two cases that indicate the implications of societal 
involvement in reshaping government behavior. Xiamen PX protest is illustrated as a 
successful case (Chapter 8), and; the Qian Yunhui’s suspicious death is illustrated as a failed 
case (Chapter 9). The writer will compare the two cases so as to see what form of 
engagement and under what conditions can societal forces change government behavior. 
Part Four is also made up of two cases which show the involvement of societal 
forces in the decision-making. But these two cases show different results. To be concrete, 
the writer respectively chooses Wukan land protest as a successful case which societal 
engagement led to positive policy changes (Chapter 10), and Dalian PX protest which 
government policy actually remains unchanged (Chapter 11). In-depth comparison of the 
two cases indicates that there may be other factors that affect the result of societal 
involvement.   
 Concluding part evaluates the role of social activists, professionals, mass media and 
public opinion, scholars and intellectuals, NGOs and other societal forces in China’s 
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decision-making during public incidents. The writer makes tentative assessment of the 
institutional, behavioral and policy impilcations of societal involvement in decioson-making 
and by close comparison, figured out under what conditions societal involvement may be 
successful and what form of involvement under what conditions may not. 
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Part I –  
Evolving Context, Structure, Process of Chinese Political Decision-making 
& Emerging Societal Forces  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
 Along with the rise and fall of the above-mentioned three approaches, namely the 
congressional, consultative and intraparty approach, to China’s democratization, there is 
another academic spectrum of scholars who believe in other possibility. In “What If China 
Does Not Democratize?: Implicaitons for War and Peace (Asia and he Pacific)”, (2000), 
scholars from the U.S. and China discussed the implications for peace and war under the 
condition of China as a sustained autocracy. 57  Views vary and the book seems to be 
attaching greater importance to the international effect of China’s slow or reluctant 
democratization. However, consistency of the book lies in that it reveals that scholars no 
longer deem democratization as the destiny for China and its China Communist Party’s 
monopoly. This was an important academic turn in China studies, since then, scholars of 
China studies have began to move towards two schools of thoughts The first is called 
“collapse group” which is based on the assumption that China’s economic growth and 
political stability will not be sustained without democratization. This group believes that 
China’s prolonged delay and failure to democratize will finally lead the largest autocracy 
into collapse. The second school of thoughts believes that the CCP regime and the 
authoritarian system will remain stable and resilient. 
  Among those supporters of China’s “collapse”, Gordon Chang (2001), a Chinese 
American, is the most cited scholar, who believes the collapse of China is inevitable due to 
the mismanagement of the CCP. The list of reasons includes: deflation, in efficiency of state-
owned enterprises, banks with bad debts, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decline, and party 
corruption, all leading China on the “road to ruin”. Other reasons include conflict across the 
Taiwan Strait and accession to the world Trade Organization (WTO).58 However, this seems 
not to have happened. Corruption continued to worsen over the past decade, and the number 
of corrupted leaders arrested skyrocketed. The most recent case is the imprisonment of 
Chongqing Party’s head, and China’s once political rising star Bo Xilai, and Zhou 
Yongkang, formerly a standing member of China’s Politburo, China’s nuclear power 
concern. Following both of them are top military leaders, which reveals how serious it is, 
but also displayed the resolution of the present leadership in countering corruption. 
                                                        
57  Edward Friedman & Barrett Mac Cormick (eds). What if China Doesn't Democratize: the 
Implications for War and Peace，New York: M.E Sharpe, 2000. 
58 Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, Random House, 2001. pp.256-282. 
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 When Gordon Chang gradually loses his audience due to  his mistaken prediction, he 
provides further evidence of why China’s collapse is delayed rather than impossible. In an 
article Chang published in 2011, the year he predicted China’s collapse would come, while 
admitting he was wrong in averring that China’s WTO entry will contribute to its collapse, 
against the reality that China experienced an unprecedented rise after the WTO entry, he 
proposed another three reasons in support of his judgment:  1) China’s	 growth	 is	 based	 on	 Deng’s	 reform	 30	 years	 ago	 while	 the	 present	
Chinese	present	leadership	is	reverting	this	process; 2) 	China’s	 growth	 in	 the	 past	 was	 based	 on	 its	 integration	 with	 the	 world	
economy	which	stopped	after	the	2008	financial	meltdown;	 3) China	grew	because	its	population	was	young	while	it	is	now	faced	with	and	
aging	population. 
 
As far as the research is concerned, Chang also regards the 280,000 "mass incidents", and 
the recent wave of uprisings, insurrections, rampages and bombings as the source of China’s 
restlessness, as the Riot in Wukan indicated.59 
 Compared with Chang’s approach that mixes up all political, economic and social 
problems and claims that each of them would lead to unexpected result that would head 
inevitably to collapse, some scholars focus on the economic record and present trend of 
China. They believe that China’s structural economic problems are epochal and China’s 
rapid economic growth “is over”. Their evidence is the  mounting debt and rising internal 
distortions. The urgent task of shifting toward greater domestic consumption will come with 
political costs, but Beijing must increase household income and reduce its reliance on 
investment to avoid a fall.60 
 James R. Gorrie (2013) focuses on the potential risks behind the seemlingly perfect 
figures. For him, China is on the path to a complete economic and social meltdown, which 
will have a devastating impact on the entire global economy. This despite China's average 
10% annual growth in gross domectic product (GDP) over the past decade; its position as 
the dominant consumer of raw commodities and number-one exporter of manufactured 
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goods; and the trillions of dollars worth of foreign reserves, and despite the widespread 
assumption that China is poised to surpass the United States and rise to global supremacy.61 
Timothy Beardson (2013), on the other hand, delineates the daunting challenges to China’s 
continued progress ranging from an aging population to a predominantly low-tech economy 
resulting from a lack of technological innovation, income disparity and insufficient 
governmental responses.62 
 Besides the economic approach, leading scholars also see a crisis with China’s 
political system, the odd nexus between surging economy and slowed political reform, 
economic liberalism and political authoritarianism, the inconsistencies and tensions between 
them all means uncertainty and something unusual. Not like Chang who based his 
disillusion of China’s collapse on a compilation of problems, or those political economists 
or neo-Marxists that see the political consequences of economic causes, Susan Shirk (2007) 
saw the structural source of vulnerability of the CCP regimes: China is a fragile superpower 
who looks increasingly powerful from the outside but on the interior increasingly fragile.63 
The key to its fragility, Susan believes, lies in the non-democracy nature of its regime. The 
fragility also lies in China’s deeply felt insecurity, “China’s leaders face a troubling paradox: 
the more developed and prosperous the country becomes, the more insecure and threatened 
they feel”.64 Susan also realized the economic risks for China, since such an economic crash 
will throw millions of workers out of their jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw 
their savings from the shaky banking system.65 
 Another leading China scholar holds a similar view about the CCP’s future. Pei 
(2006) questioned the three central explanations academia adopts to explain the tricks for 
China's continuous reform and extraordinary development: sustained economic development 
will lead to political liberalization and democratization; gradualist economic transition is a 
strategy superior to the "shock therapy" prescribed for the former Soviet Union; and a neo-
authoritarian developmental state is essential to economic takeoff. Like Shirk, Pei sees the 
CCP’s reluctant political reform and the overconcentration of power has led to pervasive 
corruption and a breakdown in political accountability, he has also detected the risks of local 
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party heads to privatize state authority. Therefore, China will be trapped in partial economic 
and political reforms, instead of evolving toward a full market economy or democracy.66 
 In general, most scholars who cast doubt about China’s continuous rise and the 
sustainability of the CCP regime have their evidence centered on the CCP. Indeed, few 
issues affect the future of China more than the nature and evolution of the CCP and the state 
government it leads. International pressure and interference may lead to the CCP’s policy 
changes, but will not bring structural consequences. At least, no one would expect the CCP 
to compromise its status as ruling power for any reason, as Korea did in the late 1980s, or 
Central Asia, Middle East or North Africa in the new century. The “self-decay” (outmoded 
party doctrine, corruption and slowed reform) of the party, the undermined legitimacy, 
erosion of the party’s organization, malfunction of party orders from top level [“orders do 
not often come from Zhongnanhai” (zheng ling bu chu zhong nan hai)], weakened party 
control over its local branches and the latter’s dysfunction, and declined organizational 
penetration power, remain the core reason for its future of collapse. The CCP has seen its 
own legitimacy crisis, its reluctance in taking political reform (any such reform, e.g. free 
speech and association, or open for multi-party competition will lead to loss of power), and 
its reckless investment in “stability maintenance” (wei wen) indicated somewhat its fear for 
communist disintegration and regime collapse, making it very similar to the Kuomintang 
(KMT) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 However, the prospect of China’s collapse is not yet likely to happen, especially 
when China still grows and reforms are still being carried out. This is an enormous 
difference from the USSR before its collapse. Since political reform of the USSR in the 
1980s almost went into a stalemate for decades until Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power 
in1985. Its economy had been slowed by its military build-up and its society had become 
very rigid with the disappearance of its flexibility. Widespread disappointment about the 
party was accompanied by a sense of hopelessness for individuals. The case is quite 
different for present day China, whose economy continues to grow at a relatively high rate, 
highest among all major powers. The society is rigid, however basically well-ordered: the 
higher education system and public servant recruiting system still functions, the fast 
urbanization and economic development nurtures various chances for the grassroots. 
Political reform still goes on and the top leadership is committed to addressing the existing 
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problems of corruption, environmental degradation, nationalwide injustice, e.g. those people 
that are depressed about skyrocketing housing prices, high deflation rates, the financial 
burden for medical care, social disparity and injustice, they still rely on the government to 
address those issues. In one word, the CCP regime has resilience. 
 China’s economic record is even more exceptional. 15 years after its accession into 
the WTO, China has overtaken the major western powers of Italy, France, Britain, Germany 
(2007), and Japan (2010) to become the world’s second largest economy, only after the 
United States and in 2015, China’s economy reached 60% of the latter, a percentage the 
USSR never achieved during the Cold War. It has overtaken Germany and the U.S. to 
become the world’s largest exporter of merchandise and trading nation. It is the largest 
trading partner for over 130 out of the world’s 230 economies. It has the largest trade 
surplus and foreign currency reserves. Though the Chinese economy has slowed down in the 
past two years and it has been faced with severe structural problems with its financial 
system, a huge industrial capacity surplus, environmental deterioration, and widening 
income disparity, it is fairly hard to foresee a major economic crisis, let alone the “collapse”. 
 Given this, then, would a bottom-up social revolution be possible? Studies have 
revealed that revolutions took place when living standards of bourgeois were improving 
instead of deteriorating, as was the case of French revolution. As Chinese political liberalism 
is growing, the possibility for bottom-up democratization remains widely open. Supporters 
of this possibility are, but not necessarily confined to Arthur Waldron, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, 
Wang Shaoguang, Chen’an, He Qinglian, the Hong Kong’s observer Wu Hongda and the 
political scientist Wu Guoguang. 
 Though, there are widespread dissenters movements all over the country, such a 
revolution will hardly happen. Firstly, such a revolution lacks social support. Though the 
disparity is notorious, and the Gini coefficient is relatively high (around 0.5, on a scale from 
zero to one, which zero means complete equality and one is complete inequality), most 
individuals have their living standards have improved as the economy grows, the grassroots 
are fairly clear that any revolution and social unrest would be disastrous for the country and 
for individuals. As long as the economy still grows, and each individual gains, Chinese 
people would not risk their hard won social stability and improved livelihood for an 
unknown future. 
 Social stability is regarded as a top priority by the Chinese government. Though 
sometimes the concept was misused by some local governments for repressive purposes, it 
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was basically accepted by the general public and therefore has become a kind of social 
consensus. Historical memory of China’s turbulent past remains deep in the minds of the 
Chinese people. They are quite wary of the prospect of a violent revolution, which is too 
destructive while its future remains uncertain. China has experience of pursuing democracy 
in an “unusual” manner; the most recent is undoubtedly Tiananmen Square in 1989, 
suppression of which, for most Chinese, was more a reminder of endemic political chaos 
and prolonged national setbacks than an inspiration for future democratic movements. 
Intellectuals nowadays deem similar sort of mass movements, as ideals doomed to failure 
and sacrifice unworthy. 
 International experiences revealed the same, unfortunately. The collapse of the 
USSR and its decline as a secondary power are regarded as a very negative case of hasty 
democratization leading to disastrous results for a once proud super power. Lessons from 
former USSR members in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and the cases of Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Syria revealed that any hasty transition and revolution would be too 
destructive with an uncertain future. The cases are often referred to by political intellectual 
elites as evidence of a “Western conspiracy” that the Chinese must be vigilant against. Some 
political scholars believe democracy is an effective tool for the west to “contain, Westernize, 
and split China.”67  Other scholars, such as Pan Wei from Beijing University, believe the 
CCP will lose power and China may disintegrate if it adopts democracy now.68 The above-
mentioned cases are often cited to testify how democracy may lead to chaos.69 
 Last but not the least, as China develops, its people are expecting a scenario of 
national rejuvenation as “corroboree” (Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, Émile 
Durkheim, 1912) embedded in the “China Dream” proposed by President Xi Jinping. By 
calling for the whole nation to work for the national rejuvenation, the CCP as a party has 
smartly and closely bonded itself with the future of the state, as well as the nation. For a 
people from a great civilization but who had also suffered from century long humiliation, the 
catchphrase of Chinese dream and national rejuvenation was very appealing to the whole 
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population, especially “at a time when we have never been closer to national rejuvenation”. 
Chinese people may choose to abide by this proposal and allow time for that possibility. 
Therefore, most Chinese people believe they have a stalk in ruling out any possibility of 
turbulence or hasty democratization. Therefore, the regime has shown incredible resilience 
as was proposed by Andrew Nathan in 2003. 
 
              1. Authoritarian Resilience, Party Adaptability, Factional Politics and Intraparty 
Democracy 
 Scholars began to be aware of the fact that the CCP had withstood the tide of 
democratization that wiped out the entire Soviet Union block and against the assertion of the 
triumph of the democratic world and the coming of the “end of history”,70 Chinese economy 
experienced the most rapid growth after strongman Deng Xiaoping finished his 1992 South 
Patrol (nan xun) and decided to fully embrace the market economy on the 14th Party 
Congress. China’s hard line military gesture during the 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 
1996 missile test also displayed the CCP’s firm control of power, as without strong social 
support, the CCP would not have been able to take such high risk actions. Scholars of China 
studies started to probe into the tricks for the CCP’s lasting dynamism. Through intensive 
review of literature on Communist and Leninist parties, especially though comparison 
between the CCP and KMT, Columbia University scholar Bruce Dickson found the 
sustainability of China’s communist regime lies in the “adaptability” of the CCP.71 For him, 
the present CCP is very best regarded as being in the adaptation phase, of the three phase of 
development of Leninist Parties, namely “transition, solidification, adaptation”, a concept 
originally proposed by Samuel Huntington, though he denied the possibility for a similar 
transition as the KMT.72 
 By absorbing private entrepreneurs into the party and the raise of the “three 
representatives”, the CCP hopes to extend and enlarge itself from an alliance of peasants and 
workers to a union that covers a wide range of “advanced” social and economic foundations. 
David Shambaugh (2009) assesses the strengths and weaknesses, durability, adaptability, 
and potential longevity of China's Communist Party (hereafter Communist Party or CCP). 
He argues that although the CCP has been in a protracted state of atrophy, it has undertaken 
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a number of adaptive measures to revitalize and strengthen the party’s rule. Shambaugh's 
investigation draws on a unique set of inner-Party documents and interviews, and he finds 
that the Communist Party is resilient and will continue to retain its grip on power.73 
 
              2. China’s Factional Politics and Decision-making 
   Though most outsiders believed that the Communist Party remained a monolithic, 
united entity, some studies attached importance to the effect of disputes among the Chinese 
leadership upon the Chinese decision-making process. 74  In particular, the intra-party 
disputes that emerged before and after the June 4 students’ movement that brought to the 
surface the different factions among the top leadership. Some even foresaw from the 
struggle among the factions the prospect for major changes in the leadership structure, 
decision-making and democratization. Scholars believe that the disputes and factional 
competition within the CCP will finally result in the split of the party, and finally evolve into 
a multi-party system under the support of an open-minded leader who would take top-down 
reforms to face arising challenges, as the KMT did in the late 1980s and the early 1990s that 
ultimately led to democratization of Taiwan. Factional struggles, for distinctive ideals, 
“routes” and leadership, date back to the early years of the CCP’s creation. However, open 
disputes after the June 4 students’ movement has attracted intensive scholarly interest 
because of the reformist context within China and the tide of democratization 
internationally. 
 Because of Deng Xiaoping’s indisputable dominance among the Eight Elders, 75 
factional struggles from 1989 through 1992 ended up with the success of Deng that allowed 
the country to warmly embrace the market economy, a major decision confirmed by the 14th 
party congress. Deng’s success is  
“not just because his followers outnumbered those of Chen Yun (the relatively 
conservative factional leader), but because, like Mao, Deng was the only one in 
leadership who had control of the mountaintops in both the Party and military 
systems”.76  
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As the Elders gradually faded away in China’s political decision-making process, following 
the ending of the Central Advisory Commission in 1992, factional competition based on 
ideology and “struggle of routes” among the elders gave way to the overwhelming task of 
economic development in the 1990s, which nurtured diversified interest groups and a plural 
society, which in return, has had major implications for the intriguing process of decision-
making.   
 Along with factions within the top leadership, bureaucratic factions also emerged 
following the political reform in the 1980s. However, because of the limited openness of 
China politics and the consequent inaccessibility of information and data, estern scholars of 
China studies saw China’s foreign policy decision-making as a window to open China’s 
decision-making black box. Arthur Doak Barnett (1985), in “The Making of Foreign Policy 
in China: Structure and Process”, systematically examined the roles different institutions 
play and the patterns of interaction among them.77 This is an important pioneering account 
in that his research relied heavily on interviews with Chinese officials and scholars that are 
necessary and effective especially given China’s regime. The findings are also inspiring. The 
study revealed China’s policy making is becoming increasingly systematic and 
professionalized; policies are made taking into account the concerns of various institutions. 
He also depicted the increasing role of the younger generation and the tension between the 
young negation leaders who could carry out bold actions in reform and opening-up and the 
elders who deemed regime security as their top priority and therefore were relatively 
“conservative”. 
 
           3. From Faction Politics to Intraparty Democracy 
 Factional politics in the two decades following the 1989 incident have become full-
fledged and have drawn intensive scholarly attention. For the many, without a paramount 
leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the 80 million members would have varying 
perspectives on social, economic, political, military and foreign affairs based on their very 
diverse backgrounds, education, occupations, and more importantly interests. For some, the 
collective leadership of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee is evidence 
of factionalism.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 375. 
77  Arthur Doak Barnett. 1985. The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process, 
Westview Press. 
 40 
 Reorganization of China’s political biology finally resulted in the competition and 
tensions between two different camps. One of the camps (or factions), according to Li 
Cheng, is the elitist princelings who come from families of veteran revolutionaries or of 
high-ranking officials who began their careers in the economically well-developed coastal 
cities; and the other is the populist Youth League who come from less-privileged families 
and developed their careers based on accumulated leadership experience in less-developed 
western or inland provinces.78 The elitist faction favors the interest of entrepreneurs while 
the populist coalition usually represents the interest of the farmers, migrant workers and the 
urban poor. After the revolutionary elders faded away, no leader from either camp has 
indisputable authority over both. Both camps even have their domestic disputes. Generally 
speaking, the above-mentioned two factions do exist; though the party has always promoted 
a unified voice, and the boundary tends to be unclear and ambiguous. The two camps have 
no difference in safeguarding ideological and territorial independence of China and 
maintenance of the party-state regime. However, they have distinct interests, priorities and 
plans for China’s reform and opening-up, as well as foreign policy. This bifurcation has 
created within China's one-party polity something approximating a mechanism of checks 
and balances in the decision-making process and to some extent undermines the autocratic 
rule of the CCP. 
 Regularization of competition between the two factions for power, influence, and 
control over policy initiatives and their compromise, coordination and cooperation 
differentiate the present decision-making approach from the strongman era before the early 
1990s and the “patronage approach” 79  throughout the two decades that followed. 
International scholars in recent years are particularly interested in the intra-party democracy 
prospect. Most recently, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee 
of the CCP, in September 2009, called for promoting democracy within the Party.80 The CCP 
even regard intra-party democracy as “the lifeblood” (dang de sheng ming).81 
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 The intra-party approach is rather pragmatic in that it does not seek multi-party 
competition nor does it seek the routine democratic procedures of voting, and a general 
election, it even does not even desire for the immediate release of free press and association 
and other liberal rights. Instead, it does not hurt the ideological and regime security of 
China.82 The intra-party democracy not only reflects the need for institutionalizing the new 
rules and norms of elite politics in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but might also 
provide for an incremental and manageable experiment of Chinese-style democracy.83 In 
times of an ever-growing party role and the absence of an opposition party, a multi-party 
system can hardly be acceptable. Intra-party competition and “puling and hauling” based on 
distinct interest groups may still render some positive results for the party and the country’s 
possible transition. Chinese elites and the grassroots may accept this approach since they 
may feel at ease with transitions incremental over time and manageable in scale. 
 
              4. Limitation of Previous Studies  
 Generally speaking, Western scholars and Chinese scholars have different 
approaches in their research concerning the CCP. Though most insightful and inspiring, the 
limitations are apparent.  
 Firstly, in comparison with academic endeavors on societal involvement, on-track or 
off-track, existing researches has focused exclusively on the elites level as attested to in the 
introduction. Those articles on China’s civil society tend to draw from Western experience 
that focuses on the tension between economic and intellectual elites and the political elites 
which is true in China. Other studies who do keep a keen eye on civil societies tend to be 
conducted in a separate and fragmented manner, or generally fall into the revolution 
approach.84 Therefore, they basically failed to take into account how the societal forces 
interact with the regime, and therefore neglected another major possibility conducive for 
Chinese political decision-making. Generally speaking, former civil society studies tend to 
rely on studies of non-governmental organizaitons (NGOs) whose activities have been under 
overall scrutiny and strictly limited. Admittedly, they do play a key role in the many cases of 
state-society interaction, and in most of the cases their participation is vital (if we take a 
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broader means), as they function in a way very different from those in democracies, making 
it very difficult to examine Chinese societal forces/civil society.85 
 Secondly, while late cases have been studied, these are conducted in an isolated 
manner, and the particularities of one single case does not reveal the whole picture and can 
seldom tell the whole picture of China’s social movement, participation and contention.86 A 
cluster of cases allows the author to find something consistent and regular. For example, 
what societal forces are there? How do they interact with the government and among 
themselves? What implications and limitations their involvement has institutionally, 
behaviorally or even conceptually? The writer intends to adopt a holistic view with the aim 
of answering these intriguing questions. 
 Thirdly, Chinese social stratification has experienced drastic changes over the past 
ten years, which has had greater implications for decision-making than ever.87 Generally, 
stratification is the result of the power structure of a society and further illustrates the 
structure class it determines the pattern of decision-making, participation and inter-reactions 
between decision-making and social participation. 
 Sociologists have studied the new stratification in depth.88 However, scholars of 
political science and decision-making have not responded sufficiently and rarely have there 
been recent evaluations. 89  This study tries to evaluate how societal forces involve the 
government whereas the regime basically remains authoritarian and less responsive, with 
very limited channels of participation. While the CCP as the largest vested interest group, it 
is reluctant to push forward any reform that threatens its one-party regime, on the other 
hand, it is fully aware of the risks of expected scenarios and contingencies if it does not 
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screen out social dissents. 
 
            5. Party State-Societal Interaction: the New Possibility 
 Following a consistent logic of scholarly academic interest, one can find that 
scholars of Chinese politics tend to rely exclusively on the elitist top-down approach. For 
instance, they first saw possibility of democratization from factional groups within the CCP 
both during the Cultural Revolution and after Tiananmen Square.  Since the late 1990s,90 the 
growing autonomy of provincial governments was keenly studied, 91  with most people 
regarding economic growth and the emerging middle class as the greatest potential.92 In the 
past ten years after 2000, academic attempts were made for reform with parliamentary 
democracy (National People’s Congress) and negotiating democracy centered on the 
reinforcement of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference, inter-party 
democracy, etc.93 Seldom have scholars regarded the grassroots-led bottle up approach as 
possible.94 
 It is understandable that scholars would believe that Chinese political regimes have 
basically remained unchanged over the past three decades, if their analyses were exclusively 
made on political, economic, and even intellectual elites. Conventional evidence supporting 
this perspective normally concentrates on the one-party monopoly of the CCP, political 
authoritarianism, the state government’s dominance in people’s economic and social life, 
etc. A most recent heated discussion in  China Studies academia is focused on the buzzword 
of  “Beijing Consensus”, a term proposed by Joshua Cooper Ramo as compared to the 
“Washington Consensus”.95 According to him and the most common generalization is that 
the China model could be best characterized by “market economy and one party regime 
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(China Communist Party)”. It shows the widespread disappointment and lost confidence of 
the Western society in the democratization of China as well as that in their own long 
believed democratic political models. 
 However, a few prominent scholars began to take into consideration the influence of 
various social factors, namely public opinions, media, think tanks and the business sector. 
David Lampton (2001), for example, examined how China’s foreign and security policies 
have been shaped by an altered domestic agenda, dynamics of bureaucratic politics, 
changing structures and roles of institutions and localities, changing views of the elites, 
increasingly diverse social forces and public opinions, and the growing influences of 
globalization and multilateral regimes during the era of reform.96 
 
            6. Economic Priority of the CCP and Growth of Societal Space 
 However, if we move from the structure of the party-state system to the economical 
and social sector, people’s confidence may grow. As was always the case in most of the 
revolutions, fundamental changes often appear first in the social sector in an imperceptible 
way, but is nurtured, accumulates and develops until a full-fledged event that eventually 
transforms the human community comprehensively and fundamentally.97 One major such 
social development different from Mao’s times is the emergence and growth of societal 
forces (NGOs for example) and their increasingly active involvement in the policy-making 
process, both in domestic and foreign affairs. This is, on the one hand, because the CCP is 
engaged in the overwhelming task of economic development and therefore has loosened its 
control over the society. Compared with the economic and political sectors, the CCP and 
governmental role in the social sector is relatively weak. This is better displayed by 
government inefficiency in the welfare system that lagged behind economic expansion. 
Another explanation is that economic growth strengthened the legitimacy of the CCP’s 
regime and therefore the CCP and the state government no longer needed to exert strong 
control over the society.98 Whatever the reason, governmental weakness nurtured civil forces 
                                                        
96 David M. Lampton (ed.) 2001. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform:1978-2002. Stanford Press. 
97 See especially: Nelson, Joan M.; Tilly, Charles; Walker, Lee (eds). Transforming post-Communist 
political economies. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999; Edwards, Michael; Sen, 
Gita. NGOS, Social Change and the Transformation of Human Relationships: A 21st-Century Civic 
Agenda. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, NGO Futures: Beyond Aid (Aug., 2000), pp. 605-
616. 
98  Pei Minxin, China’s trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005. 
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and allowed opportunities for their fast growth, while conceptual changes with the CCP 
leadership and institutional changes with the political regimes provided access to 
participation of civil forces in the policy-making process.  
 On the other hand, various factors have jointly stimulated the increasing demand for 
political participation among the grassroots, and the Chinese decision-making bodies are 
faced with increasingly powerful domestic pressure. In the nexus between economic 
elements and political change, economic foundation constitutes the root for political change 
(upper architecture). This is especially true in an ostensibly socialist country.99 In terms of 
industrial output, there was a huge decline in the share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
from 78% in 1978 to 41% in 2002 and further to 27% in 2012 while private sector (foreign 
investment included) rose from 0.4% in 1978 to 41% in 2002 and further to 73% in 2012.100 
According to the Third National Economic Census carried out in 2014, China has 5,604 
million private enterprises, accounting for 70% of the 8,006 million businesses.101 This trend 
can also be proved by the employment data. By the end of 2013, 143. 85 million of Chinese 
were working with private companies or self-employed, accounting for roughly 40% of 
urban employment and 90% of job creation.102 According to Chinese data, the new non-
public sector accounted for 80% urban employment, 60% of China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and contributed 50% of China’s taxes.103 In urban cities like Beijing, non-
public organizations accounted for up to 80% of the city’s social organizations and 85% of 
employment by September 2014.104 
 In the wave of surging new interests, businesses, and classes, five changes deserve 
academic attention:  1) corporate	pluralization	nourished	by	 a	market	 economy	and	 the	 consequent	
changes	with	the	social	stratification;	 2) the	emerging	of	professional	groups	and	the	middle	class;	 3) the	growing	democratic	consciousness	among	the	masses; 
                                                        
99 Nelson, Joan M.; Tilly, Charles; Walker, Lee (eds), 1999. 
100 China Statistics Year Book (Zhong guo tong ji chu ban she), 2000, 2003, 2013. 
101 China Bureau of Statistics: the Report on 3rd National Economic Census, 2014. 
102 China Industrial and Business Newspaper, (zhong guo gong shang bao): Number of International 
Organizations reached 60 million and Total Capital reached a hundred billion, February 27, 2014. 
103 Huang Mengfu. Available at: 
 http://www.acfic.org.cn/Web/c_00000001000100030011/d_0840.htm，2015-03-25. 
104 Niu Youcheng, Speech made at Beijing Federation of Industry & Commerce, the 13th Congress of 
Beijing Federation of Industry & Commerce. Available at: 
http://test.bjgsl.org.cn/index.php?m=special&c=index&a=show&id=11，2015-03-05. 
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4) 	the	 explosive	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 people’s	 groups	 and	 societies	
(gongmin	shehui	tuanti);	and	 5) the	development	of	democracy	at	lower	level	governments	as	discussed	in	the	
Chapter	of	the	Emerging	Societal	Forces	and	Political	Decision-making. 
 
            7. Domestic-International Interaction and Societal Participation 
 
 Owing to China’s particular political system, international pressure has always been 
an important source for domestic reform. In an increasingly globalized world, there is a 
general tendency towards internationalization of a country’s domestic affairs. Namely, 
domestic affairs always bring “international” consequences and how a state government 
deals with its domestic affairs is now under intensive scrutiny by foreign governments and 
civil societies. Whenever there is a major case of environmental degradation, local 
corruption, violation of people’s liberal right (or more commonly, interest, either collective 
or individual), international media coverage, official statement from an government, report 
from an professional NGO combined will create a powerful international community that 
the Chinese government cannot just simply ignore.105 
 International pressure can also exert direct influence over domestic politics 
(Katzenstein, 1978; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Garret and Lange, 1991). Not surprisingly, 
the air pollution in Mongolia and China has sometimes affected Korea and Japan and the 
latter is concerned about China’s domestic environmental policies. Because of the mutual 
economic dependence, for instance, the China-U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue has 
discussed each time the two countries’ respective financial and fiscal policies, besides global 
issues of illicit nuclear and radioactive materials trafficking, transnational crime, non-
proliferation and other issues. China is often urged to lever the playing field for its domestic 
market, spend more on social welfare and improve human rights, which are typically 
domestic issues.106 
                                                        
105 See especially the statement of Robert Zoellick (2005) who called China as a “responsible great 
power”. 
106 The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is a high tank (often led by US state 
secretary and Chinese vice premier) cooperation framework where the two sides held in-depth 
discussions on major bilateral, regional, and global issues. The 7th dialogue was held on June 22-24, 
2015, in Washington, D.C., Secretary of State John Kerry, special representative of President Barack 
Obama, and State Councilor Yang Jiechi, special representative of President Xi Jinping, chaired the 
Strategic Track, which included participation from senior officials from across the two governments. 
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 While economic globalization may lead to the unification of domestic social forces 
and changes in one nation’s policy or even political institutions (Garrett and Lange, 1991), 
globalization of values, norms and international regimes greatly affects the behavior patterns 
of national leaders and the policies of nation states, since many of the values, norms and 
regimes gradually get internalized (Krasner, 1983). Though the CCP has been emphasizing 
its uniqueness and particularities, it is true that the CCP has realized that China does benefit 
from globalization and that many of the norms, such as democracy, welfare, and government 
accountability are universal values. While China has a different understanding of the 
Western concept of human rights, China deems the collective right for development as one 
of the most important human rights for developing countries, China finds the “Western” 
values are compatible to its own concept of “people centeredness” and is connected to the 
Chinese philosopher Mencius’ thought that “the people is most valuable, the state is less, the 
emperor least”. As China is increasingly integrated into the world system, more 
international norms will be internalized through the process of socialization. This is 
significant since without conceptual improvement any further institutional breakthrough 
would be either impossible or ungrounded. 
 Amongst all the complexity and ostensible rigidness of Chinese politics, regular 
interactions between domestic and foreign affairs are discerned. Distinguished Chinese 
scholar Zhang Baijia (2002), after examining the history of twentieth century China and the 
world, found that the three major shifts of world structure typically coincide with that of 
China, he further arrives at the conclusion that self-change is China’s major source of 
national power and that China influences the world mainly by changing itself.107 Until after 
the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars began to pay attention to the international 
implication of domestic factors, with their research covering various fields and in diversified 
approaches.108 This is partly because with the expansion of its economic, political capacity, 
China is exerting a growing impact on the world politics. This is partially because the third-
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generation Chinese political leaders are becoming more confident, more open, willing to 
allow more active involvement of societal forces in the decision-making process, which may 
nurture fundamental structural transformation in the Chinese decision-making regime. 
 
              8. Technological Innovation and Its Impact on Societal Participation 
  Technological progress also contributes to the emergence of societal forces in that it 
provided the latter with an effective means for their involvement in the decision-making 
process. For instance, the development of the Internet and other modern communication 
network, social media, and information-transmitting methods provides the general public 
with valuable access to various sources of information and essential channels to get their 
forces united and well-organized (Chase and Mulvenon, 2004). Compared with traditional 
paper-base newspapers and magazine, television, the Internet, Smartphones, and cameras 
have played an increasing role in people’s lives. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, the 
Chinese version of the Facebook Renren, as well as WeChat, has proved to be vital in some 
of the cases.109 
 Technological innovation and the spread of modern transmission methods have 
contributed a lot to the participation of these societal forces in that they helps to go beyond 
governmental censorship and control over social reorganization, as it has been indicated in 
many cases in this study. In one of the major cases, the blind lawyer Cheng Guangcheng, 
and his supporters known as the four-member group (composed of He Peirong, Guo Yushan, 
Hu Jia and Miss. Zeng Jinyan, who are all social activists) planned and coordinated with 
Chen via telecommunication and internet which successfully circumvented government 
censorship and rescued him out of his remote village surrounded by scores of “guards” sent 
by local governments. When Chen successfully obtained refuge in the U.S. Embassy in 
Beijing, this resulted in severe U.S.-China political disputes. The plan succeeded once Miss. 
Zeng had sent Chen’s real intension of leaving China for U.S. to the press outside of China 
through Twitter which proved to be very important for the latter settlement of the issue. 
Miss. Z was able to do so at that time as Twitter and Facebook were still accessible via 
mobile and Internet or proxy service. Chen’s story revealed how technical developments 
helped social involvement. 
 The most recent case that tells the importance of technological developments in 
                                                        
109  Cai (2010) has also exemplified the role of new media and internet in popular protest in China. 
Cai, Yongshun. Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010. 
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social involvement is the Tianjin explosion of the chemical stock that claimed the lives of 
114 people (by August 20, 2015) in the Tianjin Binghai district in August 12, 2015. The 
Chinese public does not trust much traditional media, which is under governemnt 
information control (they receive guidelines from the party propaganda department and 
release number of casualties provided by government); the Chinese public seldom believes 
the information released. In this case, the number of casualties, reporting leaders’ guidance 
and on-site presence, overwhelming coverage on praising heroic deeds of firefighters, 
condolences to the dead and their relatives without anyone claiming responsibility. The once 
efficient and relatively safe internet is currently under severe censorship. The government 
has developed a powerful firewall called “Green Dam”110 which controls information flow 
from outside by the nine interfaces. Therefore, domestically people rely on the mobile-based 
WeChat to communicate with other users, calling for help and sending news and pictures 
from the site of explosion. Via this platform, for instance, timely and original news, instead 
of government-processed news was released in terms of the harm of chemicals, the severity 
of the explosion and air pollution, assuring the audience’s access to the truth. 
 The development of modern media also has a role in promoting international 
exposure, transparency and publicity as the case of the Wukan village incident. International 
pressure for democratization and inspections from multiple NGOs and states, making 
repressive means of settling unrest or social movement no longer applicable, as in the latest 
case of Tunisia, Egypt, and the various color revolutions in Central Asia and North Africa. 
 
            9.  Societal Participation 
 Societal participation in decision-making is not something new. In the pre-reform era 
(1949-1978), there was already social participation by non-party members and “democrats” 
(min zhu ren shi). One good example is the Hundred Flowers Campaign (da ming da fang) 
in 1957, when non-party intellectuals were encouraged to criticize the party boldly in order 
to improve the democracy and efficiency of the party. 111  Another wave of social 
participation by the grassroots was the Cultural Revolution whose anecdotes were already 
well known to all. Both social participations turned out to be disastrous. The former led to 
                                                        
110 The Guardian. China's Green Dam internet filtering system will go ahead, official says. July 2, 
2009. Available at: 
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the Anti-Rightist movement when up to 550,000 intellectuals were arrested and repressed 
and marked the beginning of roughly two decades of persecution of intellectuals, the peak 
time of which was exactly “the Great Cultural Revolution” where participation was made by 
the “Red Guards” who created the most notorious and absurd chapter in history of 
Communist movement, if not for modern history. In this sense, regular, ordered and legal 
participation in modern meaning took place after the Reform and Opening-up period.  
 After the Reform and Opening-up period (starting form 1978), especially during the 
1980s, China experienced a period of unprecedented social freedom and active political 
participation of the masses which contributed to a handsome increase in the studies of the 
interplay between domestic and foreign affairs as well as to the honeymoon of the Sino-U.S. 
relations. Intellectuals in academia have been active and involved in the various issues in 
economic and political reform as this research has shown. Because economic Reform and 
Opening-up is a new cause with so many things unknown for the reformers themselves, 
there is no model to learn from, neither had any Marxist canons taught them what to do. 
Therefore, political leaders in the 1980s had been open for intellectual discussion for they 
were keen to learn practical suggestions about pricing reform, land policy, and investment 
incentives. The most influential case is the Mo Gan Shan (莫干山) Meeting held in 
September, 1984, attended by 124 young economist scholars selected from authors of more 
than 1,300 articles, secretaries of national economic leaders, workers from major academic 
and governmental branches, Zhejiang provincial government, and media. The result of the 
discussions were reported to top leadership and contributed to the two-track pricing reform 
in the 1980s.112 Motivated by the second global wave of democratization, colleague students 
waged another tide of participation and this led to major incident at Tiananmen Square in 
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 51 
1989 that called into a halt to student participation. China was met with a setback of political 
development and intellectuals experienced general depression in the early 1990s. The 
success of Mo Gan Shan conference and the failure of the 1989 movement also revealed 
how the effects of societal involvement vary from economic and political sectors. 
 Entering into the new century, Chinese society has witnessed an ever-growing role of 
societal forces in the political and social decision-making process. A few examples are 
merely the tip of the iceberg:  
        The Custody and Repatriation system, which was adopted in early 1980s, was finally 
abolished when Chinese media revealed the death of a college student in Guangzhou and 
incited a heated discussion over the country;  
         The complicated interplay between provincial government and ministry-level 
government based on consideration of interest and responsibility in the Shaanxi Huanan 
Tiger incident, when a Chinese farmer, in support of the local government, claimed that he 
had managed to take photos of the disappeared Huanan Tiger and therefore proved its 
existence;  
          The PX (paraxylene) chemical plant incident in Xiamen, Fujian province, where local 
residents forced the government to move a major chemical project (which was ranked in the 
“Eleventh National Five-year Plan”) to a small town in Zhangzhou through the silent 
protests of “walk”. 
             Public opinion affected China’s foreign relations as well and a best example is the 
way the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiated with the U.S. after the U.S. EP-3 
surveillance plane collided with a Chinese J-8 fighter and this developed into a major 
diplomatic crisis. 
 The particularity in China’s societal participation, generally speaking, is related to 
the authoritarian nature of its regime, most social participation before the Reform and 
Opening-up was non-institutional. Even today, “participation” was made in the form of 
“antagonist politics” and after a decade and a half of intensive interaction, a relatively fixed 
interaction pattern between societal forces and the decision-making organs is gradually 
taking shape and becoming predictable. This made researches on the relatively loose social 
forces technically available. More importantly, the involvement of societal forces in political 
decision-making stands as a major step towards better governance and further bears some 
significance for the intriguing issue of Chinese democratization, since it represents a 
different possibility from the normally top down approach which most scholars favor. 
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Therefore it is of academic and practical importance. 
 The most recent societal involvement raises a number of crucial questions regarding 
the CCP and China’s political development. For instance, could new dynamics of societal 
participation change the elitist nature of Chinese politics and eventually trigger a more 
fundamental transformation of the Chinese political system? Or could the societal 
involvement in China escalate to a fundamental demand for democracy in terms of a 
contentious politics? 
 This research is an interpretive study from a sociological perspective, which was to 
examine how active involvement of societal factors (public opinion, mass media, think 
tanks, NGOs, enterprises, interest groups, etc.) leads to a change in agenda, different 
behavior patterns and alters domestic policy in the political decision-making process.  This 
study tries to establish a systemic model of interactions between social factors and political 
decision-making in foreign and domestic affairs, which the former is considered as the 
independent variable and the latter as the dependent variable, and also the international 
pressure is regarded as the exterior environment. Apart from the analytical level of societal 
forces as units, the writer will also try to take into consideration the structure/pattern as well 
as their latest evolution and development of these factors. The study will also examine the 
general social structure and the possible implications of it for the Chinese decision-making 
agenda. 
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Chapter 2: The Evolving Context for China’s Political Decision-making 
 
 Here the writer would like to historically contextualize China’s political decision-
making from different levels’ of perspective so as to better understand the cases in the main 
idea of this dissertation that is to examine how the institutional, behavioral and policy 
implications of societal involvement in decision-making gained momentum since the past 
few decades. This chapter briefly introduces how international community, such as 
governments, politicians and activists, has influenced and persuaded Chinese government in 
its decision-making, and also how the CCP has answered and adapted along the past years. 
Equally important to approach here is to show how the CCP’s identity has evolved since the 
Party’s inception. This certainly has not happened without certain critical situation within 
the CCP as it will be briefly addressed in the last session of this chapter. This content here is 
important as a background for the following chapters as well as for accommodating a longer 
spectrum of the transformation of the Party over time. 
 Since the reform era began in the late 1970s, a new and ever-changing mix of forces 
has been reshaping China’s domestic and foreign policy-making institutions and processes. 
Some of the forces that helps shaping the process can be classified as bureaucratic politics 
and evolving organizations, changing elite attitudes, changed domestic agenda, diverse 
social groups and public opinion, which generally fall into the category of “societal forces” 
of this research. All of these societal forces certainly influence decision-makers and beyond 
China’s domestic process the external environment serves as the greater backdrop of the 
narratives. Leaders at all levels in China have to make decision considering regional 
architecture, arising human trends and ubiquitous global challenges. 
 As an illustration, China’s reputation has been greatly marred and tarnished due to 
air pollution throughout the country, but especially in Beijing area, which pollution has 
already has been affecting Korea and Japan. Thus, China has been placed in an unfavorable 
situation in the global climate negotiation, since the industrialized countries have pressured 
her to take more responsibilities in reducing carbon emission. As a result, Central 
government has assured  Korean and Japanese government that pollution will be relieved 
through collaboration and mutual support with neighboring provinces such as Shanxi (which 
is one of the main responsible for coal mining pollution) and Hebei (which is the primary 
source of industrial pollution). Yet, at the same time, Beijing municipal government has to 
honor orders from central government to increase the growth rate of GDP as well as 
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consider  harsh criticism from her dwellers. Thus  more flexible negotiation strategy has 
been adopted because of a significant worsening of the pollution that has affected the global 
climate change and, as a consequence, instigated the international and domestic public 
opinion. 
 In this sense,  Beijing municipal government needed to consider socially and 
environmentally responsible policies that guarantee restructuring process of urban and 
industrial development of the city. The government has also encouraged farmers to quit the 
massive agricultural production that compromise the environment balance. Farmers in inner 
Mongolia, for instance, have been asked by local government to turn their farmland into 
forestry so as to stop the deteriorating eco-system. Internationally, China has agreed with 
Japan and Korea to create a Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meetings since 1999 as a joint 
effort for environmental protection. China has also sought cooperation in global climate 
negotiation with India and Brazil, among other developing countries, to meet the pressure 
from  U.S. and  E.U. 
 China, but especially Beijing, has faced a dilemma by choosing between competing 
and conflicting interests. But under strong societal and international scrutiny in an 
increasingly globalized world, Beijing may not have better choices. Based on these 
examples, this chapter describes how in the changing international context and CCP’s 
identity, source of legitimacy and tasks have affected China’s political decision-making. 
Further analysis will be made on why the CCP needs to encourage societal participation in 
its decision-making.  
 
1. Growing International Scrutiny 
 
 International pressure has been one of the reasons for China’s political domestic 
changes as many historical cases can reveal. Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (1996) 
analyzed the interaction between domestic implications of “internationalization”. According 
to them, the domestic effect is a result of the preference change of the political systems 
when they realize the benefit of internationalization, which in turn, remolds domestic 
policies.113  The generalization was precise, since it was only after the early 1990s that 
China restarts to be involved in world affairs. China’s Tiananmen incident marked a starting 
                                                        
113  Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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point of intensive international criticism and scrutiny of its human rights issues, among 
others criticisms such as ballistic missiles as well as weapons proliferation policies.114 The 
following events such as the Yinhe incident in 1993,115 the Most Favorable Nations (the 
MFN) disputes, Taiwan crisis in 1995 and missile test in 1996, and U.S. bombing of Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 as well as China-U.S. fighter-surveillance plane clash in 2001, 
all revealed China’s shock in immediate exposure to the international society whose 
mainstream systems, values and discourse were so different. Some of the events such as the 
MFN disputes, increased concerns in the international community, especially in U.S., 
regarding China’s human rights as it was discussed in several newspapers at that moment 
(Boundreau, 1993). Despite having international impact China did not expect such 
repercussion. Most of the above-mentioned events, such as the Tiananmen Square, the 
Taiwan issue, the Embassy bombing, and air clash, just to name  few, were cases involving 
U.S. challenging China’s domestic political and value system as well as challenging the 
integrity of its sovereignty. The Yinhe case reflected the seeming distrust between the two 
countries. Wang Jisi, a leading Chinese scholar and diplomatic advisor, pointed out in a very 
recently article that the major source of distrust between the two Titans is that the U.S. fears 
China to challenge the international order dominated by U.S., while China fears U.S. is 
challenging China’s domestic order.116 This is fairly insightful for the case of Sino-U.S. 
relationship during the late 1990s. 
 Internationalization of domestic affairs of a country means that the formerly regarded 
as purely domestic affairs now have been kept under intensive international scrutiny. The 
U.S. in the 1990s, under the Clinton Administration, adopted  Chinese policy of 
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“Containment and Engagement”. 117  If the containment was a cliché with ideological 
essence, the policy “engagement” proves to be vital for China’s success since it 
internationally reshaped the Chinese foreign affairs and internally the Chinese domestic 
political landscape. China intended to engage with and integrated itself into the world 
system in order to benefit from it, and if chances permit, reform the world system according 
to her leadership. One of the major steps China has taken was to join the WTO with major 
compromises.118 This decision was made by reformist Premier Zhu Rongji, who pushed 
China into the wave of globalization that transformed the country to what it is today. 
Looking back, even the most bold minds will not imagine couldn't’ have imagined how 
much China has changed over the past years. The CCP itself, without doubt, is one of the 
major driving forces for those changes, and part of the changes. 
 International scrutiny is overall comprehensive, and international pressure is 
continuous. The U.S. government since the late 1990s, has been urging the Chinese 
government to release the dissenters by claiming through the Chinese agreement to the two 
UN international covenants on human rights or by accessing the Red Cross and other 
international monitors into the Chinese prisons as well as by accounting for Chinese 
prisoners.119 Societal forces that defy government often risk their basic human rights. Social 
activists, for example, are often detained, arrested or unfairly treated or even physically 
oppressed. Journalists, another key player in almost all group incidents, are not treated any 
better. In some cases of covered by this dissertation some important journalists and 
commentators were fired by their institutions due to pressure from ‘unknown’ sources 
because of their political involvement in an incident. Some newspapers and journals were 
even forced to stop operation under “required reform” (zheng dun) label or suspended 
permanently. Therefore, international scrutiny is centered on human rights issues. Since 
2000, the U.S. government has annually released reports on China’s human rights, called 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and also known as the Human Rights Reports. 
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Imaginably, all Reports basically express criticism of China’s human rights records. The 
Report of the year of 2000 stated that, “China is an authoritarian country, citizens lack both 
the freedom peacefully to express opposition to the Party-led political system and the right 
to change their national leaders or form of government”,120 and in its review’s part, it was 
concluded that: 
 
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government tightened 
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press, and increased controls on the 
Internet; self-censorship by journalists also increased. The Government severely 
restricted freedom of assembly, and continued to restrict freedom of association. The 
Government continued to restrict freedom of religion, and intensified controls on 
some unregistered churches. The Government continued to restrict freedom of 
movement. The Government does not permit independent domestic 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to monitor publicly human rights conditions 
[……] Particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in some minority areas, 
especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other 
fundamental freedoms intensified.121 
 
 In recent years, the annual Reports on Human Rights of China began to cover the 
country’s progress in human rights protection. The Reports then brought great pressure on 
the Chinese government, especially to those divisions concerning ideological work (a 
conventional work of the party propaganda department is to deal with the report by “fighting 
back”).122  In response, China began to issue Human Rights Report of the U.S. foreign 
assistance activities in the PRC, which aims to promote human rights, democracy, rule of 
law, and environmental conservation in Chinese domain.123 In studies developed by Robert 
Sutter (2013), many of the think-tanks and NGOs had been very active working on human 
rights protection and political participation; on the list of his research are the Brookings 
Institute, Ford Foundation, Asian Foundation, Amnesty International, Transparency 
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International, and Human Rights Watch, among others.124 Organizations in Europe are also 
very active, in a research on international role of Chinese human rights protection; the writer 
specially studied three renowned NGOs: Norwegian Center for Human Rights (NCHR), 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (RWI) and the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights (DIHR).125 
 International conventions and law also constitute major source of international 
pressure directly and indirectly. The regulations and operational procedures of, for example, 
WTO and its multilateral organizations and its subsidiary bodies, the spaghetti bowl effect of 
Free-Trade Agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for instance, and 
international conventions such as United Nations Global Compact on corporate social 
responsibilities, which include environmental, legal conduct and labor rights, all contain 
provisions on human rights. As China is increasingly growing into a world power, it has to 
act  comply with universally accepted norms and practices. One of the major steps marking 
China’s changed gesture was its decision in October 1998 to sign the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),126 a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly that ensures the protection of the right of self-determination for all 
people, prohibits torture, cruel or degrading punishment, and provides for democratic 
elections and freedom of movement, thought, religion and expression. 
 The basic mechanism for China’s positive response to international 
scrutiny in terms of both human rights and social welfare protections and, say, fast 
governmental response to natural or human disasters, is that as China continues to grow into 
a influential power centered into the world stage, audience, applause and international 
recognition may be indicators of acceptance. China does not want to be a lonely power. It 
does not seek to disengage the world to seek security and overcome marginalization as 
Stephen Krasner (1985) had proposed 127  and as North Korea and Russia probably had 
practiced. That is why China has been engaging the world comprehensively. The effect of 
international pressure is not just confined to Chinese domestic politics. It is also conducive 
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for China’s international behaviors. In the case of  Darfur humanitarian crisis (2003), the 
international pressure has altered China’s non-interference policy which it has been adhered 
to for half a century and sent its special envoy for African Affairs to mediate between the 
Western society who were concerned about the Sudanese government’s domestic repression 
and the Sudanese government who sought to address the rebellious military forces based on 
its understanding of sovereignty.128  China was asked to step in and send an envoy for 
African Affairs, because China is one of the biggest investors in Africa, so they may have 
been pressured to take responsibility beyond the world for economics. The Darfur 
experience is a typical case where international scrutiny helped adjustment of China’s long 
cherished principle and reshape its foreign policy, which would not be possible without 
significant change with its self-identity through long-term socialization. International 
scrutiny is a parcel of the whole process that regards China’s political decision-making. The 
CCP itself is also making considerable internal transformation along the years. We shall turn 
to the internal changes and challenges faced by the CCP since its foundation. 
 
2. Identity Change of the CCP 
 
 Any party, as a political organization and an institution, has its own identity. While 
party identity and interest is formed and formatted within a particular cultural and 
institutional environment, they tend to “reproduce” the cultural and institutional 
environment by directing and influencing policy-making and implication. 129  And as 
civilization with long tradition, Chinese political elites have drawn on the traditional culture 
to justify and legitimate its rationale.130 Here the writer would like to examine how China 
Communist Party’s identity has internally evolved over the decades and how these changes 
have reshaped the decision-making agenda.131 Let us start by briefly talking about the CCP 
as a revolutionary proletarian party, following for the next topic on the CCP’s failed 
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endeavor for a joint government and its identity change and then finalize this topic with new 
identity change in reform era. 
 
2.1. CCP as a revolutionary proletarian party 
 
 The China Communist Party rose in revolution against the three oppressions of 
feudalism, bourgeois and imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century. Most 
revolutionary leaders were actually intellectuals, however, they deemed the party as a 
Proletarian Party representing the interest of labor workers, since they relied on industrial 
workers to conduct armed struggle against the above-mentioned “reactionary” forces. For 
the CCP, the proletariat class was the most resolute and thoroughgoing class for 
revolutionary struggle and most politically conscious because of the leadership of its own 
party of the CCP.132  Because the enemies were, according to Mao Zedong, “extremely 
strong and cruel, (the China Communist Party), develop and consolidate the united frontier 
to the utmost […]”.133   The party aimed to assume national leadership and revitalize the 
semi-colony of China, it has to resort to peasants and nationalist bourgeoisie among other 
social classes so as to seek their cooperation and represent their interest as well. However, 
its major doctrine of being a Proletarian Party remained unchanged. After betrayal of Jiang 
Kai-shek in 1927, 134 the Chinese Communist Party turned underground and moved 
geographically to rural China, where China Communist Party could still rely on few 
workers. However, the proletarian nature of the party had been emphasized instead of 
diluted because farmers more than workers joined into the party. Sixth Party Congress 
especially attached the background of the leadership, among all 36 members of Central 
Party Committee, 21 were former workers, Liu Shaoqi and Yun Daiying who were eminent 
leaders in early communist workers’ movement were excluded from the committee for their 
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intellectual background; Xiang Zhongfa, a former worker, was elected as the Party 
Secretary, the top position in the CCP. The CCP then embraced its identity as a Proletarian 
Party by showing how ideology matters within China’s top leadership.135 As a revolutionary 
party, it has to stick to the classic Marxism while adapting to China’s changed revolutionary 
environment. 
 The CCP’s identity as the “pioneer of proletarian class” has not changed. However, 
the role of the CCP has evolved along with progress of the revolution, which in turn was 
“reproduced”. During the anti-Japanese war, the CCP claimed for a nation-wide united front 
that along with all gathered forces could possibly engage driving the Japanese out of 
Chinese domain. After Zhang Xueliang arrested Jiang Kai-shek in 1936, and the consequent 
formation of National United Front against Japan, the CCP became a legitimate party for the 
first time, the CCP and its armed forces joined the Kuomintang (KMT) “as a whole”. It no 
longer deemed itself as   rebellious/revolutionary party against the nationalist KMT 
government, but instead, part of the nationalist regime against imperial Japan’s invasion. 
 
2.2. CCP’s failed endeavor for a joint government and its identity change after take-over 
 
 In 1946, the CCP endeavored to establish a new government together with KMT and 
other democratic parties. Apparently, it sought legitimate political participation within the 
existing nationalist regime (after reformed). This failed attempt lead to a 3-year civil war 
that ended with KMT’s retreat to Taiwan and CCP’s take-over of China in 1949. In March 
1949, right before the revolutionary victory, Mao pointed out in his report delivered on the 
Second Plenum of the CCP’s Seventh Congress, that the CCP should move its activities 
from rural to urban China, by moving from revolution to economic construction.136 The 
conference was very important for the CCP and China since it represented a major shift of 
the CCP’s identity as a revolutionary party to a party of construction, or from an image of 
armed opposition party (rebellious party) to a ruling party. Ideally, the party moved its 
gravity from class struggle to social integration and based on which it may build a new 
nation state under the Chinese version of the Marxist doctrine, namely the Mao Zedong’s 
Thought (Maoism). Compared to power transfer, institutional and identity building are a far 
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more difficult job. 
 The communist survival and thrive was founded on the fundamentalist Marxist 
doctrine of class struggle. By defining and categorizing the population into different classes, 
it led the party to be represented ostensibly by working class and peasants who made up the 
majority of the revolutionary forces and who fought against the landowners, which were 
considered as the most reactionary force in the feudalist society, as well as the upper 
bourgeois and imperialists. In places under communist control, they conducted land 
revolution, which were to deprive the wealth of landowners and distribute among the 
grassroots peasants. For the upper and national bourgeoisie, the CCP organized workers 
protests, which are no different from the labor protests today, and once the CCP took over 
China, it deprived and nationalized the wealth of upper bourgeoisie. Generally speaking, it 
was a matter of taking and redistribution.137 Ruling Communist China is different. The first 
thing was how to build an essential social order for an economic reconstruction. Repression 
worked, but it was only for those most dangerous and violent armed landowners and 
veterans, not for bourgeois and intellectuals; the more difficult stage would be the 
integration among different social classes which faced tension among each others but were 
somewhat split by the CCP. The most important thing to address was: What identity should 
the CCP adopt under the new context? 
 What would be the relationship between classes? What would be the major tasks? 
And what policy would be appropriate for both intellectuals and bourgeoisie classes? Also, 
what would be for China’s other 8 democratic parties? Thus how the party answered these 
questions was based on its perceived identity. The CCP’s relationship with intellectuals and 
the bourgeois could better reveal something. In 1956, the Eighth CCP Congress concluded 
that, 
 
The principal contradiction within the country was no longer the contradiction 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but the one resulted from the need of the 
people for rapid economic and cultural development, which fell short of their 
requirements. The chief task confronting the entire nation was to concentrate all 
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efforts on developing the productive forces, industrializing the country and gradually 
meeting the people's growing economic and cultural needs.138 
 The Party compressed the class struggle and called on all other parties as well as the 
people to work jointly for reconstruction, industrialization and better life of the new China.  
This can be considered as a significant progress and it revealed the party’s identity shift and 
self-consciousness of its changing role. However, not long after the Eighth Party Congress, 
especially after the anti-rightist movement, Mao changed his judgment by arguing that 
“Undoubtedly, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeois and the 
contradiction between socialist and capitalist road, are the main contradiction in our society 
at the moment”. 139  Chinese leadership’s ambition to realize industrialization and 
communism was hammered by the Soviet Union’s peaceful coexistence between the 
socialist and capitalist camps. Harsh criticism of the CCP by intellectuals had also invited 
Mao’s vigilance of return of the bourgeois (zi ben zhu yi fu bi) and the consequent harsh 
repression of the intellectuals. “The rightist opportunism in the society reveals the anti-
socialism of bourgeois within the party”. 140  Some researches indicate that the coming 
ideological disputes between CCP and Soviet Union also had a role.141 Mao Zedong had 
long deemed himself of vanguard, orthodox heir and loyal practitioner of fundamentalist 
Marxism who would never allow and domestic and international revisionism to hurt the 
pureness of the CCP as the pioneer of the proletarian classes. It was the reverse of identity of 
the CCP under the dominance of Mao Zedong that finally led to more than ten years’ turmoil 
that brought his party and the country to the brink of collapse. 
 
2.3. New identity change in reform era 
 
 The CCP’s identity after the 1949 take-over remains an unfinished task. This identity 
evolution lasts until the present day. It is a delayed process where the CCP should remake its 
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identity and respond to the new context, fulfill new tasks and in new ways. Concretely, it has 
to transform itself from a revolutionary party to a constructive party. However, it seems to 
be fair to admit that the Communist Party had already changed their policy from 
fundamentalist proletarian ones to a policy that accommodates economic development with 
the new bourgeois, namely the entrepreneurs, and small business owners. Especially in the 
1980s and the 1990s, many private entrepreneurs had been elected as members of the 
Congress and the National People's Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC) system, or 
even granted leadership role at lower level government, say duty head of township. 
 The major theoretical breakthrough that marked the CCP’s identity changes was “the 
important thought of three representatives” credited to former President Jiang Zemin and 
ratified by the Sixteenth Party Congress held in 2002. 
 
This experience and the historical experiences gained by the Party since its founding 
can be summarized as follows: Our Party must always represent the requirements for 
developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced 
culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
people. These are the inexorable requirements for maintaining and developing 
socialism, and the logical conclusion our Party has reached through hard exploration 
and great praxis.142 
Jiang Zemin, Report on the Sixteenth CCP Congress 
 
 The CCP’s representing “advanced productive forces, advanced culture and 
fundamental interests of the majority” means that the Party had abandoned the traditional 
approach of overemphasis on the background and origin of the social grouping (the 
proletariat), and adopted a new criterion which can also serve as guiding principles for the 
CCP. The new interpretation has revealed that the CCP now stands for the interest of the 
whole nation instead of the interest of a designated group. Later, former President Jiang 
Zemin further pointed out that, “China Communist Party is not just pioneer of the working 
class, but also pioneer of the Chinese nation”.143 The “three representatives” constitute a 
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major shift of the CCP’s identity and it presents the party’s adaptability to the new domestic 
and international environment. The Party’s embrace of the new identity and new guiding 
principle while abandoning the old identity based on the traditional origin (chu shen) also 
symbolizes that the CCP has become a mature and modern party instead of traditional 
revolutionary party. 
 Various facts may prove such an evolution and development. Firstly, party ideology 
and class struggle mentality have both been in steady decline. The ideological erosion dates 
back to the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in 1978, which represents 
a major departure from Maoist class struggle’s doctrine and constitutes a rupture with the 
revolutionary past. After the collapse of the socialist bloc in the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping 
raised the 24-word strategy.144 One of his core reminders was to “keep a low profile”（it has 
been translated as “hide the capabilities and bid for the time” instead of debating with the 
“West” over ideological issues – he warned the party to concentrate on forging the economic 
development and let facts tell which system is superior. 
 The new generation leaders of former President Hu Jintao and the very present 
leader Xi Jinping had further initiative concerning reforming the CCP’s identity. Chinese 
growth in the past 15 years (starting from 2000, especially, a longer spectrum dates back to 
1978 or 1992) has been extraordinary which has exposed China to the center stage of 
international powers from which Chinese new leadership has seen the prospect of China’s 
return to its traditional primary in the world system as it happened centuries ago. The CCP, 
the ruling party and the pioneer of the Chinese nation, gradually deems itself as the 
rejuvenator of the old civilization.145 Not long after Xi’s election as a Party Secretary, he 
vowed to realize the Chinese dream: “The Chinese dream, I believe, is the rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation”, and “we are closer to the great Chinese rejuvenation than any time in 
history”.146 
 The CCP’s new identity as the rejuvenator of Chinese nation could be revealed by its 
attempt to revitalize Chinese traditional culture and to build a cultural great power. In the 
past decade and a half, the CCP has increasingly been engaged in the cultural building. In an 
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important official report, it states that, “Since the CCP was established, it has faithfully 
drawn upon and carried forward China’s outstanding traditional culture as well as actively 
advocated and developed the country’s advanced culture”.147 And it has been promoting the 
influence of Chinese culture overseas. China had run cultural exchanges activities in the 
form of “Year of Culture” hosted by other countries and year of “China-France Cultural 
Exchange”. Most recently, it has been investing heavily to establish and run the Confucius 
Institute, a kind of an international Chinese language-training program. By the end of 2014, 
over 15,500 Chinese language teachers have been teaching Chinese at 1326 Confucius 
Institutes from 126 countries all over the world. 148  Besides its endeavors in promoting 
Chinese soft power internationally, China also proposed its own world order of “harmonious 
society” based on its Confucian tradition.149 
 For the CCP, Confucianism helps reshaping a sort of national identity at a time of 
declining Marxist appeals, which the former can help filling the ideological vacuum left by 
the Marxism. It also serves as shields that help the CCP to defend against the so-called threat 
of Westernization. The CCP, on the other hand, projects itself as both a rejuvenator of 
traditional culture and a nationalist defender of such a culture, therefore, have its legitimacy 
strengthened. Yet the major challenge for the CCP may be how to reshape the Party without 
losing its essence since the reform era began in the late 1970s. 
 
3. Changed Source of Legitimacy  
 
 Over a long period of time, and even before 1978, CCP had not regarded social 
participation as a source of legitimacy. Instead, it relied on its traditional legitimacy in the 
revolution and in establishing a socialist state and order. Namely, the legitimacy of the CCP 
mainly came from its success in its struggle against the Japanese aggression in alliance with 
the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and its victory over the latter in the civil war. The 
communist victory successfully ended the so-called “a hundred year of humiliation” when 
                                                        
147 Decision on the CCP Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Deepening Reform of 
the Cultural System and Promoting Reforming the Great Development and Flourishing of 
Socialist Culture, Passed at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central 
Committee on October 18, 2011. 
148 Li Changchun requires developing Internet-based Confucius Institute to Promoting Chinese 
Culture, Xinhuanet, April 25, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2007-
04/25/content_6025148.htm, 2015-06-01. 
149 From the Confucius Annual Report (2006-2014), and the homepage of the institute. See 
http://www.hanban.edu.cn. 
 67 
Imperialist Powers constantly bullied the old civilization, it established a brand new social 
order, and developed the war-worn economy, communist blue print of a prosperous, affluent 
and equal society appeal to the vast majority of Chinese people. These are some of the 
reasons of the CCP propaganda organs constantly attached importance to historical 
education and indoctrination of communist ideology to its people since their primary 
schooling. 
 The vast majority of currently alive Chinese is born after the establishment of 
People’s Republic of China; they do not have any memory about what China was like before 
the year of 1949. For them the relatively recent memory was much bitter – the notorious 
disasters during the two decades before the period of Reform and Opening-up with an 
estimated over 36 million people starved to death during the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-
1961),150 and even the harsher disasters during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), which is considered to be even bitter for the CCP itself. The failure of the CCP 
in realizing the blueprint of a prosperous socialist state and the more recent memory of 
various class struggles greatly hurt the party’s legitimacy as a ruling party. Chinese 
historical memory of the CCP’s struggles and sacrifice during the revolution has gradually 
faded away and no longer has provided a compelling basis for legitimizing the party-State 
nor offers a definite set of normative values for organizing society. 
 After the Reform and Opening-up, China witnessed increasing people-to-people 
exchanges with other countries, knowledge about the affluent lives in the developed world 
have created a wave of going abroad in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With ideological 
decline in international politics and the rise of economic issues, the world had seen a new 
wave of globalization. The CCP had to find new sources of regime legitimacy in the 
changed discourse. The answer seems to be relatively easy. In times when communism has 
seen its most powerful political entity, the Soviet Union collapse out of the expectation of 
the boldest thinkers and that Francis Fukuyama (1992) even claimed the world has 
welcomed the “end of history” when democracy remain the last form of human practices, 
the CCP would be successful if it were to revitalize its communist ideals to make it more 
appealing to the vast population. 
 Public opinion manipulation and tightened control, as the CCP has adopted in the 
early 1990s, momently worked but did not last long. In times of growing social 
diversification, pluralization and openness, this revolutionary approach will further reduce 
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the CCP’s appeals to the people. Therefore, the choices seemed limited. The CCP needed to 
found its rule on steady economic growth and lasting improvement of people’s living 
standard. Economic upswing during the period between 1992 and 1995 encouraged the CCP 
while the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) restructuring and overall marketization of 
education, housing, medical care in the late 1990s laid the foundation for sustained rapid 
growth after China entered into the new century, especially after its WTO entry in 2001. 
However, economic patronage will not render lasting result. The CCP has realized that it is 
in legitimacy crisis when economy continued to grow. 
 Possibly, economic growth, improved living standard, and skyscrapers strengthened 
the legitimacy of the CCP’s regime and therefore the CCP and the state government no 
longer need to exert strong control over the society as before. In this sense, the CCP is 
getting confident in its regime stability and would allow more social freedom and political 
participation. Legitimacy of top leaders no longer relies on their loyalty to communist 
ideology or to the CCP, but on the performance and achievements in fulfilling their 
responsibilities, i.e., the economic development. Accordingly, more adaptation endeavors 
encouraged it to promote social participation, being it to increase its legitimacy, or for more 
rational, professional, and scientific decision-making. This is the innate drive for the CCP to 
promote social participation.   
 
4. Changed Tasks for CCP in the New Era  
 
 Identity and environment change had formulated CCP’s tasks. The CCP had three 
inter-related tasks: faster economic development, better, social governance and greater 
international prestige. While economic development remain the core task, improving social 
governance and expanding China’s international influence is gaining salience in the recent 
decade.  
 
4.1. Economic Growth 
 
 Economic development is one of the major tasks for any government. Though Mao 
Zedong had announced right at the dawn of the Communist take-over of the Chinese 
mainland, the primary tasks of the CCP changed from “revolution” to “construction” which 
was to modernize its far-backward industry and improve the living standard of the vast 
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population. The party managed to add to the list of its early performance the recovery of the 
war-worn economy to the country’s peak time of 1936 within 3 years, and further 
established the initial foundation for Chinese industry via the first five-year plan carried out 
during 1953-1956(successfully finished in advance). 
 However this did not last before the top leadership gradually deviated from the 
“construction” track in favor of “class struggle” and “continued revolution”. Under that 
doctrine, the CCP waged one political movement after another which spoiled the earliest 
plan for economic revitalization, and alienated itself farther and farther from the former 
prospect based on the motto “strong socialist country”. 
 Real “economic construction” did not begin until the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh CCP Central Committee in 1978, which determined that the country’s major task 
was to transfer from class struggle to economic construction. The Session marked the 
beginning of the “Reform and Opening up” policy. For the second-generation CCP leaders, 
economic construction remain the No.1 task ever since its takeover of the country, though 
the party used to deviate from the task. The Chinese leadership had a conviction that it had 
to make the cake greater before distributing it properly. It is under this doctrine that its 
economy began to take off and maintained a double-digit growth in the following three 
decades.  
 
 
4.2. Social Governance 
 
 Besides economic growth, the communist party endeavors to fulfill its role in social 
governance. Needless to say that fast economic growth and the great social transformation 
have brought serious social challenges. 151  It is clear that the CCP still has to address 
effectively the serious income disparity between the eastern coastal areas and the remote 
western provinces as well as between urban cities and rural areas. 152  It is also worth 
remembering that it must take gradual yet effective reforms in medical, education and social 
welfare system, and it must contain the skyrocketing housing prices while at the same time 
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maintain a good GDP growth record. Also, it should be reminded about the serious 
environmental pollution and reform its problematic financial system, 153  as well as the 
unemployment of an enormous number of college graduates,154 plus the moral decline of the 
society. 
 
4.3. International Prestige  
 
 Over 30 years’ vigorous economic development has helped China to expand its 
international prestige and influence enormously. It is both a natural development and a party 
strategy. The adaptation of this strategy is based on the fact that China has been a leading 
civilization over the long history. The Party successfully hosted the Twenty-eighth Summer 
Olympic Games in 2008, the World 2010 Expo in Shanghai, and the Sixteenth Asian Games 
in Guangzhou, 2010. Under the leadership of the CCP, China has played an epochal role in 
the international scene such as took part in the six-party talks by addressing the North Korea 
nuclear issues, holds the largest member of military officials and soldiers in the UN peace-
keeping programs, and shares within the IMF and the World Bank financial aid since the 
U.S. is reluctant giving up its financial hegemony and to give China due share of voting. 
However, China’s financial influence and leverage is growing since it hosts the largest 
foreign currency reserves and a fiscal capacity that grow at an annual rate of 30% or 
above.155 
 Though China has not yet dominated a single international agenda in addressing 
global issues such as climate change, free trade negotiation, environmental issues, and non-
proliferation so far; she has been an active participant and constructive player, willing to 
provide support for any regimes that it deems conducive to peace, stability, prosperity and 
international justice either for a region or the world at large. “Without China, international 
issues won't be addressed easily” is a cliché hung over the lips of politicians and scholars all 
over the world. For this reason, U.S. Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005) called on 
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China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in 2005156 and “a responsible great power” and the 
academia and policy sectors even raised the “G2” mirage.157 
 China still remains a bit “reluctant” to assume the responsibilities as the Western 
powers expected, according to Zoellick.158 Chinese leaderships do have realized its newly 
achieved international influence. As a director of a nation that has long been marginalized by 
the West-dominated modern system despite its long history as a superpower, Chinese new 
leaderships see their due task to revitalize and “rejuvenate” the country into world 
leadership and regain its centralism (Zhongguo, or the Central Kingdom). China’s new 
President Xi Jinping, when watching an exhibition in 2012, raised the concept of “the 
nation’s rejuvenation being the greatest Chinese dream”. Obviously, international prestige is 
an integral part of the Chinese dream. Compared with the domestic aspect of the Chinese 
dream, namely realizing the welfare society and the four modernizations, international 
prestige weighs more in the top leadership’s mind.   
             This said, the domestic and international part of the Chinese dream couldn’t be 
separated. If China were to gain global recognition, it has to embrace instead of rejecting 
universal values. Anyway, an open, confident, accountable China would be more popular 
and appealing to the international community. Domestic accountability sometimes is more 
important than international accountability. Therefore, protection of human rights, 
democratic participation and transparency in decision-making is an integral part of 
government accountability. The Chinese leadership had a strategy to improve its 
international prestige via improved social governance. 159 
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5. CCP Leadership Needs Societal Participation 
 
 It is believed that the Chinese Communist Party will continue to have strict control 
over the army, media, legal and judicial system. While recognizing all these continuities, the 
CCP and Chinese government had never denied democracy and social participation. Mao 
Zedong attested by answering the question from Huang Yanpei, a famous proponent of 
democracy, that “How could ensure the communist party wouldn’t repeat the cycle of rise, 
decline and collapse of previous dynasties in Chinese history”, he affirmed that the only way 
is through ‘democracy’. 160  For Mao, the meaning of democracy relied on truly 
representation of the government by the popular will by having the support of the broad 
masses throughout the country. This means that people must be free to support and have the 
opportunity of influencing its policies.161 Societal participation of political life in Mao’s 
times was ensured regular and institutional. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was, in 
part, a radical attempt to achieve Mao's "Great Democracy". Since Mao realized that the 
concentration of power within the Party had created a new privileged class called 
bureaucracy, which had became the biggest obstacle to attaining his ideal of democracy.162 
 Deng Xiaoping had initiated “structural political reform” in order to address 
indiscriminate concentration of political power that “ruined intraparty democracy and 
distorted the principle of collective leadership and individual responsibilities”.163 However, 
Deng’s understanding of democracy was confined within the four cardinal principles (si 
xiang ji ben yuan ze), namely upholding the socialist path, upholding the people’s 
democratic dictatorship, upholding the leadership of the CCP, and upholding the Mao 
Zedong’s Thought and Marxism-Leninism doctrine.164 As a reformist leader, Deng was very 
pragmatic in balancing between the democratic ideals and the expedient need to keep the 
CCP in power. He was successfully in introducing the market economy and every positive 
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element from human practices from democracies while maintaining the dominant role of 
communism ideologically. In terms of decision-making, under his “supervision”, the open-
minded leaders of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had left the society with considerable 
freedom in speech, gathering and social participation as mentioned in the introduction. 
 Not surprisingly, as the CCP is increasingly modernized, its emphasis on democracy 
grew. Jiang Zemin, a leader from the most open metropolitan of Shanghai, was also a 
supporter of democracy. In one of his major speech, he used the word “democracy” or 
“democratic” 31 times during his report on the Fifteenth Party Congress, in a session 
entitled “Reforming Political Structure, Strengthening Democracy and the Legal System”, in 
which occasion he stated that, “It is our party’s consistent goal to develop socialist 
democracy. Without democracy, there would be no socialism or socialist modernization.”165  
During President Hu Jintao’s tenure, the term “democracy” had been fully adopted in 
official context, the frequency and intensity was unprecedented compared with his 
predecessor and his successor, President Xi Jinping. In Hu’s Report of the year 2007, he 
stated: 
 
We must continue to expand orderly participation of our citizens, perfect the 
democratic system, enrich the form of democracy, and broaden the democratic 
channel; we must press on with our efforts to make decision-making more scientific 
and democratic, perfect decision-making information, and intellectual support 
system; we must develop grassroots democracy and ensure that the people can 
exercise their democratic rights directly and in accordance with the law.166 
General Secretary HU Jintao, 2007 
 
 In this context, democracy seems not to remain merely as a slogan or as a blueprint 
for the future but an intrinsic part of the Party’s thoughts. The report had also put forward 
very concrete measures to expand democracy and societal participation. Several important 
factors are now changing the behaviors and policies of the CCP. Changes of the party’s 
identity have been most fundamental, either factual or perceived. Yet this implies a period of 
crisis and restructuring of the party itself. 
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6. Is the CCP in Crisis?  
 
 The introductory part of this dissertation has reviewed in-depth and width the 
suspicion about the CCP’s sustainability by international scholarship. For the writer, the 
tricky point is not any single challenge but a bunch of challenges that the CCP were not 
capable or willing enough to address. But because of the interrelated, intertwined and 
complex “multiple paradox” of these problems, the would explain the CCP’s crisis under the 
framework of “multiple paradox”. However, it would be partially approached instead of in-
depth analysis due to the complexity of the subject. 
 For many Chinese and foreign scholars, rampant corruption topped the list of 
China’s crisis list. The top leadership of the CCP is fully aware of the severe challenge of 
corruption, and the resolution of the present leadership, for instance, is unprecedented. 
Starting from the Sichuan Deputy Party Secretary Li Chunchen shortly after President Xi’s 
Administration entered into office, Xi waged his campaign against the “Sichuan cabal”, the 
most corrupted “petroleum cabal”, and the “Political and Legal cabal" (Police, court, the 
procuratorate system) topped by Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee.167 President Xi has sent 3 waves of inspection teams to all level of 
governmental organs and other organizations of public ownership: the SOEs, Ministries, and 
cities (director-general level), each wave of inspection resulted in removal of a number of 
officials from all provincial, municipal and division levels. Shanxi alone had 9 out of 13 
provincial top leaders removed from their posts. In 2013 alone, 26 director-general level and 
336 county-division-level officials from the province were “disciplined” with another 17 
county-level party chiefs arrested in 2014.168 The lasted progress is the collapse of the high 
rank generals from the army, which proved President Xi’s belief that anti-corruption 
campaign has no “boundaries”. By March 2015, 26 of China’s 31 provinces have at least 
one of their provincial party chief, governor or their deputies arrested (exceptions are 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jilin, Ningxia and Tibet/Xizang) and over 100,000 division-level officials 
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were disciplined.169 
 Despite national populist vowing of President Xi’s campaign against its own 
corrupted party, many in the society has been questioning the sustainability of the anti-
corruption campaign since it is more like the up-down movement which the princelings are 
fond of and good at.170 However, without reliable institutions and legal framework, the 
campaign will not go any further, as was the anti-corruption practices of former 
administrations. President Xi has stated on many occasions the importance of anti-
corruption campaign, citing historical and international cases where corruption resulted in 
the collapse of the regime. Apparently the major motivation for his anti-corruption campaign 
was to maintain the CCP regime longer. However, the campaign itself may risk the regime. 
Penetration of corruption into the top leadership hurt the CCP’s legitimacy, while it may also 
create endemic fear among top leadership and even potentially fracturing the elites. 
 Corruption in China seems to be systematic and ubiquitous, while President Xi must 
rely on the existing system, the organizational network to tackle the problems. The dilemma 
is as if the anti-corruption is carried “on a level playing field” it will hurt his allies and will 
have his own team questioned (such as the case of Zhou Yongkang, who manipulated the 
political and legal system, a kind of corruption of the anti-corruption); or if the campaign is 
conduced in selected way, then the credibility will be questioned.171 President Xi has been 
very wise to select Wang Qishan, an intimate ally and another princeling with strong 
background and network among the princeling community, to lead the campaign. He was 
assigned such a task also because of his intensive experience in the financial sector where 
corruption abounds. What, if a corruption case was dragged from Wang’s allies? The recent 
collapse with the China stock exchange, in June 2015, has revealed the severe problems with 
the financial sector, the above-mentioned possibilities cannot be ruled out. Then where does 
it stop? A halfway stop would invite societal dissents while the continuous anti-corruption 
may hurt the economy, and many Chinese scholars are already discussing the exit of the 
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campaign.172 
 The most dangerous part of the story is that as an unprecedented campaign, President 
Xi lacks a theoretical doctrine to justify and legitimatize the pro-longed movement. Within 
the CCP’s system, it is conventional and usual practice for new leaders to explicate their 
planned policies and vision for the country as an extension of the Marxist canons. The 
“theory” serves as leader’s mandate to rule, and defends them against inner party criticism. 
Some China observers even look to the “four comprehensives” as a possible contribution of 
President Xi that may enshrine Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as part of the ideological 
legitimacy and legacy for his rule.173 Both former Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
succeeded when concluding their tenure, while current President Xi’s campaign began 
without such a theoretical framework. 
 On the long lists of China’s challenges, sluggish GDP growth, widening social 
disparity, and environmental degradation have also proved to be vital. Even the lower-
politics environmental issues had become pressing. It is not because of the improving of 
China’s awareness in environmental protection or the rising apatite for better living quality 
of the Chinese people. Rather, because environmental concern has become a major source of 
social dissents and poses a huge question about the responsiveness and capacity of the CCP. 
In fact, many of China’s protests (incidents) arise from environmental problem. Updating 
the economy for environment’s sake (for further and better economic growth of course) may 
further slow down the already sluggish economy, either for the economic growth circle, 
unfavorable external influence (the world financial meltdown) or structural financial risks, 
and often fueled by reluctant political reform that far lagged behind economic reform and 
further hindered the second largest economy from further development. 
 Problems with both the economy and the political regime are true. Not only so. 
Dynamic economy and society have already luring away from the rigid, outdated systems of 
governance and political control. The foundation of Leninist philosophy has been 
undermined and no longer acknowledged by people after 25 years’ market-oriented 
economic reform. The party can no longer propose encouraging prospect for China and 
more and more people regard it as irrelevant and wicked. This was evident in the huge and 
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increasing number of immigration of economical and intellectual elites to U.S., Canada, 
Australia and Europe. The CCP’s approaches in addressing the problems often are 
problematic themselves. It has been pouring huge financial, policy and human resources in 
the stability maintenance (wei wen). However, it probably has realized the tightened control 
of internet, using of Google, a very useful tool for academic studies, social media such as 
Facebook and Twitter; even Renren, the Chinese version of the Facebook, and Wechat have 
been under strict censorship. Therefore create new tensions between the party-state 
government and general public, especially intellectuals. The situation was worsened by 
deflation and skyrocketing housing price which had embossed the academia 
economically. 174   Though the Communist Party had made some adjustment to absorb 
capitalist elites into the Party, and had put forward party rules and regulation to contain the 
rampant corruption, the CCP legitimacy seems to be in decline together with its 
organizational penetration power, its questioned party authority, accountability, attraction, 
and Party disciplines. 
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Chapter 3: The Structure and Process of China’s Political Decision-making: 
Continuities and Changes with the CCP 
 
 For several decades, studies in Chinese decision-making generally fell into three 
major schools: namely historical, Maoist and realist approaches, whose common analytical 
basis lies in the assumption to treat China as a rational and highly unitary actor, either 
influenced by its own tradition and communist ideology or by some rational calculation. All 
these three approaches assume that China is a single individual who is able to assess the 
environment, make decisions, and react according to the outside stimuli.175 And for some of 
the scholars, it would be logically consistent, epistemologically pragmatic, technically 
convenient, and safe in values to regard China as a rational-autocracy with its China’s 
decision-making centered on the CCP whose elitist leaders calculates based on its national 
interest, perceived and factual. 
 Researches on Chinese decision-making, however, have mainly based on their 
analysis at foreign policy level. Little attention has been made to China’s domestic politics 
and its interaction with foreign affairs. This had not changed until the Great Triangle 
prevailed in the 1970s, which was, to a large extent, derived from the realist school.176 Since 
the mid 1960s, the highly unitary political elites began to experience a kind of split which 
was accompanied by and exerted great influence on the collapse of China’s alliance with the 
Soviet Union. This led to studies on the possible effects of inner disputes among Chinese 
political elites on the strategic choice and policy orientation.177 Thus scholars became more 
interested in Chinese domestic politics by observing the interplay between Chinese foreign 
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policy and its international position.178 These also led to other important studies about the 
relationship between intellectuals and Chinese political decision-making and reform in this 
period. David Shambaugh (2008), for instance, probed into how bureaucrats and scholars 
perceive international affairs and the U.S., and how they have influenced the decision-
making process. 179  For the outsiders, China’s political decision-making still remains a 
mysterious black box. However, because of the diametrically different discourse and 
environment, scholars can no longer apply the rational-autocracy approach to explain the 
current Chinese politics. Instead, the players and factors that affect the decision-making 
process vary from time to time and from case to case. 
 We have seen in the former chapter the evolving context in which the Chinese 
political decision-making. In this chapter, the author would like to valuate and briefly 
introduce internal changes the CCP has experienced in the past decades and analyze how it 
has affected the society and the way the decision-making is performed. Evaluations will be 
made on the changes and continuities in discourses, its tasks, and sources of legitimacy. For 
this reason, this chapter approaches the interaction among Party, central government and 
society; how the education background and experience changes among generations 
influences the Party’s organization; and how different generation leaderships counterbalance 
their influences within the Party, and further elaborate what does it means for decision-
making and societal role in decision-making.   
 
             1. The Party, the State and the Society  
  The China Communist Party (CCP) remains the key to understanding China politics. 
Its structure and process, consistence and changes have major influence on the state 
behavior and people’s daily life. The communist culture has developed all along the 
revolutionary and construction era and has been indoctrinated into the huge political-
economic entity. Needless to say, it will continue to shape the future China politics in that 
any changes are what germinate major reforms and transformations of the huge political 
system.  
 Therefore, intensive academic endeavors were made to reveal the evolution of the 
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party in terms of its component, its nature and its missions over the past six decades after its 
take-over of the Chinese mainland, especially after its adoption of Reform and Opening-up 
program since three decades ago by starting in the late 1970s. Shambaugh (2008) stresses, 
“the strengths and weakness, durability and adaptability and potential longevity of the CCP 
as the ruling party in China”180 by carefully examining the latest changes of the communist 
system. He pointed out that “It is evident from a wide variety of indicators that the CCP, as 
an institution, has been in a progressive state of decline in terms of its control over the 
intellectual, social, economical, and political life of the nation”.181 
 If the review of the structure and process of the CCP were hard to handle, a relatively 
easier approach is to evaluate the players within this grand game. In terms of decision-
making, governance and the much broader topic of democratization tend to attach great 
importance to the economic sector. The assumption of the major discussion is the approach 
of the “economic growth leads to democratization”, as a number of scholars have indicated 
in previous studies.182 This approach supports the assumption that economic growth will 
lead to the emergence of middle class who will later press for liberal rights, votes and in a 
larger process of the decision-making. Therefore, previous studies on China, which have 
been approached on Chinese democratization, tend to focus on the industries immediately 
after China’s opening-up, especially during the 1980s when many private enterprises 
emerged as economic power accounting for almost one third of the China’s total 
enterprises.183  Scholars, the majority of whom tend to be Westerners, focus on the emerging 
new classes, such as legal service group，layers, accounting, auditing and other professional 
working groups, the commercial groups, new media (internet-based and self-media), civil 
and society organizations. They usually focus on how this new emerging class constitutes 
challenges to the communist monopoly of power.184 
 Since the Chinese middle class seems not to have been developed to the extent 
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expected, some other China scholars remain skeptical about this assumption. 185  Their 
evidences are that the CCP no longer need to push for political reform, since the economic 
development has become a new source of regime legitimacy.186 It is true that the communist 
party has been reluctant to continue political reform especially after the June Fourth 
Tiananmen Square Incident. Under increased international pressure and constrained by 
domestic politics, the CCP foresaw great danger of the whole communist regime. However, 
it is equally well founded that the party is fully aware about the potential dangers of keeping 
the newly emerging classes out of the regime. 
 The United Frontier Work (UFW), for instance, played a large role in addressing the 
above-mentioned concern. Developed since the very beginning of the establishment of the 
CCP, the UFW is regarded as one of the three trumps (San da fa bao) of the CCP’s success 
in revolutionary era and remained an important part of the party work until the present day. 
From the central committee to the township level, there is a party organ of the UFW whose 
aim is to “motivate all useful social resources to serve the cause of socialist construction”.187 
 The philosophy of the United Front is to mobilize the societal forces by engaging 
them instead of alienating them. Owning to limitations of resources (limited access, uneven 
distribution, etc.), institutions (organizational, financial) and ever-shifting priorities of 
leadership, the effectiveness of UFW tends to decline. Especially after the 1992 reform, 
Chinese economy began to gain momentum, and new classes nurtured by economic growth 
had become a new concern. And the CCP has to adjust to those new changes. A bold 
approach is to integrate those new economical and societal forces into the party system, 
simply put, to make them party members. Bruce Dickson (2007, 2008) is one of the earliest 
scholars who has studied the relations between the CCP and entrepreneurs. The communist 
party has been vigilant against the capitalist erosion of its fundamentalist doctrine. However, 
when the private business grew up in the 1980s and the early 1990s, and had displayed their 
eminent role in job creation and economic development, especially when reconstruction of 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) had led to numerous laid-off workers who had become 
serious social problem. Then the CCP began to embrace private sector and regarded them as 
a positive factor for economic growth and social management. Therefore they began to 
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absorb entrepreneurs into the Party, simply put, to induct wealth into power.188 Not hard to 
understand, many other scholars as well as Party members tend to regard the induction of 
the business sector into the Party as a severe challenge to the purity and legitimacy of the 
institution, since fundamentally speaking, the Party was deemed as the pioneers of the 
working class and represented the interest of the working class — the Proletariat.189 
 The CCP had heated debate on their policies towards business sector. After over 
ninty years’ development, sixty years’ governance of the world’s most populous country and 
near forth years of  Reform and Opening-up program, the CCP needs to reorient and adapt 
itself to the new environment and new tasks. Especially, people’s dissents with the June 
Fourth Incident in 1989, the redundancy tide of the SOEs in late 1990s, China’s embrace of 
market economy after 1992, and the impending entry into the WTO in 2001 have called into 
question the legitimacy of the CCP, who can no longer rely on its revolutionary past, instead 
it has to “keep pace with the time”. One major step is the new definition of the CCP as Three 
Represents, which claims that the CCP “forever represents the advanced productivity, 
forever represents the direction of advanced culture and forever represents the interest of the 
vast majority of the people”. The CCP is the pioneer of not only the proletariats, but the 
whole Chinese nation  (zhong hua min zu). 
 The Three Represents is the greatest theoretical innovation in terms of party ideology 
in the new reform era. It shows that the CCP has given up the fundamentalist Marxism that 
deemed bourgeoisie as a target for revolution. It is under the theoretical framework of the 
Three Represents that the CCP has its absorption of the private entrepreneurs justified. The 
Policy of incorporating those business representatives into the party to address the potential 
challenges is still on operation till the very present day. It enlarged the CCP’s 
representativeness and showed the adaptability of the Party.190 
 Of course, not all China experts rate the CCP’s evolution in an optimistic manner. 
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Another school, headed by Pei Minxin (2006), believes that China is likely to be trapped in 
transition because of the “self-destructive logic of predatory authoritarianism”.191 Following 
the pessimist evaluation, the most extreme prediction comes from Gordon Chang (2001), 
who believes the collapse of China is inevitable and China’s inevitable collapse is due to the 
mismanagement of the CCP. For him, China’s “road to ruin” include conflict across the 
Taiwan Strait, corruption, and accession to the World Trade Organization”.192 However, 
even Pei Minxin does not agree with this extreme pessimism. He further qualifies this 
conclusion by saying that “deteriorating governance and economic performance may be the 
necessary – but not sufficient—condition for the emergence of a fatal crisis”.193 The CCP 
may still survive for decades if it can use the “same mix of repression, cooptation, and 
adaptation to maintain an elite-based ruling coalition”.194 
 Generally speaking, a great majority of the academia follows the elitist approach for 
the eminent role of the CCP in Chinese political life and the very centralized nature of the 
Party’s structure.195  They tend to favor the top-down approach that characterizes China 
politics along the decades. However, those assessments failed to take into account the 
equally important approach and “tradition” of bottom-up approach, as if it will never be 
possible. Anyway, time has changed. China is different from the revolutionary past, even 
much different from the early reform eras in the 1980s or immediately after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union when a major event happened within China that revealed its revolutionary 
tradition and represent a major setback of China’s Reform and Opening-up program, which 
was even called into stop the political reform if the strong man Deng Xiaoping had not been 
successful in its “southward cruise” that restarted the market-oriented reform. 
 China alienated in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, has learned in the 1990s the 
lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union and began to warmly embrace the market 
economy and capitalism which it deemed as a effective means to develop its economy and 
further to safeguard the communist regime with accumulated national capacity. The result of 
further marketization is the emerging of more township level companies and millions of 
small and medium-sized businesses. Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in 
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the late 1990s created a number private business owner transferred from former heads of 
factories and companies of public ownership, laid-off workers most of whom later became 
small business owners and freelance professionals. The unified state owned sector has been 
split which cultivate new social classes. 
 David Lampton (2001) from Johns Hopkins University, for instance, concluded that 
China’s foreign and national security policy making as well as China’s performance abroad, 
are largely shaped by the forces of globalization, decentralization, pluralization, and 
professionalization. In the same masterpiece, Lampton also revealed how the enduring 
power of Chinese decision makers and their national interest focus also molded China’s 
behavior, notably in crises and in major strategic decisions.196 
 Lampton’s observation is insightful. Decentralization is the main theme and basic 
doctrine for the Reform and Opening-up. China’s political reform in the later half of the 
1980s headed by former Premier Zhao Ziyang was the Party’s earlier practice in limited 
decentralization (to functional ministries and provincial government), freedom of speech for 
intellectuals, democratic consultation and “dialogue with the society”. The wave of 
decentralization is wide in scope but limited in depth. China’s reform in the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s gave to the former SOEs autonomy in operation, mergers, bankruptcy and 
partial privatization. Provincial governments became especially powerful since they were 
granted fiscal rights via Taxation Reform in 1994. Actually it would be safe to say that 
decentralization has resulted in pluralization of Chinese society, while professionalization is 
exactly the CCP’s goals to modernize the political system.197 Professionalism is also one of 
the values for the CCP either in their selection of cadres, social governances and political 
process. The CCP has also developed an organizational culture of favoring the “technocrats” 
especially during the Third and Fourth generation leadership. 
 Each political or social change has its economic roots. Chinese decision-making 
evolved as a result early interaction among political elites and economic elites. Therefore, 
social participation starts from economic groups in economic sector. The extraordinary 
development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s, the fast emerging 
merchants in early 1990s and the restructuring of the SOEs in the late 1990s, as well as the 
                                                        
196 David M. Lampton (ed.) 2001. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform:1978-2002. Stanford University Press. 
197 For example, the 2012 version of Party Charter of the CCP stated that the party should cultivate 
“revolutionary, young, professional and knowledgeable” (gan bu ge ming hua, nian qing hua, zhuan 
ye hua, zhi shi hua) cadres.   
 85 
flourishing of internet-based business in the past decades, and ever-growing foreign direct 
investment have created a huge number of entrepreneurs, managers, and IT professionals.  
Economically well-off, educated and open-minded, this group are exactly the so-called 
middle class who are supposed to be interested in participation. 
 Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson (2010) draw on extensive fieldwork as they explore 
the extent to which China’s private sector supports democracy, surveyed more than 2,000 
entrepreneurs in five coastal provinces (Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and 
Guangdong) which host over 70 percent of China’s private enterprises. 198  The authors 
examined who the private entrepreneurs are, how the party-state shapes this group, and their 
relationship with the state. Findings are that China’s entrepreneurs are closely tied to the 
state through political and financial relationships, and these ties help shape their views 
towards the political system and its process. 199  While most entrepreneurs favor multi-
candidate elections under the current one-party system, they do not support a system 
characterized by multi-party competition and political liberties, including the right to 
demonstrate. The attitude could be attributed to the capitalists’ political beliefs and their 
assessment of the government’s policy performance. In a word, China’s capitalists tend to 
be conservative and status-quo oriented, quite different from other societies where a same 
group expect greater political freedom, representativeness and rights in times of rapid 
economic growth; and in times of crisis, the same group will become revolutionary forces 
for political transition. In both cases, economic elites in societies other than China serve as 
agents of democratization.200 This is a valuable contribution to the debates over China’s 
political process and the roles of this integral social group. 
 
             2. Generation Changes of Leadership 
 Generation changes of leadership are also a major precursor for improved political 
decision-making. Before the Reform and Opening-up, Chinese leadership was made up of 
overwhelmingly revolutionary cadres and organizers of contentious social movement. 
Among all 25 members of the Twelfth politburo for example, only one member held a 
college degree from a university of the Soviet Union. For them, loyalty to the party, 
knowledge of Marxist theory, and revolutionary background were the major criterions for 
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selecting and promoting cadres. In decision-making, orders followed the up-down approach, 
where lower level cadres receive orders from their superordinate and do what their bosses 
told them to. The approaches worked well since China then was a highly unified and 
organized society. National adornment of the Charismatic Chairman Mao Zedong seemed to 
have simplified the decision-making process since whatever Mao’s directives would be 
carried out faithfully by the bureaucratic system and the people as well. Farmers and 
workers have regular channels of participation in politics because of the egalitarian ideal of 
top leadership (especially Mao Zedong) and the overwhelming support from the society. 
Farmers and workers’ representatives seldom challenged party decisions; neither did they 
have the vision and expertise to do so. Intellectuals were repressed after the Anti-rightist 
movement in 1958 and faded away from political decision-making process. Therefore, the 
society was branches under strong leadership of the party, or to some extent, organs of the 
party regime. 
 The reform ended the class struggle that brought China into around 20 years’ 
turmoil, and economic development had topped the CCP’s priority list. China unveiled its 
rapid industrialization and modernization. Instead of loyalty and political correctness, the 
new task called for engineers, technicians, scientists and various experts. Knowledge, 
technology, courage and vision gained importance. Not surprising, China’s top leadership 
after Deng Xiaoping, President Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) and Premier Li Peng (1989-1997) 
and his successor Zhu Rongji (1997-2002), the third generation leader, President Hu Jintao 
(2002-2012) and Premier Wen Jiabao (2002-2012) were all technocrats. In 1997, out of the 
25 members of politburo, 14 were technocrats; the number rose to 18 in 2002. 15 out of the 
20 politburo members hold a university degree (the other 5 had no university degree), and 8 
out of the 9 standing members of the politburo major in engineering, the only one exception 
is former Premier Wen who major in geology at college. Actually this phenomenon began to 
change during the second tenure of the fourth generation leadership. In the central party 
committee, the proportion of technocrats rose from merely 2% in 1982 to 51% in 1997, but 
declined to 36% in 2007.201 This can best prove the professionalism pursuit of the third and 
fourth generation and also revealed the new trends with the present leadership. 
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 Undoubtedly, the education background has major effects on the decision-making. 
Priority on industrialization and economic development had given favorability to 
professionals, technicians and scientists. In each level of governments, public service 
organizations, the SOEs, people’s associations (ren min tuan ti), professionals prevail and 
have greater say. Financial, policy, and human resources were poured to production sector. 
Instead, environmental protection, social welfare such as medical care, education and 
housing, social and cultural development were left behind without sufficient investment. 
Efficiency goes first and equality is a secondary concern. The top leadership had a basic idea 
of making the cake first before they could divide it evenly and properly. Without background 
in political science or law, they have different understanding of free press and association; 
based on their own experience as technological elites, they may not realize the extreme 
importance of democratic procedures and social participation. For them, the party legitimacy 
comes from its performance in reduction of poverty, GDP growth, and improved living 
standard instead of election with due procedure. 
 Top former leadership Jiang Zemin’s experience with the June Fourth Incident, at the 
Tiananmen Square (he was major of Shanghai where his way of processing students’ protest 
and national ideological debate may have determined his attitude towards social 
participation) and his successor Hu Jintao’s experience in Tibet may have also contributed 
(he might be well aware about the importance of stability and order of the region). 
Admittedly, though both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao fall into the same category in terms of 
their approach in addressing social pressure, the former was more pro-democracy and 
liberty, probably related to his experience as governor of China’s most developed and open 
city of Shanghai, while most of Hu’s profile is within the Youth League where “ideological 
work” values more heavily than economic performance. China in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s witnessed more independent and influential media, which helped to cancel the 
“Compulsory Custody and Repatriation System” that led to the death of college student Sun 
Zhigang. 
 However, immediately after going into office, the Hu Jintao administration put out 
new regulations that tightened control over the media. The notorious “stability maintenance” 
under former Security Chief Zhou Yongkang is another proof for President Hu’s tightened 
social control. Even though there are speculations about Hu’s weak control of the Politburo 
in shadow of his predecessor President Jiang Zemin, it cannot simply explain why Zhou’s 
repression of media freedom, dissenters’ movements and liberal intellectuals intensified in 
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Hu’s second tenure when Jiang’s influence weakened for his health problems. The 
technocratic decision-making approach would be proper to explain why both third and 
fourth generation leadership did not favor social participation and rendered repressive 
gestures for any contentious attempts from the society.202 
 Following the same approach, the education profile of the new generation of Chinese 
leadership is very impressive in that all the 25 members of the politburo received college 
education. 5 out of the 25 members, including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, 
hold a doctorate degree. More impressively, 18 out of the 25 standing members of politburo 
major are in law, economics, management and other majors of humanities and social 
sciences, accounting for 68% of the politburo, indicating there would be great change with 
the decision-making approach. President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Vice President 
Li Yuanchao all have a degree in law. In addition, both Zhou Qiang, the President of the 
Supreme People’s Court and Cao Jianming, president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
have also a degree in law. Governance of lawyers seems to be a common practice in 
developed world, a large proportion of whose top leaders have background in law. This 
seems to be especially true with their legal architecture. However, it is a huge progress for 
China, especially compared with former leadership in the first and second generation who 
grew up and won nuclear power via violence, cruel struggle among “comrades” for “routes”, 
and realist power competition. Hopefully, the legal background of top leadership would be 
conducive to rule of law, human rights protection and better governance. Especially in times 
of surging disparity, intensified social conflicts, wide-spread dissenters’ movements, 
increasing human rights activists, and growing awareness in political participation, 
governmental practice in rule of law remain as the core of governance. 
 
            3. Power Structure among Elites 
 Power structure of China’s government has also undergone far-reaching and in-depth 
changes. Among top leadership, regular, peaceful and procedurally legitimate transition of 
top leadership has been gradually realized. By comparing the leadership transition 
respectively in 1989-1992, 2002 and 2012, one can find that the CCP has made huge 
progress in institutionalization, and has transited from a revolutionary party to a modern 
political party. Both power transition at the down of the Reform and Opening-up program, 
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the crackdown of “Gang of Four” by Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor in 1976, 
and the Hua’s outmaneuver in December 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, a senior revolutionary 
who later became pragmatic reformist leader, were unusual. The former transition was 
realized by violence, the latter was by forced resign and early retirement. Following Hua 
were reformist leaders of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who were removed from the posts 
by party seniors of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun in the 1980s. Power transition in 1989 and 
until 1992 highly resembles the case between 1976 and 1978. Understandably, decisions 
were made by senior revolutionaries based on factional struggles among top leadership. The 
struggle is partially individual power struggle but more competition among different roads 
of national development (more reformism or more conservatism, in a comparative sense. 
However, we must admit that both Deng and Chen were pro-reform more generally). 
 The leadership transition from the third (headed by former President Jiang Zemin) to 
the fourth (headed by former President Hu Jintao) was widely regarded by then as the most 
predictable and peaceful transfer of power in the history of the People’s Republic.203 But 
still, former President Jiang delayed to quit from his post as the Chair of CCP’s Central 
Military Committee, which, many believed is to retain influence for the next generation. 
One of the fruits of political reform by Hu Yaobang in the late 1980s is to ensure the senior 
officials, especially the old revolutionaries to retire regularly so that they will not intervene 
the economic and political reform under new domestic and international context. However, 
by retain the military position for another two years, as well as keeping the majority seat of 
his followers in the Politburo Standing Committee, former President Jiang was able to keep 
influence in the following five years or more. Maintaining of influence on civilian 
government by military is against the common practice of modern state, Jiang’s endeavors 
revealed the party ideology and power structure of the CCP in the early twentieth-first 
century. The situation completely changed when in 2012, institutional and regular transition 
of top power was realized under full-fledged Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang regime. 
 
              4. Check of Balance among Top Leaders of Generations and Factions 
 Jiang’s retaining power as chairman of the Party Military Committee also revealed 
the power competition between generations. Power competition and struggle between 
generations is not new. The competition between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng was 
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such a case. Though both Hua and Deng had rich experiences during the revolution and 
socialist construction period, they belong to different “generations”. Deng Xiaoping, born in 
1904, had been an eminent member and close ally of Mao Zedong during the early 
revolution, anti-Japanese war and Liberation War. In 1956, he was nominated as party-
secretary and member of the Politburo Standing Committee. In 1975, when the then Premier 
Zhou Enlai’s health condition worsened, Deng became the vice Chairman of the Party, Vice 
Premier and vice chair of the Military Committee, the actual leader of the State Council. On 
the other hand, Hua Guofeng, born in 1921, used to be Guerrila leaders in Shanxi and local 
leaders in Hunan until 1971. He skyrocketed to nuclear power because of Mao Zedong. 
Deng’s experience, competence and prestige within the party was far beyond Hua. In early 
1976, Hua denied the return of Deng in political life and this later became one of his 
“mistakes”.204 But it revealed the struggle of power between Hua and Deng as leaders of 
different “generations”. 
 In another occasion in the late 1980s, when political reform under then Party 
Secretary Hu Yaobang deepened, Hu himself proposed to reform the personnel system of 
leadership (ling dao ti zhi), one of the major initiatives was to abolish the life tenure 
leadership system (ling dao zhong shen zhi) that targeted against the party elders since the 
latter had intervened the political reform with their outmoded doctrines. Hu undertook to 
abolish the life tenure leadership system by the Thirteenth party congress in 1987.205 His 
attacks against the corruption of the princelings had also invited strong resents from the 
revolutionary elders (senbai).206 In the intraparty life meeting attended by top leadership 
(especially the elders from the Central Advisory Committee) held in January 10-15 that 
actually decided his “resign” from top leadership, Song Renqiong and Deng Liqun harshly 
criticized Hu for not “respecting” Deng Xiaoping and Deng’s ideas in major decisions 
concerning personnel reform.207 
 Between the third generation leader of former President Jiang Zemin Administration 
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and the fourth generation of former President Hu Jintao Administration, can be also seen 
tension in personnel arrangement and “roads” concerning national governance. For instance, 
Jiang Administration defined himself and his administration as “the Third Generation 
Leadership centered around Jiang Zemin”,208 after Mao Zedong and Jiang Zemin, while the 
former President Hu Jintao Administration is defined as “Central party with Hu Jintao as the 
General Secretary”, without defining him as “ Fourth Generation Leadership centered 
around Hu Jintao”. The present leadership of President Xi Jinping has inherited the term.209  
Apparently, Hu and Xi do not deem themselves as a generation, which is actually a term not 
appropriate to name the leaders of a modern polity. Therefore, the power and “routes” 
competition between generations seems to be also one major benchmark to understand the 
decision-making of the CCP. 
 Intra-party check of balance exists among the factions as well. As analyzed in the 
introductory part, Jiang’s rise to top power was based on the compromise between the 
reformist elder of Deng Xiaoping and the conservative Chen Yun on a relative basis. 
However, Jiang was supported basically by the princelings and represents largely the interest 
of entrepreneurs. The princelings have strong influence in and intensive involvement in the 
SOEs in power, energy, resources and financial sector, especially in center cities and wealthy 
east provinces. Former Premier Li Peng was also a typical princeling whose siblings are also 
very influential in the energy sector (his daughter Li Xiaolin is nicknamed Miss. No 1 of 
Electrical power, and his son now serves as vice governor of the resource-rich of Shanxi 
province). 
 While the next generation leadership, both former President Hu Jintao and Premier 
Wen Jiabao rose though the Youth League. Within his administration, Zhou Qiang, Ling 
Jihua, Wang Yang, and Liu Yandong who later become very influential state leaders. For 
instance, 4 provincial party secretaries (including Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao), 6 provincial 
governors, and 4 leaders of both Provincial People’s Congress and People’s Political 
Consultative Conference had been leaders of central or provincial Youth League. 
 Current President top leader Xi Jinping is no doubt a typical princeling, whose father 
Xi Zhongxun, was an early revolutionary and close ally of Deng during the reform era. He 
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used to be Party Head of Guangdong to lead the Reform and Opening-up in the 1980s. He 
had also been one of the 8 elders from the Central Advisory Committee administration. Like 
other princelings, Xi Jinping rose from Mayor of coastal Xiamen, a special economic zone 
as well as a pilot city of Reform and Opening-up, and later became Governor of Fujian, 
followed by Zhejiang province, and also Party head of Shanghai. Meanwhile, he also had 
been village head of least developed Shaanxi and county Party head of Hebei province, an 
experience typical for those who came from Youth League. Xi has full profile with his 
footprint covering township, county, municipal (Xiamen) and Provincial government. In his 
Administration, only Premier Li Keqiang grew into top leader from the League. In the 
Politburo, Wang Qishan, and Yu Zhengsheng are typical princelings. Liu Yunshan and 
Zhang Dejiang are both descendants of early revolutionaries. Two other competitive 
candidates from the League, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang failed to squeeze themselves into 
the top leadership. 
 However, if we look to the prospect of future leadership, the competitive candidates 
such as the former Youth League head and Guangdong Party head Hu Chunhua, the 
president of the Supreme Court Zhou Qiang, and the governor of Heilongjiang Lu Hao 
are/were all top leaders of the League. Given that Hu Yaobang had intensive experience with 
the League there seems to have an alternation between the two factions of princelings and 
the Youth League in China’s top leadership such as follows: League (1982-1989), 
Princelings (1989-2002), League (2002-2012), Princelings (2012-2022), League (2022-, 
possibly). 
 Given the distinctive differences between the two factions in priority, interest 
representation and doctrines, the competition between the two factions has created a kind of 
intra-party check and balance with upper political architecture. Following the factional 
politics between the League and Princelings, inter-regional shift of leadership has also 
occurred. In the former President Jiang’s Administration, more nationals were elevated from 
coastal areas, especially from Shanghai. Recently, grassroots-level experience is gaining 
importance because of Chinas serious problems with the peasants, the rural politics and 
agriculture. The huge migrants fueled by Chinese urbanization calling for those cadres with 
both rural and urban experience. China’s intension to address the rural-urban and inter-
regional disparity also needs expertise of governing rural localities. Most of the League, Hu, 
Wen, Li and the coming leaders of little Hu (Hu Chunhua) rose from grassroots. Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao had also worked in rural west of China. Sun Chunlan and Hu Chunhua, as 
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well as Zhang Chunxian all had worked in China’s west provinces. Understandably, they 
may have contesting ideas and proposals in major reform and foreign policy as well. 
Generation and factional competition for power, interest and legitimacy will be a major 
discourse change for interpreting any policy and decision-making process, and of course, in 
group incident as well. 
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Chapter 4: The Emerging Societal Forces and Political Decision-making 
 
 The prvious two chapters are devoted to assessment of the CCP. Chapter Two 
introduces the international and domestic environment in which the CCP has evolved along 
the years; and Chapter Three presents the structure and process in which the Party has 
adapted throughout different generations and leadership by pointing out its continuities and 
changes. Within this context, Chapter Four focuses on how societal forces made inroads into 
Chinese society in the past few decades and how these emerging societal forces are likely to 
influence the Chinese political decision-making. Thus this chapter begins by describing the 
differences between societal forces and civil society as well as the composition of these 
emerging forces. By analyzing the components and features of Chinese societal forces, the 
writer makes a tentative assessment of the involvement of social groups in Chinese decision-
making regarding the multiple incidents. 
 One can say that the emerging societal forces and their influence in Chinese political 
decision-making have appeared after the Reform and Opening-up. The complexity of 
China’s transformation after the program, however, is far-reaching and comprehensive. A 
general understanding trend of the reform is the retreat and shrinking of state power and 
expansion of society that had been unduly repressed before the late 1970s. This trend has 
left social spaces and opportunities for the growth of societal forces and seems to have 
major implications for China’s decision-making and political development as well. 
 
              1. Societal Forces versus Civil Society 
 Societal forces refer to groups, whose interests, purpose and values differ from 
government, and to those who collaborate in leading actions that changes governments’ 
decision-making, as well as to those whose involvement in governmental decision-making is 
relatively regularized, conventionalized or institutionalized and therefore traceable. Societal 
forces in this sense involve individuals and organizations such as individuals (public 
intellectual/opinion leaders, some famous members of the People’s Congress or the CCPCC, 
“VIP blog owners”, some social activists), NGOs, media, scholars, and public opinion. 
 The definition of societal forces should be compared and contrasted with the term of 
“civil society” which is normally adopted by Western scholars, as the arena of uncoerced 
collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional 
forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market; though in practice, the 
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boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and 
negotiated. 210  Notably, civil society requires the basic divided, separate and mutually 
independent sets of systems between the state and the society, without the former 
manipulating, repressing or replacing the latter. 
 Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional 
forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often 
populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental 
organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business 
associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.211 Therefore, the Western term of civil society 
may not suit to the Chinese society well. The Chinese government has been vigilant against 
an opposition party, class, organization or social group. It had even refused the term in 
recent years. Most importantly, because of the authoritarian nature of Chinese government 
and its rigid control over the society, civil society in general, is underdeveloped and 
fragmented. The way it functions is diametrically different from a democratic society. This is 
the most important reason for the writer to adopt the term “societal forces”. Thus, societal 
forces and civil society are different in the following ways: 
 1) Civil society requires those social forces to be organized, conventionally operated, 
and predictable. While societal forces could be fragmented and more diverse. Often it takes 
the form of a contemporary loose union in one public incident or social movements, 
therefore, the term societal forces are China-specific. 
 2)  Civil society has a private and non-governmental nature. While societal forces 
here refer to those groups whose interest, purpose and values are different from 
governments. Therefore, semi-governmental or government-affiliated organizations, even 
governmental organizations, sometimes adopted its individual policy that differentiate 
themselves from the systemic action or reaction, and therefore are regarded as societal 
forces, provided that they differentiates themselves from the “government”, and join the 
masses in public affairs. In such cases, the responses of such a government has distracted 
themselves from the government tack and become part of society. The phenomenon cannot 
be simply explained by factional politics or bureaucracy. As in the case of Wenzhou train 
clash, where the Wenzhou municipal government had displayed very subtle differences from 
                                                        
210  London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/CCS/home.aspx 
211 Ibid. 
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the statement of the central government and the then Ministry of Railways who tried to 
avoid due responsibility as an interest group. 
 3) Non-profit. Non-profit is one of the mayor criteria to identify civil society. Its 
major purpose is to differentiate civil society from business organizations who seek profit 
instead of focusing on the public good. Societal forces, on the other hand, contain those 
profit-seeking enterprises that influence the decision-making. Though in all the cases of this 
study, there was not any entrepreneur or enterprise involvement in the decision-making in an 
incident; business organizations are included in the grouping of societal forces. Particularly 
if taken into account that many of China’s societal organizations have been registered as 
enterprises since they were not able to register as “social groups” according to legal and 
technical restrictions set in official guidelines. Legally they are not different from profit-
seeking companies. However, most of their activities are non-profitable. The absorb 
donations from enterprises, individuals, churches, and other social organizations. Some 
Chinese companies and NGOs also accept foreign investments. 
  4) Self-governing. Since civil society is made up of various organizations, societies, 
and associations, they enjoy autonomy in their own realm. This autonomy is a result of their 
financial independence, and is also protected by the constitution. Behind this is the deeply 
embedded value of individualism typical of western culture. The community is an entity 
made up of independent but innately-connected individuals. The community exists because 
of that of the individuals, while, Oriental culture falls into the opposite category, which we 
call collectivism, where individuals are part of a system or integral organ. The individuals 
survive and thrive because the system does. Therefore, the cultural community calls for 
individuals obeying, serving and sacrificing for the community. This Oriental culture is the 
root of Oriental totalitarian and autocratic tradition. This culture stream was developed by 
Chinese feudalist dynasties and has been partially reinforced by communist ideology and 
revolution that were to build a human society free from individualism and private 
ownership. After the Communist takeover of mainland China, it reconstructed and 
reorganized Chinese society with a fundamentalist doctrine, and surpressed society, leaving 
very little space for social autonomy. Therefore, self-governance is neither legally applicable 
nor practical because of the underdeveloped civil organizations, public awareness and 
sufficient expertise. The major benchmark for societal forces defined here is whether they 
have an independent stance from the government and create pressure for decision-making, 
most often, in a group incident. 
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 5) Voluntary. The core essence for civil society is that it constitutes an arena where 
coercion, either from external (state power, especially) or from within an organization or 
community, is absent, therefore allowing the existence of a discursive public sphere or 
citizens. Apparently, the Chinese government has been quite vigilant against such an arena. 
It once appeared under the encouragement of the Party itself in 1957, when democratic 
scholars were asked to “criticize” the CCP and propose suggestions to improve the party 
leadership; and a second case start from the “Democratic Wall”, in Xidan district in Beijing, 
that began another wave of social discussion and participation all across the 1980s. Both 
ended with tragedy since they have crossed the bottom line set by the communist party. 
After the two waves of “civil society” discussions, a third wave in the public sphere 
appeared in the virtual space of the Internet that flourished for a while but shrank soon when 
the party tightened social controls. Thus, the discursive space is much greater than the pre-
reform era. Citizens have the freedom to discuss and criticize the government. However, the 
present state-societal interaction was more often achieved by pressure or contentious 
politics. Therefore, the studies in this research also take into account those forces that are 
motivated by state power. 
 Societal forces have differentiated stances or propensity from Chinese government. 
As a group, they have shared interests, purposes and values, though these interests, purposes 
and values may not be established and vary from time to time, and area to area. These forces 
may have regular channels to influence the decision-making process alone or in 
collaboration with other organizations. Scholars of China in general, but especially those 
who the writer considers as supporters of “democracy” in the introductory,212 are extremely 
keen on the implications of the increasingly active societal forces and equally in the 
emerging middle class, as the growth of China’s middle class has further implications 
beyond China’s domestic policy-making. According to Lieberthal (2010)   
“a large number of Chinese citizens who have acquired sufficient personal 
wealth to turn them into the types of discretionary consumers—of housing, 
appliances, vehicles, clothing, home-use products, information, and services—
                                                        
212 Frederick Marks, Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (Santa Barbara, Calif.: 
Praeger, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Middle Class Attitudes towards International 
Affairs: Nascent Liberalization?”, China Quarterly, Vol.179 (September, 2004): 603–28; David S. G. 
Goodman, ed., The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives (New York: Routledge, 2008); 
and Deborah Davis and Feng Wang, (eds.), Creating Wealth and Poverty in Post Socialist China 
(Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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that are the hallmarks of a middle class”.213  
 
The emerging middle class is likely to strengthen consumption in the international 
and domestic markets by consuming energy and luxury goods, for instance, or 
through business marketing, as well as economic growth and global climate 
initiatives. Societal forces and the middle class are different concepts based on 
different criterions of definition in this dissertation. Basically, societal forces have a 
much wider range and coverage than the middle class. However, the middle class is 
by no means part of the former term. Differentiation would be made throughout the 
analysis in the following section. 
 
              2. Middle Class, Civil Society and Societal Forces 
  Middle calls is a broad term used in sociology and can be also considered as an 
ambiguous term in political science, especially if the studies refer to the Chinese middle 
class due to Chinese political rigidity and economic inequality in which the term is involved. 
The following sections allows the readere to understrand what is the Chinese emerging 
middle class is and its political implications. 
 
           2.1. The Chinese emerging middle class and their political attitude 
 China’s emerging middle class is generally made up of the three clusters below on an 
occupational and socioeconomical basis. 214  Firstly, economic clusters are made up of 
entrepreneurs, senior and middle managers from state-owned companies (SOCs), especially 
in energy, financial and high-tech sectors, as well as foreign investment companies and some 
large private companies. Middle class in the economic sector also contains some small urban 
business owners and farmers who have benefited heavily from land transactions fueled by 
booming real estate in the past 10 years. For example, a large amount of government 
compensation and resettlement in the form of housing brings a life comparable or even 
better to a senior managers with a private or SOCs, even though they are not often regarded 
as middle class according to Western experience. 
                                                        
213  Lieberthal, Kenneth. Forward. In.: Cheng Li, (ed.) China’s emerging middle class: beyond 
economic transformation, The Brookings Institute, 2010. 
214 I would like to thank Cheng Li from the Brookings Institute for the categorization of the clusters 
here borrowed from his ideas from his inspiring book China’ Emerging Middle Class: Beyond 
Economic transformation (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). Further elaboration 
and adjustment are made by the author. All citations and references will be clarified. 
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 Secondly, political clusters of middle class contain higher and middle ranking 
officials, lower ranking officials with relatively “resource-rich” departments, heads of 
functional department, and local governors. In terms of income, these clusters can by no 
means be ranked as middle class. However, Chinese bureaucrats and public servants enjoy 
institutional welfare in housing, medical care, children’s education and other potential 
benefits that are not necessarily categorized as corrupt or illegal. Crony capitalism 
characterized by “mutually beneficial ties” between political leaders and business is almost 
common practice. In order to appease the officials who are paid poorly while relying on 
them to develop the economy, the CCP seems to have rendered an astonishing tolerance of 
official-business ties that allow the cadres to benefit handsomely, and more importantly 
“legally”. The benefit could be legal additional income as a bonus, bribes, entrepreneur 
subsidy for luxury consumption, and schooling of children and other favor provided to their 
family members, or even mistress (es). Therefore, middle range officials and local cadres are 
certainly part of the emerging middle class. 
 Thirdly, intellectual clusters that contain renowned scholars, within-regime 
intellectuals, senior media journalists, and especially those bureaucratic intellectuals or 
intellectual bureaucrats at universities, research institutions, or think tanks. Intellectuals 
refer to those which work is solely based on intellectual work or “thought”. Not all workers 
who conduct research within an organization are middle class. Considering that the average 
income of a university teacher (even including professors) is quite low and not enough to 
support the usually “middle class” life style. The intellectual middle class refers to those 
“famous mouths” and renowned scholars who have often been invited by businesses for 
“guidance”, TV programs, academic, and popular broadcasting companies and therefore 
benefit economically from the new social engagement in Chinese society. Within-regime 
intellectuals refer to scholars affiliated to an important party or government division (central 
party school, for instance), that have good relations with the party or government branches, 
working for them (either as advisory jobs or ideological work which supports the 
government), and therefore have gained extra benefits from the regime. 
 Some senior journalists, freelance writers, frequent commentators especially (for 
media attached to the financial sector) may also be regarded as part of the middle class. 
Most bureaucratic intellectuals or intellectual bureaucrats, those professors and researchers 
with an administrative post as dean from a public university, director of a research institute, 
can be considered as part of the middle class, because usually they have access to more 
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academic (research funding) resources that allow them to be economically better off than 
other average colleagues. For instance the director of a secondary research institute within 
the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is a director-general level official. He or she 
can be considered at least part of the middle class and may be also regarded as part of the 
political elite. 
 The three clusters essentially outline the basic strata that make up the Chinese 
emerging middle class. Besides, the upper-level of the professional groups which include 
lawyers, doctors and those involved in financial and consultancy services (almost all of 
which are undoubtedly a pillar of the middle class in advanced economies), investors in real 
estate and stock markets, as well as entrepreneurs and some businessmen may also be 
deemed as part of the new Chinese middle class. Some farmers can be also raised as 
examples of being part of the middle class, especially because some of them have been 
enriched by receiving huge amounts of compensation from the government or real estate 
investors and also by having close ties with senior officials from who they also benefited 
through business relationship. 
 However, how many middle classes have China produced? What is their political 
attitude? How do they involve themselves in decision-making? What is their role in the 
incidents and social crisis? If they do have a role, what it would be? We have to admit that it 
is fairly hard to estimate the proportion of middle class in China. In 2006, Merrill Lynch 
estimated that China would have a middle class of 350 million people by 2016, accounting 
for 32% of the adult population.215 Another joint study conducted by the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and MasterCard projected a total of 100 million 
middle class households by 2016.216 China’s expanding middle class is in line with the 
global trend and therefore quite reliable. The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects of 
2007 estimated an expansion of the global middle class from 7.6 percent of the world’s 
population in 2000 to something between 16.1 and 19.4 percent of the world’s population by 
2030.217 Another report from Goldman Sachs also avers the global middle class will expand 
from 29 percent of the world’s population in 2008 to approximately 50 percent in 2030.218  
Despite the difference in the estimated figures, the general trends revealed by the studies 
                                                        
215 Merrill Lynch, China Consumer Brands Participation Certificate (Singapore, April 2008). 
216 See: www.singtaonet.com/chinafin/200712/t20071210_688541.html 
217 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization (2007). 
218 Dominic Wilson and Raluca Dragusanu, “The Expanding Middle: The Exploding World Middle 
Class and Falling Global Inequality,” Global Economics Paper 170 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 
2008). 
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above show similarities and without doubt, China as the most populous country and the 
fastest growing economy should be the major contributor to this wave of expansion of the 
middle class. 
 Chinese urbanization can also tell us part of this story. Along with the rapid 
urbanization and industrialization, the number of urban residents grew significantly since the 
reform. According to official statistics, the share of the urban population rose significantly 
from 18% in 1978 to 31% in 1999 (with an increase of 222 million of urban population) and 
further grew to 43% of the total population in 2005, that means 562 million were living in 
urban cities by the end of 2005. The rate rose continuously to 50.3% in 2012. And by the 
end of 2014, 54.7% of China’s population lived in urban areas. It has been estimated that by 
2020, over 60% of China’s total population will be living in urban cities.219 
 The geographical relocation of Chinese residents to  urban areas is also changing the 
economic and political landscape of China. Once has to also take into account the 
demographical structure of the population. Among half of the rural population, a large 
proportion comprises of the eldly, the women and children. Most of the young workers have 
moved to urban cities to look for better job opportunities and a better life. Not like the rural 
society, most localities are pouring investment mainly into their urban areas and are working 
very hard to incorporate migrant workers by providing insurance, medical care and 
schooling for children of migrant workers. Currently the government is working on making 
medical care insurance and other social security accounts transferable among regions. In the 
past migrant workers often lost their social security account and the accumulated money in it 
if he/she moved to within the country. The government is also working on to reform the 
household registration system (called hu kou) that limits the free flow of labor and limits the 
migrants’ rights and access to social welfare, education and medical care. Some places are 
already providing permission to migrant workers. The permission allows them to live legally 
as local residents and based on this, there will be an increasing welfare bond to it. 
 If standardization comes true, relatives of those migrant workers will also move into 
cities and may push urbanization to a much higher rate. Thus, the implications do not rest at 
the change of numbers regarding the urbanization rate. But the phenomenon of urbanization 
would significantly influence the social participation and decision-making related to 
government matters. Yet what one may consider is that the population in rural areas, are 
largely apolitical because of the basically dysfunctional local electorate and insufficient 
                                                        
219 Li, S. “China’s urbanization rate to reach 60% in 20 years”, People’s Daily, 2001-05-17. 
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incentives for people to vote, as well as the ubiquitous corruption at grassroots level of 
government and the lack of benefit,220 resulting in the absence of representatives for their 
most interests. Therefore the rural population, though very large in number, has been 
excluded from the political decision-making process. However, once they merge into big 
cities and can be daily politicized as well as allured by relevant interest such as in form of 
unemployment, housing subsidies or schooling policies, their desire to get involved in 
political life may increase. Even if they are not willing to be politicized in a conspicuous 
manner, they will be extensively exposed to media as well as to their community, and may 
unconsciously take part in decision-making factors either as a concern for social stability or 
an opportunity for practicing good governance. As a result, they will likely integrate 
themselves into urban life and grow influenced by the middle class whose political attitude 
has influenced the way of involving decision-making. 
 
             2.2. Growing political consciousness of the middle class 
  Changes not only happened with the number of middle classes, but in the ideology 
of the classes’ members. The bourgeoning middle class is still expanding in terms of 
population numbers and with their acquired wealth, and growing social influence, their self-
consciousness and pursuit for external recognition will certainly increase. Thus, if their new 
pursuits such as protection of their wealth, political rights and decision-making rights arise, 
their consciousness in participation and involvement will become more pro-active. 
 In fact, a similar situation has been seen among a group of incidents in China of 
which the writer has been working on. The Xiamen and Dalian PX plant incident and the 
Wenzhou Train crash 221 are some of the cases to be raised here. The Chinese middle class 
                                                        
220 One can admit that in coastal areas of the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze Delta, grassroots 
level election has been quite developed and there are many innovative incentives by lower level 
governments to encourage populist participation. Most eminently, in places of Wenzhou, local 
government had invented the form of “Meeting for Consultation of villagers” (恳谈会), which had 
aroused intensive scholarly interest and had been granted by the Central Bureau of Compilation and 
Translation. However, in rural areas of China’s inland provinces where most migrant workers come 
from, political participation generally remains ineffective and unsatisfactory. 
221  The Wenzhou Speed Train Clash is a major accident resulted from design flaws, sloppy 
management and mishandling of a lightning strike that crippled equipment and led to a bullet train 
crash that killed 40 people, leaving 172 others injured. The relatives of victims (mostly middle 
class), supported by mass media, social activists, NGOs, intellectuals and other societal forces had 
ensured the government to investigate the accident, and drew reliable conclusion based on which, 54 
officials and railway workers, including Former Minister of Railways, were  punished, and the 
compensation for the victims raised from the originally proposed RMB 172,000 to 915,000. The 
author believes the “success” of societal involvement could be partially attributed to the skillful 
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has shown a stronger sense of “rights maintenances” (wei quan), and become more astute in 
dealing with the media, government and other institutions. They have sufficient basic legal 
knowledge and because of this, their attitude is pragmatic and rational. Therefore, their 
critical engagement with the government and their participation in the decision-making 
process has been shown to be more effective. Compared to the many social uprising and 
protests by the grassroots, those protests attended or mainly led by middle class showed 
distinctive features. On the other hand, cases such as the Weng’an protest,222 for instance, 
were often a release of anger, involving the government was often done via the form of 
pressure politics or contentious politics. They air their anger and the governments responds 
to their pressure based on their own judgment. Deeming the events as a trouble or crisis they 
should have avoided and that should be immediately solved, their responsiveness often rests 
with appeasement of the anger, instead of finding a solvation to the unrest. 
 In cases such as the Wukan Land Protest and the Xiamen PX Incident, interaction is 
a two way process, each side received information and responded according to the other. 
Communication, coordination and persuasion play an important role besides negotiation and 
compromise. Both sides are willing to listen since both deem the other side to be rational 
and negotiable, if not persuadable. Therefore, the interaction is often conducted in a peaceful 
and rational manner. Chinese society has not yet developed a culture of negotiation between 
the government and society, sometimes as the last resort, violence is adopted as a choice 
without choice (those who burn themselves as a protest against the government or some 
other functional authority in a land dispute) to arouse public awareness. 
 However, generally speaking, evidence has shown that violence often brings 
unexpected results and it sometimes justifies government repression, which the government 
regards as a simple yet effective way to settle a protest. Especially before the event has 
attracted enough audience or has not been exposed to media, violence often kills the 
prospect for a better solution. In this sense, the way the Chinese middle class engages the 
government has shown to have a far-reaching impact. With better legal knowledge, more 
                                                                                                                                                                          
strategy of the middle class passengers’ relatives.  
222 A riot occurred on June 28, 2008, which involved tens of thousands in Weng'an, a rural town in 
remote Guizhou Province of Southwest China, to protest against the police’s verdict of “suicide” of 
15 year-old schoolgirl, Li Shufei, since rumors circulated that she was murdered and that the 
conclusion of “suicide” was drawn because of corruption. The protests displayed the lost credibility 
of government and grassroots’ lack of trust in government officials. This kind of protest is quite 
common in the underdeveloped inland rural west. A similar case also happened in Shishou of Hubei 
province in June 2009 when the death of a male cook led to a major riot attended by several 
thousand of people.  
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social resources, either economic, personal ties with government organizations, access to 
superior political power, the middle class will first resort to institutional/ lawful measures, 
and in their intensive interaction with the political system, they have gradually learned the 
expertise and “skills” necessary for bargaining with the political decision-making body. 
 Compared with domestic expertise, their international vision has also empowered 
them with better bargaining skills. The Reform and Opening-up program can be considered  
to some extent the internationalization of China’s politics. Here internationalization does not 
mean the international exposure of China’s domestic politics, but refers to China’s learning 
from international practices and adjusting to international standards. Many widely used 
terms, i.e. democracy, good governance, right to know, public good, citizenship, and 
accountability just to name a few, were generally borrowed from experiences and statement 
from “Western” discourses. The Communist Party never denied such universally accepted 
values. The middle class has used those terms and international practices to negate measures 
taken by government. 
 In the most recent case of the Tianjin chemical explosion which had claimed 159 
lives (by September 1, 2015), an article circulated at that moment in Beijing’s media 
regarding the principle of “burn down” has attested that literally, the best strategy in a 
chemical explosion is to wait until everything were burned down because of the extreme 
danger and uncertainty, which was considered as “international practice”. 223  This 
explanation had been circulated intensively around the knowledge circle. The article 
provided evidence to question or negate the improper directions and orders of the fire-
fighting authority so fight fire knowing or not knowing the materials that led to explosion 
were chemical which led to the unnecessary death of scores of fire-fighters. The term “burn 
down” was also adopted to question the unprofessionalism of the firefighting practices in the 
case of Tianjin. 
 Since the Opening-up, a large number of young Chinese students have studied 
overseas, they have been used to the lifestyle of their hosting countries, enjoyed the efficient 
service of foreign governments, and had watched closely the way democratic countries 
work, and the various protests organized by locals. 
      China’s growing body of educated population and its deepened opening-up and intensive 
international exchange has helped spread global norms, such as democracy, liberal rights, 
                                                        
223 Here the debate on “burn down” is provided as a short sample to explain the characteristics of 
middle class in engaging the government. The writer is not responsible for technical correctness of 
the term “burn down”, nor does he holds any stance concerning the term. 
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human rights protection, government accountability, which have been generally accepted by 
even the most ordinary Chinese. New visitors to Beijing may be surprised that a taxi driver 
should chat with him or her about domestic or international politics with the above-
mentioned terms, though their understanding of those terms may be different from 
professionals or academics. The increasing number of Chinese returning from overseas has 
also contributed to the ideological change of the Chinese. A recent statistic shows that 
Chinese students in the U.S. reached 274,439 during academic year 2013-2014, accounting 
for 31% of all America’s international students. 224  China’s  Ministry of Education reported 
a total of over 459,800 Chinese studying abroad from 1978 to 2014 and a total of 1,809,600 
had returned to China.225 
 The values and norms of free gatherings, free speech, human rights protection, and 
governmental accountability appeal to this large educated population. Sometimes, even short 
term visits or tours to a foreign country helps reshape the knowledge and value of ordinary 
people. According to a recent statistic, the number of Chinese travelling overseas grew from 
10.5 million in 2000 to more than 107 million in 2014.226 They are aware of their political 
and economic rights, eager to be successful in economical and political sectors and remain 
critical of the many restraints from the political system and bureaucratic organizaiton. 
Therefore, they keep an eye on the decision-making of the political system and criticize the 
government via various publications in newspapers, magazines, internet-based communities, 
blog, and Weibo thus pushing attitudes concerning public affairs. 
 
             3. What Are Societal Forces Composed of? 
 
  According to the definition above, the groups below could be regarded as Chinese 
societal forces that are influential in the decision-making process. 
 
              3.1. Public Opinion (yu lun) 
                                                        
224  Wang Huiyao, Miao Lv, Annual Report on the Development of Chinese Students Studying 
Abroad (2013-2014), Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 
http://www.ccg.org.cn/Research/View.aspx?Id=1526, 2015-08-8. 
225 China Ministry of Education, Bluebook of China’s Returned Overseas Students working in China, 
2014, 
http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_fbh/moe_2069/s7861/s8441/s8443/201411/t20141127_178852
.html, 2015-08-12. 
226 Chinese Travelling Overseas in the Past Fourth Years: From Once a Lifetime to Travel Overseas 
on Weekend”, http://www.bj.xinhuanet.com/fw/2015-02/02/c_1114215495.htm, 2015-08-08. 
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  Public opinion refers to an aggregate of the individual views, attitudes, and beliefs 
about a particular topic, expressed by a significant proportion of a community.227 Generally 
speaking, scholars tend to treat the aggregate as a synthesis of the views of all or a certain 
segment of society. However, others may regard it as a collection of many differing or 
opposing views.228 Public “opinion” may be different, fragmented, but there is always one 
major opinion prevailing among all others, and attracts the largest audiences. That is the one 
“public opinion” that matters. 
 Public opinion is not a statement from an established group of people or 
professionals. It composes a changing group of people from various backgrounds, in terms 
of their education, occupation, economic and social status, as well as gender and nationality, 
etc. Public opinion concerns public affairs, often government affairs. Therefore, it is also 
defined as “the aggregate of public attitudes or beliefs about government or politics”.229 
They affect major decision-making through wide discussion, airing their voices through 
public media (writing articles, having interviews, putting up posters, protests), therefore 
creating great social pressure for governmental decision-making. 
 Public opinion develops based on background from political socialization, education, 
life experience, political parties, the media, and the government itself.230 Public opinion 
functions in major public affairs, especially through public crisis when government, under 
pressure of interest groups, adopts policies apparently unfair for the general masses. In 
Western society, public opinion is very influential. Some prestigious opinion polls are often 
used by government branches as important references in their decision-making. In the U.S., 
for instance, the results of opinion polls sometimes even influence the result of the 
presidential election.231 In Japan, various opinion polls have also been influential in policy 
formation.232 
 Public opinion doesn't not only function in the form of opinion poll. In democratic 
                                                        
227 Speier, Hans. 2013. Historical Development of Public Opinion. American Journal of Sociology. 
Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jan., 1950), pp. 376-388. See also: Encyclopedia Britannica, Available at: 
http://global.britannica.com/topic/public-opinion. 
228  See: Tang, W.; Iyengar, S. The Emerging Media System in China: Implications for Regime 
Change. Political Communication 28 (3): 263–267. 2011. 
229 Bianco, William T., and David T. Canon. "Public Opinion." In American Politics Today. 3rd ed. 
New York: W.W. Norton, 2013. 
230 Ibid. 
231 McCombs, Maxwell E. Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion. Cambridge : 
Polity, 2014. 
232  Ishibashi, Natsuyo. The Dispatch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces to Iraq: Public Opinion, 
Elections, and Foreign Policy. Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 5 (September/October 2007), pp. 766-789. 
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regimes, public opinion is a “soft” part of the decision-making process adopted to justify and 
legitimize government policy, and also as an “undue” (non-procedural) review of a 
designated policy. 
 China also has opinion polls but because of China’s journalistic system, content of 
opinion polls concerning the government or policies remain as a taboo. The small-scale polls 
conducted by mainstream media often serve for political needs and are therefore are not so 
reliable. Sometimes, opinion polls conducted by governmental organizations among certain 
groups of people even cheat by selecting their favored interviewees. In order to achieve 
wanted result, falsification or even fabrication is not rare.233 In academia, many scholars 
have conducted reliable opinion polls; however, most of them target on a relatively small 
group of people for academic analysis. They often circulate among the academic community 
with limited influence. The topic of their research often concerns issues that have long-term 
and far-reaching meanings, and may fall short of the timeliness which reduces the practical 
effect of their polls. Therefore, opinion polls are not the major channel for public opinion to 
play a role. In most of the cases adopted by this research, public opinion serves via societal 
pressure in discourse of contentious politics. They are invisible in that one cannot find 
public opinion directly in any organizational form. However, public opinion is also 
ubiquitous in full exposure of media coverage, Internet discussion, real-time social media 
(especially WeChat very recently).    
 
            3.2. Mass Media 
 In democratic societies, the role of mass media is so prominent that it is regarded as 
the “the fourth power”, after the administrative, legislative and judicial power. In autocratic 
states, mass media also plays a vital role in that it constitutes the very few means to inspect 
and contain the unlimited political power. Chinese media has long been, and is presently still 
under censorship of the CCP and state authorities. Communication systems under 
authoritarian regimes rarely extend beyond transmitting, faming and interpreting for the 
audience the decisions and actions of the government. 234  They facilitate government 
recruitment, socialization and mobilization, hence communications have distinct social and 
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political responsibilities of social control and nation building that are consistent with the 
development of priorities and ideological assumptions of the regime.235 
 However, as media developed from square to cubic (paper media, digital media, and 
more importantly Internet), censorship of mass media by any government is getting 
increasingly difficult. In particular, the rapid development of the Internet over the past 10 
years has brought China the second largest population of “netizens” after the U.S.. 236 The 
nature of the Internet makes it even more difficult for the CCP and governmental censorship 
over mass media, though it could use the aforementioned “Green Dam” and the nine major 
Internet gates to restrict the flow of information to China. 
 The inner driver of China’s media change dates back to the market-orientated reform 
and restructuring of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s when most media that  
used to be fully funded by the government, became financially independent and had  to 
make profit as an ordinary business. This change was significant, since financial 
independence also means autonomy in their operation. In order to survive the market, media 
has to “serve” the market. The political and social implications of that decision are still 
unfolding as the Chinese government, media, and the society were still adapting mutually to 
each other and to the changed political and social and information environment. But it is true 
that it has brought, for many, the spring for Chinese journalism. Many media elites with 
ideals quit the regime to establish their own media in China’s coastal Guangdong and 
Shanghai areas where media enjoyed greater freedom. One of the famous newspapers, 
which had played an essential role in a major case of this research, the South Metropolis 
Newspaper, was launched in January 1, 1997. It was also China’s first in-depth investigatory 
newspaper. The identity changes of the media from a propaganda mouthpiece into a 
watchdog agent are far-reaching. From then on, the media has been involved in each major 
event in Reform and Opening-up program, and it is safe to say that no progress in decision-
making and political development would be possible if the role of media is absent. As 
displayed in some of the cases, when media access was completely denied and the space for 
maneuver between journalists and political authorities was completely denied, societal 
engagement did not bring any results. 
 Chinese media themselves have undergone fundamental changes and their role has 
been expanding over the past decade or more. As it has shown in public affairs through cases 
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such as the outbreak of SARS and the Sun Zhigang incident, as well as the Sichuan Great 
Earthquake, anti-corruption campaign, Xiamen PX plant incident, the Qianyunhui case, the 
Wukan protest, and the Wenzhou Train clash, the role of the media themselves has changed 
from merely a record of the CCP and the government, to a more independent role in 
inspecting and containing political power, truth-teller, and promoter of joint actions, 
organizer of social movement, and conventionally, as an educator and as an agent of 
socialization. As Chinese media became more mature, it also serves as an independent 
player with its own attitude, propensity, and values in major social happenings, especially in 
a period of crisis. Among those multiple roles played by the media, the most important one 
has been truth-teller and carrier of public opinion that creates strong societal pressure, and 
becomes part of the decision-making process. Therefore, the writer would like to examine 
the role of the mass media in the decision-making process of each case and figure out how it 
functions and in what pattern it interacts with other societal forces and well as the decision-
making organs. 
 This said, constrained by the political system and its media management system, 
Chinese media cannot simply perform their normal roles as in the case of the Western media. 
Especially given that there is a great anxiety of conflicting identities that the Chinese media 
holds simultaneously. The media have to balance their role to serve to grandmothers: the 
party and the market. 237  The former requires it to be consistent with party’s doctrine, 
favorability and priority, while the latter needs the media to play a more diverse, 
professional, and “social” role. Often the directives and guidelines they receive from the 
party propaganda division tend to be against the spirit of professionalism that favors the 
“rights to know” of the public, neutrality of the media itself and other technical details. For 
known reasons, professional lives of Chinese investigative reporters are extremely short, 
they often work under high-pressured sometimes dangerous work environments, maneuver 
with difficulty with the uncooperative bureaucratic system and its affiliates and other parties; 
suffer from severe censorship imposed on their reporting, and the often low input 
inconsistent with their paychecks. Several very prominent and committed investigative 
journalists died young, including the most recent death of Chief Reporter Guo Guoliang 
(1983-2014) of the Zhuhai News Center, Southern Metropolis Daily. Guo had a very special 
role in the Wenzou Train Clash accident. 
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 In January 2004, half a year after the Sun Zhigang’s case, Deputy Chief Editor Yu 
Huafeng, Li Mingying, senior investigator and head of social committee of the South 
Metropolis Group; and another former Deputy Chief Editor Deng Haiyan from the Southern 
Metropolis Daily were accused of corruption which later developed into a major political-
legal case since it was regarded as persecutions of their journalist freedom for their role in 
the Sun Zhigang’s case and their disclosure of the Guangdong government in withholding 
true information during the outbreak of SARS which caused panic among population. The 
case had incited a long legal bettle until very recently when an important Guangdong Party 
leader was arrested for corruption, who was believed to be deeply involved in the legal case 
of the South Metropolis Newspaper. As of 2008, the international NGO Freedom House 
ranked China 181 worst out of 195 countries in terms of press restrictions, and Chinese 
journalists have been aptly described as “dancing in shackles”.238 Without strong will and 
journalistic ideals, seldom can an ordinary reporter endure the pressure of an investigative 
job. It is also for this reason that media participation in decision-making is most valuable. It 
also shows how different societal participation is without institutional protection of 
journalism in an autocracy. 
 
            3.3. Professionals 
 Professional expertise proves to be very import in crisis management, emergency 
response, legal affairs, and state-society interaction, especially in times of questioning 
government authority and in incidents where the government (in most of the cases, local 
governments) often withhold information and avoid taking due responsibilities. On the one 
hand, people need official evidence to support their pursuit. Evidence has shown that often a 
report of a scientific test or technical expertise provided by qualified and specialized 
reporting institutions helps greatly. For the government, in order to prove the credibility of 
their stance, they are willing to rely on professional organizations. In a word, both 
government and society for their expertise, neutrality, and objectiveness often trust 
professional organizations. In most social incidents as this study will analyze, professionals 
play an essential role. 
 Professionals in this research study cover lawyers and legal experts, medical and 
medical-legal experts, as well as engineers, and others professionals. Because many cases of 
societal involvement concern human rights violations, abuses of power, and other legal 
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affairs, the expertise of lawyers or legal specialist are important, such as in the example of 
Sun Zhigang’s case, the suggestion of a lawyer to do a medical-legal test proved to be very 
important since the test confirmed the real death was caused by physical torture instead of 
disease based on a previous statement. 
 In the case of Wenzhou Train Crash, because of the disputes between “the technician 
cabal” and the “administration cabal” over the major causes of the train crash, reliable and 
neutral investigations from a third party was vital. Wang Mengshu, the Chief Scientist for 
China’s high-speed train and railway system, was mainly responsible for technological 
development for China’s new locomotive trains. Wang firmly believes that the major cause 
of the severe accident lies in the negligence and malversation of the conducting center and 
the actions of the driver (who also died in the accident), as one train had stopped and was 
stationary before the accident, and it was the train which ran after it that hit the train 
stationed before it. Therefore, it was because the conducting center had given wrong 
directions to both trains that made the accident happen while in fact, the accident could have 
been avoided and had nothing to do with technical liability of the train. However, if this was 
the conclusion, the workers at the conducting station, the conductors of both trains 
(especially the ones that hit) would be responsible. 
 More importantly, public outrage was poured on the whole railway ministry that had 
long been criticized for its deficiency, poor service, and corruption. As usual, the head of 
regional railway systems and even the minister needed to assume responsibility. For the 
administration cabal of the ministry, attributing the accident to technical defection was a 
relatively more pragmatic choice since they had only developed the new technology within 
one decade, and the Chinese public may render an understanding attitude even if there is 
minor technically defect with the system. But doing so will also hurt the reputation of the 
Chinese high-speed train, which had become a proud achievement for China. Since both 
parties are stakeholders in the matter, a neutral third party investigation was very important 
in defining the major reason for the crash and further decided who should take the 
responsibility. 
 
             3.4. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
 NGOs are an important part of the civil forces. In fact, various interest groups, 
societies and associations, civilian corporate and youth movements, are the major 
component of societal forces or the more commonly adopted term “civil society”. In terms 
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of numbers, the NGO family is large in China, which grew from some 100 in 1965 to more 
than 200,000 in 2000. Since the second half of the 1990s, “social groups”, the Chinese term 
for NGOs, have flooded all over China. By the end of 2013, China hosted over 500,000 
registered NGOs. Between 1988 and 2013, the number of registered NGOs had increased 
over 100 times, from merely less than 4,500 in 1988 to over 540,000 in 2013.239 This 
number does not contain those unregistered social organizations. A worker from the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs has admitted that registered civil organizations roughly account for about 
one-fifth to one-third of the total number.240 Many of them, however, have to register as 
enterprises while conducting the normally non-profit activities, making it fairly hard to track 
and observe their activities.241 
 However, Chinese NGOs have a dichotomy: those small organizations do not have 
sufficient means to influence the decision-making process, while those influential ones are 
almost exclusively non-political government-funded or government-affiliated, such as the 
Song Qingling Foundation.242  Meanwhile, the Chinese government greatly tightened its 
control over the NGOs after the “color revolutions” in Central Asia that further reduced the 
influence of the NGOs as a group. 
 The period of the research, 2002-2012, marked the rapid growth of the NGOs both in 
numbers and influence. The Hu Jintao-Wen regime had rendered greater tolerance, if not 
acceptance towards the NGOs. Sustained economic growth and the diversification of 
interests of the Chinese society, more importantly, since a factional disputes among “leftists” 
and “liberals” have nurtured a few very influential civil organizations in Beijing and other 
cities. Many foreign NGOs were allowed to open their offices in Beijing and a number of 
Chinese NGOs were established.243 Different from the NGOs under government branches 
and public service organizations whose activities were mostly confined to functional, 
professional or industries, the new type of the NGOs are more involved in public policy 
making. Not like the NGOs affiliated to government branches that had shown consistency in 
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their political attitude with the government, or international NGOs that concentrated on 
human rights and environmental protection, the new types of NGOs have implicit political 
propensities. 
 Put simply, they focus on political affairs, and are created to advocate certain 
political values and social policies. Their involvement in policy-making is more general and 
comprehensive. They regularly hold discussions, seminars, issue academic research papers 
and reports airing their concerns and perspectives about on-going reform and gained a lot of 
audience and influence with the decision-making process. Among them, the most influential 
leftist group is the “Utopian” (wu you zhi xiang), which adopts the Maoist ideology and calls 
for a just and more balanced society, always inviting experts from the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) or foreign universities. While another organization called the Transition 
Institute (chuan zhi xing she hui jing ji yan jiu suo) is typically a liberal one who favors 
“liberty, equality and human rights” and always holds discussions about sensitive topics 
such  as historical and present human rights abuses, they often invite U.S. embassy officials, 
human rights or environmental activists to give speeches, and publish manuals about 
taxation, human rights protection, etc. They also print educational materials concerning 
liberal philosophy, researches concerning rights of vulnerable groups such as taxi drivers, 
migrant workers, staying-at-home children (liu shou er tong) and women; they publish 
books and reports, and are involved in rural education. These two organizations could be 
regarded as the NGOs even according to the strictest definition, and have gained a huge 
body of audience. 
 More importantly, these organizations, especially the latter have created a wide 
social network that has brought together famous social activists who are involved in major 
events concerning decision-making. Its members have been active in independent 
representative nomination, 244  investigation of Zhejiang Qian Yunhui case, the Wukan 
incident in Guangdong, and also the recent case of the blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng.245 It 
is also for this very reason that the Chinese government has been alert against activities of 
the NGOs, whose living conditions remain very worrisome.  However, they represent a 
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major approach to studies of civil society and the much broader topic of democratization. 
 
             3.5. Scholars/Intellectuals 
 Academia have developed similar roles in China’s social participation. A small 
family of scholars serve as government advisors though regular seminars and consultations, 
and sourcing-out research projects. A considerable number of members of the advisory 
committee of the CCP are from Chinese top universities, such as Beijing University, 
Tsinghua University, Renmin University and China Academy of Social Sciences, among 
other universities and think tanks. They are to some extent part of the decision-making 
process. However, in terms of public incidents, they seem not that salient in the advisory 
aspects. Instead, their role is more about reshaping public opinion through writing articles, 
having interviews, making comments on their own webpage or weichat pages.   
            There are also many scholars and intellectuals from policy-orientated research 
institutes under universities. In some independent think tanks, research fellows are mostly 
former university professors or present university researchers. Therefore it is fair to 
categorize the two in one class. 
 In the past, most Chinese think tanks were governmental or semi-governmental. 
They may be a division under a party department or ministry of the state. In general, they 
are independent organizations “under the guidance and supervision” of the party or 
government. 246  For instance, the Center for Chinese Economics Studies under Beijing 
University is the most influential think tank in economics. Research institutes such as the 
China Academy of Social Science (CASS), the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs 
(zhong guo ren min dui wai you hao xie hui) (CPIFA), China Institute of International 
Studies, Institute of Contemporary International Relations (zhong guo xian dai guo ji guan 
xi yan jiu yuan) and China Society of Strategic and Management (zhong guo zhan lue yu 
guan li xue hui) in international relations and Unirule Institute of Economics (Tian ze Jing ji 
Yan jiu suo) can to be also be cited here.247 
 Since universities and their research centers host a number of highly professional 
personnel who are becoming more and more independent from the government, they 
constitute an important part of the Chinese think tanks. Because of that think tanks certainly 
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affect the decision-making process by doing research, publishing journals, writing reports, 
and having interviews since these institutes usually host well-known scholars and influential 
personnel. 
 
            3.6. Potential Candidates for Societal Forces  
 Though China’s authoritarian party-state centralizes all power and streamlines its 
policy-making process, one cannot deny that multiple potential groups as societal forces 
have managed to emerge and exert intensive influence. Besides the above-mentioned groups 
as societal forces, there are groups that may play a role in future state-society interaction. 
They have the recourses and access to influence decision-making alone; however, they may 
also side with the society under special circumstances. As Chinese economic reform 
deepens, they will also be reorganized and become fragmented, allowing part of them, if not 
all, to join other societal forces in a future incident, even though their interest, attitude and 
role remain somehow unclear and ambiguous in the past cases.  
 Enterprises represent one of the major elements of society other than the political 
power. Enterprises and state government always appear as an interest alliance, they have a 
lot of differences in their pursuits, approaches and logics. Enterprises, especially State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs) and large transnational companies of foreign investment or as 
joint ventures have been very influential in China’s decision-making. In fact, because the 
majority of China’s key industries, namely petroleum, petro-chemical, power grid, energy, 
telecommunication, railways, and tobacco industry are controlled by SOEs. Industrial 
policies are basically dominated by those SOEs. Their great economic power as well as their 
relationship with the government, especially when we take into account the fact that they 
expand their business through national monopoly or crony capitalism, are likely to constitute 
part of the interest group.248 In this sense it seems reasonable to attest that SOEs have great 
say in the Chinese decision-making process. Very often the SOEs are game players against 
what we term as society. However, in some other cases, they may be part of the societal 
forces. 
 Private companies have shown strong dynamism in recent years. Especially in the 
high-tech arena, private companies far outpace SOEs. Huawei and ZTE had become world’s 
leading telecommunication solution providers. According to All China Federation of 
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Commerce, in the year 2013, private enterprises accounted for more that 60% of China’s 
total GDP, private enterprises in 19 out of 31 provinces have contributed more than half of 
the economy, and in China’s most developed Guangdong, private sector account for more 
than 80% of its GDP.249 Because of the eminent role of enterprises in economic development 
and job creation, they had become an eminent player in engaging the government’s 
decision-making.   
 Enterprises are regarded as part of the civil forces because they gradually formed 
differentiated pursuits from that of the state power, though their interest is normally different 
from that of the general public too. The introduction of entrepreneurs into the Party by 
offering membership or the CCP’s system250 to develop “out-Party representatives” have 
also indirectly expanded the role of enterprises in decision-making.251 Corporate interest 
groups seek privileges and favorable policies through decision-making or through the 
administrative departments and supervising departments and via their special government 
and business relationship. An outstanding case is the delaying of an anti-monopoly law for 
13 years by cartel-like corporations and their government protectors.252 
 Additionally a very important factor for the emergerce and rise of civil society in 
China lies in the local government, especially the provincial governments, which are 
considered as a special force in this dissertation. Reform centered on decentralization since 
the early 1980s entitled provincial governments, especially those in coastal areas with policy 
making powers in taxation, foreign trade, and economic development. For instance, the 
privileged location and advantageous trade arrangements granted by central government 
enabled the provinces in coastal areas to attracted more foreign investment and get 
industrialized and modernized sooner. Accordingly these provinces embraced the opening 
up policies at larger momentum. While northeastern provinces may require the central 
government for strategic support to revitalize its once strong industry; provinces in central 
China may demand to get more funding; provinces in the west side area where natural 
resources are abundant, may ask for a larger share of interest from the exploitation of natural 
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resources. Provincial interests got highly diversified owning to the unbalanced development 
of different regions.253 
 Competitive relationships seem to be significantly formed among provinces and a 
kind of tension began to arise between authority from the central government and provincial 
power. As a result, provincial governments began to air different ideas and may have 
neglected or even resisted orders from central government (and indeed this is not a rare 
happening. It has been happening in Guangdong, Shanghai and even in Beijing as has been 
observed by the writer). In order to gain public support and justify their policies and most 
importantly in order to guard their own interests, these provincial governments choose to 
side with the media; the local scholars, general public and those from other provinces in 
similar situations, without openly challenging the central government or ministries. 
Therefore, an alliance among provincial governments and media, scholars and other possible 
forces may take shape. By far, there is no appropriate case to test this possibility. However, 
given the tension between central government and local government, and that the latter may 
have particular interest with the local societal interest the possibbility remains open for 
future political development. 
 Prospective groups may cover a much broader scope of organizations, formal or 
informal. As the Chinese market economy develops, more diverse interest groups will raise 
and they tend to be more societal than governmental or semi-governmental, and this has 
great implications for Chinese governance. We shall next see how societal forces increased 
in the critical realm, often becoming a threat to the state and how this differs from the public 
sphere where civil society, the main feature of democratic society, freely discuss and identify 
societal issues. 
 
             4. Critical Realm and Public Sphere: from Societal Forces to Civil Society 
 To some extent, the temporary union of some groups of the societal forces in many 
public incidents covered by this dissertation could serve as the precursor of an emerging 
civil society in China. Comparison of the definitions of societal forces and civil societies in 
the early session of this chapter have revealed the differences between the two terms. We 
shall summarize again in the following paragraphs. 
 As mentioned previously, civil society is defined by the London School of 
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Economics Centre for Civil Society as the arena of uncoerced collective action around 
shared interests, purposes and values.254 Besides its distinctions from institutional forms of 
the state, family and market, civil society relies on and also favors a diversity of spaces, 
actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. 
Civil society is visible via civil society organizations such as registered charities, 
development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, 
religious groups and organizations, professional associations, trade unions, chamber of 
commerce, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and 
advocacy groups in Western society.255 
 The degree of development of the civil society is often valued by analyzing the 
number, autonomy, and activities of the NGOs which encompass a entire range of civil 
society once they devote to specific issues such as health, protection of environment, 
humanitarian relief and protecting basic civil and political rights. However, for the reasons 
mentioned before, it is not quite effective to focus solely on the NGOs because of the 
characteristics of the NGOs in China, though they do provide an important and useful 
benchmark to evaluate Chinese civil society. However, given the fact that China’s NGOs 
themselves remain weak and not even able to influence the decision-making process alone 
without the support of other societal forces, let alone to incorporate the societal engagement 
in political decision-making, a comprehensive review of public opinion, media, academia, 
and professionals would be essential. 
 By adopting the concept of “societal forces”, which has a much broader meaning 
than civil society, this dissertation allows us to know how a society of a country where a 
(mature) civil society is absent can still interact with the state and make a difference in the 
latter’s political decision-making. Though societal forces cannot function as civil society 
who can legally and institutionally participate in public affairs in a peaceful way, it can still 
change the attitude, agenda, and pattern of decision-making though pressure or contentious 
politics. Both have differentiated stances or propensity from state government. In this sense, 
the participation of societal forces is sometimes unlawful and even violent, and therefore 
unusual. 
 Unlike civil society whose actions are more constructive, some of participation of 
societal forces appeares to be destructive even though their appeals can be justified and 
                                                        
254  Definition followed the term adopted by the London School of Economics Centre for Civil 
Society. 
255 Ibid. 
 119 
reasonable. The former’s actions are often led or driven by values and some “public” 
purpose which does not directly relate to their own interest, while the latter’s participation 
often belongs to right-maintenance (wei quan) actions. Major actors often have a stake in the 
events. There are many social activists who are deeply engaged in more than one event just 
for their ideal for social justice. However, they seldom are major actors for most of the 
incidents. For instance, Xu Zhiyong and Teng Biao, two graduates of law school from 
Beijing University who later became lecturers at universities in Beijing have been engaged 
in Sun Zhigang’s case and the Qian Yunhui’s case as well as the Wukan activities. Their 
most recent engagement was their appeals for social support of the feminist movement and 
persecuted lawyers, but none had evident results. The general absence of values in societal 
participation and engagement differentiates civil society from societal forces and justifies 
that civil society is the advanced form of societal forces. These are preliminary findings of 
this research but certainly need further analysis. 
 The writer will adopt two terms to further illustrate the relationship between 
“societal forces” and “civil society” that are “critical realm” and “public sphere”. “Critical 
realm” is according to Yanqi Tong (1994) a term adopted to describe the political or 
dissident portion of civil society which poses a threat to the state, in contrast to the “non-
critical realm” which refers to economic and professional activities that do not necessarily 
threaten the state and may even be welcomed and encouraged by it.256 White, Howell, and 
Shang (1996) make a similar distinction between the “political dynamic” and “market 
dynamic” of civil society.257 Evaluated against Chinese reality, we may find that the Chinese 
society is to some extend resembles the “critical realm” which often appeares to be source 
of pressure and challenges the stability and legitimacy of the regime. That is why priority for 
and incident is to calm down the event instead of to intensify it. Almost all local 
governments adopt the approach of “to change big events into small, and small to none” (da 
shi hua xiao, xiao shi hua liao). However, that does not mean that the societal forces do not 
create a “non-critical realm”. In fact, in most of the cases, the society, especially in those 
incidents attended by middle class in big cities, choose to interact with the state government 
in a constructive way. However, the timeframe of existence of the critical is often short-
termed and temporary. As a case-specific problem-solving mechanism, the “realm” often 
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decayed or disappeared immediately after the settlement of an incident. 
 The “critical realm” is different from “public sphere”, which is a core term that 
characterizes the civil society. Public sphere is an area in social life where individuals can 
come together to freely discuss and identify societal problems, and through that discussion 
influence political action. It is “a discursive place in which individuals and groups 
congregate to discuss matter of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common 
judgment”.258 Public sphere mediates between the private sphere and the “sphere of public 
authority”, the appearances of which indicates a mature society is already empowered 
enough to either confront or partner with the state power. The public sphere comprises civil 
society in a narrower sense, that is to say, the realm of commodity exchange and of social 
labor. 259   Evaluated against the reality, we can observe apparently the creation and 
development of the “critical realm” while the very under-development or even absence of 
“public sphere”. However, the former has provided the soil for the development of the latter 
which also proves the conclusion of societal forces being the predecessor of “civil society”, 
and accordingly, the “critical realm” serves as the predecessor of the “public sphere”. As the 
public sphere widens, and societal forces become stronger, the mentality and party doctrine 
evolves; civil society will finally be full-fledged in the long run. 
 If we review within a longer timeframe, the space and role has definitely expanded. 
The CCP has displayed its willingness in improving its regime legitimacy through allowing 
more social participation so as to enlist the decision-making process with a more democratic 
essence, and of course image too. Before 1978, social interests were highly unitary, social 
strata solid, and people’s privacy was totally deprived. There was no public sphere. People 
in rural zones lived a public life in communes, while people in urban areas lived in public 
residences assigned by the Units (dan wei) within small communities. Free speech was 
repressed, dissident intellectuals jailed; even those who made oral mistakes that violated 
political correctness were severely punished. The party even sought to control people’s 
minds, let alone speeches that had an independent nature from the official statement. 
Nowadays, the social interest has become very diverse, and the society is segmented, public 
space has been greatly expanded. Before 1978, the intensity of social involvement was 
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greater because of the campaign, however, participation was done in a non-institutional, 
motivated, and not legally ordered manner. Now social participation is becoming 
increasingly regular, institutional, voluntary, and legally ordered. Concerning the 
motivations for participation, it is largely ideology-based before 1978 while motivation for 
participation in contemporary China is interest-based after 1978. 
 
            5. Is China in the Process of Building a Civil Society? 
 Civil society may be found in any field where the governmental power is weak and 
its control remains loose. The existence of civil society indicates that there is always a 
structural tension between state and society. Normally, civil society is believed to comprise 
of various nongovernmental organizations, such as interest groups, associations, civilian 
corporate and youth movements.260 Chinese scholars raised their own definition for civil 
society within a Chinese context.261 Since the concept of civil society is too abstract a notion 
covering a wide variety of social dynamics, a practical approach is through assessing the 
living conditions of the NGOs and their capability to progress and develop. Probably since 
after the later 1970s, China experienced a rapid growth in civil society organizations, from 
less than 100 in 1965, to over 135,000 NGOs and 130,000 non-profit organizations (NPOs) 
from 2000.262 However, if we were to take into account the organizations below country 
level, the total number of the NGOs may be three million or even more.263 A survey carried 
out through September to October of 2003, by the Swedish Embassy in Beijing in 
collaboration with Sida’s NGO Division estimated a total of 136,000 social organizations 
and 82,000 private non-profit corporations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs at 
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the end of 2002, with approximately 1.3 million unregistered organizations.264 Though we 
are lacking concrete data or supporting evidence, an increasing influence of the NGOs can 
be easily discerned. Suzanne Ogden (2002) has observed over 200,000 county level, 
regional (city) level and provincial level interest groups and professional associations and 
over 1,800 national level organizations and studied the outcome of governmental grants of 
power to civil society organizations. Ogden discovered that such organizations better 
represent the interests of their members and sometimes they may be put into  competing 
relations with the government.265 
 Professor Lester Salamon and his colleagues from Johns Hopkins University (1999), 
after having studied NGOs over 40 countries, identified five common characteristics of 
them: 1) organized, 2) private, 3) non-profit, 4) self-governing, and 5) voluntary. 266 
However, if closely examined by these criteria, no organization in China may be termed as a 
NGO. 
 Therefore, because of the vagueness of the definition according to what classifies 
NGOs, as well as their great number, it is fairly difficult to analyze the Chinese NGOs and 
their activities in depth. But it is rather clear that, either for reasons of the authoritative 
political regimes or for funding problems, seldom can a NGO remain truly independent from 
the government in the case of China.267 They normally rely on the support of government 
and the party for funding or policies. Typical NGOs that function smoothly were the 
traditional mass organizations, such as the All-China Women’s Federation and the Youth 
Federation; national charitable organizations such as the China Charity Federation, the 
Youth Development Foundation, the China Poverty Reduction Foundation and the Song 
Qingling Foundation, which are actually semi-governmental organizations, people who seek 
jobs with these organizations take the same exam with ones seeking jobs with the central 
                                                        
264 Kristina Gough. 2004. Emerging Civil Society in China, Department fro co-operation with Non-
Governmental Organizations and Humanitarian Assistance, Sida. Available at: 
www.sida.se/publications 
265 Ogden, Suzanne. 2002. Inklings of democracy in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press. 
266 Salomon, Lester M, et al. “Civil Society” in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999. 
267    By 2000, there were at least 70 grant-making foundations, 70 advocacy groups, 200 
humanitarian organizations, and 150 faith-based charitable groups working in China. International 
NGOs play an important role in the Chinese political and social development as well as inter-cultural 
communication. See Carol Lee Hamrin. 2002. “China’s Invisible Social Revolution and Sino-
American Cultural Relations”, in conference volume (forthcoming), from President’s Forum: U.S.-
China Relations in the 21st Century, Baylor University, October. 
 123 
government. 
 The Youth Federation share great administrative power in each level of government, 
Chinese former President Hu Jintao as well as President Zhao Ziyang and the current 
generation leader Li Keqiang all have been General Secretary of this Organization. The 
NGOs in the business sector, though do not rely on government financially, they need the 
latter’s support for economic interests. Religious organizations, for the sensitiveness of their 
business, prefer to maintain a sound relationship with the government in order that more 
freedom would be allowed for their concerned activities, which the governments feel uneasy 
with for ideological concerns. 
 Examining the distributions of the activities, we can easily see an apolitical 
tendency.268  The types of organizations in Chinese civil society are predominantly confined 
to environmental protection, green development, women’s issues, consumer protection 
issues. Very few are engaged in sensitive areas such as religious affairs, even less in 
advocacy work or political issues. The national government has never loosened its control 
and restrictions on the NGOs development; at least it never encouraged it. The first national 
regulation was introduced in 1989, when the Government saw the need to monitor and 
control the growth of new social organizations. In 1998, the State Council adopted the 
current “Regulations on Registration Administration of Associations” (III-06-04-202). In the 
same year, the State Council also adopted regulations for registration of private non-
enterprise units: “Interim Regulations on Registration Administration of Private Non-
enterprise Units” (III-06-04-203). Since former President Hu Jintao came into office, 
personal space and freedom have increased, permitting greater individual activism than 
before. However, space for political organizations still remains limited. The requirements 
and regulations for registration are still used, which still limits the development of the 
NGOs. 
 In brief, civil society in China, if any, has just begun to take shape from the late 
1990s, with political democratization, decision-making professionalization and social 
diversification as the domestic context and globalization being the international context. 
Technical revolution with the Internet and modern media make it possible by providing vital 
means for the historical process. Though it still remains very weak and apolitical, and under 
rigid governmental control, Chinese civil society organizations are getting increasingly 
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influential in the policy-making process, the possible participation of provincial 
governments in the civil society will promise a more powerful civil society in China. 
 The government, on the other hand, under such social pressure, evaluates these 
different voices and makes adjustments to its policies. This interaction between the decision-
making bodies and social forces are made possible only under a time of significant social 
changes, namely political democratization, professionalization and social diversification, 
while globalization makes up the exterior environment where Chinese decision-making is 
faced with increasing international pressure. 
 
           6. Government Attitude towards Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
 Government attitude is key to the development of social organizations. On October 
13, 1989, at the 49th State Council Executive Meeting, the Regulations on Social Group 
Registration and Administration were passed and were implemented starting October 25, 
1989. They consisted of 32 articles. It was not a law approved by the congress; however as 
the supreme administration body of the country, the state council has the right to issue 
guidelines and regulations. Therefore it well represents the attitude and direction of the 
government towards “social groups” or “social organizations”. Because of the diversity of 
emerging social organizations, the regulations did not provide a legal definition of social 
groups, but it did so by a list of “associations, academic associations, federations, research 
associations, foundations, friendship leagues, promotional associations and commercial 
associations organized within the PRC”. According to the lists, we see almost all types of 
what is termed as “civil society organizations”. According to the regulation, all “social 
groups” “must apply for registration according the regulations herein, and may undertake 
activities after their applications are examined, approved, and registered”. 269  And after 
“examination, approval and registration”, those social groups shall be granted legal person 
qualifications. 270  In order to operate nationwide, social groups have to meet the 
preconditions of being a “legal person.” It means the state government has been open to 
social groups/NGOs since the late 1980s. 
 Given the timing of the regulations, it was more a kind of restriction on societal 
organizations since unregistered students’ organizations were believed to be responsible for 
the many democratic movements in the latter half of the 1980s. Since approval is certainly 
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based on some conditions, the most important one is the applicant organizations must find a 
government branch or public service organization to serve as its supervision or sponsor body 
(gua kao dan wei), many civilian organizations may not be able to find such a sponsoring 
unit. By reviewing the applicant organizations during the registration, it will have all data 
about the leadership, structure and funding source of the applicant originations and therefore 
would easily control them if necessary. More importantly, since most sponsoring (not 
necessarily financial funding) or supervision bodies are governmental branches or affiliates, 
they would be very careful when sponsoring such social groups. And if they do decide to 
agree to sponsor such organizations, they are responsible to make sure that the organizations 
are running legally and in consistence with the “main rhythm” of the party’s policy. 
 During the Hu-Wen era, the general environment for social organizations remained 
stable. Since most registered organizations tended to be non-political autonomic ones or 
functional ones that provide social services supplementary to the governments. Applications 
from those politically sensitive organizations were rejected to be registered or unable to 
apply for registration since no government organizations or public service unit (shi ye dan 
wei) dare to assist them in their application. However, many NGOs were registered as 
business organizations but they operated under the name of research institutes for example 
the law institute. However, after one wave after another color revolution swept the post-
communist countries, including but not confined to Yugoslavia's Bulldozer Revolution 
(2000), Georgia's Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004), Lebanon's 
Cedar Revolution (2005), Kuwait's Blue Revolution (2005), Azerbaijan in mid-2005, 
Chinese governments’ attitude towards began to turn negative, because of the notable role 
that the NGOs had played.271 Especially when reliable evidence shows most of those NGOs 
had Western backgrounds or were directly supported by the U.S. government supported 
NGOs, the Chinese government tightened their review and controls of the NGO activities in 
China. 
 The most conservative organ in China had always been the ideological department, 
namely the Propaganda Department. In 2011, the Central Propaganda Department of the 
Government announced in January that “civil society” was a forbidden term for use by the 
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media.272 Since 2009, the term disappeared from the mainstream newspaper of the People’s  
Daily. However, as a conventional existence, banning usage of the term does not really make 
sense, on the contrary, it revealed the Party’s ideological insecurity. In reformist Guangdong 
province, major steps had been taken by announcing to promulgate its civil society 
organizations registration regulations that allows eight types of “social organizations” or 
“people’s societies” to be registered without separate sponsor from government organs or 
public service organizations. After around one year’s operation, on December 23, 2012, the 
Minister of Civil Affairs Li Liguo announced that the “Guangdong experiment” could be 
applied to other parts of the country. If this were true, a national regulation and guidance 
concerning the establishment of civil organizations would come into being. 
 In addition, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) and the China 
Foundation Center, the number of private foundations (under private capital) for the first 
time exceeded the number of public ones (those older ones associated with government, 
such as the Red Cross Society and the China Charity Federation by the end of 2011). Finally, 
an experiment in Beijing started in June, which involved using the local MCA bureau as 
both the registering and oversight body resulted in more social organizations being 
registered there than in previous periods. As of the end of the year 2012 there were 
approximately 500,000 registered social organizations all throughout China, an increase of 
10,000 over the previous year-end total. 273  These facts suggest that the government 
recognizes the need to loosen the current “double track management system” (shuang gui 
zhi) to make it easier for at least some Civil Society Organizatons (CSOs) to gain legal 
existence. 
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Chapter 5: Group Incident and Societal Forces 
 
 This chapter serves as introductory guide for the chapters contained in Part Two, 
which comprise a review and analysis of several “group incidents” (qun ti xing shi jian). As 
explained at the beginning of this dissertation, six group incidents were selected according 
to their relevance in the Chinese decision-making process and they were organized into pairs 
so as to compare between successful and unsuccessful cases. The cases were organized 
according to three different categories: institutional transformations, behavior changes, and 
policy adjustments. The organization was performed according to the degree of influence 
that each case caused in government’s decision-making.  
 In China, group incidents are considered the same as “protests” in Western discourse, 
but the CCP has been wary of the use of political terms that have an explicit “Western” 
nature. Terms such as “social group”, which describes the NGOs, or “civil society”, may 
pose a threat to the CCP’s ideological security. More importantly, as groups rose from the 
organization of protests and uprisings, the CCP also avoided using terms such as “workers’ 
strike”, “protests”, and “uprising” since according to fundamentalist Marxist thoughts, these 
terms only exist in a capitalist system, and therefore would never exist in a socialist society, 
since the contradictions within a socialist society are contradictions among its people. 
However, since the number, scale, and frequency and intensity of social conflicts and 
protests have grown far beyond the CCP’s expectations, group incidents constitute one of 
the most challenging tasks for the Party. 
 Scholars’ definitions for “group incident” also vary. Song and Yu (2010), for 
instance, argue that group incidents refer to legal or illegal gatherings or antagonistic 
movements against governments, such as outer-regime activities that are often incited by 
social conflicts. Often groups involved in incidents have common purposes of protecting 
political, economic, or liberal rights; others expressing specific ideals, appeals, or dissent 
against a designated government. Such activities may have major implications for social 
order and stability.274 Xiang Deping and fellows (2003) state that group incidents refer to 
large-scale social incidents that are incited by social conflicts. Such activities go beyond 
social conventions and have some influence on normal social order. Group incidents take 
very diverse forms ranging from group petitions, systematic soldiering, labor strikes, illegal 
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gatherings, riots, protests, violence, popular panic, etc. 275  Group incidents have gradually 
become one of the main factors that assume to undermine social stability. 
 The Chinese government’s recognition of “group incident”, however, has undergone 
different stages owing to different social discourses. In the revolutionary years, gatherings of 
farmers or workers petitioning to leaders or expressing dissent against the leaders by the 
masses was somewhat tolerated provided they abided by the guidelines of Chairman Mao, 
though it brought trouble. In the 1970s, popular antagonism was called “mass riots” or 
“crowd riot” (crowd trouble). This changed in the 1980s when China’s Opening-up process 
brought unprecedented political freedom that combined with a high unemployment rate, 
which was caused mainly due to underdeveloped industries, resulted in many public 
incidents which were often accompanied by criminal cases that affected the public order. 
Therefore these public incidents were called “public order incidents”. From the late 1980s 
through the 1990s, such happenings received a new definition; “public security 
contingencies” or “emergent public security cases”. Since the late 1990s and the early 
2000s, those happenings gained another new name; “group public security incidents”. 
 More recently the Ministry of Public Security defined “public security incidents” as 
“collective behaviors of a group that violate the law, rules and regulations, disturb the social 
order, endanger public security, or violate the individual safety or safety of public and 
private property”.276 As a government branch responsible for maintaining social stability and 
order, it is not surprising that the Public Security authority wanted to highlight the illegal 
side of the group incidents because these incidents may bring social instability. 
 This chapter, however, does not focus only on defining the term “group incidents” 
which is regarded as a large-scale social protest against the government. They could be 
human right abuses or legal injustice and incited social outrage; or major accidents resulting 
from governmental dereliction of duty; or disastrous happenings or simply human rights 
abuses. While the governments want to avoid responsibility by withholding information, the 
public, on the other hand, wants to make sure that the people responsible for an incident 
would be punished and “justice can be done”. Thus in order to better understand the 
interaction between societal forces in the decision-making process, the next section shows in 
which conditions this interaction may occur. 
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1. Societal Forces’ Involvement in Decision-making: General Approach 
 
 Societal forces engage the government in many ways, the most common of which 
should be legal and institutional participation within legislation, due to bureaucratic 
procedures in policy making and external supervision. The involvement of Chinese societal 
forces in political decision-making is comprehensive. Besides the approach of institutional 
and legal involvement, some new forms of interaction have emerged. The societal forces 
“negotiate” in some cases with government branches, not without “supervision” and 
“guidance” of government representatives. Negotiation was adopted to solve those tensions 
between the state and society that are lesser antagonistic. Negotiation remains the key 
component of cases where rational bargaining led to compromise accepted by both sides, 
even though government branches are often in a more favored status. 
 The way in which societal forces currently function in the way of contentious 
politics is what this dissertation mainly addresses. However, what is the mechanism in 
contentious politics? What factors influence the result of contentious politics? The passages 
below will focus on the general approach of the interactions between Chinese societal forces 
and decision-making. 
 
1.1. The Interaction Patterns Between Chinese Social Forces and Decision-making  
 
  Though societal participation is becoming more visible, regular, and common, its 
scope, depth, and effects vary from time to time, and from area to area. These forces may 
have regular channels to influence the decision-making process alone or in collective actions 
with other organizations. The writer has defined the interaction patterns between the societal 
forces and government according to two different types: centralization and decentralization. 
Certainly different patterns of interaction might lead to different results. 
 
1.1.1. Pattern 1: Decentralization 
 
 As shown in Figure 1, decentralization means that each group of the societal forces 
is involved separately and in a fragmented manner in order to settle an incident. Their 
stances are not well coordinated by a unitary organization or person and the pursuit of each 
societal force may differ to some extent but they are working on the same incident. The 
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length of involvement, roles played and functions performed vary from one another, and 
from case to case but generally they jointly created strong societal pressure for the 
government to make a difference. 
 
Figure 1 – Structural Transformation Based on Decentralization’s Pattern 
 
 
Source: elaborated by the writer. 
 
 This “synchronized movement” or “alliance” is loose, unstable, and only for a 
temporary period of time. The “alliance” is formed naturally because of similar awareness 
and public concern instead of being organized by anyone of them or by a third party. 
Decentralized interaction patterns often take place in the early phase of societal involvement 
when the situation remains unclear and consensus is still not formed. The alliance remains 
loose often because most, if not all, societal forces do not have a stake in the resolution of 
the incident or the relativity is not high. The degree of tension is also an important variable, 
if the state-society tension stays high in an incident, societal forces may choose to unite with 
each other to be stronger in their negotiation with the government, and the greater or more 
consistent their stance towards the government will be. We suppose based on tentative 
findings that this interaction pattern renders limited results. However, it is not a clear-cut 
conclusion, and this assumption will be further analyzed through the following case studies. 
This pattern of interaction has profound significance because without societal participation, 
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1.1.2. Pattern 2: Centralization  
 
Figure 2 – Decision-making Based on the Centralization’s Pattern 
 
Decision-making 
 
                              Mass media 
 
Source: elaborated by the writer 
 
 In most of China’s public incidents, government behavior and policy at the initial 
phase remained very unresponsive and unreasonable. When a confrontation occurs, local 
governments often choose to use the police and even armed police to settle highly sensitive 
issues of land disputes, labor disputes, serious medical incidents, or apparent abuses of 
human rights by government affiliates, therefore leading to an antagonistic reaction by 
society, and therefore this is when the group incident takes shape. During most of the cases 
evidence has shown that improper actions by the government proved to be vital.  Given 
public mistrust of government that has been serious in many localities, the inappropriate 
responses of government often serves as a catalyst for a group incident since society has 
been vigilant against apparent misconduct. 
 In such cases, a centralized interaction pattern often takes place. A potential coalition 
is often created based on coordination and cooperation among different societal forces. 
Sometimes a temporary organization is launched to coordinate the stances of all parties. 
Common conviction is that unity instead of fragmentation would bring better conditions. A 
centralization pattern often appears when facts are relatively simple and the consensus is 
achieved concerning what goals are to be achieved. The alliance becomes stable either by 
formal or informal contract. In such cases, often the stakeholders have strong social support, 
necessary skills and knowledge in dealing with the government or have close ties with them. 
The degree of tension is often very high, and injustice is apparent that could urge or justifies 
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the Wukan Incident, which will be explained in detail in a later part of this dissertation. 
 
1.2. Rationality 
 
 Generally one can suppose that rational engagement will be more effective since it 
allows the societal forces to better persuade the government branches under pressure of 
public opinion. The more rational the engagement, the stronger sympathy public opinion 
may render to the societal forces involved, and the more favorable position the latter will 
have in the negotiation. On the other hand, the writer’s observation is that irrational dealing, 
which includes unreasonable or over-demanding requirements, harsh criticism and blaming 
of the government, violence, targeting all government bodies in an indiscriminate manner, 
creating rumors, has led to the government’s counteractions. In particular, the appearance of 
violent protests that may justify government repression, which is likely to happen in 
authoritarian states; repression may be considered a simplified approach to solving complex 
problems by an authoritarian government, who “justifies” the use of violence against an 
apparent violation of law. 
 Research on the CCP’s behavior has indicated that the Party prefers to crush those 
perceived as anti-government or anti-Communist Party, while often urges local governments 
to compromise on demands that are environmental or economic in nature. Therefore it 
would be wise not to make the CCP confirm that the engagement of societal forces has an 
anti-government stance.  The unchecked authority of government leaders and bureaucrats 
created a deeply-embedded sense of privilege and arrogance of power that they believe is 
beyond challenge, while a challenge, perceived or actual, will lead to a breakdown in 
cooperation and become perfunctory at the very least or radical reactions at the most, despite 
the top leadership launching waves of campaigns to “improve the working style” of the 
Party and government officers. As mentioned previously, the writer believes that the 
engagement of the middle class often leads to a better result since the group has the 
necessary knowledge, experience, and wisdom to properly engage the government in the 
discussion while the latter is often willing to make a compromise. 
 However, this seems to be an obvious intention. A rational-good result while 
irrational-bad result nexus would be an oversimplified and hasty generalization. China’s 
bureaucratic system is characterized by a multiple-head governance because of unclear 
division of responsibilities, which leads to a “ball-kicking game” whenever there is a tough 
 133 
job to handle. Rational communication, especially for ordinary citizens, is often neglected 
leaving the problems unsolved. While controllable tension or antagonism commonly arouses 
the attention of officials who may choose to deal with the matter immediately after it occurs 
since they may be afraid once they lose control of the matter; it hurts government officials’ 
chances of being promoted or even punished for not having handled the problems properly. 
The rational-irrational nexus revealed how rationality of societal participation affected the 
result of government-society interaction. 
 
1.3 Societal forces involved  
 
 Who participates in a group incident does matter. The emergence of societal forces 
all resulted from the economic boom and political development after the Reform and 
Opening-up program started. However, in none of the incidents was the participants’ 
involvement spontaneous, nor was it similar. Most societal forces have a role in the cases 
studied; here the writer explains a bit more about the public opinion and the media as major 
participants. 
 In each incident, public opinion and mass media never seems to be absent. They 
remain two major sources of social power. Even in diplomatic decision-making, they have 
shown strong influence, particularly in decision-making regarding Sino-US and Sino-Japan 
relations. Let us take the US as an example, how the Chinese public perceives the US may 
directly affect US policy-making or help reshape the perceptions of the policymakers toward 
the US and thus exert potential influence on the Policy-making process. Chinese scholars 
Yufan Ho and Lin Su (2006) conducted a very interesting survey on the US perception of 
261 IR students and MPA students who held mid-ranking positions within the Chinese 
bureaucratic system and examined the possible effect of their perceptions on the 
construction of US policies.277 David L. Shambaugh (1988), on the other hand, studied the 
sources of anti-Americanism in China during the Cold War and how it affected the Sino-US 
relationship.278 It is a fact that policymakers do not just follow the public mood; good 
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Americanism :Origins and Context. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, p. 155. For more 
Anti-Americanism works, see Gil Butler. 1996. “China-anti-Americanism,” Background Report, 
August 13. gopher.voa.gov: 70/Newswire; Paul Hollander. 1995. Anti-Americanism: Irrational and 
 134 
policymakers guide them. 
 Media had been very active even at the harshest times of the “Cultural Revolution”, 
when different factions among the elites competed for “public opinion bases” (yu lun zhen 
di). But the 1980s proved to be an important period for media development, and China 
witnessed a decade of increasing involvement of the media in Chinese policy-making until 
the tightening of the Chinese political atmosphere after the Tiananmen Square Incident in 
1989. The freedom of the media throughout the 1990s was a recovery of the 1980s. During 
the last ten years China was filled with overwhelming international pressure (the four major 
Sino-US crises, namely the 1993 Yinhe Tanker Incident, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 
1998 Embassy Bombing, and the 2001 Connoisseur Plane Crash with a Chinese fighter) 
accompanied with the revival of Chinese political consciousness as well as the expansion of 
national power which aroused the national enthusiasm for international politics. 
 The quick development of the Internet in the late 1990s functioned as a catalyst for 
public awareness and participation in domestic politics. For the first time in history, Chinese 
society began to emerge as a powerful civil society, though a virtual one. The general public 
gained direct access to information and different perceptions outside China, and, on the 
other hand, enjoyed unprecedented freedom of speech through this virtual world and 
cyberspace. This was possible because the Chinese government is unable to control the 
Internet in the same way it does for paper media. 
 One important factor the writer has to mention is that the former Premier Zhu 
Rongji, in order to show his determination in anticorruption and gain social support from his 
ambitious reforms, granted the Chinese media unprecedented freedom. The latter exploited 
this freedom earnestly and gained its say in Chinese decision-making. The rise of think tanks 
and NGOs is easily discerned in present China’s decision-making process, though the latter 
met with a short-term shrink after the Chinese government tightened its control after the 
color revolutions in central China. This research covers the timeframe between 2002 and 
2012; a period of rapid development with twists and turns. 
 
1.4. Issue Areas 
 
 The reason and cause of the incidents partially decides the effects of societal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rational. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, p. xiii.; Peter Hays Gries. 2004 China’s New 
Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 18. 
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participation. In international policies, negotiation and cooperation among states is in the 
low politics areas of trade, as well as investment which would be more easily concluded 
than in the high politics areas concerning territory, sovereignty and security. In domestic 
policies, the effect of societal participation will be different from area to area. Generally 
speaking, in those incidents concerning institutions, regime legitimacy, and social stability, 
the government was more vigilant and conservative, and therefore societal involvement was 
more active but less effective.  Societal involvement in other areas tends to be less active but 
more effective. In the environment protection area, which was deemed to be a low-level 
politics area, the will of societal participation remains strong and the government seems 
more engaging. A tentative explanation is that the incident of environmental protection 
directly related to people’s security and daily lives, especially when it relates to a potentially 
dangerous program. Societal involvement turned out to be more effective also because 
environmental protection is consistent with the CCP’s priority list. 
 
1.5. Sensitivity 
 
 Sensitivity means the extent of what the government is subject to. There are several 
determinant factors for sensitivity. The scale of the event, the government role in the 
incident, and policy area all affect the sensitivity of the issue. 
 We suppose that large-scale incidents have greater sensitivity. The greater number of 
people interested, affected or involved, the greater economic loss, often means the higher 
degree of sensitivity with the event, especially when hints of violence appear. In that case, 
the government needs to respond more urgently and settle the issue more carefully. Once the 
sensitivity is neglected the issue can often become worse.  From 2001-2013, there are 271 
incidents that involved more than 1,000 people, and another 10 incidents that involved more 
than 10,000 people.279  Apparently, such large-scale incidents tend to call for more domestic 
and international attention and the governments need to handle them with greater caution. 
 A key criterion for defining sensitivity is whether the incidents have resulted in loss 
of human life. Incidents with casualties tend to be of a higher sensitivity than incidents 
without loss of human. The greater number of human losses means the higher sensitivity. 
Death caused by natural disasters such as earthquakes, landslides, and floods tends to be of 
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lower sensitivity than incidents of death caused by irresponsibility, negligence, or 
malfeasance. Therefore, the role of governments in the incident is also an important factor 
for sensitivity. According to the report mentioned above, 44% of major incidents were 
caused by conflicts between citizens and governments (government officials), 174 out of the 
871 cases were caused by legal injustice (roughly 20%).280 Apparently, sensitivity of such 
cases is much higher than cases where the government remained neutral. 
 Policy area is another criterion. As stated above, we cannot simply conclude that 
sensitivity is lower with purely economic affairs while sensitivity is high when it is related 
to political and ideological security. The Chinese government remains very alert against any 
incidents that challenge regime legitimacy, social stability, and the political system. Once 
such cases happen, the governments’ attitude may turn negative and conservative towards 
societal involvement and possibly take repressive actions leaving societal engagement 
unfulfilled. 
 The paragraphs above have outlined the basic analytical framework of the incidents. 
In each case, the framework will be considered to explain why involvement of societal 
forces was successful or unsuccessful. Besides the peculiarities of each case, this 
dissertation aims to understand what pattern maximizes the result of societal participation, 
and which pattern was basically effective. 
  
                                                        
280 Ibid. 
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Chapter 6: The End of Custody and Repatriation System 
 
1. Background: Guangdong and Its Huge Migrant Population  
 
 When Deng Xiaoping initiated China’s Reform and Opening-up program in the late 
1970s, he selected 14 special zones in coastal provinces as a pilot experiment. Standing 
against China’s long-embedded egalitarian ideal, Deng devised a strategy of “allowing 
certain areas and some sections of the population to get rich first”. Undoubtedly, coastal 
Guangdong would be the ideal subject for this experiment. As the pioneering region for the 
Reform and Opening-up program, Guangdong has taken the lead in economic development, 
institutional reform and other social governance experiments. Guangdong’s GDP had grown 
from RMB18.6 billion in 1980 to RMB1.07 trillion in 2000, raising its share of China’s total 
GDP from 8% to 10% in this period.281  In this span, Guangdong’s share of FDI fell from 
42% in 1990 to 27% in 2000. Given this remarkable rate of growth, many rural farmers from 
the populous inland provinces of Sichuan, Henan, and Anhui crowded into Guangdong to 
look for job opportunities and better living conditions, growing its population from 62.8 
million in 1990 to 86.4 million in 2000 to 104 million in 2010, for an average of over 2 
million per year.282 Although we do not have precise data as to how many of these were 
migrant workers, the figures for 2000 and 2010 can shed some light on this issue. During the 
decade, 6.44 million migrant workers arrived from other provinces in addition to 2.08 
million migrants with official registration (hu ji ren kou), for a total of 8.52 million, 
accounting for 47.7% out of an overall population growth of 17.88 million.283  Chinese 
urbanization and the expanding disparity between regions, especially between coastal 
regions and inland areas had fueled the population flow to cities like Guangzhou. Because of 
Guangdong’s fairly high share of China’s total industrial output and FDI ten years ago, the 
proportion of migrants would be even greater when compared with the Fifth Population 
Census, owing to the economic rise of the Yangtze delta and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei delta 
which became the new destinations for migrant workers. 
 As the capital city of Guangdong province, Guangzhou has been hosting the bulk of 
the population inflow. This rapid increase in population created many problems as illegal 
                                                        
281 GDP data from the World Bank, data for Guangdong’s GDP, trade and investment from 
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283 China National Bureau of Statistics, the 5th and 6th population censor report, 2000, 2010. 
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dealings and criminal activity become sources of social instability. To combat this, in 1982 a 
Custody & Repatriation system (hereafter C&R) was adopted nationally. This system 
initially applied to the people of “three withouts”, namely those "without fixed place of 
residence” (homeless), “without means to make a living” (jobless), and “without Temporary 
Residential Permission” (zan zhu zheng) issued by the local public security authority, but in 
1991 was expanded to cover those “without residence or work permits” in 1991. 
 Temporary Residential Permission is connected to China’s household registration 
system, which the CCP has relied on for social governance. The major purpose is to restrict 
the free flow of rural labor into cities via the household registration system (hu kou). Hu kou  
not only reflects identity, but also grants the holder accesses to medical care, education, 
employment opportunities, and other social welfare benefits. Temporary Residential 
Permission allows those migrant workers to live and work in cities outside of their hu kou, 
but without access to social welfare. The intent of C&R was to accommodate the jobless and 
beggars for a short period of time before compulsorily sending them back to their registered 
hu kou, often their hometown, with all costs are borne by the Guangzhou government. 
 However, problems with the system abound. Human rights violations went 
unchecked and the system deviated from its original purpose, culminating in the death of a 
college student named Sun Zhigang. Backlash from Sun’s case eventually led to the 
abolishment of the notorious C&R system. Laws and regulations constitute an important 
institutional pillar in any country, and the case was symbolic of Chinese political decision-
making. This chapter will examine the roles of both media and individuals as well as 
internet, whose challenge to authority has led to significant progress in China’s endeavor for 
better governance. 
 
2. The Faulted System and the Sun Zhigang’s Case 
  
 As mentioned above, the CCP manages its population with household registration 
(hu kou) that separated the majority rural population from urban dwellers. Before 1978, 
migration away from the place of hu kou registration was illegal, and police would often 
detain any prospective migrants and send them back to their “due places” (repatriation). 
 The compulsory C&R system was launched in 1982. Originally it was deemed a 
social security program with the major responsibility of “assisting, education, and resettling” 
vagrants and beggars.  According to the Measures of Custody and Repatriation of Urban 
 140 
Vagrants and Beggars: 
 
Custody and Repatriation is a forcible administrative apparatus under which the 
Civil Affairs departments and Public Security bureaus may send back to their places 
of hu kou registration any persons whose homes are in the rural areas and who have 
entered cities to beg; urban residents who are roaming the streets and begging; and 
other persons who are sleeping in the open or have no means of livelihood. This 
measure is employed by the state to provide relief, education and resettlement to 
those persons who are indigent and begging in the cities, so as to protect urban social 
order and stability and unity.284 
 
 Evidently the system was adopted in the early reform era when economic growth and 
industrial development in urban areas have encouraged migrants flow from rural areas to 
neighboring cities and regional centers. However, concerted managerial reform did not 
follow, and the old registration system, which still in effect today, and rigid population 
control can no longer meet the demand for labor in cities. The system allows the government 
to assist  vagrants, beggars and the jobless by providing short-term accommodation, meals 
and return tickets. 
 The government was to fund the system. With China increasingly opening, foreign 
investment, mostly from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and Southeast 
Asia, began to flood into the mainland. Major cities regarded the system as means to keep 
up appearances, as in the minds of governmental officials, vagrants and beggars wandering 
the streets would hurt the images of the cities that were making every effort to attract foreign 
investment, and building such a system furthermore showcased the capacity and 
responsibility of the government in managing the population flow, pleasing their superiors, 
investors, and other beneficiaries. However, the primary consideration for launching the 
system was “to protect urban social order, stability and unity” as stated in the official 
document. 
 The operations of the C&R proved to be quite tricky. According to regulations, the 
Civil Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of the Public Security should be responsible for 
running the system with the Civil Affairs Ministry as the first-order entity. In theory, the 
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regional centers and stations follow this joint working pattern with civil affairs division 
chiefly responsible. However, in practice, since the Civil Affairs division did not, and does 
not, have the right to detain or take other compulsory actions against the target group, it had 
to rely on collaboration with and cooperation of the police, especially local police stations 
and street level policemen to “arrest” or “detain” the vagrants and beggars who, in turn, 
often resisted arrest or detention. After bringing the vagrants and beggars into C&R centers 
and stations, the Civil Affairs staff was responsible for their routine management and care. 
Since they were often arrested in groups, just like in a prison managing them proved to be a 
huge headache, with frequent disputes and fighting, which came to light during Sun 
Zhigang’s case. As some detainees were held for prolonged periods, they naturally formed 
cliques based on origin or kinship, nurturing a source of instability which further reinforced 
the role of the policy. Therefore, from the very beginning, the C&R centers and stations 
were jointly run by the Civil Affairs division and the police, with the latter exercising the 
stronger role. 
 However, the role of the Civil Affairs division was not absent. They built medical 
care stations close to the C&R to provide basic treatment for sick detainees, yet as their 
number increased many problems, particularly financial, arose. Gradually the Civil Affairs 
divisions became pessimistic about the system and starting from the late 1980s, the Police 
Authority took greate responsibility. Given that the ministry and the police work through 
asymmetric approaches, such arrangements have harbored structural risks for “accidents” 
concerning severe human rights violations. The Civil Affairs division provides social 
welfare for veterans (and their relatives) and other vulnerable groups, registration and 
management of civil organizations, marriage (and divorce) registration, disaster relief, and 
other civil affairs.285 The police forces are responsible for suppressing crime, preventing 
counter terrorist activities, and maintaining security and social order. 
 Police authority is a tool that maintains societal order with legal authorization to use 
force. Based on the fundamentalist doctrine of Marxism however, police authority is often 
tied to the maintenance of the State’s interests and capitalist property relationships, and 
hence cannot be considered as serving the working class . In China, the insufficient number 
of policemen compared with the huge population,286 large proportion of migrant workers in 
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urban areas, rising crime rate, heavy workload, poor working conditions, low salary, and the 
structural problems have demoralized the police force.287 They often feel depressed and it is 
common to treat suspects improperly, to the extent of torture or soliciting bribes. Chinese 
police have been harshly criticized for violent abuses, violations of human rights, and 
corruption, and there are daily newspaper reports about detainees dying suspiciously in 
police custody or prison. 
 In 1992, the State Council issued the “Guidelines Concerning the Reform of the 
Custody and Repatriation Work (guan yu shou rong qian song gong zuo gai ge wen ti yi 
jian) which expanded the system to cover the aforementioned “three withouts persons” - 
those without fixed place of residence, without means of livelihood, without temporary 
residential permit. However, it was a common practice in all cities to expand the application 
to cover even more people. For example, Shenzhen, another special economic zone at the 
forefront of the opening-up process, applied the C&R to cover 6 groups of people. 
According to Tang Rongsheng, who become the third director of Shenzhen Municipal C&R 
Station after its establishment in 2001, in addition to the jobless, vagrants, and beggars, the 
station also accommodated people without the Special Economic Zone Entry & Exit 
Permission, used to control the inflow of population to Shenzhen and from Mainland to 
Hong Kong, people without a fixed residence, and people without an ID card or Temporary 
Residential Permission.288 
 According to regulations in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou, migrant workers 
from a foreign province must apply for temporary residential permission, or else be regarded 
as homeless. The police had the right to arrest those without this permission and send them 
home or detain them in the C&R center. While they normally target migrant workers, the 
homeless, and beggars, the police soon found the policy a convenient means to deal with 
petitioners and criminals as well, and cities frequently wage campaigns of mass arrests to 
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maintain their image or to strengthen security. 
 The situation worsened in the late 1990s and early 2000s because of the huge masses 
of workers laid-off in the SOEs restructuring as well as college graduates whose numbers 
have increased by 30% annually since “Enrollment Expansion” in 1999. The case of Sun 
Zhigang happened just 4 years after he graduated from college. Since the C&R system was 
effectively run by the police, the Civil Affairs staff served only in an assistant role and did 
not wish to be embroiled in controversies289 surrounding the C&R stations, even hiring 
“social personnel” to do part of their job. Petitioners and criminals were sometimes sent to 
the stations temporarily due to insufficient police manpower or over-crowdedness at 
stations, and in some cases, simply for convenience. 
 Therefore, the system serves both as the sole means of controlling the flow of the 
rural population into cities and as a “semi-prison” for those detained. The Chinese 
government has never revealed the exact number accommodated in the C&R stations 
throughout China, but the figures from Shenzhen may be revealing. According to Sun 
(2015), the head of the Shenzhen Municipal C&R station received around 300 people per 
day, or more than 10,000 per month and roughly 130,000 per year between 2001 and 2003, 
right before the abolishment of the system. Given Shenzhen’s population, the number of 
people who have experienced the C&R system must number in millions. 
 In addition to the issues of arbitrary detention, human rights abuses, physical torture, 
and poor living conditions, there is sufficient evidence to show that the police made an 
already problematic system worse by exploiting it as a business opportunity.  By detaining 
citizens randomly, who in turn contact their relatives or employers to provide proof they do 
not belong in the system, often alongside a sum of money. Those sent back to their 
hometowns were also required to pay for accommodation and transportation that should 
have been funded by the government. Therefore, the police had strong incentives to detain 
as many people as possible,290 and arrested many local residents simply going for a walk, 
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job-seeking college graduates, and other individuals who could have much more easily been 
sent home by their relatives or employers instead. Migrants from inland provinces often 
resisted expulsion and some could not afford a return ticket, and many resorted to bribing 
the police to be released. At times the police even waited at the C&R stations looking for 
potential targets, and many people were arrested immediately upon arrival and sent back at 
their own expense, forcing their families to pay before they were released by the counterpart 
C&R stations in their hometowns. 
 Many Civil Affairs staffers and legal scholars have questioned the legitimacy of the 
C&R system and called for revisions of or restrictions on the system. 291  The central 
government had likely realized the systemic problems with the C&R, and in early 2003, the 
Ministry of Public Security, in conjunction with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the 
Ministry of Finance, issued official guidelines that required concerned units not to recklessly 
expand the number of potential targets, and to set a “cushion period” between the C&R and 
future arrangements meant to provide assistance to targeted people. However, major reforms 
were carried out only under strong societal pressure and intensive popular participation that 
led to the abolition of the entire system, and only at the cost of the lives of Sun Zhigang and 
others who remain unnamed and unknown. 
 
3. The Development of Sun Zhigang Case and Societal Involvement 
 
 Sun Zhigang (1976-2003) was a graduate of Wuhan Institute of Science and 
Technology and an employee of Guangzhou Daqi Clothing Company at the time of his 
accident. On March 17, Sun was arrested for not having up to date residential permission, as 
he unfortunately had not brought his ID Card292 with him, and illegally detained at the 
Guangzhou Police Holding Center before being transferred to a nearby custody station. 
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Sun’s situation by no means meets the conditions for detention according to regulations, but 
as analyzed earlier, the police had become reckless in arresting and detaining people at C&R 
stations. Indeed, it had become tolerated and supported by the municipal government who 
hoped to control the inflow of unwanted migrants, who were often uneducated, unskilled, 
and “smelly” farmers. Those arrested invariably belonged vulnerable groups, spoke in 
dialects, dressed shabbily and behaved indecently, always carrying a large bag of clothing. 
When arrested, they would attempt to secure their release without making any trouble for 
the police or the C&R staff, as doing so would bring further trouble for themselves. 
Arbitrary detention had become rampant and seen as “normal” and hence Sun Zhigang’s 
detention came as a surprise to no one. 
 The sordid details of his subsequent tragedy soon became well known. Reports and 
later investigations indicated that, on the night of March 18th, Sun reported the police that 
he was suffering a heart attack and was sent to the center's clinic. On March 20th, Sun was 
found dead. Initially, no details were revealed concerning what exactly had transpired during 
his three days of detention, but later government reports confirmed that he had been beaten 
by his fellow detainees in the clinic, under orders from an attendant named Qiao Yanqin. 
The station maintained that Sun had died of disease, while the government was initially 
irresponsive to the matter, only acting when some professionals revealed information vital to 
the case. After the media intervened a month later, information surrounding the case was 
released to the general public and incited nationwide outrage. Sun’s death aroused sympathy 
primarily because he was a college student, which at that time had not yet lost its elite status 
since in 2003, only 3.82 million out of 6.13 million high school graduates were able to 
continue on to college, while in 1997, the year of Sun’s graduation, only 1 million high 
school graduates entered higher education (including senior vocational training).293 
 The case gained nationwide attention and under strong societal pressure, the 
government intervened and conducted a thorough investigation, which revealed the real 
cause of Sun’s death, and punished the 12 responsible persons. Qiao Yanqin, the clinic 
attendant and ringleader of this notorious abuse of human rights, was sentenced to death, Li 
Haiying was given a 2 year suspended death penalty, and the remaining 10 criminals 
received prison sentences ranging from 3 years to life imprisonment, with 6 of these being 
officials convicted of dereliction of duty.294 
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 The lasting achievement of this landmark societal participation was the wholesale 
reversal of policy under the new “Measures for Assisting Vagrants and Beggars with No 
Means of Support in Cities,” signed by Premier Wen Jiabao on June 20th, under which the 
detention centers would be replaced by simple service stations providing necessary 
assistance to poor beggars or homeless persons on a purely voluntary basis. It signals a 
return to the originally intended functions of the program established in 1982, and most 
importantly represents the official abolishment of the C&R system. Needless to say, such 
achievements are significant and rare in China’s communist history, and this case especially 
was one of the few incidents where societal pressures on governmental decision-making 
actually made a lasting impact. Encouraged by the experience, the same societal forces have 
become further engaged in the decision-making process surrounding later incidents, and the 
hence warrant further examination. 
  
4. Societal Participation and Institutional Implications 
 
 The following sections will detail the respective roles of each of the societal forces 
involved, discuss their effects on the government’s decision-making, and further elaborate 
on their importance in pushing for greater change moving forward 
 
4.1. Societal Involvement: a review 
 
 Broadly speaking, societal intervention in Sun’s case can be divided into three 
stages.  
 
4.1.1. Stage 1: Fighting alone (March 17th to April 3rd) 
 
 Sun’s family negotiated with the clinic and the government individually without an 
attorney and understandably made no progress. Although Sun’s family contacted various 
governmental organizations, including the C&R station and clinic, as well as the police and 
the procuratorate, the Guangzhou Civil Affairs Bureau, Public Health Bureau, and Medical 
Association, they received no response. As usual, these organizations played the “ball-
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kicking game,” none willing to take the necessary responsibility.295 
 
4.1.2. Stage 2: Professionals (April 3rd-25th) 
 
 Professional expertise proves to be an important factor in crisis management, 
emergency response, legal affairs and state-society interaction, especially in times of 
questionable governmental authority and in incidents where the local government often 
withholds information and avoids fulfilling its responsibilities. On the one hand, people need 
officially recognized evidence to support their causes, and often a scientific report or 
technical data provided by qualified organizations adds considerable weight to their cases. 
On the other hand, governments also rely on professional organizations in order to prove the 
credibility of their stances. Therefore, both government and society trust professional 
organizations for their expertise, neutrality and objectivity, and indeed in most social 
incidents studied here, professionals played an essential role. 
 For the family, the priority was to find the real causes for Sun’s death. None of his 
relatives had the expertise necessary the reveal the truth, not knowing who should be held 
responsible for Sun’s death, how to press the case, or even if a lawyer would be necessary. 
However, local lawyers in Guangzhou whom Sun’s relatives had consulted all refused to be 
involved in the case. 296  The family’s economic condition may have been an important 
reason for this, since large law firms had become involved in many major cases that were far 
more sensitive, complex, and difficult. Fortunately, Wang Xiangbin, the lawyer employed by 
Sun’s relatives in their hometown, advised them to immediately seek medical and legal 
expertise the sooner the better, and his guidance proved to be great value to the family.  
 On April, Sun’s family went to the Medical-Legal Expertise Center of the Sun Yat-
sen University Hospital to procure a legally recognized document as key evidence of Sun’s 
death. The report pointed out that Sun Zhigang had died from frail cell tissue, through 
injuries and traumatic shock, and the result of the autopsy also indicated there was no 
problem with Sun’s internal organs. The conclusion ran against the clinic’s acclamation that 
Sun had died from a cerebral hemorrhage and heart attack. Sun’s symptoms indicated he 
was beaten within the last 72 hours prior to his death, indicating the C&R station and clinic, 
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were responsible for Sun’s death, since he had spent his last 72 hours there according to all 
official documents including his own account, work report, and signature as well as witness 
testimony. 
 
4.1.3. Stage 3: Media involvement (April 25th) 
 
 A major breakthrough in Sun’s case came with the intervention of the influential 
Southern Metropolis Daily (nan fang dou shi bao), a Guangzhou-based newspaper notable 
for in-depth investigative reporting. In mid-April roughly one month after Sun’s death, one 
of his classmates working for the Supreme People's Court contacted the newspaper which 
agreed to report it. On April 25th, the paper reported Sun’s sad story with banner headline 
entitled “Sun Zhigang was beaten to death”, and also provided in-depth analysis under the 
subtitle “Should Sun Zhigang be detained by the C&R?” as well as a personal depiction of 
Sun Zhigang’s story to arouse public sympathy. In the story, the newspaper also revealed the 
medical-legal report by the Sun Yat-sen University Hospital noted in Sections 6 and 7.297 
This public exposure proved to be vital since it aroused national outrage and the mounting 
public pressure attracted the attention of senior leaders at the central and provincial level.  
 Although circulated nationwide, South Metropolis Daily is still a local newspaper, 
but their reporting led the central media to follow suit, making the incident into a truly 
national event. On April 30th, the China Youth Newspaper (zhong guo qing nian bao) 
reported extensively on Sun’s case in a story entitled “Without Temporary Residential 
Permission, A Company Employee Lost His Life in Guangzhou C&R Stations”,298 which 
subsequently led to intensive coverage by Xinhua news agency, CCTV, People’s Daily, 
Workers’ Daily and other central media outlets. Most notably, the People’s Daily (East 
China News) published a commentary entitled “How Far Can the Sun Zhigang Case Goes?” 
calling for further inspection of legal implementation, by starting with “details of truth, open 
procedure, and necessary inquiry”.299   Public opinion became strongly favorable towards 
                                                        
297 Chen Feng, The Death of Sun Zhigang: a Detainee of the C&R, Southern Metropolis Daily. 
298 Lin Wei. “Without Temporary Residential Permission, A Company Employee Lost His Life 
in Guangzhou C&R Stations Because of He doesn’t Have a Temporary Residential Permission”, 
China Youth Newspaper, April 30, http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2003-04/30/content_656498.htm, 
2015-06-06. 
299 Ho, Hong. How Far Can Sun Zhigang Case Go, People Daily (East China News), May 30, 
2003, first section. See also: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/27/20030530/1004075.html, 2015-03-03. 
 149 
Sun’s family due to expectations that mainstream media would continue to track these 
events and arouse public pressure. 
 Unsurprisingly, several days later the Central and Guangdong government jointly 
announced a thorough investigation of the case. Beijing Youth Newspaper made a total of  9 
reports and commentaries on Sun’s case, and the Newspaper of Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone and many other local newspapers all had reported on the story. The Workers’ Daily, a 
newspaper affiliated with the All China Federation of Labor, organized a special seminar on 
the C&R system, where renowned scholars and social attendees discussed the institutional 
causes of Sun Zhigang incident and questioned the legitimacy of the system. 
 The Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV program, an influential Chinese media outlet 
popular all over Chinese-speaking, especially in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the 
Southeast Asian countries, commented on Sun’s case on May 14th and publicized the story 
to a wider audience, particularly overseas. On May 14th, the BBC News also reported the 
initiative of three law PhDs to review the constitutionality of the Measures of Custody and 
Repatriation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars, further expanding the case’s international 
exposure.300 On June 2nd, 2003, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
held its first roundtable testimony on Sun’s death, 301 followed by a second testimony in 
October to make further evaluations.302 
 On July 10th, after the outrage had finally smoothed over, South Weekend, the most 
influential newspaper focused on social problems published a front page commentary 
entitled “ Never Allow A Second Sun Zhigang to Appear”, pushing for institutional reform 
of the entire system.303 
 
i) Leadership Involvement 
 
 While leadership involvement does not fall under societal involvement, it is certainly 
a key component of the decision-making process, as the engagement of leadership indicates 
                                                        
300BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/chinese/china_news/newsid_2933000/29333341.stm 
301 Tong, Yi. Kidnapping by Police: Custody and Repatriation, This is an edited version of a 
paper presented to the Congressional Executive Commission on China on June 2, 2003. 
302 After the Detention and Death of Sun Zhigang: Prisons and Detention in China, Routable 
table before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 108th Congress, First session, 
October 27, 2003, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg91305/html/CHRG-
108hhrg91305.htm, 2005-08-14. 
303 Deng Zibin, Never Allow a Second Sun Zhigang to Appear, South Weekend, June 10, 2003. 
http://news.hsw.cn/gb/news/2003-06/10/content_294815.htm, 2015-06-06. 
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that the preceding societal engagement was at least partially effective. In China’s decision-
making, official responses from the government authorities, particularly regional leaders, 
rather than the functional branches, often marks the watershed in the development of a 
social event or solution to a social crisis. While functional branches of the government often 
play the “kicking ball” game, promises of government leaders signal a commitment to a 
systemic and coordinated solution between the government branches and functional 
organizations. Governmental statements also intensify media coverage and raise public 
awareness since speeches and special visits by leaders are often noteworthy news items for 
local media, and also serve to justify further societal involvement and follow-up inspections. 
 Since the media coverage and public outrage over Sun’s death has brought was 
unusual in recent decades, the Guangzhou municipal and Guangdong provincial government 
finally took over the matter. On May 11th, Guangdong provincial leaders as well as the 
concerned departments visited Sun’s father and other relatives and expressed strong anger, 
promising that this case would be made clear no matter the difficulties. Thereafter Sun’s 
case entered into the official agenda and decision-making procedures, which would not have 
been possible without media disclosure and societal pressure. 
 
4.1.4. Stage 4: Involvement of academia and intellectual elites 
 
 After the May 11th visit by Guangdong leaders, the due investigative and legal 
procedures officially started, and appeared to go smoothly at the outset. However, for 
societal participation had already entered into a new phase, as the public was no longer 
satisfied merely with resolving Sun’s case. Headed by legal scholars, voices for further 
institutional reform of the C&R system were becoming stronger. 
 On May 14th, 2003, three Ph.D. graduates in law from some of the most prestigious 
universities in Beijing, Yu Jiang (School of Law, Central China Science and Technology 
University), Teng Biao (School of Law, China University of Politics and Law), and Xu 
Zhiyong (School of Arts and Law, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications) 
submitted a suggestion to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to 
reexamine the constitutionality of the 1982 “Measures for the Custody and Repatriation of 
Vagrant Beggars in the Cities” according to which the C&R system had been launched. The 
legal provision they cited was that under the PRC’s Administrative Punishment Act and 
Legislature Act, promulgated in 1996, citizens could only be deprived of their freedom 
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through laws passed by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee. The 
State Council and the various provinces had no power to make regulations that effectively 
deprived citizens of their personal freedoms, and therefore C&R, which arose from Party 
and State Council directives, was unlawful. 
 A week later, more prestigious legal experts joined the three scholars in their appeal. 
On May 23rd, He Weifang (贺卫方), a leading liberal scholar in law from Beijing 
University, Sheng Hong (盛洪), a liberal scholar in law and economics and co-founder of 
the leading civilian think tank Unirule Institute of Economics, Shen Kui (沈岿), a law 
scholar from Beijing University, Xiao Han, a law scholar from the aforementioned Unirule 
Institute of Economics and active media commentator on social affairs,304  and He Haibo (何
海波), then a law scholar from the China Academy of Governance,305 jointly appealed to the 
Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, urging it to immediately begin a special 
investigation into the C&R system. 
 The Law of Legislation promulgated just 3 years before Sun’s death, in Article 90, 
item 2, granted ordinary citizens the right to initiate “suggestions” of constitutionality 
review to the Standing Committee, so the three doctors were certainly eligible to initiate 
their review. Because the appeals of the legal scholars were rational, legislative authorities 
were quite active by early July, and related committees had already confirmed the reception 
of the appeal, indicating that authorities had begun reviewing it.306 Niu Longyun, speaker of 
the Office of Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, published a special 
commentary in Outlook Weekly (Liao Wang), a weekly journal affiliated to the Xinhua 
News Agency, issued in early July, admitting that China’s conditionality review system was 
incomplete. He also analyzed the common practice of “review after legislation” under the 
legal framework, indicating that the State Council could possibly revise the Measures of 
Custody and Repatriation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars promulgated in 1982，upon the 
official request of Special Committee or Legal Committee of the National People’s 
Congress.307 
                                                        
304 Xiao is now professor of law at China University of Politics and Law. 
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306 Legal Work Committee of National People’s Congress to Reply the Suggestions by Three 
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307 For details, see Niu Longyun, An In-depth reflection on Sun Zhigang Case, China News, July 
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i) Collaboration of entities and individuals 
 
  Many other people were also involved in this landmark event and contributed in 
various ways. Initially, 18 of Sun’s college classmates provided the needed financial aid, 
while Professor Ai Xiaoming from Sun Yat-sen University, and Phoenix TV’s host Dou 
Wentao also rendered financial assistance. Given their influence, their help would be 
symbolic of the elites’ attitudes towards these events, though they did not express their own 
opinions publicly. 
 Doctor Liu Xiaoshan and his colleagues from the Medical-Legal Expertise Center of 
Sun Yat-sen University Hospital also played a critical role in assisting Sun’s family. 
Generally, it takes about a month to obtain the results of an autopsy, but Liu Xiaoshan and 
his colleagues worked hard to finish the report half a month in advance. Though time may 
not have seemed a pressing issue here, Liu and his colleagues had won another 15 days 
which may ultimately have made a huge difference in the subsequent development of Sun’s 
case. 
 It would be difficult to predict what would have happened if the autopsy results had 
come out only two weeks later, but there were great uncertainties that were averted by its 
timely release. Sun’s family members could have given up their appeal out of 
disappointment and left unfriendly Guangdong, or due to the coming outbreak of the SARS 
they could have been forcibly quarantined, the most commonly adopted measure for those 
who came from afflicted areas or displayed symptoms such as fever. 
 The roles of some of Sun Zhigang’s classmates were also essential. At that time, one 
classmate worked at the Supreme People’s Court and was the first to contact the Southern 
Metropolis Daily. We might suspect that the occupation and affiliation of this classmate may 
have influenced the newspaper’s interest in the story since some of Sun’s poor relatives had 
also tried to contact other media outlets without success. For his prominent role in breaking 
the news on Sun’s case in the Southern Metropolis Daily, journalist Chen Feng was elected 
by CCTV as one of the Most Influential Journalists in 2003.308 
 
                                                        
308 Probably under some pressure and also encouraged by the internet-based media, Chen later 
transferred to other media, and now serves as a deputy of the PPTV, an influential internet-based 
TV Media. 
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5. End of the C&R System: A major step toward Rule of Law 
 
 On July 16th, two days before the decision by the state council on the official 
abolishment of the Measures of Custody and Repatriation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars, 
the state council also held the due Expert Audit for abolishment, a major development in 
decision-making in the recent decade. China first included an article stating “the State 
respects and preserves human rights” in a 2004 Constitutional amendment by the Standing 
Committee of National People’s Congress, marking a milestone in its human rights 
development.  Because this revision took place only half a year after Sun Zhigang’s death, it 
is quite possible that the human rights abuses in Sun’s case played a major role. 
 Compared with its pace of economic reform, China’s progress in the political sector 
had always lagged behind. As each incremental but valuable step proved difficult, progress 
is only possible when societal forces join to put sufficient pressure on the government that 
can no longer be neglected. During Hu-Wen era, the government developed other 
institutional innovations, arranging to promote “democratic, professional, and scientific” 
decision-making, including the letters visit system (xin fang zhi du), the public hearing 
system (gong kai ting zheng hui zhi du), the information opening system (xin xi gong kai), 
and the speakers system (fay an ren zhi du), though the effects of these policies proved 
limited and difficult to interpret.  
 On other hand, unlawful administrative detention such as for re-education (收容教
育) and compulsory rehabilitation (强制戒毒) of drug users and sex workers still operates. 
The resolution of the Sun Zhigang case signaled a new approach toward reviewing, revising, 
or abolishing these laws, it would seem impossible for this process to being without a major 
tragedy, as these regulations and guidelines are part of Chinese law. However, the Sun 
Zhigang case aroused public awareness both domestically and internationally awareness, 
and many social activists continue to press the government to review its legislation. 
 A similar system of assistance was established to protect homeless children in 
2006,309 and the Ministry's Social Affairs department launched a RMB1.12 billion ($164 
million) program to build 300 centers by 2010, capable of serving over 150,000 homeless 
children per year in prefecture-level cities and large counties across the country. 
 After Sun’s case, the Chinese government also began to dismantle the system of 
Reeducation Through Labor (RTL), one of the pillars of its extensive extra-judicial 
                                                        
309 Ibid. 
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administrative detention system.310 In 2013, after a new generation of leadership entered 
office in March, official documents of the CCP’s Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth 
Central Committee announced an intent to “Abolish the re-education through labor system, 
perfect punishment and execution laws for unlawful and criminal acts, complete community 
correction institutions.”311   In December, the system of RTL was officially abolished. 
 As an important component of the legal system, the Law of Legislation was further 
discussed and reform carried out. On August 25th, 2014. The Tenth Meetings of the Twelfth 
National People’s Congress reviewed proposed revisions to the Law of Legislation, for the 
first time since 2000. Other efforts included announcing limited reforms to the hu kou 
system of household registration that had denied social services to China’s internal migrants, 
and granting slightly improved access for disabled persons to the all-important university 
entrance exam. 
 Sun’s incident was a remarkable example of how societal forces, led by investigative 
journalism, and in conjunction with citizen participation and legal activism could bring 
about positive change. It is now regarded as the event that began the weiquan or rights 
defense movement, in which ordinary citizens use the law as a tool to defend their rights 
through litigation or activism.312 After Sun Zhigang’s case was settled, Xu Zhiyong and 
Teng Biao turned human rights maintenance into careers and both later became prominent 
legal scholars and social activists, whose presence was even more evident in many subseque 
cases.  
                                                        
310 Joseph D. Tucker, Abolishing government detention in China for public health, 25 January 
2014, Available at: 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/01/25/abolishing-government-detention-in-china-for-public-
health-benefits/, 2015-08-08. 
311 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, adopted at the Third Plenary Session of 
the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 12, 2013. 
312 A blow for freedom: The campaign in memory of Sun Zhigang, 10 years on, South China 
Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1236973/blow-freedom-campaign-
memory-sun-zhigang-10-years, 2015-05-05. 
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Chapter 7: The Bobai County Protests Against Family Planning Policy 
 
 The Bobai protest is a major group incident that took place in early 2007 in Bobai 
County, in China’s southwestern Guangxi province. The protest was directly incited by the 
harsh measures taken by local government to fulfill their responsibilities in family planning, 
and also revealed how difficult it is for societal involvement to make a difference if the state 
will remains strong. The incident was adopted by the writer as a failed case of societal forces 
in institutional transformation.   
 
            1. The Family Planning Policy  
 The family planning policy was a population control policy China introduced 
between 1978 and 1980 and has been adopted until the present day.313 It was initiated after 
Chinese government decided to shift its focus from the class struggle to economy and 
construction in 1978. When economic developed prioritized the CCP’s agenda, the fast 
growing population turned out to be a “burden”. Actually Mao Zedong and former premier 
Zhou Enlai had also realized the possible side effects of fast expanding population and had 
advocated “late, long and fewer” family planning (delaying marriage, having fewer children 
and more years between births) on a voluntary basis. Almost throughout the 1970s, the 
government advocated the slogan “one is too few, two is just ok, three is too many”, which 
simply explained its early family planning policy.  
 During 1979-1980, the 7th Mechanical Industry (qijibu, became the Department of 
Aerospace Industry in 1982, again canceled in 1993 and became the Aviation Industry 
Corporation in 1999) and a research fellow from China Academy of Social Sciences had 
conducted research on population prediction. The Office of the CCP Central Committee 
organized another five seminars on population policies from late March to early May 1980, 
the first two of which were attend by senior officials from State Planning Commission, 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Civil Affairs, General Bureau of Labor, Women’s 
Association and other relevant departments, as well as scientists and sociologists. 314 The 
                                                        
313 Family Planning in China, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Lithuania; Information 
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, August 1995, Section III paragraph 2, 
retrieved 27 October 2014. 
314 Qiushi, Secret Stories About the 5 Seminars that Determined the State Policy of Family Plan”, 
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five seminars basically decided to adopt the “One Child Policy”, but the seminars also 
proposed to implement the “One Child Policy” for only one generation”. 315 In February 
1982, the CCP Central Committee and State Council announced the “Guidelines Concerning 
Further Carry out the Family Planning Work” that officially made the Family Plan a State 
Policy. 316 In 1982, the Family Plan policy was incorporated into the constitution, which 
says,  
 
“The (Chinese) state adopts family plan policy so that population growth could 
be adapted to economic and social development plan”, 317 and “both parties of 
an couple has the obligation to practice the family plan policy”. 318 
 
 Undoubtedly, the one-child policy was a very aggressive population control policy, 
aiming to make immediate progress in birth control. The rapid population growth in the 
1960s had raised the official awareness of the population issue since the early 1970s. From 
1962 to 1972, the annual number of births in China averaged 26.69 million, totaling 300 
million. In 1969, China's population exceeded 800 million. 319 
 The CCP’ priority change proved to be the vital reason for the Family Planning 
Policy. As a somewhat isolated agricultural country, the state government had to accumulate 
capital from agricultural production for industrial development, while agricultural 
productivity was very low and consumption was high owning to the huge population. In the 
year 1980 when the decision was made, China had a huge yet young population close to 1 
trillion, China was still under a planned economy and there was a general shortage of supply 
of basic living commodities. There was a general tendency of attributing the financial and 
material shortage to overpopulation. The understanding was not reliable but it was very 
common among top leadership.  
 The decision-making process of the “Family Plan Policy” and the “One Child 
Policy” were very democratic at the very beginning since it was determined based on former 
studies and consecutive seminars participated by many concerned ministries, scientists and 
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experts, especially if one takes into account that China had just experienced 10 years’ 
turmoil and repression of speech. However, the final decision was made under strong 
instruction of leadership who had made it clear that the goal for those seminars was to 
control population. The very first and second seminars were attended by around 100 officials 
and experts from many departments which were gradually reduced to around 20 for the last 
concluding seminar, which was to decide whether it would be okey to carry out the “One 
Child Policy”.320 In addition, two of the most influential Seniors Chen Yun and Song Jian 
(then deputy leader of the 7th Ministry of Industries who later became the Minister of 
Science and Technology had played an important role in the making of the of “One Child 
Policy”. In order to carry out the “One Child Policy”, Chen also proposed five measures 
accordingly: publicity, legislation, scientific studies of pregnancy prevention, “favorable 
treatment of single child” and a social welfare system that may help avoid the “raising kids 
to prepare for aging”.321 In fact, such policies, if carried out, may have helped cushion the 
severe problems brought by the “One Child Policy”. However, given China’s financial 
shortfall and priority of economic development, most supportive policies remained an idea 
except the “One Child Policy” itself.  
  
             2. The Faulted Policy and Its Implementation  
 Over population has been a human challenge. The UN Population Fund had warned 
that, if human beings do not take prompt and determined moves to control population and 
maintain a balance between consumption and development, the world population would 
reach up to 12.5 billion by the mid-21st century and bring negative influences for human 
development.322 As the most populous country, China probably had a better understanding 
how population has affected daily life as well as national development. Many other 
countries have also adopted a type of population control policy. The difference is, seldom 
has a country adopted such a radical almost reckless, demanding policy.  
 Generational inheritance is a natural biological process, and often has very complex 
cultural and sociological contests, the number of children a couple have is a very individual 
choice, while the family planning policy is a bold and harsh intervention in the private realm. 
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The “One Child Policy” proved to be very tough for most Chinese people, it was far below 
the natural replacement rate of 2.1, which means the Chinese nation will not be sustainable 
if the policy is carried out for long. Actually during the seminar discussions of before the 
“One China Policy” became official policy, officials and scholars had a general consensus 
that the “One Child Policy” shall be carried out for only one generation. However, the “One 
Child Policy” has been carried out until 2015 for many reasons. 323  
 Because the Policy itself is problematic, its implementation had led to many serious 
problems. The greatest challenge was that China was a typical agricultural country, and 
labor, especially male labor proved to be vital for agricultural production. The absence of a 
social welfare system made it desirable to have at least one male child. If the couple give 
birth to a daughter first, they are likely to continue to have a second or third child until they 
have a son.  
 The family planning policy had displayed a strong will of the government but the 
desire of the grassroots to have a second child was also rational and reasonable. The family 
planning policy had met with strong resistance in rural China. In order to carry out the state 
policy, the family planning law had authorized the local family planning officials to take 
compulsory actions of forced abortions or confiscation of assets, which have also be sources 
for rural contention. The majority of family planning workers are grassroots who have no 
better education than their “work targets”(gong zuo dui xiang), and the way they dealing 
with the “work targets” is often very harsh and violent once they met with resistance.  
 Because it was not possible to expect all the people to be cooperative to family 
planning cadres in carrying out the one child policy, cadres from the family planning 
department have to resort to compulsory actions, sometimes even use violence. Liu Ji and 
De Xinjian observed four types of regulatory means the government adopted to implement 
the family planning policy:  administrative order, economic punishment (collecting fines and 
social raise fee, confiscation); comprehensive management (restraining unplanned kids via 
household registration, schooling, social welfare); and discourse disciplining.324 However，
the most effective compulsory means are economic punishment, forced abortion and forced 
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fertility prohibition surgery (jie zha). Therefore, family planning has always been a major 
source of rural contentions.  
 In order to carry out the plan, the family planning commission established a 
department in each level of government and the family planning work remained an 
important task and the performance of township or county level governor in carry out the 
plan was a major criterion for his or her future promotion. While on the other hand, most 
cadres come from the same town or nearby localities; it was very difficult for them to carry 
out the plan as strictly. The financial punishment for an extra child was very heavy; often 
times of average annual income of a locality (the author will clarify later) and it is often 
impossible to collect the “social raise fee” because of the family’s poor economic condition. 
Often the family with an extra child will choose to bribe the family planning officials with 
relatively less money and therefore corruption in local operations of the family planning 
policy is quite common.  
 
            3. Bobai County and the Family Planning Policy 
  Bobai is an inland county in China’s underdeveloped western province of Guangxi, 
which is also one of China’s five autonomous regions of ethnic minorities. The family 
planning practices in Guangxi have always been problematic and it also revealed the 
ubiquitous tension between the government and society in terms of population control. As 
time went on, population problems began to draw intensive academic and social attention. 
Bobai County had 1.45 million of its 1.6 million population living in rural areas (by the end 
of 2007), whose agricultural activities still relied heavily on male laborers. Through raising 
the “social raise fee” and numerous small unregistered fines, promotion and other interest 
transfer means, grassroots level officials had benefited greatly from the family planning 
policy and therefore, have not carried out the rules and regulations concerning the one-child 
policy. Ironically, quite a few Bobai local cadres themselves have one or two “extra” 
children, which were strictly prohibited by party discipline and relevant law. The violation 
of family planning law by cadres had worsened the situation since it undermined the 
credibility of family planning agencies, and was deemed by many in the grassroots as 
another source of social injustice.   
  In early 2007, not long after the Chinese Lunar Spring Festival, the Provincial 
government held a seminar on Population and Environment-related Work and another 
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seminar on Population and Planed Family Work, when the party head of Guangxi pointed 
out that, “there are serious problems with our population and planned family work, the 
situation is impressing”, “we should strictly control births, punish responsible person and 
implement policy of reward and punishment.” In the last conference, Bobai County was 
given a “yellow card” for its poor control over “unplanned” birth. After receiving the 
“yellow card”, the leaders from the Bobai County felt great pressure from the provincial 
leadership.  
 The amount of the fine is often calculated based on the average wage of a locality，
often many times of average wage of the locality. According to Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning Guidelines (Guangxi Zhuang zu zi zhi 
qu ren kou he ji hua sheng yu guan li ban fa), article 31, for those who illegally give birth to 
children, a “social raise fee” will be collected based on the average disposable income of 
urban residents (for urban residents) or average net income of rural families (for rural 
farmers):  
1. for those who give birth to one extra child illegally, three to five times of the annual 
disposable income (urban residents) or net annual income (rural farmers) 
2. for those who give birth to two extra children illegally, five to seven times of annual 
disposable income (urban residents) or net annual income (rural farmers) 
3. for those who give birth to three extra children illegally, seven to nine times of 
annual disposable income (urban residents) or net annual income (rural farmers) 
4. for those who give birth to four or more extra children illegally, the amount of social 
raise fee should be calculated accordingly.) 325 
 
  The National Family Planning Commission is responsible for raising public 
awareness, registration of new-born children, inspection work and post-birth social 
awareness of population policy, and ensuring the  policy was enforced at the provincial level 
through fines that were imposed based on the income of the family and other factors. 
"Population and Family Planning Commissions" exist at every level of government to raise 
awareness and carry out registration and inspection work. 
  As indicated above, the due amount of “social raise fee” is heavy when compared 
with annual income, especially for people in the less developed Guangxi Province, the 
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“social raise fee” becomes a severe burden for an average family, so people often choose to 
pay a relatively smaller fine worthy from RMB1,000 to 2,000. This money often goes to the 
pocket of local officials from the Family Planning Department. It is often not registered, or 
accumulated to deduct from the due amount of the fine, the local officials don’t even 
provide an official invoice or receipt. The next time the family is caught, it will be fined 
again. Therefore, the fine has become a way for local Family Planning department officials 
to raise extra income in many places. Township government officials and village heads had 
sold made family planning policy a good business by selling “Birth Permission” (zhun 
sheng zheng) and “certificate for Sterilization”(jie zha zheng) rampantly in Bobai. 
  “Bobai’s Family Planning work is centered on collecting the “social raise fee”, they 
do not care about other work (publicity, persuasion, inspection, etc.), the township level 
government always assigns tasks of collecting of the “social raise fee” in the form of quota 
to each village to settle the fiscal problems”.326 As an incentive, 20% of the social raise fee 
will be returned to the township level government after they successfully collected and 
submitted the fee.”327  
  Because both the villagers and the grassroots level governments have a stake in 
giving birth to more children, cheating the superior level governments has become common, 
especially when a higher level government official come to inspect the implementation of 
the family planning policy, the local family planning officials often side with villagers to 
cheat those inspectors. However, such an “alliance” may be a problem, since the family 
planning policy is regarded as “basic state policy”(ji ben guo ce), the performance of 
government officials in carrying out the family planning policy is one of the major criterions 
for their promotion, failure in strictly carrying out the family planning policy may risk their 
futures, especially if the superior officials find out they are being cheated by lower level 
government, they may have to “correct” it by strictly sticking to the policy. The Bobai 
County received a “yellow card” because its Jiangning township level government was 
found cheating in family planning statistics and many more cases of cheating were revealed 
thereafter. The “Yellow Card” was regarded a huge problem. It brought great pressure upon 
the Bobai county government, and the county waged a campaign called “removing the 
Banner”.  The Provincial Party head of Guangxi, Liu Qibao, has taken aggressive policies 
                                                        
326 Huang Tao, Jiang Dexing and Wang Ruyuan, The Social Capital and Government Performance in 
Bobai County’s Implementation of the Family Planning Policy, Journal of Chengdu University, 
2009(03). 
327 Ibid.  
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aimed at making the underdeveloped western province “economically competitive”, and the 
“radical” family planning work was part of the “aggressiveness”.    
 
               4.  The Campaign and the Protest  
    As a Chinese saying goes, “a crooked stick will have a crooked shadow” (shang 
liang bu zheng xia liang wai). The campaign starts with harsh punishment of cadres and 
party members who had more children than regulated. In 2007 alone, Bobai has fired 104 
cadres for their violation of the Family Planning Law.328 Among the 104 cadres, 38 are 
middle and primary schools teachers who had reported to “organizations and received 
punishment. According to family planning regulations; they could be exempted from further 
punishment. However, they were dismissed together with other cadres.329 Bobai was not 
alone, provinces like Hebei and Hubei had waged similar campaigns to “clean” its cadres’ 
violation of family planning law. In the year 2007, more than 900 cadres and party members 
had been punished, many were dismissed.330  
   They were also assigned quotas of collecting fines of RMB500 on behalf of the 
county government. Parents of “extra” children were required to hand in “social raise fee” 
(ranging from RMB10, 000 to RMB 70,000), those who failed to hand in the fine and 
“social raise fee” would have their possessions taken away to make up for the fine. The 
family planning workers took 42 pigs from Pang Liwen, owner of a farm in Shuangwang 
town. For those who did not have anything worthy of money, the family planning officials 
turned over the roof of their houses as punishment; and if, the estimated value of their 
possessions was not sufficient for paying the fine, the family plan divisions would “pull 
down” their houses as a further punishment.331  
   Liu Yongzhong (刘永忠)，furniture shop owner, received an “Announcement on 
Paying Social Raise Fee by deadline”  on May 13  by Shapi family planning department, 
ordering them to hand in a social raise fee of RMB24,159 by the same date, or the 
Compulsory Confiscation Team will “execute” confiscation of their assets, they took away 
                                                        
328 Meng Na and Wang Mian, 104 Cadres from Bobai County was Dismissed for Violation of Family 
Plan Policy, http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2008-01/16/content_9537625.htm, 2015-06-01.  
329 By the end of 2013, the teachers are stilling appealing to national authorities for correction of the 
improper punishment imposed by Bobai local government, interview with Mr. Zhou, a former 
principle of a local middle school.  
330 A Number of Cadres in Bobai County were punished for violating Family Planning State Policy, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-01/15/content_7427505.htm, 2015-11-08.  
331 Email Interview of a county family plan department at the Bobai County, he admitted such 
measures were taken but indicate that it was “a political task” assigned by provincial government.  
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Liu on the same day, and more than 100 family planning workers surrounded the shop and 
ordered them to hand over the fee within 10 minutes, then rushed into the room and took 
everything, including living possessions.  
Besides, the county government has been very aggressive in operation of the policies. 
“Everyday, there were around 80 family plan officials rushed into the village, each worn 
armed uniforms and helmet, with iron hammers, electric torch and handcuffs”, a local 
villager described, “they surrounded two families, opened their doors by force, took 
everything away, destroyed everything left behind”.332 A slogan was panging over the family 
plan department buildings which read, 
 
 “for those who don’t conduct fertility prohibition surgery and pay fine 
spontaneously, firmly take actions of confiscating their assets, cutting off water 
and electricity supply, sealing off the house and arrest the people”（dui bu zi 
jue luo shi huan zha he jiao fei de dui xiang, jian jue shi xing shi wu di ding, 
duan shui duan dian, feng wu zhuo ren deng qiang zhi cuo shi）.    
 
  The Family Planning Department could even, without fulfilling legal procedures, 
order the bank to freeze the bank account of those who have violated the Family Planning 
Law by giving birth to “unplanned” children, they keep this account until the family pays 
the fine (often a huge amount) within a designated period of time, or they would take the 
money directly. 333 A family who have nine children had bought eight ‘birth permission and 
fertilization certificate”, but still this time needs to pay RMB 94,884 “social raise fee”. 
  Other repressive measures contained forced sterilization of women and property 
confiscation in lieu of fines. The family planning department officials were met with strong 
dissent but no serious confrontation appeared at the very beginning. And those compulsory 
actions proved to be somewhat effective. Until the end of April, Bobai County had carried 
out 18,110 sterilizations and other three types of surgeries to prevent further pregnancy, 
which, the government claimed that it had avoided the birth of 3,855 babies. The total fine 
and “social raise fee” collected reached up to RMB 7.88 million.334 Foreign media estimated 
                                                        
332 Interview with an unnamed local peasant (whose first name is Wei (Mr.), in late October, 2012. 
333 Huang Tao, Jiang Dexing and Wang Ruyuan, the Social Capital and Government Performance in 
Bobao’s Implementation of Planned Family Policy, Journal of Chengdu University (Social 
Sciences), 2009(3).  
334 Huang Tao, Jiang Dexing and Wang Ruyuan, “the Social Capital and Government Performance in 
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better “achievement” during the first phase of the campaign. It was estimated that between 
February 6 and April 10, Yulin carried out 48,554 sterilizations and collected some RMB 
27.6 million (about $ 3.5 million) in fines.335 Propaganda has never been absent in the 
CCP’s campaigns. This time was no exception. The county government made around 6,000 
banners of slogans, large propaganda boards, and over 300 thousand advocacy manuals. 336  
 However, those repressive actions raised public outrage. On May 17, 2007, starting 
in Dungu town, violent protests took place in more than 10 towns of the Bobai County. On 
the evening of May 17, Dungu town government buildings were surrounded and attacked 
and seven police automobiles were damaged in protests; On the morning of May 18, several 
thousand people gathered at Yong’an town government, attacking and destroyed the doors, 
windows and offices of government buildings, turned over automobiles, burned documents 
and archives, and some villagers rushed into the houses of the family planning officials and 
burned their personal belongs; During the afternoon of May 18, villagers began to attack 
Shuiming town; On the morning of May 19, protests spreaded over eastern part of the 
county, Datong, Shapi，Nabu, Yingqiao, Wendi, all together eight township governments 
had been attacked, with the number of participated by  protesters ranging from 200 to10,000. 
Township level governments of Yashan，Fengshan，Lingjiao, Langping, and Jiangning 
were also attacked.  
  On May 19, a large-scale riot took place in the town of Shapi. Some 10,000 
protesters clashed with hundreds of anti-riot police armed with guns and electric cattle 
prods. The police were bused in after demonstrators had pulled down a wall, chased and beat 
officials from the family planning department, smashed cars and lit fires.337  
  The problem with Bobai County was very common and represents the general 
situation for many parts of rural China; this is especially true with China’s underdeveloped 
western provinces like Guangxi, Guizhou, etc. Less than ten days later, on May 29, 2007, 
stronger protests took place in the nearby Rong county, some 3,000 residents from Shitao 
township of the Rong county surrounded local government offices, and when the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Bobai’s Implementation of Family Plan Policy”, Chengdu University Journal (Social Sciences), 
2009(03). 
335 Dragan Stankovic and John Chan, Protest in China over the One Child Policy, World Socialist 
Web Site, http://intsse.com/wswspdf/en/articles/2007/06/chin-j01.pdf, 2015-12-08.   
336 Provided by worker from Family Plan Commission, Mr. L. he now serves as deputy of the county 
commission. The commission now has transferred to Heath and Family Planning Commission by 
merging with the Ministry of Health.  
337 The Group Incident of Bobai Mass Surrounding and Blocking the Government is now Under 
Control, http://gx.people.com.cn/GB/channel2/200705/24/1332065.html, 2015-06-18.   
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confrontation escalated, an estimated 20,000 protesters joined in the surrounding of 
government buildings, burning vehicles, motorbikes and police vans and cars. 338  
 
             5. Result of the Bobai Family Plan Protest 
  It is not the author’s purpose to detail the confrontation between the local 
governments and the interaction between the protesters and government officials. Faced 
with intensive protests and public crisis after the SARS in 2003, the local government 
officials had systematic plans to settle down all sorts of local protests. Actually, each level 
of government, department, and party schools had intensive training courses concerning 
emergency or crisis response. Concrete measures include deterrence of riot police, arrest of 
social activists, persuasion of higher level officials, commitment in punishing responsible 
officials, explanation of the necessity for the family planning policy, and possibly reassuring 
of exemption for further punishment of early engagement. 339   
   After the peak of the protests on May 19, the people involved in the protests began 
to decline. For scholars like Yu Jianrong, many people involved in such cases simply regard 
it as a good opportunity to release their anger instead of having any real purpose in their 
protest. Therefore such cases are stress-releasing or venting anger incidents.340  This is 
                                                        
338  Guangxi Family Planning Protests Erupt Again in Rong County ，
http://www.rfa.org/english/china/china_guangxi-20070529.html, 2015-12-08.  
339 Confirmed by interview with Prof. Zhang from Central Party School, Prof. Zhang from State 
Academy of Governance, Prof. Liu and Cai from Beijng Municipal Party School, Mr. Wei from 
Zhejiang Provincial Party school, Miss. Chen from Shaanxi Provincial Party School, Dr. Deng from 
Beijing Tongzhou District Party School and Miss. Jin from a county Party school in Central China’s 
Hubei Province. During the peak time of social protests between 2007 (before the Olympics) and 
2010, group incident management courses accounted 1/3 to half of all cadres training courses all 
over China. All governors, majors, governors of counties, townships had attended at least one 
training course in crisis management. Besides, different ministries, like the Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Family Plan Commission, Ministry of Health, General Bureau 
of Safe Production Inspection, Department of Publicity all had their own training program attended 
by different level of bureaucrats. Interview conducted between late autumn of 2010 to spring 2011. 
Because land disputes arose between 2010-2012 peaked, there were more training courses on land 
protests.    
340 Yu Jianrong, China’s Anger Venting Incident and the Dilemma of Management and Governance, 
Contemporary World and Socialism, 2009(11); Yu Jianrong, The Major Types and Their Features of 
Contemporary China’s Group Incident, Journal of China University of Politics and Law, 2008(02). 
Other anger venting cases are the Weng’an protest in June 2008, when the satisfaction of the 
investigation result of a female middle school student by police led to major social protests and 
populist attack of government buildings, burning of cars, since rumors came that the girl was 
assaulted and murdered. For details and analysis of the case, see Yu Jianrong, The Study of Populist 
Psychological Mechanism in Anger Venting Incident: An Explanation of the Mechanism of Weng’An 
Incident, Journal of Beijing Institute of Governance, 2009(01). A third anger venting event was a 
protest in Shishou of Central China’s Hubei Province in December 2009, when the suspicious death 
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especially true given the fact that many protesters did not have to pay the fines or do the 
sterilization or they had already done the surgery long before.  
 
“They don’t have any real goal, just because they want to see the “well-
furnitured” government buildings and offices be destroyed, cars burned, and 
the once arrogant family plan officials to lower their head to persuade them to 
leave”. 341  
 
Therefore, once anger was vented, there was not more reason to continue the protest. 
Because in all townships, government buildings, offices of the Family Planning Division 
had been damaged or destroyed, prior experience indicated that the police would probably 
arrest some social activists after the riot. Many people quit soon to avoid being arrested.  
 On May 23, Bobai County government announced that the protests had been settled 
down, and altogether 28 people were arrested for their role in advocating and organizing the 
protest. The government also sent 28 working groups made up of about 4200 cadres to all 28 
townships of Bobai County. The executive vice chairman of Guangxi Autonomous Region 
of Zhuang Ethnic Minority resided in the village to inspect and direct their work. 342 In order 
to relieve public outrage and dissent against the family planning work of local government, 
the Bobai County had temporarily stopped collecting “social raise fee”. 343  On June 18, 
Bobai County government organized a conference calling on the family planning workers to 
learn and practice their work according to an official regulation that strictly prohibits 
officials and party members from earning improper benefit by making use of their 
occupation, as a correction of their misconducts before the campaign, which the provincial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of a cook from a government hotel led to violence against government buildings, joined by local 
residents and nearby villagers.  The most recent anger-venting event took place days ago when the 
author was revising the dissertation. On December 28, 2015, a 13-year old middle school student 
committed suicide by jumping from a 17-floor building in Jinchang County of Gansu Province, 
simply because she was found to bring a chocolate, a clothes hook and soft drink out of a store 
without payment, the clerk insulted her by calling her names and asked her parents to pay RMB150 
as a fine. More than one thousand angry local people gathered attacked the store, and even attacked 
the major who came to settle the issue. The protesters partially felt pity for the little girl, partially 
because they were not satisfied with the government because of disparity, poor social welfare 
provision, and poverty. This is why anger-venting event often happen in less developed areas.   
341  Interview with a former deputy of a township government in Bobai, in late 2010, date 
unregistered. He now  runs a tea house in the downtown area of Bobai county.  
342 The Incident of Mass from Bobai County Surrounding and Blocking the Government had been 
Settled Down, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/5766376.html, 2015-12-19.  
343  Bobai Temporarily Stopped collecting Fine to relieve public anger after Settlement of Riot, 
Wenhuibao, 2007-05-23. The Internet version of the article is no longer accessible now.    
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leadership regarded as the major reason for the poor performance of the family planning 
agency, instead of the policy itself.  
   On July 10, Mr. Shen Beihai, Head of the Provincial Department of Publicity, and a 
member of Guangxi Party Committee, emphasized  
 
“(Guangxi) shall unwaveringly stick to the policy of Stabilizing the 
organizations responsible for population and family plan work, and constantly 
innovate the work system and mechanism” 
 
ensuring that no family plan officials would be punished for the campaign from late 
February to the middle May. He also conveyed the instructions from provincial party 
secretary, Mr. Liu Qibao, that the stance of Guangxi authority will not change because of the 
“storm against family plan policy”, because the family planning policy is China’s “basic 
state policy”, and it “concerns the quality of Chinese population and the long-term 
sustainable development of China as a whole”.  
   There were also serious discussions about the reason for the protest, and 
understandably, the government had been blamed for their hasty decision-making, their 
improper conduct during implementing the policy and their bad behaviors. 344 However, the 
Bobai County case itself seemed to not have aroused further criticisms upon the family 
planning policy, even though there was already harsh criticism on the policy in international 
academia and media.  345  Therefore, it would be safe to say that the Bobai County protests 
against the family planning policy and the family planning campaign had stopped as a 
populist movement that successfully stopped the harsh actions taken to implement the 
family planning policy that should have been carried out before. However, it didn’t arouse 
more media discussion and scholarly appeals concerning the family planning policy as an 
institutional arrangement.   
 
            6. Involvement of Societal Forces 
            6.1  The rural protesters  
                                                        
344 The Guangxi Bobai Public Incident was Caused by Hastiness for Success, Lian He Zao Bao, 
2007-05-24.   
345 Leading sociological scholars like Zhou Xiaozheng and Sun Liping  had been criticizing the one 
child policy and urging the government to adjust the policy soon in recent years. However, their 
gestures had little to do with the Bobai protests.  
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 Many group incidents were not actually organized by individuals or organizations. 
Because there was general dissents against the family planning policy and officials, the 
violent means the family planning workers had used often turned out to be the catalyst for 
large-scale group incidents.  
 Before the riot took place, the villagers had expected confrontation between family 
planning work team (task forces). However, the violent measures taken by the work team 
still shocked the villagers. Especially in relatively less developed ethnic areas, some of the 
actions were deemed very offensive: such as breaking the glass of the window (suggesting 
their future would be very poor since their wealth may escape from the window instead of 
being kept) and breaking the pots and pans (suggesting they will lose their job or other 
means of living)  
 Therefore, the villagers, those stakeholders whose interest, dignity and human rights 
(those who had sterilization) had been hurt, are the natural part of societal forces in the 
protests. Many villagers who didn’t have a problem with their family planning policy also 
participated in the protest either to support their relatives (very common in Chinese rural 
society where family ties remain strong) or just to express their dissents against the local 
government.  As mentioned before, in the most violent protest in Shapi, an estimated 12,000 
villagers had been involved in the protests. In protests within other townships, the 
population involved was all in thousands. Almost each family from the ten townships had 
been involved in protests against the township government.  
 
            6.2  Social Activists   
 After protests took place in Dungu on May 17, it soon expanded to another seven 
townships within two days. Though it is understandable that the family planning campaign 
was carried out all over Bobai County, and protests in one township could encourage 
neighboring townships to follow suit, however, it failed to explain why other 15 townships 
out of the 28 townships didn't have large-scale group incidents and other 5 townships just 
had small-scale group incidents.  
 In fact, as in any social movement, social activists played an essential role. In the 
Bobai County protest, some young villagers from the Dungu township and the Shapi had 
visited the neighboring townships Yongan, Shuiming and Nabu, telling them the government 
had bullied the villagers and invited the villagers to come to Dungu as  support. In inland 
rural areas like Guangxi, geographically close townships are often connected by family ties 
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and marriage.  By far it is clear that two of the activists who led the protests in Dungu have 
relatives from Shapi whose family is somewhat influential. It was not surprising these two 
townships had the fiercer protests. Several students from Nabu had also been very active in 
some coordination work during the protests.  
 Two other activists from outside of Bobai County provided an official document 
stating that the amount of fines due is often in thousands instead of tens of thousands 
Chinese Yuan. This document had served as evidence that the family planning officials 
disobeyed official regulations, and therefore “justified” their resistance against the 
government. The two activists had showed the document to villagers from more than three 
other townships while the news about the document was widely spread orally all throughout 
Bobai County. 346 After the protests settled down, the Bobai government arrested 28 activists 
and announced that they “had organized, incited, and connected secretly with  ( chuan 
lian) ”during the protests. 347  
 
            6.3  Students’ Involvement: what’s new in Bobai’s Family Planning Protests 
 Young students have been natural and ideal participants in,  modern social 
movements for their knowledge, passion and sense of responsibilities. They also have 
organizational convenience (students societies especially) for social engagement. Students 
played a leading role in China’s modern social movement, starting from the May 4 
movement in 1919 and ending after the Tiananmen Square incident. However, after that 
event, students had faded away from China’s political agenda. The eminent role of students 
in societal protests in China can also be attributed to the low literacy rate of China’s 
peasants in the vast rural areas and the working class in China’s urban cities. In remote 
townships of west China’s Guangxi province, middle school students are even regarded as 
educated people. By reading the newspapers, watching TV news and analysis, using the 
Internet, they have better knowledge and understanding about social affairs. And in Bobai’s 
family planning protests, especially in the township of Nabu, several hundred students from 
the junior middle school participated the protests. Because the students come from different 
                                                        
346 Later this “official document” was proved to be fabricated and fake, the two activists were later 
arrested together with other three leading protesters, other 23 were released and punishment was 
changed to “residential surveillance”.   
347 The Group Incident of Bobai Mass Surrounding and Blocking  Township Governments were 
Settled Down (guang xi bo bai qun zhong wei du xiang zheng fu shi jian ping xi) 
http://gb.cri.cn/14714/2007/05/23/1245@1601052.htm, 2015-12-18.  
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villagers of the the Nabu town, they  served as coordinators among villages and several 
students were believed to have engaged in linking with other townships.  
 
              6.4 Media’s Absence 
  The Bobai’s County’s campaign lasted for roughly two and a half month before the 
protests fizzled out. Misconduct of the family planning workers had begun since late 
February, 2007. However, before the protests in the middle of May, neither national media 
nor local media (newspapers, TV programs, broadcasting) had revealed the news, except the 
Internet webpage people.cn under the People’s Daily, which reported the settlement of 
Bobai County’s protest on May 23, 2007.  348 This is probably because family planning 
disputes had been quite common over the past decades while Bobai County is a relatively 
closed area and  media from other provinces didn’t cover the event. 349  
 As a major protest, international media had sent journalists to the Bobai County 
when the protests took place but were blocked and prevented from entering. However, the 
Singapore-based Lianhe Zaobao published two reports about the event on May 24 and July 
10 when a conference on family plan policy was held as a follow-up. 350 The Washington 
Post and the New York Times had reported the news; Radio Free Asia also reported the 
following protest by the neighboring Rong County on May 29. 351  But for obvious reasons, 
the news failed to reach the Chinese public and therefore had insignificant influence.  
                                                        
348  Bobai’s Group Incident of Mass Surrounding and Blocking the Governments Settled Down, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/5766376.html(no longer accessible by December 31, 2015, 
probably of deletion of news by publicity department, but the author had copied the news two years 
ago) 
349 One exception was a report by the Shanghai-based Wenhui Bao, Bobai Temporarily Stopped 
collecting Fine to relieve public anger after Settlement of Riot, Wenhuibao, 
http://paper.wenweipo.com/2007/05/23/YO0705230011.htm, 2007-05-23 (The Internet version of 
the article is no longer accessible by December 31, but the author had copied down the news two 
years before) 
350  Guangxi Bobai Family Plan Protests Caused by Officials’ Attempt to Succeed Soon, 
http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/cnpol/pages/cnpol070710.html, “Guangxi Bobai’s Stance in 
Family Plan Policy Not Shaken by Riot”, 
http://www.zaobao.com/special/forum/pages5/forum_lx070522.html) The Internet version of the 
article is no longer accessible by December 31, but the author had copied down the news two years 
before). 
351  Birth Control Crackdown Sparks Riots In Rural China, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/22/AR2007052201496.html,  Corruption in China: The anger boils over, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/opinion/29iht-edminzer.1.5912729.html?_r=0, Guangxi Family 
Planning Protests Erupt Again in Rong County, http://www.rfa.org/english/china/china_guangxi-
20070529.html (accessible until December 31, 2015) 
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   Exposure of the Bobai County protest by the Internet was also very limited. After 
the incident, there were just few articles pasted on the BBS and local Internet-based 
community. For the majority of protesters, the villagers didn’t have access to the Internet, 
neither did the students, so modern technology did not have a role in the protests. Several 
social activists even went to nearby townships in person to ask for support. This was unique 
for the Bobai protest.  
 
             6.5. Scholarly Involvement and Follow-ups  
 
 As a “basic state policy” that had been carried out for more than three decades, a 
policy turn proved to be very hard. Even the 2014 government work report still stated, 
“unshaveringly stick to the state policy of family planning, practicing the policy that allows 
the couples to have two kids if one of them is single child”. 352 
 However, demographical and sociological scholars and economists have been urging 
the government to review the one child policy. Since 2010, Wang Ming from Tsinghua 
University and Shandong University began to initiate bills jointly to the National People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, advocating to give up the “One Child Policy”, encourage 
“two children for each couple”. 353 In early 2013, leading scholar Yi Fuxian published an 
influential book “Great Country, Empty Home” and warned the comprehensive dangers of 
the family planning policy, calling for abolishment of the policy.354 On March 22, 2015, 50 
legal scholars from 21 universities, headed Beijing University Professor Zhan Zhongle and 
Li Jianxin, joined by the “Thee Seniors of Law”(former editor-in-chief of China Legal 
Studies, Professor Li Buyun from China Academy of Social Sciences, and leading professor 
and former president from China University of Politics and Law) and other influential 
scholars, 355 presented a bill to the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress and 
the State Council, urging the latter to revise the  Population and Family Planning Act.  
                                                        
352 The 2015 Government Work Report Didn’t Mention “Sticking to the State Policy of Family 
Planning”, http://www.guancha.cn/politics/2015_03_05_311170.shtml, 2015-06-12. 
353  Two members from the National People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC)  had 
initiated Family Plan Policy Act for 6 consecutive years, since 
http://www.yicai.com/news/2015/03/4580879.html, 2015-12-12.  
354 Yi Fuxian, Great Country, Empty Home: China’s Misled Family Plan Policy, Beijing: China 
Development Press, 2013.   
355 Including Professor Zhang Qianfan, who had been defending for Mr. Pu Zhiqiang, the well known 
human rights lawyer; and Shen Kui, who was one of the five professors who urged the Standing 
Committee of National People’s Congress to conduct constitutionality review of the Custody and 
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 Lasting scholarly pressure, fueled by China’s increasingly serious shortage of cheap 
labors in urban cities (yong gong huang), meant that for the first time, the 2015 government 
report didn’t have such a statement, instead emphasizing “promoting reform on family plan 
service and management”, therefore indicating that the “One Child Policy” would change 
soon.  
 On October 29, 2015, the Fifth Plenum of CCP’s 18th Party Congress announced 
that “(China should) carry out the two children Policy comprehensively and take actions to 
address aging”. 356  However, this is a result of continuous endeavors of scholars and 
enlightened officials. It is also a major decision by the top leadership to maintain the 
momentum of China’s economic growth. Generally, aside from the Bobai County protests, 
which was the only major protest against the family planning policy in  recent decades, other 
incidents remain very small. 
 
          What’s the Different in Sun Zhigang’s case and the Bobai County Protest?  
 
 The Compulsory Custody & Repatriation System (C&R System) and the Family 
Planning Policy are two institutional arrangements that have been adopted for decades: the 
C & R system was adopted in 1982 (can be dated back f to the early 1950s) and the Family 
Planning Policy was officially adopted in the 1980s. Both were proved to be somewhat 
effective and useful at the early phase for China’s social management (the former were 
adopted to manage China’s migrant population during China’s early urbanization, while the 
family planning policy was adopted to manage China’s population for faster modernization). 
As time passes, both the two systems have proved to be very problematic in their 
institutional design as well as their implementation, with ubiquitous human rights abuses 
and rampant corruption.  
 Both systems resulted in numerous human tragedies and cost human lives (even in 
the cases of the Bobai County family planning protests, there was no direct human loss 
according to official news, it is certain that many people lost their lives in forced 
sterilization, confrontation and even suicide, over the decades) and therefore, there was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Repatriation System in 2003, He Bing from China University of Politics and Law and Xu Xin from 
Beijing Science and Technology University.   
356  Complete Version of the Report of the 5th Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Party Congress, 
http://www.yjbys.com/news/389856.html，2015-12-18.  
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widespread dissent against them and societal forces calling for the abolishment of the two 
systems.  
 The two cases analyzed by the research present two societal movements that had 
institutional implications for societal involvement in decision-making. However, the result 
of the two cases was very distinctive. In Sun Zhigang’s case, fragmented involvement of 
professionals (lawyer and medical-legal review expert), media (mainly traditional media, 
national media, local media in Guangzhou and media from other provinces), social activists, 
and scholars successfully forced the government to abolish the twenty-year old C&R 
system. However, in the Bobai County protest, which was characterized by fiercer 
confrontation and a greater number of the population, involvement of societal forces failed 
to lead to institutional changes with the family planning policy. Then what contributed to 
make the difference?  
 
            1. Limited Involvement of Societal Forces  
 
 In terms of societal forces involved, though more people were involved in the Bobai 
County’s protest, the way they engaged the government was simple: confrontation, and 
almost venting anger as mentioned earlier.  Very importantly, because of the withdolding of 
information and relative isolation of the inland rural area, the news about the protests failed 
to gain enough media exposure by both traditional and new media and therefore failed to 
form a strong public opinion. Without such a pressure, the government’s willingness to 
make major compromise declined. The major protests lasted just three days (from May 17-
19) until it were settled down. Though several the social activists and the students had 
played a role, however, their major function was no different from that of the villagers.  
 Intellectuals and professionals were basically absent, making societal involvement 
very limited compared with the case of Sun Zhigang. Understandably, compared to other 
societal forces, the scholars’ role is very special. In most cases, their concern doesn’t lie in 
the immediate solution to an impending problem. Instead, they tend to focus to long-term 
issues that serve the longer-term interest of a greater number of people. Therefore, their role 
will be vital in legal and institutional affairs and their absence may be a very important 
reason too.  
 In Sun Zhigang’s case, societal forces were involved in a fragmented and rational 
manner while in the Bobai County protest, the societal involvement was made respectively 
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in a somewhat coordinated yet irrational manner. However, since the violence didn’t lead to 
government repression, one can’t simply attribute the failure of societal involvement to the 
rationality of the involvement as well.  
 What then had hindered the incident from more media exposure and scholarly 
intervention? Besides the local media withholding information and Bobai County’s 
geographical location, media from other provinces were also silent, this was very different 
from the case of Sun Zhigang  case and all other cases to be researched in later part of this 
dissertation. Scholars  had involved much during the Bobai County protest, though they 
have been advocating revising the family plan long before and after the protest, then why 
changing the family plan policy so difficult given that it was almost the  national consensus 
that the one child policy was problematic and needs immediate change? 
 
             Family Planing commission: the Interest Group  
 
 The interest groups approach may explain the phenomenon. As a state policy, the 
family planning policy had been carried out for nearly thirty years before the Bobai County 
protest. Different from the C&R system which mainly benefited the grassroots level 
policemen and civil affairs workers within the C&R centers. The Family Planning Policy 
benefits the powerful family planning commission, a government organ. According to 
statistics by the family planning commission, by December 31, 2005, the family plan system 
had 13 national, 252 provincial, 1,799 municipal, 10,730 county level and 69,556 township 
level organs, totaling 82,350 organs. It has a total of 508,713 workers including 45,555 
workers at township level.357 Once reform was decided, all levels of officials and the half a 
million workers would prove a headache for the government.  
 More importantly, officials from the family planning organs had benefited from the 
policy. The system had been collecting “social raise fee” up to RMB 20 billion to RMB 30 
billion annually, and instead of being spent on children, most of it had been utilized by the 
family planning department.358  The National Auditing Agency announced that, findings 
from the auditing of the “social raise fee” of 45 counties from 9 provinces indicated that a 
                                                        
357 Fan Ming, A Study on the Family Plan Policy based on Fertility Behavior(sheng yu xing wei yu 
sheng yu zheng ce), Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press 2010, p13.  
358 Lecture by Zhou Tianyong from Central Party School, Renmin University of China, October18, 
2010, Speech in the News release on the report A Study on the Family Plan Policy based on Fertility 
Behavior.  
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designated proportion of the fee was returned to family planning department and the fee was 
an important funding source for family planning work. Statistics by scholars indicated that 
the total “social raise fee” collected since 1980 totaled more than RMB1.5 trillion. 359 
Therefore, the family planning department had become a powerful interest group and 
became a barrier that hinders any challenge to it. Also importantly, as a “basic state policy”, 
performance of in family planning work is often regarded as one of the major criterion for 
promotion of leaders. When the Bobai County protests took place, the party head of 
Guangxi, Liu Qibao, had taken very aggressive economic actions to improve Guangxi’s 
competitiveness. It would be equally understandable if he took aggressive actions in the 
family planning department, too.  
 
  
                                                        
359 He Yafu, Social Raise Fee Shouldn’t be So Unclear (she hui fu yang fei bu ying gai li bu qing), 
Dong Fang Zao Bao, 2013-09-06, Z23.  
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Part Three 
The Implications of Involvement of Societal Forces:  
Behavioral Change  
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   Chapter 8: The Xiamen PX Plant Incident 
 
 The Sun Zhigang case, analyzed in the previous chapter, can be considered an 
unusual case where societal engagement led to broader institutional change. This chapter 
looks to the behavioral side of the Chinese government. Indeed, another major incident 
occurred during the timeframe of the study, at the Xiamen PX plant to be precise, and we 
aim to again investigate how societal engagement influenced the behavior of the Chinese 
government. Thorough review of behavioral continuities and discontinuities allow us to 
obtain a more general picture of the progress as well as the limitations of societal forces in 
the reform and evolution of government decision-making.  
 
1. Concepts and Analytical Methods 
 
 Governmental behavior refers to the government’s actions and mannerisms in 
conjunction with its environment. Simply put, it is the response of the government to various 
stimuli or inputs, whether internal or external, conscious or subconscious, overt or covert, 
voluntary or involuntary.360 For example, let us suppose two mayors of cities A and B 
received orders from the provincial government to maintain yearly GDP growth above 8% 
while reducing carbon emissions by 5%, two requirements that are manifestly contradictory. 
Suppose now that new investors in aluminum production showed interest in both two cities 
and choose between them on the basis of  land and taxation conditions. Assume that the 
mayor of city A is a fundamentalist GDP-first supporter, believes that the welfare of its 
citizens relies primarily on economic development, and decided to attract the investment 
even though it would cause heavy pollution and that would worsen the city’s environmental 
record, and also promised to provide a piece of land without the villagers’ consent. While 
the mayor of city B also needs to meet the GDP growth target of 8%, and could best achieve 
this by expanding production and agreeing to the investment, he also cannot ignore the issue 
of severe air pollution which would cause widespread dissent if not addressed. In order to 
make a decision that would be acceptable to all sides, he organized a public hearing, inviting 
both experts and ordinary citizens to attend.  
 Predictably, the investor chose city A. In order to provide the land that he promised, 
                                                        
360  Elizabeth A. Minton, Lynn R. Khale (2014). Belief Systems, Religion, and Behavioral 
Economics. New York: Business Expert Press. p. 3. 
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the mayor arrested the villagers despite their protests. By year’s end, environmentalists 
harshly protested against the air pollution from the new investment while villagers were still 
struggling with the mayor’s unjust handling of the land disputes. Nevertheless, the mayor of 
achieved his primary goal of GDP growth at 8%, and the unemployment rate declined 
steeply. Concerned that protests may hurt his chances for promotion, he arrested the leader 
of an environmentalist NGO and a journalist who reported on the pollution in the city, only 
releasing them after the case was reported overseas causing harsh criticism. In contrast to his 
counterpart in city A, the mayor of city B is broadly supported for his environmental 
protection policies as well as for his democratic manner, but as GDP growth declined to 7%, 
people became unhappy due to the high rate of unemployment. 
 Both mayor A’s acceptance of the new investment as well as major B’s inactivity fall 
under the broad scope of government behaviors. Likewise, both mayor A’s arbitrary 
decisions and mayor B’s deference to democracy are also behaviors. The story indicates 
how separate governments might act differently under the same stimuli, within the same 
institutions, and in the same context. That mayor A first arrested and later released the 
environmentalists and journalists indicates how the same government behaves differently in 
opposite contexts. 
 Recently, Chinese citizens have experienced unprecedented change with respect to 
their legal rights to participate in the decisions affecting increasingly important 
environmental issues. 361  In late 2004, China had adopted a law that requires an 
environmental impact assessment before launching new projects, which had constrained 
some local officials in their “partial pursuit” of economic growth. Therefore, examining 
governmental behavior with regard to environmental issues became useful to studying 
China’s political decision-making. In this chapter, the author will first introduce an event to 
analyze how societal participation can result in behavioral changes in local government, and 
then evaluate these changes according to criteria laid out earlier in this dissertation. 
 We now examine how the government, namely the Xiamen municipal government, 
responded to the societal pressures as the incident developed.  The criteria we adopt to 
evaluate the government include: 1) How did the government initially respond? A 
government unable to fulfill its responsibilities shows a lack of accountability of a 
                                                        
361  Jesse L. Moorman and Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in 
China’ s Environment Impact Assessment Process: Comparing China’s EIS Law and US NEPA, 
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 8, 282-303. 
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government; 2) How quickly did the government respond? Timely responses are obviously 
desirable; 3) Did the government respond arbitrarily or democratically? Did it follow an 
elitist or populist approach? Did it respond to social stimuli in a repressive, coercive, or 
persuasive manner? 4) What was the role of higher and lower level officials, such as the 
Fujian provincial government and local district government, respectively? Did each of these 
act consistently? 
 The PX plant incident in Xiamen was a rare instance where societal involvement 
finally led to considerable changes in governmental behavior. After analyzing these changes, 
we will evaluate what factors affected these results, focusing on the participants, interaction 
patterns, rationality area, and sensitivity. A shortcoming of these findings is that 
governmental response tends to be quite specific to context, and official commonly apply 
multiple methods in an inconsistent manner. Nevertheless, the analytical framework allows 
us to see the extent, pattern, results, and limitations of societal participation on the 
behavioral aspect of government. 
 
2. The Xiamen PX Plant Incident: a Review 
 
 The Xiamen PX plant incident was a major event symbolic of China’s increasing 
societal participation in decision-making. As a rare success of citizen protests that led the 
government to make major compromises, the PX plant incident became the focus of many 
narratives and analyses by scholars both at home and abroad.362 
 The PX plant was a major chemical program located in the southeastern coastal city 
of Xiamen in Fujian province, one of the first “Special Economic Zones”. Due to its 
geographical proximity to Taiwan, Xiamen attracted heavy Taiwanese investment. With total 
investment of over RMB10.8 billion and expected to create an annual value of over RMB80 
billion, the PX plant program was Xiamen’s “largest ever industrial program”. More 
importantly, it was approved by the state council in February 2004, and was listed among the 
major programs of “Eleventh Five-year Plan”, indicating support from the state. The 
program was officially launched when construction began on November 2006, and was 
expected to render benefits by 2008. 
 Compared to other chemicals on the 3,823 item Dangerous Chemicals List, 
                                                        
362 Ansfield, J. (2013). Alchemy of a protest: The case of Xiamen PX. In S. Geall (Ed.), China 
and the Environment: The green revolution (pp.136-202). London: Zed Books. 
 180 
paraxylene, or PX, is only mildly poisonous and but is believed to be highly risky for 
pregnant women, their infants, and young children as it may damage human development 
and reproductive systems.363  International organizations required such programs to be at 
least 100 km away from cities, while in mainland China, the average distance is less than 20 
km. However, Haicang, where the Xiamen PX plant program was located, was only 5 km 
away from a community of 100,000 residents.  The nearest residential building was less than 
1.5 km from the factory while both Gulangyu, Xiamen’s main tourist site, and the Xiamen 
island were within 7 km. Two middle schools were also located within a 4 km radius of the 
factory. Before March 2007 however, the public had little knowledge of the program itself. 
 In late 2002, the National People’s Congress enacted the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Law of the People’s Republic of China (EIA Law).364 In 2004 alone, some 30 
projects had construction suspended under a mandate by the increasingly powerful State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in December. Most of these projects were 
hydro or thermal power plants, which failed to meet the environmental impact assessment 
standards of the EIA law.365 Nevertheless, the PX plant project had passed the original 
assessment in 2005, but without the results being released to the public.366 The EIA Law 
imposes the additional requirement that the entity drafting the Environmental Impact Report 
(EIR) consider all opinions of the relevant departments, experts, and the public, and to 
include their reasons for accepting or rejecting the initial opinions in the final EIR submitted 
for approval.367 
 A proposal submitted to the National People’s Political Consultative Conference to 
relocate the PX plant program raised public awareness and eventually developed into an 
                                                        
363National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Education and Information 
Division. 
364 Environmental Impact Assessment Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), art. 19. Available at: 
http://www.sepa.gov.cn/law/law/ 200210/t20021028_84000.htm (P.R.C.). 
365  Lin Gu, China Improves Enforcement of Environmental Law, http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t214565.htm, 2015-02-02. 
366 No news directly indicates that the Xiamen Municipal government had released the EIA 
report. However, the EIML had made it clear that participation of citizens in the EIA should be 
ensured. However, the law didn't specify concrete measures to ensure participation, and in now 
where had it required the result of the EIA be published opening. 
367    Environmental Impact Assessment Law (promulgated by Standing Comm.  National 
People‘s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), art. 5, Available at: 
http://www.sepa.gov.cn/ law/law/200210/t20021028_84000.htm (P.R.C.), arts 11, 21. (“The 
Special Plan drafting organ shall, before the drafts of such plans are submitted for examination 
and approval, hold evidentiary meetings or testimony hearings or adopt other forms of soliciting 
opinions on the environmental impact report from relevant work units, experts and the public). 
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organized protest. Under increasingly strong pressure and opposition from society, the 
Xiamen municipal government relented and conducted another EIA, based on which the 
program was relocated to a small peninsula in neighboring Zhangzhou city. The Xiamen PX 
plant incident represents a typical case where concerted, rational, and elite-led involvement 
of societal forces had successfully reshaped government’s behavior, and marked a watershed 
moment for societal involvement in environmental decision-making within China. 
 
3. Societal Involvement  
 
 To outline the model of societal involvement, we divide the process into four stages: 
1) early involvement before the middle of March, when the program was mostly unknown 
with few rights-maintenance activities; 2) media release and widespread protests between 
mid-March and early June); 3) society-government stalemate from early June to early 
December; and finally 4) the democratic “decision-making” that led the government to 
relocate the plant and reconsider the program. 
 
3.1. Early Involvement: from rights-maintenance to protest 
 
 Due to a lack of general awareness, people had failed to understand the potential 
hazards of the PX plant program except residents-to-be of a nearby real estate development, 
called “Future Seaside” (wei lai hai an). They felt cheated by the developer and were upset 
at having a chemical program so close to their future homes, an formed a small rights 
maintenance group and appointed Huang Qizhong as their “speaker.” However, as major 
construction of the program had not yet started, their voices remained insignificant, and 
most Xiamen residents remained uninformed about the program. 
 It was not until China's annual parliamentary session, the “Liang Hui,”368 took place 
in March 2007 that the PX plant program and its dangers were fully revealed to the public. 
On that occasion, 105 members of the NPPCC, headed by Chen Yufen, a renowned chemist 
from Xiamen University, initiated a proposal requiring the NPPCC to reevaluate the 
environmental consequences of the Xiamen PX plant program and consider relocating the 
plant. Though it became the most important proposal of that year, it did not lead to any real 
                                                        
368 Liang Hui, or the “two conferences”, refers to the annual conference of People’s Congress 
and the National People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC). 
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changes in the program’s actual content but did arouse public awareness. Only the nearby 
homeowners of the newly planned “Future Seaside” residential community were acutely 
aware of the potential harm. 
 
3.2. New Media: Blog, Bulletin Board Systems (BBS), SMS 
 
 On March 18th, the China Business journal reported on the proposal initiated by 
Zhao Youfen and 104 other members of the NPPCC, and exposed the PX plant program to 
the national public. Yet initially, report made little difference, unlike with the South 
Metropolis Newspaper in the Sun Zhigang case, which was quickly followed up by mass 
media. 
 By contrast, in this case new media played a greater role. Before releasing the news 
to traditional media outlets such as newspapers and TV programs, the people of Xiamen 
began to publish small news items on Internet blogs and bulletin board systems (BBS) 
concerning the PX plant program, revealing the dangers of the program. Anti-PX forces 
from both society and government began playing a “cat and mouse” game in the virtual 
space of the Internet,  and established a special community to discuss the incident. 
 In late May, large numbers of SMS messages began circulating among Xiamen 
citizens via mobiles phones, with the text partially taken from Zhao Youfen’s proposal, and 
it was estimated that over one million Xiamen citizens had received the message which 
reads: 
 
The Xianglu Group has started contracting the PX Plant Program in Haicang district. 
Once the production of such highly poisonous chemicals starts, it is like an atomic 
bomb placed on the entire Xiamen island, the people in Xiamen will be living in 
Leukemia and deformed children ever since! We want life! We want health! 
International organizations had required that this type of programs be developed no 
closer than 100 kilometers from cities. Our Xiamen is just 16 kilometers from the 
plant! For our sons and grandsons, please send this message to all friends in 
Xiamen!369 
                                                        
369 Xiamen PX Plant Incident: the Government Tested by Public Opinion (Xiamen PX shi jian: 
min yi kao liang zheng fu), Xinhuanet, http://www.zj.xinhuanet.com/website/2008-
04/11/content_12944203.htm, 2014-10-10. 
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 Later evidence showed that this message proved vital. Given that Xiamen’s only had 
a population of roughly 3 million, nearly all families in the city had been informed about the 
dangers of PX plant. The message also called for a “walk” on June 1st in front of the 
government building. 
 
3.3. Government Response and Government-society Interaction  
 
 Realizing that a protest may lead to unexpected consequences, the Xiamen municipal 
government began to take action in late May.  On May 28th, it published a long Q&A Report 
in the Xiamen Daily entitled “The Haicang PX plant program has been under construction 
after being approved according to the national legal procedure,” emphasizing that the 
program was legally and environmentally approved and that sufficient precautionary 
measures would be taken to ensure the safety of the plant.  On the same day, the head of 
Xiamen Environmental Protection authority sought to appease the people by addressing 
their concerns, and the following day an extensive article was published in the Xiamen 
Evening News, by the CEO of the Xianglu Company, “correcting” Professor Zhao, who had 
testified to the possible harms of the program, by noting the highly technical perspective of 
the program. 
 More importantly, on May 30th, two days before the scheduled “strike,” the 
Executive Vice Major of the Xiamen Municipal Government, Ding Guoyan, announced the 
suspension of the PX plant program in the news. He further announced that the municipal 
government had authorized a leading academic institute to conduct a new Environmental 
Impact Assessment extending to the whole industrial zone.370 
 However, the encouraging news did not prevent protesters from initiating a “walk” 
on June 1st and 2nd, attended by approximately 8,000-10,000 local residents, under the 
careful eye of the police. Convinced of the potential danger of the PX plant and encouraged 
by the success of their previous engagement, which had forced the government to change 
their irresponsible and repressive policy, the citizens of Xiamen had turned firmly against 
the PX plant program. 
 
                                                        
370 Xinhuanet, Xiamen government decided to suspend the construction of the PX program. 
Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2007-05/30/content_6173301.htm, 2015-0-03. 
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3.4. Society-government Stalemate: game continued 
 
 Since early June, the interaction between society and government had become less 
tense and relatively stable. The protest marked the peak of tension even beforehand, the 
government had shown a willingness to respect the appeals of citizens and engage society in 
the decision-making process. However, repressive measures were still taken as several 
blogs, BBS and Internet communities had been shut off and on June 3rd, some protestors 
were detained.  The leading organizer of the walk, Wu Xian, had already been detained on 
May 30th before the protest took place. 
 Since early June, Professor Zhao Yufen had attracted Internet criticism, as other 
analysts termed Zhao’s proposal faulty and rumors circulated that the PX was not a “highly 
poisonous chemical” as Zhao had previously termed. 371  Meanwhile, Zhao’s students 
defended her on the university BBS and website. Obviously, Professor Zhao was under 
pressure for her attitude towards the PX plant and on June 3rd, Xiamen University 
spokesperson made a statement on her behalf in support of the government's temporary 
suspension of the PX plant project. 
 
Zhao Yufen has never been interviewed and never authorized any media to express 
her opinions concerning the Xiamen PX plant project; Zhao believed that the fact 
that the Xiamen city government has decided to suspend construction of the PX plant 
project and reassess the environment impact showed that the city party and 
government respect science, public opinion, and environmental protection.372 
 
 Alongside its usual repressive measures, the Xiamen government also sought to 
engage and communicate with its citizens. On June 5th, authorities published a brochures 
entitled “How much do you know about PX plant?” and circulated it free of charge to 
citizens on June 7th and 8th. The government also signaled that it was willing to 
                                                        
371 The writer had taken a simple note for the criticisms against Zhao, however, at the time 
being, those tiezi, cannot be found. But such news was known to all during the PX incident. 
Later reports showed similar views about the PX that may not be consistent with Zhao’s 
perspective. However, Zhao and other scientists had also conducted strict research concerning 
the potential danger of the PX program. See “One Year After the Xiamen PX Incident, 
http://www.fjsen.com/newscenter/2007-06/03/content_276555.htm. Accessible by June 2, 2015. 
372  Clarification by Zhao Yufen, Available at: http://www.fjsen.com/newscenter/2007-
06/03/content_276555.htm, 2015-06-03. 
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accommodate public opinion via SMS, telephone, fax, email, and letters. 
 During this phase, the society-government relationship remained stable. Because 
investment in the PX program would contribute to the economic growth and job creation, 
the municipal government was of no mind to abandon it and sought to educate people on the 
potential dangers in a rational manner. For their part, the Xiamen citizens had been steadfast 
in their opposition. Neither side expected the other side to compromise, so any progress 
would need to be supported by more reliable evidence coming from a new Environmental 
Assessment Report. 
 
4. Citizen Symposium: Democratic Decision-making? 
 
 On December 5th, a 14 page version of the Strategic Environmental-impact 
Assessment Report, conducted by the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental 
Sciences, was released on Xiamen Net, the government's official website. The report 
revealed faulty environmental protection measures in another major petrochemical program 
by the Xianglu and Dragon Group and criticized the company’s repeated emission breaches 
and their disregard since 2003 of requests by the local environmental protection bureau to 
address these problems. Although less concerned about the environmental effects of the 
plant, the report pointed out serious flaws in the development scheme for Haicang that 
simultaneously pursued the conflicting goals of industrialization and urbanization in such a 
small area. The report suggested that the district should choose between becoming a 
“petrochemical industrial zone” or a “sub-center of Xiamen”. Releasing the EIA via Internet 
demonstrated transparency, as was the EIA Law. 
 The following two weeks marked a significant transition in the political decision-
making of the CCP, albeit on the local level. The municipal government took the initiative to 
fully engage society, and took the decision on whether to relocate the PX plant in a highly 
democratic manner. 
 While releasing the report, government pointed out that it did not suggest whether 
development of the PX plant should be halted.  Citizens were welcome to express their ideas 
or suggestions via hotline, email, and letters, and were invited to attend an upcoming 
symposium on the matter. 373  To encourage participation, an internet vote began on the 
                                                        
373 Xinhuanet, Xiamen EIA Voting Page Canceled, Over 90% Votes Against (PX Program), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2007-12/11/content_7227307.htm, 2015-0606. 
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evening of December 8th, but was unexpectedly shut down on the December 9th. 374 
Statistics before closure indicated 55,000 votes against the program, with only 3,000 in 
favor.  While the reasons for the early shutdown remain unclear, the vote nevertheless 
showed that the Xiamen government had some measure of respect for public opinion.   
 Between December 13th and 14th, the municipal government held a symposium 
attended by 106 citizens randomly chosen from 519 eligible applicants,375 along with 100 
representatives from the NPC and the NPPCC. Among the 106 citizen representatives, 
nearly 90% were against the program while among the 15 speakers from the NPC and the 
NPPCC, 14 opposed it.376  In the ten days following the release of the EIA report, the 
government had also collected over 6,100 items of criticism or suggestion, of which were 
3,720 were via email, 2,380 via registered telephone calls, 47 via letters, and the other 6 
petition letters jointly signed by 2,491 persons.377 
 Evidently, an overwhelming majority of Xiamen people opposed the program. To 
make the event open, transparent, and reliable for all, national media as Xinhua News 
Agency, People Daily, and Guangming Daily were invited to attend and report on the 
symposium. Both the process of randomly selecting representatives and the symposium 
itself were broadcasted live . Based on the results of this participation, the provincial 
government held a special conference on December 16th, deciding to relocate the Xiamen 
PX plant program after half a year of intensive interaction between society and government.  
 
5. Government Behavioral Change  
 
 A close examination of the Xiamen PX plant incident reveals that strong societal 
pressure led to behavioral shifts in the Xiamen government occurred under strong societal 
pressure. We will now explore the three main facets of these shifts. 
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5.1. Responsiveness 
 
 The municipal government of Xiamen had become increasingly responsive to 
societal outcry. Initially, obsessed with the potential benefits of the petrochemical program, 
the government did not take any action in response to early criticism and concerns from 
residents.  As typical with Chinese cities, the leaders of Xiamen were likely aware of the 
potential dangers and the environmental impact of the PX plant program, but economic 
growth undoubtedly took priority, as “Development is the Law.” The approval of the EIA 
had also justified the environmental feasibility of the program, and even the proposal to 
relocate by the 105 members of NPPCC proposal did not yield an immediate result.  
 However, growing public concern and Internet discussion over the program had 
become led to increasing pressure on the government, especially when social activists 
advocated a protest,  an incident that would undermine social stability and further hinder the 
progress of the PX plant program. For the first time, the government made official 
explanations about the PX plant through news releases, publications and unsuccessful efforts 
at socialization. By the final phase, when societal attitudes stood firmly against the program, 
the Xiamen government fully engaged societal forces to make its decision, taking the 
initiative in encouraging participation, conducting public opinion polling, and holding a 
symposium to ensure that decision-making was open, transparent, and credible.  
 
5.2. Repression, Persuasion, Democracy  
  
 Government responses to societal pressure had gradually evolved from repressive to 
persuasive and finally to democratic means. Typically, the Chinese government held a 
hardline mentality of “stability maintenance” prioritizing social stability above all else. 
Therefore, they preferred to address tension with force, media control, and coercion. In late 
May, right before the “walk” on June 1st, the government had deleted news, blocked SMS, 
shut off internet chat rooms and blogs, and arrested the protest organizers and activists. 
 The Phoenix Weekly published an article entitled “Xiamen: the Petrochemical 
Shadow of an Island City” but was forced off the shelves by the municipal government for 
revealing the dangers of the PX plant program.378 In this, Xiamen was not alone, as in 
                                                        
378 Liu Yanxun, Xiamen: the Petrochemical Shadow of an Island City, Phoenix Weekly, Vol. 256. 
2007. 
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dealing with a similar PX plant incident, the government of Kunming in Yunnan province 
even required anyone advertising, printing, buying masks or t-shirts to register their real 
names, while sale of white t-shirts was even forbidden.379 By early July, rumors spread that 
the municipal government had planned measures to punish those who released or spread 
“harmful and bad information” and citizens would be forbidden to publish news 
anonymously, but under societal pressure, the government gave up these plans. 
 After the protest however, the government became more cooperative and engaging, 
and their repressive approach gradually turned persuasive.  Since late May, the government 
had held press conferences in an attempt to relieve the public frenzy towards the 
petrochemical program, and had also used traditional news media to win public opinion and 
support. In consecutive days, the head of Xiamen Environmental Protection Administration 
and the CEO of the petrochemical company each published long articles in two major local 
newspapers, written in a highly coordinated manner with the former concentrated on the 
legal and policy issues while the later focus on technical matters. The government also 
published a live manual and distributed it freely to citizens. The purposes of all of these 
measures were similar, in that each was meant to ensure the Xiamen citizens that the 
program was legal and safe, and persuade them to accept the program. Persuasive rather 
than repressive measures had become the primary mode of government behavior. 
 In the last phase of incident, governmental response went beyond persuasive 
measures and took on a democratic nature. The government conducted a third-party EIA that 
was more reliable and convincing, and encouraged societal participation in the EIA so that 
public opinion would be taken seriously. Most importantly, the government held a 
symposium inviting 100 participants in addition to 100 candidates randomly chosen from 
over 600 applicants, allowing each of their voices to be heard. Even Professor Yuan Weixing 
from Xiamen University, a strong opponent of the PX plant program was specially invited. 
Therefore, the incident serves as a remarkable example of how government behavior can 
evolve, in a relatively short period of time, from employing repression and control to 
embracing democracy 
 
5.3. Secrecy, Openness, and Transparency 
 
                                                        
379  Guangming Net, Real Name System: “Stability Maintenance” Exhausted All Methods? 
http://guancha.gmw.cn/2013-05/27/content_7760283.htm, 2015-06-06. 
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 Transparency refers to the practice of conducting official business in a way that 
makes substantive and procedural information available to and broadly understandable by 
people and groups within society, subject to reasonable limits to protect security and 
privacy. 380  As such, transparency is the basis of good governance and the first step in 
fighting corruption. 381   Transparency implies not only disclosing information about the 
political process, but also allowing the public to supervise, criticize, and evaluate the process 
as, ensuring their participation. The shifting behavioral patterns of the Xiamen government 
was best demonstrated in its record of transparency records through the incident. 
 Transparency requires both societal participation and institutional compliance. The 
UN has simplified the principle of transparency into “openness from above, participation 
and scrutiny from below, honesty from all”.382 While the Chinese government has taken 
steps to improve transparency by disclosing public affairs, public hearings, and speaker 
system (fay an ren zhi du), 383but so far there are no legal or administrative means to ensure 
sufficiently transparent decision-making during major incidents. The Xiamen PX plant 
incident thus reflects a typical case in which government gradually made its decision-
making transparent to increase the credibility of its policies while encouraging participation. 
 The early decisions were made somewhat “secretively”. The launch of the program 
itself and the results of the first Environmental Impact Assessment had not been released to 
the public.  Though this was the norm case for many local governments, it violated the 2003 
EIA Law requiring “public participation”.384 As “a major event that are closely related to 
people’s life”, the dangers of the program should have been made known to public, but as it 
happened, even Professor Zhao, a chemist and member of Congress, was not informed. To 
some extent, the program progressed smoothly because of this secrecy. 
                                                        
380  Michael Johnston, Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency, and Accountability, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010193.pdf, 2015-06-18 
381  IFLA Manifesto on Transparency, Good Governance and Freedom from Corruption, 
http://www.ifla.org/publications/ifla-manifesto-on-transparency-good-governance-and-freedom-
from-corruption, 2015-06-18. 
382 Ibid. 
383 The ministeries and their equavalent, local government (provincial, municipal and conty 
level), large state-owned enterprise, and the PLA had designated a worker to announce 
important news, hold regular or irregular news release, dealing with the media, following the 
speaker system of the Foreign Ministry), the system was established to ensure the public 
“right to know” and transparency.  
384 Environmental Impact Assessment Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003), art. 19, Available at: 
http://www.sepa.gov.cn/law/law/ 200210/t20021028_84000.htm (P.R.C.). 
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 After sensitive information had been leaked, the government could no longer 
withhold details and showed a limited degree of openness towards criticism and societal 
participation. However, it continued to control information as many news sites, blogs, and 
internet communities were shut down and traditional media was ordered not to report on PX 
plant issues to avert greater social unrest. Nevertheless, the process was relatively open, and 
citizens were updated on government actions to address the issue. Over time the 
government’s grip weakened as planned information control measures were given up to 
ensure openness.  
 In the aftermath of the release of the EIA report, unprecedented levels of 
transparency were observed. The report, the short-lived voting system, the random selection 
of representatives, the name list, and most importantly the symposium were all publicized. 
Both the selection of representatives and the symposium itself were broadcasted live to 
ensure transparency. All telephone calls, emails, letters, and petitions were sourced out to a 
third party, the China Academy of Environmental Sciences, in order to ensure credibility of 
the analysis and publication. The entire event was carried out in an open, transparent, and 
credible manner, and reviewing this development thoroughly allows us to observe the shift 
in the government behavior. 
 
6. Societal Involvement: What is New in Xiamen PX Plant Incident 
  
 The Xiamen PX plant incident was not the only case that saw extensive societal 
engagement. In its aftermath, PX protests became increasingly common, with unrest in 
Ningbo, Shifang, and Qidong in 2012 alone. Another major incident surrounded the Dalian 
PX plant program that had was ultimately scrapped due to protests against soon to be 
disgraced Party Head Bo Xilai. Nevertheless, nearly a decade later the Xiamen experience 
remains a unique and inspiring event, and the triumph of societal involvement is 
indisputable. In the following passages, we will analyze the particular elements of society 
and the role that each played in the ultimate success.  
 
6.1. Societal Forces Involved 
 
6.1.1. Professionals 
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 Similar to the Zhigang case, where the medical-legal autopsy confirmed the victim 
had been beaten to death and served as vital evidence of human rights abuses, the Xiamen 
PX plant incident aroused public awareness through an NPPCC proposal led by Professor 
Zhao Yufen. Professor Zhao was a young academic from the China Sciences Academy, a 
leading scientific institute with a good reputation for research and professionalism.  
 Among the 105 members of the NPPCC who jointly initiated the act, there were at 
least ten academics and “several scores” of university presidents amongst many other 
scholars and experts. Notably the NPPCC, unlike the People’s Congress, consisted primarily 
of members from democratic parties, social celebrities, and entrepreneurs with an evident 
elitist nature. Only a small proportion of influential scholars could have been elected to the 
NPPCC and the “all-star” list of names itself became a catch phrase.  
 In order to make the proposal reliable, another scientist, Professor Yuan Dongxing 
from the Xiamen University Center for Environmental Science Studies, had conducted strict 
research on the impact of the program, the findings of which were shocking.  Together with 
the existing PTA (Purified Terephthalic Acid) program by the same company, the two new 
programs would emit at least 600 tons of chemicals into the air.385 Furthermore, the program 
consumes 5,000 tons of coal daily, a considerable source of further air pollution. These 
professionals provided evidence that reinforced the convictions of scientists to firmly stand 
by Zhao in resisting against PX plant program in Xiamen. 
 The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) also involved professionals, with two 
academics and 19 other experts appointed by the China Academy of Environmental Sciences 
to conduct the new EIA. This lent credibility to their report they submitted which was 
accepted as trustworthy by both the public and the government. While no evidence indicates 
the extent to which the government’s attitude had been influenced by the report, as one of 
the few reliable sources, the EIA by the China Academy of Environmental Sciences must 
have played a role in the government’s deliberation.386 
        When compared with the lawyer and the medical-legal doctor in the Sun Zhigang’s 
                                                        
385 Ibid. 
386 Based on neutrality and professionalism, the report didn’t support the government’s insisting 
on continuing the program, while criticized the disrespect in environmental requirements of the 
same company in another program, which may further incited public outrage, and left the 
supporters of the PX plant program in an unfavorable situation. More importantly, since the 
report didn’t make it clear whether the program should be stopped, suspended or continued, the 
government had to resort to public opinion poll or other participatory means, which showed 
overwhelming opposition to the program. 
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case, Zhao’s contribution in the Xiamen PX plant program was prominent, if not decisive. 
Further elaboration will follow in later paragraphs. 
 
6.1.2. New Media  
 
 Any public incident needs media exposure to arouses public awareness and bring 
societal forces together. On March 18th, the China Business Journal reported the NPPCC 
proposal initiated by Professor Zhao and exposed the PX plant program to the public. This 
time however, new media played a greater role. 
 Xiamen is a small city with few newspapers and TV programs, and therefore the 
press was relatively easy to be influence. Even after the China Business Journal revealed the 
PX plant program, it did not garner much press. However, protests had already begun in the 
internet as Xiamen residents began to publish small news items on blogs, bulletin board 
systems (BBS), chat rooms, especially the Little Fish (xiao yu she qu, a famous local 
internet-based community) and the Xiamen University BBS. Some were specially 
established to discuss on the PX plant program. The Tencent chat groups were efficient in 
organizing discussion, starting by revealing the dangers of the PX plant program and then 
calling on actions to oppose it.  
 Mobile SMS also proved effective. In late May, large numbers of SMS messages 
began circulating among Xiamen citizens via mobile phones, albeit somewhat exaggerating 
the risks of the program, and calling for a protest in the form of “walk”.387  The high 
circulation of the message aroused public sentiment and served as a simple yet effective 
platform for organized protest, directly leading to the government’s behavioral change.  
Subsequently, online social media and local knowledge of urban terrain also initiated a large 
scale anti-PX protest in Guangdong’s Maoming city in 2014, even without the support of 
mainstream media and the middle class.388 
 
6.1.3. Social Activists  
 
                                                        
387 Say, stating that the PX was “highly” poisonous and comparing the PX program to a atomic 
bomb. 
388 Kingsyhon Lee and Ming-Sho Ho, The Maoming Anti-PX Protest of 2014: An environmental 
movement in contemporary China, China Perspective, 2014(03), 
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~msho/public.files/m80.pdf, 2014-11-11. 
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 Several social activists expressed their concerns about the incident, though as 
ordinary citizens their role is somehow hard to evaluate. However, while their contributions 
were neither well-known nor noticeable, this by no means suggests that they were not 
important.389 
 Wu Xian, who initiated the Tencent chat system (also known as QQ), began a 
discussion group entitled “Return our clean water and blue sky” (huan wo bi shui lan tian), 
which later expanded to three due to an overflow of members. As participation grew, their 
discussions evolved from merely announcing the dangers of the PX plant to finding ways to 
actively resist the program. Wu was an active organizer and controlled the discussion, 
mediating  “extremist” and “conservative” members to “keep the unity of the group,” and, 
critically, keeping the group rational and peaceful. Through this method a discursive public 
sphere appeared on the virtual space. 
 On May 27th-28th, Wu called for a “walk” on the street and in front of government 
buildings. All participants were to bring a banner emblazoned with the slogan “No PX, 
Protect Xiamen” and wear a yellow ribbon on the left arm as a symbol of the movement.  At 
noon of May 29th, he also brought printed materials to examine sites for the proposed 
“walk,” but dropped out when they knew that police awaited them in the site, and organized 
discussion among the core participants to make the “walk” peaceful and successful. Late on 
the afternoon of May 30th, he was detained for 15 days. Lian Yue, a former prosecutor and 
journalist of South Weekend’s press, then a famous columnist and critical blogger, had 
published many articles in opposition to the Xiamen PX plant program. He had served as a 
public opinion leader and intellectual (gong gong zhi shi fen zi), who was later chosen as one 
of the top 10 “citizen journalists” (gong min ji zhe). Lian became the face of Chinese 
blogging in 2007 for his role in increasing awareness about the Xiamen PX plant. 
 
6.1.4. Xiamen Citizens 
 
 The Xiamen case was special because of the overall level of participation among 
ordinary citizens. Xiamen was one of the first Special Economic Zones and a wealthy 
coastal city with a GDP per capita close to RMB10,000 in the year of 2007.390 A large 
                                                        
389 The writer had contacted one of the organizer, however, he did not provide more information 
than this dissertation has suggested. 
390  According to China Statistics, Xiamen’s GDP per capita was RMB 56,595 in 2007. 
Demographic estudies estimated Xiamen’s GDP per capita reached up to $15,600 in 2007, 
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proportion of the people were well-educated and middle class, and had shown social 
awareness and responsibility, as well as good communication skills in negotiating with the 
government.  
 Seldom had a city been so comprehensively involved in a social movement like 
Xiamen in this incident, with later studies showing that over 70% of the people had become 
engaged whether through emails, fax, telephone calls, letters, protests, or the symposium 
which directly led to the relocation of the Program. During the six months of society-
government interaction, officials, policemen, protestors, and ordinary citizens all had 
displayed rationality and prudence, and did not resort to violence. Even during the most 
contentious protests on June 1st, police did not confront the protesters and only maintained 
order.  While the police did arrest some protest leaders and detained them for up to 55 days, 
they seemed to show a level of respect rather than giving the usual harsh treatment. One 
policeman, when detaining Xu Xian, comforted the crying young man by saying that 
“history will give you a final judgment.” Evidently, even the police believed that the protest 
and the Xiamen PX plant incident would indeed be a “historic event.” 
 At the end of 2007, the South Weekend selected Xiamenren (Xiamen people) as one 
of the top 10 Most Influential People of 2007, because of their commendable performance 
during their interactions with the government. 
 
6.2 Interaction Pattern 
 
 Unlike the Sun Zhigang case in which the societal forces engaged the government in 
a fragmented and decentralized way, the Xiamen people had been well organized and 
coordinated in their interactions. 
 Starting from the NPPCC proposal, Professor Zhao and other scientists had formed 
the initial coalition and over time more and more societal forces became involved. 
Immediately after Zhao’s proposal was publicized, the speaker of the Residential 
Community “Future Seashore” wrote a letter to Zhao, expressing their gratitude for 
exposing new evidence to support their rights-maintenance activities. The new media of 
blogs, BBS, and the Web-based Little Fish Community, under the leadership of Wu Xian, 
Lian Yue, and other social activists, gradually formed the core for the societal interaction. 
Though there was no evidence indicating that Zhao and other scientists cooperated with the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ranking 10th of Chinese cities, http://www.demographia.com/db-chinacitygdp.pdf, 2015-06-12. 
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social activists, the latter had been consistently using the former as a banner to attract more 
participants. Zhao’s initial assessment also became part of the SMS community, which 
circulated among ordinary citizens of Xiamen.  
 As noted before, Xiamen had a population of around 3 million at the time of the PX 
plant incident, so that an estimated circulation of 1 million meant that nearly all household 
had received or conveyed the SMS to others. Beginning in late May, nearly all residents 
were discussing the PX plant, most of them against the program. Other national and local 
mediafollowed up on the story and created greater external pressures on the government.  
All segments of society including professionals, activists, traditional and new media, as well 
as ordinary Xiamen citizens, had been highly consistent in their anti-PX stance. Their 
actions were highly unitary and concentrated instead of fragmented or mutually 
contradictory, as revealed in the protest and the symposium. This centralized application of 
coordinated and concerted societal forces had functioned as a temporary civil society that 
was powerful enough to negotiate with the government, the key factor in its ultimate 
success. 
 
6.3 Rationality: Constructive Engagement  
 
 Improved governance requires an integrated long-term strategy built upon 
cooperation between government and citizens,391 and while an engaged citizenry is critical 
to social participation, equally important is “the ability of well-informed citizens to exercise 
their democratic rights and to play an active role in society”.392 In mature democracies, 
citizens are used to participating in bureaucratic decision-making as well as major events 
such as elections. In China, people lack such experience and expertise in decision-making, 
because of the absence of proper institutional channels. Recently however, the government 
has come to realize that public participation is an important mechanism for collecting 
information and gaining expertise on which to base rational regulation as well as for gaining 
public acceptance of and compliance with new laws and regulatory decisions.  The State 
Council has made new regulations to encourage public participation393  and cities such as 
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  http://www.unesco.org/webworld/libraries/manifestos/libraman.html. 
393 State Council Office of Legislative Affairs Notice on Further Intensifying the Degree of 
 196 
Guangzhou promulgated regional regulations to ensure the right of societal participation in 
lawmaking.394 
 However, as noted before, Chinese citizens have neither practice and training in 
democratic participation nor the institutions to ensure such participation. The effects of new 
channels such public hearings, open meetings, news releases, and speaker systems remain 
limited. Chinese societal participation is often “achieved” via contentious politics or 
pressure politics. Larger scale gatherings, often violent protests which damage or destroy 
buildings, cars, office, and other symbols of “government,” are the usual means of societal 
“participation,” but such demonstrations often justify repressive measures by the 
government. Violence may arouse government attention or elicit directives from superiors, 
but it not only threatens social order and stability but also sharpens tensions between 
government and society. Therefore, rational and constructive engagement would be the most 
desirable path for China to develop benign state-society interaction in the long-term. 
 The PX plant incident proved to lie within such a pattern. Professor Zhao Youfen, 
who headed the proposal, acted rationally and professionally in engaging the government. 
Her expertise could partially be attributed to her doctoral studies in U.S. where she was 
likely influenced by American politics and social participation. Her rationality can be 
attributed to her occupation as a scientist as well as her experience as a member of the 
NPPCC. As a leading expert who had benefited from the regime, she had every reason to 
promote its positions rather than going against them.  Indeed, by November 2006 Zhao had 
realized the danger of the program, and had private talks with several other scientists in the 
same university. In late November, Zhao and other 5 scholars with the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences wrote a letter to the leaders of Xiamen city, explaining the potential danger of the 
chemical program from their professional perspectives.395 On December 6th, leaders from 
Xiamen municipal government held a small seminar with the 6 academics aiming to change 
their attitudes, while the scientists likewise hoped to persuade the government to relocate the 
program. Understandably, no progress was made. Zhao’s private engagement with the 
government showed she did not expect the matter evolve into a social incident and instead 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Public Participation in Matters Related to Government Legislative Work, issued March 31, 
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sought to influence the government through her professional status as both a scientist and a 
NPPCC member. 
 In order to put forth her proposal without publicizing it, Zhao prepared three versions 
of material, the first for group discussion at the NPPCC, the second to the officials, and the 
third with more academic and professional detail to be published on the “NPPCC 
Information”. This shows that she was familiar with the political process of the NPPCC and 
more importantly, did not seek only to resist the PX plant in Xiamen as ordinary citizens 
would and indeed tried to work out a solution for program. After intensive research, the 
scientists proposed the Gulei peninsula, a desolate 20 km wide region well suited to the 
program both environmentally and economically. In hindsight this proved decisive as the 
program was indeed moved to Gulei just as Professor Zhao proposed. They even proposed 
the innovative idea of making the Gulei Peninsula a “flying lands” of Xiamen, where the 
Xiamen government would buy the Gulei Peninsula so as to retain the investment, while 
paying taxes to Zhangzhou, where the peninsula is located. This allowed both Xiamen and 
Zhangzhou to share the economic benefits. 
 Compared to other instances of pressure politics, such constructive engagement had 
a relatively easier time gaining the acceptance of the Xiamen government. Social activists, 
protestors, ordinary Xiamen citizens, and internet-based communities showed restraint,  
concentrating on the PX plant itself without targeting any individuals or the “government” 
more generally. In response, the Xiamen government also showed respect for civil rights, 
social participation, and free expression. Both sides consistently favored rationality over 
radicalism and constructive engagement rather than antagonistic destruction. The spirit and 
experience of cooperation, prudence, and constructive interaction deserve more attention for 
future social movements. 
 
6.4. Issue Areas 
 
 The Xiamen PX plant incident was an issue of an impending “environmental crisis” 
rather than long term degradation such as soil, air and water pollution, deforestation, or 
industrial pollution. It differs from climate change and global warming, which are 
considered more severe, but structural and so not directly or immediately felt by individuals. 
The particular danger of petrochemical programs is that any accident would have 
catastrophic consequences. Most recently, an August 2015 chemical explosion in Tianjin 
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claimed more than 160 lives and led to incalculable economic losses. Air, water, and soil 
pollution in neighboring areas would last for decades since the hazardous PX pollutants 
would contaminate each phase during the storage, transportation, and production process.  
 Given China’s faulty management system as well as the problematic EIA ,396 lack of 
effective public participation,397 and loss of credibility, Chinese society strongly mistrusts 
Chinese petrochemical companies who are notorious for disrespecting environmental law 
and regulations, and do not believe that the GDP-oriented fundamentalists of the Chinese 
government would be truly responsible in managing those programs. The “success” of 
societal involvement in Xiamen PX plant incident meant only that residents of Zhangzhou, 
instead of Xiamen, would be subject to the environmental and health risks posed by the 
plant's continual operation, as evidenced by the explosion at that very plant on July 29th, 
2013. 398  Besides Xiamen, PX plant programs in Dalian, Zhanjiang, Ningbo, Chengdu, 
Nanjing, and Qingdao as well in 15 other cities, have faced protests. 
 Together with other major environmental crises, severe accidents such as the 
aforementioned explosions have become the major focus of large-scale group incidents. 
Among all 10 such incidents, involving more than 10,000 people over the past 14 years, 5 
were caused by severe environmental accidents.399 These environmental incidents concern 
economic strategy, political processes, social stability, governance, and international 
relations, and therefore environmental issues had become an independent area with 
comprehensive significance. China’s societal participation and decision-making process in 
these issues has been distinct from other areas, and therefore demand lasting and in-depth 
academic research and investment. 
 
6.5 Scale 
 
 The Xiamen PX plant accident involved the majority of Xiamen population. More 
than 70% of its total population had been reading newspaper articles and discussions about 
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the incident 400  while others had participated via complaints, telephone, email, letters, 
sending messages, or the protest “walk”. Despite being a highly contentious activity and the 
least adopted means of participation, the protest was been attended by around 10.8%,401 
according to a questionnaire conducted in 2008, numbering in the tens of thousands. We can 
therefore conclude that the Xiamen PX plant incident was one of the largest such incidents 
in recent decades. 
 
6.6 Sensitivity 
 
 Sensitivity refers to the extent to which the government is subjected. According to 
the definition and analysis in the introductory chapter of Part II, sensitivity of an event is 
evaluated by three criteria, namely whether it relates to regime stability, whether there was a 
human cost, and whether the government held responsibility for the event. Sensitivity relates 
to the scale and dynamism of confrontation and policy areas. Based on these criteria, the 
Xiamen PX incident did not cause great sensitivity, but only a moderate level. 
 
7. Preliminary Remarks 
 
 The Xiamen PX plant incident was as a unique example where concentrated 
participation of professionals, social groups, new media, ordinary Xiamen citizens, and 
other societal forces led to major behavioral changes by the Xiamen municipal government. 
These changes were evident in the government’s responsiveness and in its shifting means of 
engagement from a repressive attitude to persuasive ways and ultimately to democratic 
conduct. The government’s information policy also changed from opacity to transparency. 
 The success of societal forces in effecting behavioral change can be attributed to the 
forces involved, concentration of interaction, rationality and constructiveness of 
involvement, and the large scale of the incident contrasted with the medium level of 
sensitivity. 
 China has been undergoing rapid urbanization and industrialization simultaneously. 
However, the two goals and trends are often contradictory instead of synergistic and 
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coordinated. In China’s present phase of development, the dilemma between economic 
priorities and societal harmony may be a lasting quandary for Chinese cities. As the Chinese 
economy slows down, while societal expectations in good governance, in areas such as the 
environment, human rights, social welfare, citizen participation, and democracy, continues 
to rise, this dilemma will intensify. Thus the interaction of Xiamen is both particular and 
typical. 
 China had launched altogether 16 mega PX programs in its major cities, including in 
Xiamen, despite protests. But its experiences from this incident, dubbed “the Xiamen PX 
Model”, continue to reshape government and societal behaviors in China’s environmental 
movements. For instance, in the most recent societal PX protests in Maoming, Guangdong 
province, both society and government used the Xiamen PX plant incident as an example to 
follow. Maoming citizens and social activists used the new media to successfully halt the PX 
plant program, again without the support of traditional media and middle class, using the 
Xiamen PX plant program to encourage people and citing it as evidence to support their 
pursuit. The government, for its part, adopted the strategy of the Xiamen government, 
holding a public hearing, ensuring transparency, and freely distributing PX manuals to 
inform tcitizens. 
 The central Chinese government has also been improving. In 2014, the State Council 
published the revised version of the Regulations on Safe Management of Hazardous 
Chemicals in China of March 11th, 2011 (Decree n. 591). These regulations, which include 
clauses dealing with the production, storage, import, use, sales, and transport of hazardous 
chemicals, was implemented on Dec 1st, 2011 and replaced the old version issued in 2002. 
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Chapter 9: The Qian Yunhui’s Suspicious Death  
 
“No matter what is the truth of Mr. Qian’s death, doesn’t this 
demonstrate a political crisis, considering the preference of public 
opinion? If you’re the ruler, shouldn’t you be feeling anxious and 
concerned? Even if you don’t strive for justice, equality and 
progress, shouldn’t you start considering (political) system reform 
simply for the sake of ruling?” 
                                                                                                 Yasheng Huang, MIT professor 
 
 The Qian Yunhui case is by far the most mysterious public incident that had aroused 
national attention and concern, societal forces were intensively yet had limited results 
owning to a combination of fators. The case has many different features that are worth 
analyzing for this research.   
 
             1. Background 
 
 Qian Yunhui (钱云会，1957–2010) was a village headman in eastern China’s 
Zhejiang province. He was elected head of the village in the 2005 despite government 
intervention because of his long history of petitioning against land abuses by local 
government developer, the Yueqing Electric Power Plant. He was crushed to death 
suspiciously on December 25, 2010 (Christmas Day) by a truck loaded with crushed rocks 
for a nearby building site operated by the Yueqing Electric Power Plant.   
 An eyewitness, Qian Chengwei (Chinese: 钱成委) , the nephew of Qian Yunhui, said 
that Qian Yunhui was “murdered” by four uniformed men who held the victim down on the 
ground while the truck killed him by driving over him. The eyewitness was arrested and 
detained by the police. Other eyewitnesses including villager Huang Diyan(Chinese: 黄迪
燕), who claimed she saw four uniformed men with gloves pulling and hauling Qian and 
then put his body under the front tire by force. The truck's owner and driver, Fei Liangyu 
(Chinese: 费良玉) was detained by the police, along with other villagers who questioned the 
police's investigation, including Qian's daughter. Qian’s death was quite suspicious for 
several reasons.  
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 First, Qian had a long history of petitioning against land abuses by local government 
and enterprises, and therefore was deemed troublesome for interest-driven officials and 
developers. Ever since he was elected as village head in 2005, he had been leading the 
villagers to visit the superior level government (shang fang) and protest against land seizures 
by local government, he was even detained for three times, each time he was released, he 
continued to protest, and right before his death, he was still leading the villagers to protest 
the Yueqing Power Plant Company and the local government. Another election for village 
head was coming soon, and with little doubt, Qian Yunhui would have been re-elected as 
head. Therefore, the possibilities of Qian Yunhui being murdered can’t be excluded.  
 Second, two witnesses said they saw Qian was murdered by four uniformed security 
guards, and all witnesses were arrested, Qian’s family members, those who may have proof 
of the truth behind Qian’s death were arrested illegally. Their attitude and description of the 
case changed under pressure and intimidation. Wang Liquan, who kept a watch on Qian with 
video, recorded the last moment of Qian Yunhui’s death, and was also arrested. The local 
police had destroyed the real site, instead of protecting it; they also took away Qian’s body 
by force despite strong confrontation with the villagers. Apparently, it seemed the local 
government had obvious tendency. Those there was a possibility that the local government 
took the body in order to preserve it for furher medical legal autopsy, and the police is 
justified to do this by the law that states “the body of accident should be preserved at places 
that can better preserve it”. It was also true that it would be in the interest of local 
government and the police authority if Qian Yunhui really died of “accident”.  
 Third, there are some suspicious technical details that remain unexplained. The 
monitoring cameras that may provide key evidences “happened” not to be working that day. 
Many people questioned why Qian’s position was exactly vetical (90 degrees) against the 
wheel while the truck was moving in a reverse direction, violating the traffic rules.   
 
            2. Societal Involvement 
 
 Because government credibility was questioned and Qian’s death was very 
suspicious, the general public was outraged by the local government and was pressing for a 
thorough investigation for the truth. The situation was worsened when the local police 
illegally arrested Qian’s relatives and key witnesses, and unbelievably exerted pressure on 
their oral testimonials; the police had also harshly destroyed the site of the case and taken 
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away the body of Qian Yunhui by force. Therefore, the Chinese society had a general 
expectation of a third party, independent and objective investigation. Famous journalist and 
social activist Xiao Shu advocated for the first time a citizens’ investigation team be 
organized to settle the issue and was warmly supported. In this sense, the Qian Yunhui case 
is different from other cases. Besides the main stakeholders, namely the villagers, other 
societal forces were also involved, making it a national incident. 
 
             2.1  Social Activists  
  
 When the suspicious death of Qian Yunhui was reported first through the Internet 
and newspapers, it soon aroused public concern. Many social activists were fully involved in 
the investigation of the death NGO.   
 Well known Chinese online activist Tu Fu (alias, real name Wu Gan, 吴淦) was 
among the first citizen reporters to visit the crime scene, and began interviewing local 
eyewitness. Wu had obtained a police video of the crime scene right after the victim's body 
was being removed, and had since posted the video online. Wu regularly posted comments 
on Twitter and other Internet platforms, and with the help of a group of Chinese lawyers, is 
offered free legal aid to villagers in need.  
 
             2.2 Non-government Organization (NGOs) Investigation Teams  
 
 The Qian Yunhui case is special in that several “Citizen Investigation Groups” 
arrived at the village to investigate the real cause of Qian’s death, besides the 11 working 
groups made up of 43 workers sent by Puqi township government to the village of Zhaiqiao 
for investigation and reconciliation of Qian’s family and his relatives.  
 
             2.2.1 Citizens’ Union Investigation Group 
 
 One of the teams organized by the Citizens’ Union, a non-governmental organization 
established by Dr. Xu Zhiyong in Beijing, who had issued an appeal to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress for constitutionality review of the Custody & 
Repatriation System during Sun Zhigang’s case and later established the Citizens’ Union 
and involved in many social activities. 
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 Also among the team is Mr. Peng Jian, the lawyer hired by Peng Chengyu, Qian 
Yunhui’s nephew, who was arrested in the name of “affray”(because he was believed to be 
the key “witness” of Qian Yunhui’s death, and he claimed at the very beginning that Qian 
Yunhui was held by four security guards hired by the Yueqing Power Plant Company, and 
put under the wheel of the truck which drove over his neck to kill him. Later the nature of 
his crime was changed to “Obstruction of official business”；the other three members are 
Miss. Liu Shasha, Mr. Zhang Yongpan and Mr. Xu Jian.  
 
             2.2.2 Academic Sector Investigation Group 
 
 The most famous yet most reliable report was done by the Academic Sector 
Investigation Team, which was made up of political science and legal scholars, journalists, 
lawyers, former policeman, but later split into Qian Yunhui’s Death Investigation Group 
(Led by Xiao Shu) and the Land Investigation Team (headed by Yu Jianrong).  The Qian 
Yunhui’s Death Investigation Group later published a report that denied both the conclusion 
of “traffic accident” or “murder”, which means it was reluctant to draw a hasty conclusion 
because of lack of sufficient evidence, especially when the key evidence was absent. 
However, the report revealed many important details and facts during their investigation.   
 The members of the team included: Xiao Shu (real name Chen Min), commentator of 
South Weekly; 402 Piao Baoyi, journalist; Chen Jieren, research fellow at Center for Legal 
and Journalist Studies, China University of Politics and Law; Si Weijiang, well-known 
lawyer from Shanghai; Lv Wenju, former police officer; Ma Shen, lawyer, Associate 
Professor from Guang Dong Institute of Commerce; Guo Weiqing, Professor from School of 
Politics and Public Administration, Sun Yat-sen University, joined by two of his Ph.D 
students (unnamed here); Yu Jianrong, Professor from Institute of Rural Development 
Studies, China Academy of Social Sciences; Fu Guoyong, famous historian scholar, public 
intellectual; Yang Jianguang, Professor from School of Law, Sun Yat-sen University. 
                                                        
402 He resigned from the South Weekly for his involvement in the investigation of Qian Yunhui’s 
death, probably because of the Newspaper was under pressure. Xiao Shu later joined the Transition 
Institute, a famous liberal NGO based in Beijing, which was forced to shut off in the name of illegal 
operation (NGOs is not easily registered in China to be legal social organizations, instead, they have 
to be registered as companies, which means publications, and other social advocate work is not 
included in their due business. The government could choose to shut off it in economic names, as is 
the case of Transition Institute) because its director Mr. Guo Yushan and other workers had played an 
eminent role in the case of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng.  
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Besides, there were two volunteers, Liu Chang, an investigative journalist and Ye Yin 
(nickname) whose occupation was not revealed. Both volunteers had no right to vote.  
 Because the team was made up of professionals, they made a “Charter for Academic 
Sector Observation Team” (called Yueqing Eight Rules including “objectiveness and 
professionalism”; “independence”, “truth seeking”; “non-media”(they seek truth instead of 
media effect”, “inclusiveness” (conclusion shall include those disputes); “unity” (all 
members were not allowed to release any news concerning the team); “self-funding”, and; 
“Robert’s Discussion Rule”. 
 The teams worked separately but had coordination and collaboration during the 
investigation, through they had released different investigation report during and after the 
investigation.  
 
           2.3 Scholars/intellectuals   
 
 The investigation team was supported by famous columnist Lian Yue, a former 
journalist from the South Weekly who had a role in the Xiamen PX Incident, in one of his 
blog posted on December 29, 2010, he praised the fact that “Qian Yunhui’s death had 
resulted in the emerging of Citizens’ independent Investigation Team, this is an ice-breaking 
tour.” 403He also warned that “if such independent investigation Teams appeared often, they 
will help alleviate the dilemma of mistrust between government and grassroots”, he further 
warned that “ The Yueqing government should not fear it, instead it should welcome it”. 404 
The Yueqing official blog “Ping An Yueqing” (Peaceful and Safe Yueqing) also sent an 
announcement that “it welcomes the Investigation teams”.405 
 Aside from scholars within the observation team, many other scholars had expressed 
their support of the team. Distinguished Professor Chang Yuan from the China Aerospace 
Laboratory of Social System406 sent an open letter to the investigation team encouraging it to 
                                                        
403 Three Independent Citizens’ Investigation Teams will Head for Yueqing to Investigate the Truth 
of Qian Yunhui’s Death”, http://news.ifeng.com/society/special/leqingchehuoshigu/content-
2/detail_2010_12/29/3771146_0.shtml, 2015-10-01. 
404 Three Independent Citizens’ Investigation Teams will Head for Yueqing to Investigate the Truth 
of Qian Yunhui’s Death”, http://news.ifeng.com/society/special/leqingchehuoshigu/content-
2/detail_2010_12/29/3771146_0.shtml, 2015-10-01. 
405 Shen Jiayin, The Tour of Citizens Observation Team to Yueqing, Jing Hua Zhou Kan, 2011(01). 
http://paper.people.com.cn/jhzk/html/2011-01/17/content_962439.htm, 2015-10-08.  
406 The system is the first of its type in China that strives to conduct systematic studies of social 
sciences.  
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conduct independent, reliable investigation with norms that support orderly and constructive 
participation.407 
 
            2.4  Mass Media and Public Opinion 
 
 As in other cases, media exposure of incidents proved to be vital since public 
awareness and opinion are always the first step for contentious politics. Media coverage was 
intensive in Qian Yunhui’s case. Qian Yunhui died at around 9:45 am on December 25, 2010 
(this time was claimed by police, while there was evidence indicating it happened at around 
9:30 am, the author will elaborate later), but his death was first revealed by a blogger 
“somebody 1199” at 19:39 in the same evening. Because his blog doesn't have fans, the 
news about Qian’s death didn't’ spread to a wider audience. At 0:03, December 26, 14 hours 
later, the message was sent with two photos by a blogger Meng Jianwei, a protester and 
relative of a land dispute victim who had 3,065 fans and the news was transferred for over 
3000 times.408 The news began to circulate among blogs but the local government had no 
answer. Because those micro bloggers described Qian’s death as “murder”, more and more 
people began to look for truth via the Internet. A journalist form Ningbo introduced Qian’s 
former right-maintenance work and Qian’s story gradually became known to the people.409 
And as many new facts were revealed, national attention was drawn to the suspicious case. 
To some extent, investigations began with the Internet.  
 The Citizens’ investigation teams also highly relied on the Internet. News about the 
investigation, the reports and analysis were all released via blogs. Because of the very 
sensitive nature of the issue, and also because many facts were unclear, traditional media 
was  somewhat reluctant to report or comment on the matter. The situation changed later. 
 Coverage by traditional media appeared at around 7:33 am on December 27, nearly 
two days after the incident. As was the case of the Xiamen PX protest, when local media 
was under pressure, the role of media from other provinces and localities proved to be vital. 
Foreign media had also reported Qian’s death intensively. The New York Times, the 
                                                        
407  Professor Chang Yuan’s Message to the Citizens’ Observation Team, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6290394e0100nggo.html, 2015-11-08. 
408  Micro Blogs Discuss Qian Yunhui’s Case Hotly: The Intervention of Citizens’ Investigation 
Teams, http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2010-12/30/c_12934476.htm, 2015-11-08.  
409 Ibid.  
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Guardian, CNN, the Wall Street Journal and some Hong Kong media had reported or posted 
commentaries. 410  
 
            3. Result of Societal Involvement: an Assessment  
 
 Was Qian Yunhui’s death a murder or an ordinary accident? The goal of involvement 
of societal forces was clear: “truth” based on reliable evidence, especially when there was a 
general societal distrust over government, who had exerted strong influence and even 
adopted repressive means trying to reach a conclusion of Qian’s death as an ordinary 
accident. Therefore, whether societal involvement is effective lies in whether they finally 
make a difference in governmental behavior or lead to different conclusion. Though many 
people suspected about the real cause of Qian’s death, and there was a general tendency of 
deeming it as a murder, the society didn’t have any reliable evidence leading to that 
conclusion. Therefore, whether the government has changed its behavior, policy or 
conclusion under societal pressure would be a major criterion. The author will first make an 
assessment of the effect of societal involvement based on the reports respectively made by 
the government and the citizens’ investigation team, and then analyze the reason by 
comparison with the Xiamen PX Protest which had led to obvious behavioral changes of 
government to see what pattern of societal involvement, and under what conditions, could 
really make a difference in government behavior.  
 
            3.1 Government Conclusion of Qian’s Death 
 
 The police announced at the very beginning that “it was a normal accident”, the 
police also published the evidence for this conclusion. Evidence includes photos of the 
truck, body, the brake marks of the truck and the umbrella used by Qian before his death; the 
record of the news release by the police; telephone records; testimonials by witnesses (Qian 
Chengwei, Huang Diyan, security guards, the driver, etc), videos; report of the technical test 
of the truck; a polygraph report of the two witnesses.   
                                                        
410 Xiyun Yang, Edward Wong: "Suspicious Death Ignites Fury in China“, The New York Times 
(December 28, 2010); Jonathan Watts (in Beijing), "China's new netizens voice suspicions over 
death of village chief“, Guardian, (December 29, 2010), London; Eyewitness: Chinese police, 
protesters clash after villager's death, By Eve Bower, CNN |January 3, 2011;"A Traffic Death 
Exposes Government Credibility Crisis",Wall Street Journal, 2010-12-28; Village head's death 
sparks outrage", RTHK English News. 2010-12-28.  
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 Though the conclusion seemed reasonable and logical to some extent, it won’t help 
relieve societal skepticism. The most important evidence for a reliable conclusion resided in 
the testimony of the witness. If the government was neutral and the investigation process 
was made open in a transparent manner, the conclusion would prove more convincing. 
However, the government had a great stake in making the case “an accident”. The 
government, together with the Yueqing Power Plant Company, seized the land from the 
villagers and had, improperly even illegally arrested Qian and his fellows before Qian’s 
death. If it proved to be a murder, it would be a great scandal not only for the local 
government, but also for the whole political system and greatly undermine social stability, 
though the possibility of “a murder” can’t be excluded.  
 Though the Wenzhou municipal government had directed that investigations be 
conducted based on both possibilities (murder and accident), the behavior of the government 
in arresting all witnesses (driver and his assistant driver, Qian Chengyu, Huang Diyan, Qian 
Yunhui’s daughter and former fellow, etc) and apparently that all the testimonials of these 
people had changed before and after their arrest because of strong pressure from the police). 
Meanwhile, during the investigation, the police took away the body of Qian Yunhui by force 
and destroyed the site of Qians’ death; and meanwhile the police had kept pressure upon 
Qian’s family for earlier cremation. Qian Chengyu even telephoned his family urging Qian 
Yunhui’s family to accept compensation (conditions from the police were that they had to 
agree that “it was an normal accident”) so that he and other arrested villagers could be 
released soon. The “conclusion” of “a normal accident” seemed a predisposition to be 
proved.  
 There were also very suspicious details of the story that may never be revealed 
forever. There was mutually-proved evidence indicating that Qian’s death took place at 
around 9:30 instead of 9:40-9:43 as claimed by the police.411 The key evidence of the video 
record by Qian Yunhui’s mobile seemed to have been edited and the lawyer’s request to 
conduct a legal review of the video was rejected by the judge.412 Another very important 
qeusitoin is that the police insisted the last telephone call Qian Yunhui received was by 
Wang Liquan at around 8:30-31 am, but in fact, many evidences indicated the last phone call 
was made by another person at 9:00, hints indicated that it may be made by deputy head of 
                                                        
411 Qian’s family members, an official record by traffic police indicated this. See Liu Jianfeng and 
Oiyang Yanqin, The Investigation Record of Cell Phone and Micro video in Qian Yunhui Case, 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/ggzhc/article_2011021429774.html, 2015-08-08.  
412 Ibid.  
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township government Xu Zhongxiang.413 However, truth is not what this research wants to 
address. Instead, the author intends to analyze how societal forces interact with the local 
government and whether this interaction has made a difference.         
 
             3.2 Report of the Citizens’ Union (Gong Meng)      
 
 On December 31, 2010, seven days after Qian’s death (in Chinese tradition, relatives 
of the decreased shall respect the lost family member) and 48 hours after investigations, Dr. 
Xu Zhiyong from the Citizens’ Union Investigation Team (mainly made up of legal scholars 
and lawyers) was the first report via the Internet.  
 In order to draw reliable conclusions, the team visited more than 20 villager 
witnesses, interviewed Qian Chenyu’s mother, elder sister and other villagers who were 
present at the site of the “accident”; Mr. Peng Jian visited and talked to Qian Chengyu as his 
lawyer; the team had also read the materials of the villagers’ appeals over the land seizures; 
they invited villagers to watch two videos recorded immediately after Qian’s death as well 
as Qian Chengyu’s talk with the police, analyzed the talks between Qian Chengyu and Fei 
Liangyu (the driver of the truck);they visited the power plant, the security guard company, 
Fei Liangyu’s company; they also had talked to some journalists.414 
 The report denied the public suspicion of “Qian Died of murder” and claimed that 
Qian’s death “was a normal accident”; it became a major public incident because of public 
mistrust of the government who had improperly dealt with the issue. 415 Understandably, the 
report was criticized very harshly by the public because there seemed a general expectation 
the investigation will prove the case to be a “murder” instead of an accident, especially 
given that the report was hastily published 48 hours after investigation when many 
important facts were still unclear and that there was disagreement in conclusion within the 
investigation team. 416  There were even serious journalistic comments that expressed 
disappointment about the “Citizens’ Union” indicating that the report didn’t reach 
                                                        
413 ibid.  
414 Xu Zhiyong, Citizen Union Investigation Report on “The Truth of Qian Yunhui’s Death”(2nd 
Edition), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/dfzl/2011/0911/45125.html, 2014-12-12.  
415 Ibid.  
416 Ibid.  
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satisfactory result because the team was not so serious in drawing a reliable conclusion, it 
was so accused of giving in because of “fear”. 417 
 In late 2011, when the incident about “Qian Yunhui’s death” calmed down and more 
details were revealed and the conclusion of “accident” by Yue Qing police seemed to be the 
final and official conclusion, Dr. Xu Zhiyong released a second report on behalf of the 
Citizens’ Union Investigation Team. While he added more details and analysis based on 
“complementary investigation” conducted during January 1-16, 2011, he insisted on the 
conclusion that “Qian Yunhui’s case was a normal accident which developed into a public 
incident because of societal mistrust on the government” and that “the conclusion of the 
police was basically reliable”.418 
 
3.3 Report of the Academic Sector Investigation Team 
 
 In comparison, the academic teams’ report was more prudent, cautious and more 
detailed. It recorded the whole investigation process of the team and other teams, including 
disputes among its members; analyzed the credibility of all evidences, including testimonies 
of all witnesses and all related persons, listed all suspicious aspects of the incident, and 
provide reasonable analysis of the truth. However, lacking of reliable evidences, especially 
when credibility of those key evidence (testimonials of witnesses, the video that were 
claimed to be original from Qian’s watch, for instance) were questionable, Qian Yunhui’s 
Death Investigation Group (split from the Yueqing Citizens’ Investigation Team because 
several other professors quit and claimed they would focus on investigations concerning 
land issues of the case, members of Qian Yunhui’s death Investigation Team included Xiao 
shu, Piao Baoyi, Chen Jieren, Si Weijiang, Lv Wenju) finally concluded that it could neither 
support the case being “an accident” nor could it support it to be “a case of murder”.419 
 
           3.4 Other Reports 
                                                        
417  Xia Youzhi, the “Qian Yunhui Case” and the Fineness of the Citizens, Dong Fang Daily 
(Shanghai: Dong Fang Zao Bao), 2011-01-21.  
418 Xu Zhiyong, Citizen Union Investigation Report on “The Truth of Qian Yunhui’s Death”(2nd 
Edition), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/dfzl/2011/0911/45125.html, 2014-12-12.  
418  Xia Youzhi, the “Qian Yunhui Case” and the Fineness of the Citizens, Dong Fang Daily 
(Shanghai: Dong Fang Zao Bao), 2011-01-21. 
419  Academic Citizens’ Yueqing Observation Team Qian Yunhui Death Investigation Group: 
Observation Report about Qian Yunhui’s Death by Academic Observation Team (Phase 1), 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/pl/article_2011012028485.html, 2015-12-12. 
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 Besides the two reports, there were three other  reports concerning the investigation. 
The most valuable one was written by Mr. Liu Jianfeng, a journalist from the China 
Economic Times, whose report was written based on his secret investigation and interview of 
the witnesses. His report revealed many facts about Qian’s death that were different from the 
official statement of Yueqing police authority; much of this evidence was also proved by 
findings of other teams.420 However, he also revealed some key facts as well as evidence 
from witness of the whole process (of Qian’s death) and based on the “confidentiality 
Agreement” he signed with the unnamed witness, the latter would make testimony of the 
“murder” “in person” once the central government sent an investigation team directly. 421 
Though many people believe the conclusion of Liu’s investigation, the evidences presented 
by Liu could hardly lead to the conclusion that “Qian Yunhui died of murder”.  
  A third report was made by Ling Xin and Yan Jianbiao entitled “Details of Qian 
Yunhui’s Death” and a fourth report was made by famous columnist Tufu (nickname, 
meaning “butcher”) titled “Tufu’s conclusion of Qian Yunhui’s Death”, both opinions 
remain very personal and failed to reveal new evidence.  
 
             4. Analysis of Societal Involvement  
 
 According to the analytical framework, the author will review the sector for the Qian 
Yunhui case, the societal forces involved, the interaction pattern and rationality, the 
sensitivity of the issue and how it relates to the effectiveness of the involvement of societal 
forces.  
 
          4.1 Involvement of Societal Forces  
 
 From the above description, we can see that social activists, mass media (traditional 
media, and new media such as internet based BBS and blogs), public opinion, NGOs, 
professionals and scholars were involved in the investigation of “Qian Yunhui’s suspicious 
death”. 
                                                        
420 Liu Jianfeng, “Investigation Record of Witnesses for Qian Yunhui Case”, China Economic Times 
(jing ji shi bao), available at http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/pl/article_2011011328061_2.html, 
2015-08-18.  
421 Ibid.  
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 As with other cases, media exposure and coverage made Qian’s case known to the 
general public and further created a strong public opinion that urged the government to 
conduct an official investigation while calling on third-party, independent and neutral 
investigators because of a general mistrust of the local police who had a stake in “making” 
Qian’s death an accident. Professionals here in Qian’s cases refer to the many lawyers who, 
in collaboration with scholars and social activists, formed the multiple investigation teams, 
which were actually NGOs in nature. Technical review and testsof the truck did not make a 
difference because of poor conditions, also because local police may have influenced the 
process. The unique part of societal involvement was the role of NGOs that was basically 
absent in other cases.  
 
          4.2 Pattern of Interaction  
 
 Societal involvement in the decision-making during the investigation has a very 
diverse and fragmented nature. The Chinese society had great expectations from those non-
governmental investigation teams, and different teams had the same goal to find out whether 
Qian Yunhui’s death was “murder” or “an accident”, and they did coordinate and cooperate 
with each other before and at the very beginning of the investigation. However, different 
opinions and disputes existed from the very beginning.  
 Xu Zhiyong’s Citizens’ Union, Liu Jianfeng’s journalist investigation and the 
Academic Sector investigation had been carried out separately, even though the people they 
visited and the details they wanted to confirm were almost the same. They had discussed and 
consulted each other about how to find evidence, the credibility of evidences they collected 
and in a way supported each other in dealing with the government. However, their judgment 
of the situation and about the credibility of the evidences was different which led to the split 
of those teams.  
 Because the incident was highly sensitive, and local police had created a strong 
atmosphere of fear, some members of the investigation team quit during the investigation. 
The report of Dr. Xu Zhiyong’s team came out within two days of the investigation and was 
criticized harshly, even his team members didn’t agree to publish the report, some members 
refused to publish the report in the name of the Citizens’ Union whose head is Dr. Xu 
Zhiyong.  
 213 
 The Yueqing Academic Sector Investigation Team was quite influential; however the 
team proved to be the severely divided and disputable. The members couldn’t reach an 
agreement on the basic action code “The Yueqing 8 Items of Rules” (yue qing ba tiao), Yu 
Jianrong, once the leader of the team, refused to publish any announcement as a team, and 
he refused the “Robert’s Discussion Rule”. On December 31 afternoon, not long after the 
team members arrived at Zhaiqiao Village and the on-site investigation, Yu predicted that a 
large scale group incident may take place and proposed to stop the investigation and retreat 
from the village soon. Later, the team split into two groups: the Land Issue Investigation 
Team headed by Yu Jianrong and Qian Yunhui’s Death Investigation Team headed by 
Xiaoshu. Even worse was that the major advocate of the Citizens’, “independent”, 
“objective” investigation, did not strictly follow the rules of the Yue Qing Eight Items, and 
released news individually, though he later retracted the news, the possible negative 
influence had already been created and was irreversible.     
 Disputes among scholars and media were more apparent. Wu Danhong, an associate 
professor from China University of Politics and Law, had criticized Si Weijiang and Zhang 
Xuezhong for not being professional. He criticized Si for over-emphasizing the “procedural 
justice” as a lawyer of intellectual property rights, and  Zhang from East China University of 
Politics and Law since the latter had required the government to explain many societal 
suspicions. 422  In terms of mass media, CCTV and other traditional media (the China 
Economic Times, for instance) had different propensities while disputes on the Internet were 
even fiercer.  
 
            4.3 Rationality  
 
 Right after Qian Yunhui’s death, the outraged villagers attacked a police officer 
(Qian Chengyu was arrested in the name of “affray” because a later video showed he was 
throwing a stone at the police), surrounded the site of Qian’s death to protect the site and 
had confronted with the police when the latter attempted to take Qian’s body away. 
However, generally speaking, the protests and investigation had been conducted in a 
peaceful manner. Most members of the investigation team were legal scholars or lawyers, 
and they engaged the government in a very peaceful and rational manner.   
 
                                                        
422 Ji Qingqin, The Legand of Qian Yunhui’s Watch, South Metropolis Weekly, 2011-2-15.  
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            4.4 Sensitivity  
 
 Disputes and even protests resulting from land seizures was very common in China 
over the past decade (2004-2014), therefore land issue is by no means something very 
sensitive. Local governments often use repressive means to settle land protests. However, 
Qian Yunhui’s case was more sensitive than ever, first because there was abnormal loss of 
human life; second because Qian’s suspicions death was believed to be relevant to local 
government whose lost credibility had also revealed and affectted the questionable 
accountability of Chinese government as a system. Once proved to be a murder by local 
government, it would be a great scandal and may cause unexpected consequences. 
Therefore, the Qian Yunhui’s case is highly sensitive.   
 
         5．Summary: unchanged government behaviors  
 
 The intensive involvement of societal forces in the Qian Yunhui case failed to bring 
any positive result. Investigations by several citizen investigation teams had revealed many 
new facts, and some helped relieve public skepticism, however, some increased their doubt 
and reinforced their belief that Qian was murdered. However, neither of the investigation 
teams had drawn convincing conclusions. The conclusion of the Qian Yunhui case as “a 
normal accident” made by the Yueqing police remained the official conclusion. A more 
disappointing part of the case was that strong pressure from domestic and international 
media, strong public opinion, legal scholars, lawyers, social activists and the Citizens’ 
Investigation Teams (NGOs) had not changed the repressive, arbitrary and manipulative 
behavior of the Yueqing police. Though, police authority is a special government organ, its 
behavior may be different from what we normally call “government”. As the responsible 
body designated by the Yueqing and superior Wenzhou government to settle the issue, the 
Yueqing police had been authorized to settle issues beyond just investigation. Simply put, it 
stands for the political system. The government’s repressive, arbitrary and manipulative 
behavior constitutes one of the major causes for the failure of societal participation, and is 
part of the failure.  
 
           A Comparison of the Xiamen PX Protest and the Qian Yunhui Case: How 
Governmental behaviors are changed  
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 The Xiamen PX protests and Qian Yunhui case are two major group incidents in 
Southeastern China’s Fujian and Zhejiang province. The Xiamen PX protest is a typical 
environmental protest that is gaining importance in recent years, the Qian Yunhui case is a 
combination of land disputes and legal injustice. The two cases together could reveal the 
general picture of China’s protests and societal involvement since environmental concern, 
land disputes and legal injustice are exactly the three main sources of social conflicts. More 
importantly, the societal role in both cases had apparent implications for the Chinese 
government’s behavior under societal pressure. In the Xiamen PX protest, the combination 
of the major stakeholders (Xiamen dwellers), media (especially new media) and public 
opinion, leading scholars, professionals, and social activists together had urged and 
rationally engaged the Xiamen Municipal government to change its behavior from 
repressive to engaging, from less responsive to more responsive, from information 
withholding to transparency. However, in the Qian Yunhui case, government behaviors 
remained repressive, arbitrary and manipulative, resulting in serious government loss of 
credibility and wasted an important chance for benign government-society interaction, 
especially given the intensive role of NGOs. By reviewing the process and the result of 
societal engagement, we can draw interesting findings of what factors, under what 
conditions and in what way, could societal engagement lead to the government’s behavioral 
changes. The author will first compare the societal involvement bases on the basic analytical 
framework and then further elaborate whether other factors had affected the success and 
failure of government’s behavioral changes.  
 
           1．Societal forces involved 
 
 Societal involvement in both cases was wide and in-depth. Among all six cases 
covered by the dissertation, and even among all major group incidents that took place in the 
past decade, the Xiamen PX protest and the Qian Yunhui Case have the most complete 
record of societal forces. In both cases, mass media coverage was intensive, traditional 
media from other provinces and international media, instead of local media, new and media 
like mobile and internet-based communication means had played a more salient role; 
national attention was drawn and strong public opinion had been formed; social activists, 
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professionals, and leading scholars had been deeply involved. However, there are three 
aspects concerning the societal forces involved.  
 
               1.1 Role of NGOs  
 
 The first major difference is the involvement of NGOs in Qian Yunhui Case, while 
NGOs were basically absent in the Xiamen PX protest. The NGOs in Qian Yunhui Case 
refer to those non-governmental investigation teams made up of lawyers, scholars, social 
activists and volunteers. They were temporary working groups instead of regular registered 
social organizations, but they were to conduct a non-profit, public, independent third-party 
investigation, therefore differentiate themselves from the government organizations and 
therefore had the major essence of NGOs. NGOs also appeared in Xiamen PX protest and 
the Wukan Land Protest, however, those temporary civil coalitions were far from 
conventional NGOs and even incomparable with the investigation teams in Qian Yunhui’s 
team. It was a great pity that the role of NGOs in the Qian Yunhui Case somewhat 
disappointed the public and lost the chance to rise as an emerging societal force. It revealed 
the limited function of NGOs in China and also revealed the limited degree of development 
of Chinese society as well as the political regime.  
 
           1.2 Scholars  
 
 The role of scholars was vital for both cases. If not for Prof. Zhao Yufen and the 
other 105 famous scholars who initiated the bill to the National Political Consultative 
Conference (NPPCC), the news about the Xiamen PX program would not be released to be 
public and probably the PX would have been constructed smoothly. In the Qian Yunhui case, 
if it were not advocated and participated by many scholars, the citizens’ investigation teams 
would not have been so influential and there would not be any possibility to figure out the 
real cause of Qian’s death.  
 However, there is a huge difference between the ways the two groups engaged the 
government. While scholarly engagement in the Xiamen case was institutional and 
constructive, scholarly involvement in the Qian Yunhui case was in a way deemed by local 
government as challeng authority. Zhao and several other professors, after doing close 
researches on the potential danger of PX program, had written letters to the Major of 
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Xiamen before they submitted the bill to the NPPCC, and the Xiamen government had 
organized a private consultation with the five professors from Xiamen University, aiming at 
changing their mind by explaining and ensuring the safety of the PX program. They even 
conducted economic and geographical studies based on which they propose to relocate the 
Xiaman PX program to Gulei peninsula, which was actually adopted by the government 
latter. 
 While in the Qian Yunhui case, the scholars announced at the very beginning their 
purpose was to conduct independent investigation, they refused any donation and also 
refused the offer of Yueqing Publicity Authority to accommodate them. 423  This was deemed 
by local government as a potential challenge to the local government as well as the primary 
conclusion made by police, especially when the team work in the form of NGOs, which the 
government had been vigilant against. It was for this reason that in their investigations in the 
following days, anxious government officials and police officers refused to contact the 
investigation team, arrested almost all witnesses and relevant persons and had exerted strong 
pressure on them and created a very strong atmosphere of fear that had negatively affected 
the team’s investigation.  
 
            1.3 Professionals  
 
 Compared with the case of Sun Zhigang’s death and the Xiamen PX protest, 
professionals were more deeply involved in the investigation of Qian’s death. Among the 
members of the investigation teams, there were several well-known lawyers, former police 
officer, investigative journalists and researchers (to some extent could be regarded as 
professionals too), different from Sun Zhigang’s case where the medical-legal autopsy 
proved the real cause of Sun’s death, and the research conducted by Zhao Yufen and her 
colleagues which confirmed the danger of PX program in Xiamen. Other professional 
engagement is a second EIA review conducted by the China Institute of Environmental 
Sciences that also indicated Xiamen’s PX program may not be suitable to be built in the tiny 
island, the lawyers, police officers and legal scholars were unable to apply their professional 
knowledge, while the key part of professional process, the test of the  truck (which failed to 
                                                        
423  Academic Citizens’ Yueqing Observation Team Qian Yunhui Death Investigation Group: 
Observation Report about Qian Yunhui’s Death by Academic Observation Team (Phase 1), 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/pl/article_2011012028485.html, 2015-12-12. 
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evaluate the speed of the truck) was either designated by local police and the possibility of 
police manipulation couldn’t be excluded or rejected (medical-legal autopsy of Qian 
Yunhui) .  
 
            2． Pattern of interaction  
 
 The different pattern of societal interaction in the two cases can also help explain the 
different results. In the Xiamen PX protest, mass media, professionals, social activists, 
ordinary Xiamen citizens, had been generally consistent in their goals (to keep the PX 
program out of Xiamen) as we can see from the opinion poll (the overwhelmingly majority 
of the representatives rejected the PX program) during the Citizens’ Symposium based on 
which the decision of relocation was made.  This was also true in that the mass media, the 
social activists and the professionals had better coordination among each other, therefore 
making a stronger voice and constituting greater pressure upon the Xiamen government.  
 However in the Qian Yunhui case, the societal forces were highly divided. There was 
a huge gap between the attitudes of traditional media and new media. The state-owned 
CCTV made an investigative report indicating Qian’s death was an accident, while Mr. Liu 
Jianfeng from China Economic News published an investigative report suggesting that Qian 
probably died of murder. 424 Official media from local government introduced Qian as a 
trouble maker and former prisoner while most BBS, blogs, webpages had shown great 
sympathy for Qian, some even regarded him as a hero. Most importantly, the citizens’ 
investigation teams, which once were expected by the general public to reveal the truth of 
Qian’s death, were extremely divided from the very beginning. The three teams conducted 
investigation independently though they have some mutual support and coordination.  
 The Citizens’ Union Investigation Team, headed by Dr. Xu Zhiyong, wanted to 
expanded its own influence and insisted to publish the first investigation report on 
December 31, 2010, hastily drew the conclusion of Qian’s death as “an ordinary accident” in 
the name of his Citizens’ Union (Gong Meng), against the will of other three members who 
were not members of Xu’s NGO and disagreed with Xu’s conclusion. 425 The Academic 
                                                        
424 Liu Jianfeng, “Investigation Record of Witnesses for Qian Yunhui Case”, China Economic Times 
(jing ji shi bao), available at http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/pl/article_2011011328061_2.html, 
2015-08-18.  
425 Interview with Dr.G, director of the leading grassroots think-tank Transition Institute (an Beijing-
based non-government organization majoring in citizens’ enlightenment, the organization was forced 
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Yueqing Investigation Team were also divided at the very beginning, Leading scholar Yu 
Jianrong declined to make a unitary announcement, nor did he agree with the Robert’s Rules 
of Order or the Yueqing 8 Items, and within hours of the investigation, he proposed to retreat 
from the Zhaiqiao village because he predicted a large scale group incident may take place, 
and later he and another four members announced that they would focus on land issues 
instead of Qian’s death. 426 Dr. Xu. who advocated to establish the citizens’ investigation 
team and who invited Professor Yu to lead the team believe Yu’s quitting was a huge loss to 
the team, but understandable because Yu knows when to go ahead and when to quit to keep 
his influence while remaining safe. 427 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
to shut off in the name of illegal operation in 2012 because of Guo’s role in the blind lawyer Chen 
Guangcheng incident), a fellow and close friend of Dr. Xu Zhiyong who later parted with Xu 
because of Xu’s radical attitude. Spring, 2011.   
426  Academic Citizens’ Yueqing Observation Team Qian Yunhui Death Investigation Group: 
Observation Report about Qian Yunhui’s Death by Academic Observation Team (Phase 1), 
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/sxpl/pl/article_2011012028485.html, 2015-12-12. 
427 Interview with X, a member of the academic investigation team, he was well known investigative 
journalist form the South Weekend and after the Qian Yunhui event he resigned from the newspaper 
under pressure and joined the Transition Institute. Interview conducted in middle March, 2011, 
Beijing.   
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Chapter 10: The Wukan Village Democratic Practices 
 
 China had been an agricultural country until the most recent decade.428 Land has 
been the core resource for Chinese life, and land polices were one of the most decisive 
reasons for the rise and fall of dynasties. China’s Communist rise was, to a large extent, 
based on its “land revolution” that appealed to the vast rural population. China’s Reform and 
Opening up also started with rural land systems changes as the Household Contract 
Responsibility System, where peasants were responsible for working the land (confined to 
agricultural production). However, since the late 1990s, when China started massive 
construction of new towns, industrial and development zones as well as high-tech zones, 
land disputes began to intensify. The tricky point for Chinese land disputes lies in its land 
ownership system. Chinese land is either state-owned or collectively owned (a village, for 
instance), farmers, business, social organizations only have the “right to use” it but not own 
it.429 This has granted the state or officials of the government great advantages in land use 
while leaving the farmers vulnerable on their lands. A constitutional amendment passed by 
the People’s Congress in March 2004 further confirmed the de facto collective ownership in 
rural China, which is also considered as a human progress compared with the constitution 
promulgated in 1982 which states “Land is owned by the state”.430 The 1982 Constitution 
denied the private ownership of land for urban citizens and allowed the state to appropriate 
the collective land free of charge. 
 As early as 2001, a Chinese scholar published an article analyzing about China’s 
rural land disputes during appropriation by the government and the consequent tension 
between rural farmers and local governments.431 The new constitution revised in 2004 also 
authorized the state to legally appropriate the land and reclaimed back from farmers the 
“rights to use” it by providing appropriate compensation and conditions. 432  But the 
constitution did not clearly specify the entity of appropriation, and the meaning of “public 
                                                        
428 China’s urbanization rate reached 51.3% by the end of 2011, which means more Chinese people 
now live urban cities than in rural areas. Although one can’t simply define a country as agricultural 
country because it has a low urbanization rate, it indicates a large proportion of Chinese are still 
making a living on agricultural activities. Even in urban cities we have famers living in “villages in 
towns” (cheng zhong cun). See Niu Weiyuan and Liu Yijun, (eds), China’s New Type of 
Urbanization 2011, Beijing: Science Press, 2012. 
429 Wang Xianping, “Changes in the rural land system in China,” Economic Forum, Issue 19, 2006. 
430 Constitution of People’s Republic of China, article 10, item 1. 1982. 
431 Xiaolin Guo, Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China, The China Quarterly, No. 166 
(Jun., 2001), pp. 422-439. 
432 Constitution of People’s Republic of China, article 10, item 3. 2004. 
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interest” as well as the standard of compensation, which is actually subject to arbitration of 
local governments.433 Without legal or institutional constraints, improper and even illegal 
seizures of land by local government had become rampant. Along with China national real 
estate boom since the past decade, city and county-level governments have been 
increasingly dependent on land sales as a source of revenue in what is known as “land-based 
fiscal policy”(tu di cai zheng).  
 Because in rural China, land is owned collectively by the villagers, the revised 2004 
Constitution authorized the state government to take appropriate lands for collective 
ownership, and villages within cities (cheng zhong cun) and villages neighboring cities 
gained tremendous interest from real estate agents. As organization of village autonomy, the 
Village Committee holds huge power in deciding the major decisions of land sales. 
According to the Chinese law, villagers enjoy autonomy and have the right to select village 
heads and the village committee via direct voting. However, education, traditional rural 
governance structure (relying on “gentlemen” or xiangxian, which is often from wealthy big 
families), kinship, and lack of necessary knowledge and experience have confined rural 
governance. For instance, Xue Chang, Wukan’s Party Secretary before the incident, had 
acted in the party role and managed the village since 1970, 41 consecutive years until his 
removal. 
 The danger for rural governance is that owing to the structural problems with the 
rural political system, some rural economic and political elites may easily dominate village 
affairs. Xue had, over the past two decades, sold over 20 thousand mu (each mu equals to 
666m2) of land without informing the villagers, 434 while the villagers were left vulnerable, 
especially given that China lacks a social security system. Therefore, rural land seizure by 
local government, intertwined with corruption and legal injustice, had become one of the 
major sources of social stability and unrest. According to the research conducted by China 
Academy of Social Sciences, there were 871 public news reports on mass incidents with 100 
participants or more in the time period from January 1st, 2000 to September 30th, 2013. 
Among them, 97 were caused by relocation and land requisition (chaiqian zheng di), which 
                                                        
433  Gong Renren, The Constitutional Dilemma of Appropriation of Rural Land of Collective 
Ownership, Legal Science, 2013(09). 
434 The statement was provided by many villagers in open journalist account, their negotiation with 
the government and some scholarly interviews. However, the narrative may not be so reliable for the 
long spectrum of time and the fact that the village committee had distributed the land to villagers for 
times and some land sales were among villagers. However it would be sure that Xue had stealthily 
sold large piece land to developers, including the most recent land deals with Biguiyuan, and large 
Chinese real estate developer, that directly caused the large scale protest. 
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was the second most important cause of mass incidents only after labor disputes (laozi 
jiufen).435 About 65% of mass incidents in rural areas are triggered by land disputes, which 
are affecting rural stability and development more than any other issue.436 In Guangdong, as 
the most developed coastal province in China, 30.7% of all mass incidents, for instance, 
were related to land disputes. 
 These data also shows that the vast majority of these incidents occurred between 
2010 and 2012. China’s perceived vulnerability makes it wary of  any popular gathering or 
protest, since a protest in one place may incite other localities to follow suit and therefore 
undermine social stability and party legitimacy. Often the government uses highly repressive 
methods to address the land disputes that only create counterproductive consequences. 
Experts believe that China will likely to enter a period of frequent social conflicts in the 
decades to come. Chinese scholar Yu Jianrong even believes the possibility of a major crisis 
where peasants join hands with workers and members of the intellectual class so as to 
confront the elitist alliance that dominates society.437 
 In this sense, the protests in Wukan were not different from other land disputes that 
occurred in other provinces. Even in villages close to Longtou, for instance, villagers were 
also planning protests. However, the Wukan’s engagement with  government, and the 
latter’s response had displayed quite different characteristics. The result of such an 
interaction was also inspiring. Depicting the story is not the writer’s soel purpose here given 
the research topic. Instead, the writer will focus on how the societal forces, led by villagers 
in this case, led to a change in policy of Guangdong’s multi-layer governments. And through 
systematic analysis based on the designed framework, this dissertation tries to figure out 
what is special in the society-government interaction of this case. 
 
            1. The Wukan Incident: A Review 
 
 Wukan is a small fishery village in Lufeng city (county level city), in Guangdong 
province. It was immediately thrust into the spotlight when a protest took place on 
September 21st, 2012. The number of protestorss numbered between three to four thousand 
people but later involved almost all villagers. The residents gathered outside the village 
                                                        
435 China Academy of Social Sciences, Year Book of China’s Rule of Law, Beijing: 2014. 
436  Rural land disputes lead unrest in China, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
11/06/content_11511194.htm, 2015-07-18. 
437 Yu Jianrong, Social Conflict in Rural China, China Security, Vol. 3,No 2, pp. 2-17. 
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committee compound and asked Xue Chang, the party head of the village to release the land 
sale documents and village financial accounts. Villagers also protested in front of 
enterprises, which they believed had benefited from their secret deals with the village 
committee, and the protests later extended to the city government building. The lack ogf 
response and confrontation with the police dispatched by the government resulted in the 
damage of several police cars and police office buildings over  the following days. As the 
confrontation intensified and protests continued, Donghai township government (township, 
as the lowest level of governments, is responsible for “guidance” of village autonomy under 
Chinese administration system), Lufeng city government (a county level), Shanwei city 
government (director-general level government) and the provincial government of 
Guangdong were all involved in. Appeals of the villagers also expanded from transparency 
of village affairs, and compensation of illegal land sales by the former party head and village 
committee, to reclaiming back lost land and demanding democratic elections; additional 
requirements also included education assistance and environmental intervention of the 
Wukan harbor, among others. 
 
            1.1 Early Protest (before the end of September) 
 
 Before the protest, villagers had over two years’ unsuccessful petitions to the 
township and city government about the land abuses and serious corruption of the village 
committee. Early petitions were headed by more than 20 young villagers in a peaceful way, 
and within two years’ time they kept engaging the government via letter of visits, which is a 
major channel for rural petitions concerning social injustice and rights abuses, among others. 
The youngsters later established their organization named Wukan Iron Blood Youth Group. 
Adopting the somewhat violent name does not mean they would use violence to protect their 
interest, rather, it revealed their resolution to make sure that “justice would be done”. 
 On September 24th, the villagers elected 15 representatives to negotiate with the 
Donghai town government and Lufeng city government and on behalf of the villagers, the 
representatives raised three requirements which comprised of firstly, investigate all land 
sales in Wukan since the period of Reform and Opening-up; secondly, investigate the 
elections and tenures of the village committee; and thirdly, open village affairs and fiscal 
details. Executive vice-Mayor of Lufeng city, Qiu Jinxiong, had agreed to send working 
teams to the village since September 26th and also required the villages to be rational by 
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refraining from using violence. The first phase of contention and negotiation seemed to 
work quite well and once the working team entered into the village and started to investigate 
the land sales and other required issues, the villagers began to calm down. 
 However, the improper response of the local government had later created further 
tensions and new rounds of protest were waged under the new leadership, which was chosen 
by the villagers’ conference. The event even went into a very dangerous confrontation 
between armed police and villagers. Only when the provincial government, under guidance 
of Party secretary Wang Yang and direct leadership of vice party Secretary Zhu Mingguo, 
became involved in the issue did the event lead to stabilization and basic resolution of the 
crisis.  
 The most important event during the protest in September is that the villagers had 
launched their own organization to lead and coordinate the protests. The way they selected 
the members, the principles, and power structure and operation of the organization, and  its 
later function had been very intense. On September 29th, 117 candidates of representatives 
were elected by the villagers’ conference based on the proportion of family names according 
to the total population. In China’s rural politics, large families have been very influential in 
local governance, which is especially true with the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, 
Zhejiang, Anhui and Shanxi, where commercialism (entrepreneurism, though the essence is 
fairly different from what we mean today) had developed well. Further illustrating the role 
of big families and the mechanism for their function is beyond the writer’s academic ability, 
however, the writer would like to emphasize the representatives of the selection.  
 Out of the 117 candidates, each family (by family name) could recommend one more 
representative to further form 38 candidates, out of whom 13 members were elected to form 
a new power organ called “Temporary Council of Representatives”. Even evaluated against 
the strictest terms, the formation of the 13-members of the Temporary Council of 
Representatives was commendable. In a way, it allowed the rural village to form a highly 
representative, well-balanced and reliable entity. Lin Zuluan (now Party secretary’s head), a 
well-respected senior villager was elected as advisor of the council, Yang Semao as the 
chair, three deputy chairs and nine other members were also elected. They were to lead the 
villagers in protest, “inspect and cooperate with the working team sent by the government”, 
and hold the villagers’ conference. They even decided to raise funding from donation of 
villagers and all expenses open to public. Apparently, the villagers have the expertise and 
knowledge of democratic governance of their own affairs. It somewhat proved the former 
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assumption that the grassroots in wealthy coastal areas tended to have better awareness and 
skills for social participation. In inland or remote western provinces, constrained by poverty 
and low education levels, daily practice, social unrest, and protests turned out to be anger 
venting, as was the case of 2008 Weng’an incident in Guizhou province. 
 
           1.2 From Stalemate to Escalation (Late September to mid-December) 
  
 The 13-members of the Temporary Council of Representatives were actually a new 
power entity and decision-making body in the turbulent village. The former village 
committee had lost credibility and was under investigation by a working group sent by the 
Lufeng government. According to the Chinese social organizational registration system, the 
Temporary Council of Representatives remained an illegal social organization. This is very 
clear: the social organizations, which failed to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, are 
considered illegal and shall be dismissed, especially when the organization was established 
to lead the protest. The Shanwei government had avoided directly negotiating with Lin 
Zuluan, Yang Semao and other nuclear members, since doing so meant recognition of the 
organization. However, the township, county, and city level governments were all dealing 
with the members, and since the Shanwei government had been proceeding with the five 
requirements proposed by the Council, no major confrontation happened between the 
Wukan villagers and the government until early December, except on November 21st, when 
the villagers initiated another medium sized protest. What deserves to be mentioned is the 
slogan of the protest that had evolved from the “right maintained” ones to “Over-thrown 
corrupted leaders”, “return our farmland”, “punish corruption”, and “government-business 
collusion kills democracy” to name a few. The slogan used also showed that their pursuit 
was turning political instead of remaining economic. This is unique and important for 
Wukan’s social participation. 
 However, news released by the Shanwei government on September 9th led to another 
highly antagonistic confrontation that immediately worsened the situation and only cooled 
down after the provincial government’s intervention. Shanwei’s mayor announced the 
removal of Xue Chang and deputy party secretary and village head Chen Shunyi.438 He also 
announced that all the villagers’ five major requirements, which were investigation of the 
village’s fiscal problems, land abuse, election, educational assistance, and environmental 
                                                        
438 Chen was removed from the post of deputy party head and he resigned as village head. 
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protection of Wukan Harbor, had been met, which was a success for Wukan’s societal 
involvement. However, in the same day, the Ministry of Public Security arrested five nuclear 
members of Temporary Council of Representatives, including the organization’s deputy 
chair Xue Jinbo, Zhang Jianhong, Hong Ruichao, Zhuang Liehong, and Zeng Zhaoliang. 
 The public security authority also made it illegal for the organization of the Wukan 
Temporary Council of Representatives and Wukan Women’s Association, and therefore 
deemed they should be dismissed. Such a decision incited the most severe protest on 
December 10th that led to a dangerous confrontation with riot police. The situation was 
further worsened because of the unusual death of Xue Jinbo during his detention. This 
became very decisive since ubiquitous human abuses and the unusual death of citizens at 
during police detention had provoked very harsh criticism against police authority, and the 
issue itself had brought many protests and group incidents. The Wukan Temporary Council 
of Representatives even claimed openly that they no longer trusted any government in 
Guangdong and called for intervention by the central government. The police besieged the 
village to prevent the flow of living materials into the village while the villagers were also 
stopped suspicious people entering, but foreign and Hong Kong journalists were welcome. 
        Again, the slogans of the banners is worth mentioning: “Oppose tyranny!”, “Return 
U.S. human rights!”, “Open national election!”, “Return our farmland!”, and “Overthrown 
government-business collusion!” which indicated that the villagers’ political awareness had 
grown. 
 
          1.3 Provincial Interventions and Democratic Election  
 
 Protests had been rare in the past two decades after the Tiananmen in 1989, and as 
that  protest had won international attention and the protest itself had been politicized. The 
18th Party Congress was impending. At the right moment, (probably under provincial party 
leader Wang Yang’s directive), deputy party leader Zhu Mingguo announced that the 
villagers' basic demands were reasonable and understandable. In the evening the police and 
villagers respectively retreated from confrontation. Advisors of the Temporary Council of 
Representatives agreed a meeting with Zhu on the morning of December 21st. Zhu agreed 
the conditions raised by Lin who asked first for the return of the body of Xue Jinbo for a 
second medical-legal autopsy to confirm the real cause of his suspicious death; the 
reexamination would be attended by journalists from five leading international media; 
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releasing other three other members from the Temporary Council of Representatives; and 
recognizing the legal status of the Temporary Council of Representatives. Then the villagers’ 
conference decided to cancel the protest scheduled in the afternoon on the same day. 
 Later developments were relatively smooth, under support of the provincial 
government, Lin Zuluan was nominated as party leader of the village and was responsible 
for preparing for a direct election by which a new village committee was formed. The New 
Enlightenment Institute, which was an active political NGO head by Xiong Wei, who also 
had been very active in promoting rural election, was invited to assist and prepare for the 
election. 
 
            2. The Wukan Incident: an Assessment 
 
 The Wukan Incident was an extraordinary case of a societal movement that occurred 
in the past two decades. In terms of its implication, seldom is there a case where societal 
movements had been so resolute, and consistent in their engagement of the government.439 
Domestic and international obervers all praised the incident from different perspectives.440 
Many international observers believed the Wukan model could be used as a national 
political tool to placate grassroots political protests.441 Chinese observers also considered the 
event as a “turning point” for how government-society disputes over land could and would 
be handled in the future.442 Sun Liming, a leading Chinese sociologist, believed that the 
Wukan case signifies a new model for resolving social contradictions and contention in rural 
China, i.e. “realizing people’s interests while maintaining social stability”.443 As with the 
case of Xiamen PX incident, the municipal government and the provincial leaders of 
                                                        
439BBC News, Deal in China rebel village Wukan welcomed, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
china-16297463，2015-08018. 
440 It was viewed as a card played in the higher-level political game between politburo members 
Guangdong’s Party Secretary Wang Yang and Bo Xilai, who before his fall from grace was the Party 
chief of megacity and Municipality of Chongqing. Johan Lagerkvist, The Wukan Uprising and 
Chinese State-Society Relations: Toward “Shadow Civil Society”? International Journal of China 
Studies Vol. 3, No. 3, December 2012, pp. 345-361. 
441  Wendy Simon-Pearso,The Wukan Model: Democratic Reform or Political Maneuver? 
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/2012/12/05/the-wukan-model-democratic-reform-or-political-
maneuver/，2015-07-18. 
442   Ou Ming, “What Wukan Means”. 
http://www.alternativearchive.com/ouning/article.asp?id=864, 2015-07-18. 
443   China Youth Daily, Wukan Election Filled the Gully within the Hearts of the Grassroots (wu kan 
xuan ju tian ping min zhong xin zhong de gou he), http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2012-02- 
06/033223886066.shtml. 
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Guangdong were also deeply involved; the careful and prudent handling of the incident by 
the provincial government was believed to be unique. However, as far as this research is 
concerned, the writer would be analyzing the behaviors reminiscent of many other relatively 
less conspicuous achievements.  
 
              2.1 Societal forces Involved  
 
              2.1.1 Wukan villagers 
  
 Similar to the case of the Xiamen PX incident, Wukan villagers were major 
stakeholders in their protest against the grassroots level and local government in their land 
seizure. Compared with the areas of legal and social justice (such as Sun Zhigang case, 
Qianyunhui case), anger venting cases (as Huanan Tiger case and Weng’an Incident), 
preventive protest against potential risks, and post-event settlement (punishment of officials 
after Tianjin Fire or Weznzhou train clash and the following-up compensations), Wukan 
people had a great stake in their interest concerning the land sales. Therefore, citizens from 
Wukan as a whole have been the major player. The population numbers, their close ties and 
kinship, and their unity made the village powerful enough for a confrontation against the 
government. However, it does not mean that other societal forces did not play a significant 
role. 
 
               2.1.2. NGOs 
 
               Compared with the other two cases referenced in this study, the role of NGOs had 
become prominent in the societal involvement of the Wukan’s case. In the initial phase of 
right maintenance, the youths who later became members of the Wukan Iron Blood Youth 
Group (Wukan tiexie qingniantuan, hereafter Wukan Group) had played an essential role. 
The Group later served as a nucleus force of the protests. The Wukan Group held a QQ chat 
group444 in which they posted and shared different documents, including the International 
Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
 The first 15 representatives and the Temporary Council of Representatives had been 
the most important in the sense that they actually served as a decision-making body as well 
                                                        
444 QQ is a Chinese Internet social media which is a combination of facebook and skype.   
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as speaker for the more than 10,000 villagers. During the protests, the village had also 
established functional organizations such as Wukan Women’s Associations. The New 
Enlightenment Institute, which was an active political NGO, was invited to prepare for the 
election. International scholars even developed the concept of “shadow civil society” 
drawing from the case of Wukan where the media savvy youth at the ad hoc media center 
and the clan groupings that may have served as agents of political or social change in 
China’s future political development.445 The Wukan Incident is one of the few cases where 
the prominent role of NGOs had been observed.  
 
             2.1.3 Social Activists 
 
 Headed by Lin Zuluan, a senior citizen (67 years old), who was much respected by 
villagers, who was pushed to be a spokesperson and protesters leader since September 22nd. 
Lin was a member of the CCP who had once been in the military and a cadre. Lin’s role was 
prominent. He served as an advisor, and opinion leader at the beginning, but after the 
Temporary Council of Representatives was launched, he served as the core of the de facto 
decision-making’s body. He was influential in setting the agenda, organizing protests, 
negotiating with governments, mediating among villagers, and equally importantly remained 
very rational during the protest. It was due to his role that the CCP later nominated him as 
the party’s head of Wukan where he was responsible for the new election and operation of 
Wukan even today. Together with Lin, Xue Jinbo, Zhang Jianhong, Hong Ruichao, Zhuang 
Liehong, and Zeng Zhaoliang, among other social activists, deserve to be mentioned. 
 
2.1.4 International and New Media 
 
 What is particularly special in societal involvement with the government in the 
Wukan case is that it relied on international media and new media instead of domestic 
traditional media (such as paper media and television programs). Because the issue was 
highly sensitive, coverage of domestic media was mostly provided by Guangdong local 
government, and the content were more about how the government were endeavoring to 
have the incident settled, and most domestic media also tried to track the development of the 
                                                        
445 Johan Lagerkvist, The Wukan Uprising and Chinese State-Society Relations: Toward “Shadow 
Civil Society”? International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, December 2012, pp. 345-361.   
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incident. For the same reason, the Wukan villagers did not trust the mainland media that 
much and relied on the overseas media. 
 Provincial media accused Wukan villagers’ protests “as mobs”, which further 
increased Wukan’s trust in mainland media. 446  In early December, when confrontation 
between Lufeng and Shanwei governments reached its peak, the access of mainland 
journalists into the village was also denied, since they believed that the journalist may side 
with the local government. On the contrary, international and Hong Kong journalists were 
welcomed. On December 19th, the party’s head Zheng Yanxiong of Shanwei city even 
criticized the villagers for engaging with international media.447 
 Because of the scale and confrontation as well as the way Wukan people engaged 
with government, this soon differentiated themselves from “normal” protests elsewhere. It is 
for this reason that Wukan had attracted more international media coverage. Journalists from 
the BBC, The Daily Telegraph, NHK, the New York Times, Taiwan Eastern Television, and 
more media from Hong Kong had stayed in the Wukan village to provide realtime on-site 
reports. The village even established a newsroom especially for the international media. A 
survey conducted on December 19th by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre from the 
University of Hong Kong had indicated strong coverage outside the mainland China, but 
none of the more than 200 newspapers inside the country published any articles. The story 
was extensively covered in Ming Pao and Apple Daily in Hong Kong. The BBC, Financial 
Times, Reuters, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the Diplomat in Japan, all 
covered the Wukan incident. Among the 58 articles that were surveyed across the region in 
total, of which 37 were from Hong Kong, six from Taiwan, 14 from Malaysia and one from 
Singapore. 448  Hong Kong media intensively covered and followed up the Wukan case 
partially because of the traditional ties between Guangdong and Hong Kong. The pro-
democracy nature of Hong Kong media may also be an important reason for their coverage 
of the Wukan case, while there was much less coverage on other protests in other areas. 
Foreign media primarily focused on democracy and state-society relationship. This may 
                                                        
446  Choi, Chi-yuk (7 October 2011) "Rioting in model village attests to graft woes" 
(http://topics.scmp.com/news/china- news-watch/article/Rioting-in-model-village-attests-to-graft-
woes). South China Morning Post. 
447  See: http://www.webcitation.org/64JFk4l2T ; Sing Pao. Archived from the original 
(http://www.singpao.com/NewsArticle.aspx?NewsID=210164&Lang=tc) on 30 December 2011 
448  David Bandurski (19 December 2011). "Chinese-language coverage of Wukan" 
(http://www.webcitation.org/647G5zgw3). Journalism and Media Studies Centre (University of 
Hong Kong) Archived from the original (http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/12/19/17650/) on 22 December 
2011. 
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have helped the Wukan protestors to win more international awareness and scrutiny and 
therefore increased the safety of the protesters and contributed to the success of Wukan’s 
engagement. 
 The role of new media cannot be underestimated. In order to attract societal 
sympathy, videos that showed people of all ages being chased and beaten with truncheons by 
riot police had been spread all over the world through Internet-based media. Sina Weibo (a 
micro blog), for instance, was used by some villagers to update their protests, appeals, and 
worries, often with pictures and videos. Sometimes during the protests, Internet news of the 
protests, including photos and videos, were quickly deleted by the CCP censors because they 
brought many “troubles” for the government. Even words as Lufeng and Wukan turned to be 
“sensitive words” with baidu search engines. 
 
            2.2 Interaction Pattern 
 
 In the Wukan case, the societal forces had show consistence and mutual 
reinforcement instead of being fragmented and inner-consuming. Wukan’s interaction with 
government was highly organized and coordinated. Because of the common interest and 
appeals in reclaiming lost land and political rights, the Wukan villagers remain unified and 
stable, creating stronger societal pressure against the government. It was understandable that 
the near 20,000 villagers may not think exactly the same and there may be disputes and even 
competitions among villagers. For instance, there may be power struggles among the social 
activists and different attitudes towards the government during the more than half a year’s 
struggle. However, the villagers had successfully managed those disputes and speak with 
one voice, which seems to have been vital for their success. 
 In order to coordinate attitude and stance among villagers, and speak with a 
consistently way, Wukan had established their leadership and decision-making body for the 
protests, which is very rare compared with other protests. The Temporary Council of 
Representatives, under the leadership of Lin Zuluan and his colleagues, had performed 
strong leadership. Because illegal land sales were disclosed and the villagers’ rights violated, 
the international media and new media, in form of Internet-based blogs, Weibo, and BBS, all 
showed strong support of public opinion. The domestic traditional media had refrained from 
taking a stance since this may either violate political correctness or encourage violence 
under conditions of rising tension. However, in the latter part of the event, especially after 
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the Xue Jinbo’s death, the mainstream media had also rendered sympathy for Wukan and 
criticism against the local government. On December 22nd, the People Daily published an 
article “What did Wukan’s turn remind us?”449 Therefore the media had also functioned in a 
unified or non-contradictory manner. 
 Since the Wukan villagers mainly rely on their own forces to negotiate with local 
government, their inner unity as well as generally favorable media indicated their 
engagement with the government was centralized. 
 
             2.3 Rationality 
  
 Wukan’s protest was rare in the frequency, intensity of confrontation, the time lasted, 
and the resolution of the villagers. The Wukan incident lasted for roughly half a year, 
especially from the first major protest on September 21st to the December 20th when 
Guangdong deputy party head Zhu Mingguo visited the village and agreed on the five major 
conditions required by the Temporary Council of Representatives. Zhu also undertook to 
further address the problems, but major protests repeatedly took place, with each attended 
by several thousands of people. During the most emergent cases, in mid-December, up to a 
thousand riot police besieged the village, while the villagers erected barricades over the 
weekend to keep the police out. Outsiders even speculated that a major repression may take 
place, which led the chair of the Temporary Council of Representatives calls for “enrolling” 
100 young men to build a Security-Maintaining Team (wei an dui), and another 500 as a 
preparation team. 
 However, it did not mean the Wukan’s protest were violent and irrational. From the 
very beginning, the Wukan had raised their requirements, which were by no means 
irrational. Violence did take place, but did not regularly happen, for most of the time; there 
was confrontation instead of direct antagonism. No one died or seriously injured except for 
the Xue Jinbo’s unusual death.450 Once the government made a compromise, the Wukan 
villagers responded positively. Therefore it is quite possible that the Wukan village had 
                                                        
449 Zhang Tie, Wu Kan Zhuan Ji Ti Shi Wo Men Shen Me (What did Wukan’s Turn Remind Us?), 
People Daily, December 22, 20015. 
450  Deputy Provincial Party Head Zhu Mingguo agreed to held another neutral medical-legal 
examination, under inspection of journalists from 5 leading international media to ensure the 
reexamination was carried out neutrally and objectively. However, Xue’s family refused to do so.  
Given that the former examination done by Sun Yat-sen University Hospital showed no sighs of 
physical torture, and the police had video during Xue’s detention, it is quite possible that Xue’s death 
cause was not because of violence. 
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adopted the doctrine of “escalation” to show resolution to fight for their due rights, and 
more importantly, leverage against the government for better conditions. And if a review of 
the later development is made, one finds that most of the conditions had been agreed and 
met by the government. 
 The Wukan villagers were aware that without the support of higher level government 
and leadership, their protests would bring very little results. Therefore they have learned to 
confine their goals to merely blame local officials, appealing to the central government in 
Beijing to protect their rights by saying that “We are not a revolt. We support the Communist 
Party. We love our country”.451 International scholars had also observed that the Wukan 
protesters had “continued to demonstrate while displaying banners pledging loyalty to the 
Communist Party”.452 This is very interesting and the writer believes it is closely related to 
the leadership of Lin Zuluan and his colleagues. Therefore, the Wukan’s case can be 
considered as “rational with antagonism”. This finding may challenge the writer’s former 
assumption that rational and constructive engagement would render better results in societal 
involvement and bargaining with government. One possible explanation may be related to 
the scale. Namely, when the protest reaches a certain scale, controlled violence will not lead 
to repression. The Wukan incident seemed to be in any means a large scale one, given that 
almost all villagers were involved and functioned in a highly organized and coordinated 
manner.  
 
          2.4. Area of Issue 
 
 Land disputes concern economic benefit. Because the land was sold illegally by the 
former village head of Wukan, it also concerns corruption of the grassroots level 
government. Therefore, the Wukan case could be regarded as an economical-political issue. 
Intertwined interests and appeals tend to be more difficult to solve. By far, the land issue had 
not been addressed well. 
 
           2.5. Sensitivity 
                                                        
451 David Cohen, What Wukan Really Meant, http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/what-wukan-really-
meant/, 2015-08-18. 
452  Moore, Malcolm (15 December 2011). "Wukan siege: First crack in the villagers' resolve" 
(http://www.webcitation.org/648Pzp3H4). Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/asia/wukan-protesters-seek-return-of-xue-jinbos-
body.html?_r=1) on 23 December 2011. 
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 Sensitivity is determined by the scale, areas, antagonism, and the government’s role. 
When a social incident involves more people, it tends to be more sensitive. Generally, the 
government would be subject to a city-wide protest rather than a small scale one; an incident 
with political motivations would be more sensitive than a purely economic matter; an 
incident characterized by greater antagonism is more sensitive than a less antagonistic one; 
an incident where there is loss of human life would be generally more sensitive than a 
incident without loss of human life. However, as far as the CCP is concerned, the most 
important criterion would be its relationship with the CCP’s regime security. An incident 
that relates more to a threat to the CCP regime legitimacy means the more sensitive it would 
be. The Wukan incident is a large scale and highly antagonistic incident that is intertwined 
with party legitimacy and social stability, among others. Therefore, the sensitivity for the 
Wukan case is high. 
 Sensitivity is also related to public trust or distrust. Popular trust in a government can 
reduce the sensitivity of an incident, while public disbelief and mistrust in government will 
increase the sensitivity of an incident. In almost in each of the public incident, the initial 
news revealed by government was questioned, especially in disasters or other deathly 
confrontations, the number of casualties, and the key technical data that concerns the 
accountability of the government has been kept questionable. Qian Yunhui case is another 
example, though later evidences tends to favor that the former village head may have died 
by accident instead of a cruel murder, but public opinion, newspapers, and netizens all 
remain skeptical even until today. A scholar on rural politics published on the Southern 
Metropolis Weekly magazine that this reflected a credibility crisis for local governments that 
now inhibits effective governance in the countryside.453 
 The presence or absence of rumors maybe a useful criterion to test popular trust or 
distrust of a government and also can detect the sensitivity of an event. As is the case in the 
2008 Weng’an incident where public skepticism about an unusual death of a middle school 
student led to public protest and finally led to violence. Rumors had been created. During 
the initial Wukan confrontation, rumors circulated such as a child being beaten to death; 
after three leader protestors were arrested and one of them died suspiciously while two other 
were kept under detention, rumors were also spread that the two other protesters were also 
                                                        
453  Wu Danhong. “The Qian Yunhui Case Interrogates Public Trust in the Government”, 
http://www.nbweekly.com/Print/Article/11795_0.shtml, 2015-07-18. 
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beaten to death. 
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Chapter 11: The Dalian PX Protest 
 
             Similar to the Xiamen PX program, the Dalian Fujia Dahua PX program is a major 
industrial program promoted by local government but protested by its city dwellers. 
However, the Dalian PX program had been progressed smoothly while keeping a very low 
profile until the tropical storm “Muifa” broke through the protective dike to the Dalian PX 
program in the Jinzhou industrial complex and endangered its chemical reserves on August 
8, 2011. The greater danger was that the Typhoon was approaching soon. The potential 
danger imposed by the PX program had aroused the general anxiety of the Dalian dwellers 
and later developed into a large scale NIMBY (not in my backyard) movement that forced 
the Dalian government to stop PX production immediately and undertook to relocate the 
program. 454 However, in late 2011, the PX program already secretly recovered production 
and four years later after official announcement by Dalian Municipal government to relocate 
the PX program, the Fujia Dahua PX program was still producing PX in the same location 
without any further news. This questioned the credibility of Dalian government while also 
indicated that societal involvement in the Dalian PX program was unsuccessful. Actually the 
worst part of Dalian’s case is that, opposite to the Xiamen PX protest which provided a 
successful newt type of government-society interaction model, the Dalian’s secret recovery 
of production was learned by governments of Kunming and Ningbo, as a “new” approach to 
deal with societal protests. 455 
              1. The PX Program and the Local Government  
              The Dalian Fujia PX program was by then China’s largest private enterprise-
controlled PX program, with a total investment of RMB9.5 billon, an annual production 
value reached up to RMB26 billion and taxation of RMB 2 billion, therefore it was one of 
Dalian’s six  major projects in the year 2007. Most importantly, the program helped to 
                                                        
454 The NIMBY movement could be regarded as a game type that occurs when residents or users 
protest against government projects (roads, industrial facilities, airports, wind turbines, and so on) 
that serve a public interest, not because they object against the objectives underlying these projects, 
but because they are confronted with specific costs produced by these projects that they do not want 
to bear. For more details, see Erik Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan, Governance Networks in the 
Public Sector, New York and London: Routledge, 2016, p86.  
455  Gao Shengke, All PX Program Protested in Recent Years Started Production after Storm, 
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150407/43498542_0.shtml, 2015-12-28.  
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extend Dalian’s petrochemical industry from oil refining to PX and PTA and further to 
Polyester Chip (PET) to form a complete “gold industry chain”, improving Dalian’s 
industrial competitiveness, and “filled the blank of Dalian Industrial development History” 
of “lacking in lower end petrochemical industry” (zhi you you tou, mei you you wei, 
meaning Dalian had upper end oil refining, but not middle and lower end petrochemical 
industry such as PET). 456 The Fujia Dahua PX program represented Dalian’s ambition to 
build China’s largest petrochemical industry base, and was also part of the state plan of 
“Revitalizing the Old Industrial Base in Northeast China”, a major initiative by former 
premier Wen Jiabao.  
             On a more general basis, China had become the world’s largest producer and 
consumer of PX, its production capacity accounted for 24% of the world’s total, while its 
consumption accounted for 32% of the world’s total. 457  In order to stabilize domestic 
supply and improve China’s competitiveness in textile, it is vital for China to security the 
healthy development of the PX industry. 458  
              Understandably, the Fujia Dahua program was deemed by Dalian local government 
as a major breakthrough in its industrial development, and therefore would render strong 
support for the program to be launched smoothly, and its environmental impact would be a 
secondary consideration, and to some extent, was regarded as a “necessary cost for 
economic development”. Similar to Xiamen PX program, though the Environmental Impact 
Assessment of the program was conducted, the assessment was carried out silently, if not 
secretly without releasing any news to the main stakeholders, the Dalian dwellers. Because 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was often conducted by government-affiliated 
agencies, it is very difficult for people to believe its neutrality, objectiveness and credibility 
of the EIA since it could easily influence the assessment. “We can imagine boldly, if we 
review of all China’s PX program, we will probably find ‘original sin’ with many of the 
programs.” 459  
                                                        
456 Homepage of Dalian Fujia Dahua Company, http://house.runsky.com/mode_23166.htm, 2015-08-
09. 
457 Li Chen, Domestic and International Analysis of the Development and Future Trend of PX 
Industry, Economic Analysis of China’s Petrochemical Industry, 2010(10).   
458 Ibid.  
459 Lu Ning, Dalian, Please be open in investigating its PX Program, Dong Fang Zao Bao, 2011-8-
12, A22. 
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              This was especially true with the Dalian PX program. It was revealed that the 
program was approved by the China Reform and Development Commission in 2005 and had 
received a subsidy using State Debt (a system adopted to attract major investment). In June 
2009, the program began production. However, an official document titled “Safety 
Permission for Construction of Dangerous Chemicals Program” indicated that its plan for 
safety measures passed review and received permission only in January 2011. 460 It means 
the factory was already producing PX ten months before being approved and seventeen 
months before the EIA was passed by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 461 The 
program even expanded its annual production from 450,000 tons to 700,000 tons, while the 
expansion was confirmed only in September 2009. Actually, according to the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law, new EIA should be conducted if production capacity were to 
expand. Item 31 even regulated that production before completion of EIA would be 
punished. 462  However, in reality, the regulations often stay on paper in front of local 
government who see GDP growth as the top priority.  
              Danger exists not only because of the Dalian PX program, but also because 
chemical industries are very concentrated in the same area and may increase the danger of 
the program itself. Journalistic investigation revealed that the Dalian PX was just 200 meters 
from the site of the major accident of the “July 16 Explosion” 463 roughly a year ago.  464 
Actually in December 2014, another accident took place with the Dalian Fujia Dahua PX 
program when fire broke out because of a gas leakage. The Dalian authority claimed the 
accident was under investigation without any follow-up ever since. 465 
              2. The Dalian PX Protest: a Review 
            As early as 2009, immediately after the factory started production, there were already 
                                                        
460 Ibid. 
461 ibid.  
462 Environmental Impact Assessment Law (promulgated by Standing Comm.  National People‘s 
Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003),  
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/212/3572/3574/20021029/853043.html, 2015-12-12.  
463 On July 16, 2011, a pipeline explosion and fire hit the Dalian Xingang port, spilling around 1,500 
tons of crude oil into the sea to leave a slick covering 183 sq km (71 sq miles) . see Zhu Chengpei, 
Zhang Xiaoming, and Xie Yu, Dalian seeks to contain oil pipeline spill, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/19/content_10121115.htm, 2015-08-09.  
464 Wang Erde, “The Suspense of Next Stop in Relocation of the Dalian PX Program, the 21st 
Century Business Herald(21 shi ji jing ji bao dao), 2011-08-16.  
465  Gao Shengke, All PX Program Protested in Recent Years Started Production after Storm, 
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150407/43498542_0.shtml, 2015-12-28. 
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small scale protests in front of the factory and government building, and the Dalian Bureau 
of Environmental Protection had to responded to the public skepticism, which circumvented 
the public’s question about “whether the program had passed EIA” by assuring the public 
that strict measures would be taken to ensure “safety”. 466   
              The damage to the dam and the coming danger supposedly to be brought by the 
typhoon had resurfaced the many procedural and operational problems with the PX program 
and called into question the role of Dalian government, who are responsible for reviewing, 
inspecting and settling the issue properly. On August 8, the same day of the dam damage, a 
dozen of journalists from China Central TV (CCTV) visited the site of the damaged dam to 
investigate and report the accident, together with officials from Dalian government and the 
Dalian Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau. However, they were surrounded, 
blocked and attacked, their cameras broken, and their investigation unsuccessful. Later 
investigations confirmed that many journalists were attacked, even though they had showed 
their certificate. 467 Later, news released that the Chair of the Board of the Fujia Dahua PX 
program even ordered the workers, “If you let in one journalist, you are a dead person”. 468  
              On evening of August 9, after well-known CCTV News Commentator Bai Yansong 
announced a report and commentary on the damaged dam of Dalian Fujia PX Program 
would be made soon, the report was canceled immidiataly. Apparently, the CCTV had 
received strong pressure from the authorities. This action had annoyed the Dalian people and 
served as a catalyst for the city’s wide spread dissents. “If the PX program is safe without 
security problem, why shall the government force the CCTV to cancel the TV news program? 
The more the government colludes with the enterprises, the more problem is the PX 
program,” commented an ordinary resident close to the Gangwan Guangchang (the Harbor 
Square).469  
                The Dalian people must have learned from the Xiamen PX protest (actually the 
local governments and societies had learned from the Xiamen PX protests in later 
environmental protests, especially those against PX programs), between August 9 and 
                                                        
466 Dalian Bureau of Environmental Protection: The Fujia Dahua PX Program has nothing to do with 
Xiamen PX Program, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/19/content_10121115.htm, 2015-
08-10.  
467 “Anti-wave Dam damaged and Chemical Cans Endangered  CCTV Journalists Attacked during 
Interview”, http://myrb.newssc.org/html/2011-08/10/content_1346473.htm, 2015-08-12.  
468 Chairman of Dalian PX Program Board of Directors Was Revealed to Have Claimed Killing 
Workers If They Let in Journalists”, http://news.qq.com/a/20110811/000052.htm, 2015-08-12.    
469 An interview in August 2012, Dalian, date undefined.  
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August 14, advocacy for a “walk” began to appear in cell phone messages, BBS 
communities, Sina Blogs and social media platform like QQ, twitter, etc. On August 14, 
2011, many Dalian dwellers gathered before the People’s Square in front of Municipal 
Government to protest against the Dalian PX program. It was estimated around 12, 000 
Dalian local residents had participated in the on-site protest. The protestors wore T-shirts 
with anti-PX slogans, sanging the national anthem, and called for the Dalian government to 
relocate the PX program out of Dalian (as Xiamen PX Incident).  
                On the afternoon of August 14, the Dalian Party Committee and the municipal 
government held a press conference and announced that the production of PX by Dalian 
Fujia Dahua would stop immediately and the program would be relocated soon. However, 
the new location was not revealed. Early in the evening, the CCTV news confirmed that 
decision by the Dalian municipal government to relocate the program and the incident 
gradually calmed down.   
  
                3. An Assessment of the Dalian PX Protest  
                The announcement of the Dalian government to relocating the PX program was 
encouraging. It was regarded as another major victory for Chinese environmental protests, 
and a victory for societal involvement as well. The Wall Street Journal called the Dalian 
government’s decision “an unusual display of responsiveness” and “bowing to 
environmental protests”.470  However, relocation of such a major PX program was never 
going to be easy. After the decision of the Xiamen government to relocate its PX program in 
the Gulei Peninsula of Zhangzhou city, the local residents immediately waged another 
protest to protect their own homeland and it took another year to successfully persuade the 
Zhangzhou people to accept the program and the investment rose from RMB10.8 billon to 
RMB13.78 billion. For the Fujia Dahua PX program, the Dalian government had to find a 
proper place that is both accepted by the local residents and Fujia Dahua Company. Given 
that the PX program had been stigmatized after the Xiaman PX protests, it is almost certain 
the relocation would not go smoothly. Besides, the Dalian government had to compensate 
heavily for the Fujia Dahua Company. 
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904253204576508252300809390, 2015-12-12. 
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The trickiest part for the Dalian PX program was that, it seems that the production 
soon restarted while the matter of relocation seemed to have been shelved. On December 7, 
2011, four months after the accident, an official letter from the Dalian Jinzhou New District 
Administration Committee, sent to the Dalian Customs authority claimed that the Fujia 
Dahua PX program, having suspended production and rectification, the danger to PX 
reserves cans had been eradicated,  
“Experts believed the conditions for recovering production had been 
met, and therefore, Dalian Fujia PX program had been approved to recover 
production while preparing for relocation as a whole, and therefore, the 
customs authority was required to provide service to the Fujia Dahua 
Company”. 471  
Another report revealed that news had reclaimed back the decision to relocate the 
program because the municipal government failed to find a suitable place, announcing the 
decision of recovery of production within a small group of people and asking for their 
understanding. 472 
                Further news was that the Dalian government had authorized Beijing 
Petrochemical Engineering Company to make the “Plan for Relocation of Dahushan 
Petrochemical Industrial Zone”, which had passed the review by China International 
Engineering Consulting Firm. And on December 7, the Dalian government organized a 
public hearing on the plan of overall relocation of petrochemical programs in Dahushan 
peninsula where the Fujia Dahua PX program located. 473 The most shocking news came 
that that the PX program was shut down in September, and restarted production later in the 
month. 474 Two years later, in late 2012, further news confirmed that the Dalian PX program 
had recovered production and its production capacity even doubled, though the news 
seemed to have been revealed to support a similar PX program in Ningbo that had also met 
                                                        
471 Yan Haoze, Wang You，Re-decoding of Dalian PX Program, First Financial Daily (Di Yi Cai 
Jing Ri Bao), 2011-12-22, A01.  
472 Dalian Claimed Back the Decision to Relocate the PX Program, News of Recovering Production 
Announced Among a Small Group”, http://news.qq.com/a/20111229/000118.htm, 2015-12-12.  
473 The Xiamen PX Program is Relocating, 
http://www.guancha.cn/indexnews/2012_12_27_116916.shtml, 2015-09-10. 
474 Yan Haoze, Wang You，Re-decoding of Dalian PX Program, First Financial Daily (Di Yi Cai Jing 
Ri Bao), 2011-12-22, A01. 
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with strong public resistance. 475 However, by the end of 2015, no further news about the 
relocation ever appeared about the relocation of the Fujia Dahua program, while the 
production of PX had recovered not long after suspension. This questioned the credibility of 
the Dalian government and indicated that the societal involvement of the Dalian PX protest 
was basically not successful in that societal involvement failed to really eradicate the 
potential danger and pollution of the program, or urging the government to relocate the 
program as promised. Three years after finishing a review of the relocation plan, the 
prospect of relocation still remain uncertain.   
 
											4.	Societal	Involvement	in	the	Dalian	PX	Protest 
 
               4.1 Societal forces involved 
               4.1.1 The stakeholders: the Dalian dwellers  
               Those people who have direct interest in an event, namely, the stakeholders, are 
also part of the societal forces and as indicated in the introduction part and in analysis of the 
Xiamen PX protest and the Wenzhou Train Clash, societal forces tend be more fruitful when 
the stakeholders are middle class. This is also true with Dalian people. As a regional 
economic center, Dalian’s GDP capita weighed in at $14,000 in 2011, therefore it would be 
safe to say that Dalian is a middle-class society,476 which means the population has a better 
knowledge, awareness and resources to invest in the protests. Though the 12,000 plus 
demonstrators accounts for just a small proportion of Dalian’s overall population, more 
people are involved by sending advocacy messages, reading newspapers, daily talks, BBS, 
chatting rooms, etc. It is almost certain that the majority of Dalian people have joined the 
campaign against the PX program in one way or another.  
               4.1.2 New Media, Traditional Media and International Media 
               Though the Dalian PX protests lasted for a short time (roughly a week from August 
8 when the tropical tide broke the protective dike aroused close to the PX reserves aroused 
media and public attention to August 14 when the Dalian government announced decision of 
relocation), media coverage was intensive and wide in scope. At the very beginning, local 
                                                        
475 The Dalian PX Program was under production normally, annual production capacity doubled to 
1.4 million tons, http://xm.ifeng.com/baoliao/detail_2012_10/29/398903_0.shtml, 2015-08-12.  
476 Global Nonviolent Action Database, Chinese middle class protesters challenge chemical plant in 
Dalian, 2011. 
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media were under strong censorship, while journalists were denied access to the site of the 
accident, and the CCTV journalists were even attacked. However, new media had played 
their role. Pictures and advocacy messages were transmitting among Dalian people via cell 
phone text messages, Internet chatting rooms and Twitter-like microblogs. When the news 
was known to all, traditional media from localities other than Dalian had published many 
articles urging the government to take proper actions. South Weekly criticized the Dalian PX 
program for “coming in muddiness and going in muddiness”, and pointed out that the most 
important thing for Dalian people is how to establish a truly transparent, and truly effective 
inspection system under the review of Dalian dwellers. 477  
               Many international media, such as the Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, BBC News 
and the New York Times had reported the news, and the  Guardian in particular tracked the 
issue closely and reportedextensively on the issue. 478 By exposing the issue to international 
community, the societal forces created a strong public opinion and pressure for Dalian 
government, who had been endeavoring to project itself as an open, stable, prosperous city 
ideal for investment.  
                4.1.3  Social Activists 
                 The Dalian PX protests appeared to be well organized. Since August 9, BBS 
communities, Sina Blogs and social media platform like QQ, twitter, cell phone messages 
were started advocating a “walk” on the People’s Square toward the Municipal Government 
Building at 10:00 am on August 14, 2011. By observing the “organization” of the protests, 
                                                        
477 Li Tie, Dalian PX: came in muddiness, and goes in muddiness? South Weekly, 2011-08-18, E29.  
478 Aizhu, Chen, and Sabrina Mao, China's Dalian Fujia Plant Runs Normally despite Shutdown 
Order, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/15/dalianfujiaidUSL3E7JF0ZS20110815;Areddy, 
James, Chinese City Bows to Plant Protestors, The Wall Street Journal, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904253204576508252300809390.html;Bandurski, 
David, Dalian Protests Erased from Social Media, http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/08/14/14785/; China 
Protest Closes Toxic Chemical Plant in Dalian, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
14520438; Bradsher, Keith. "China Moves Swiftly to Close Chemical Plant After Protests, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/world/asia/15dalian.html; McLaughlin, Kathleen E., China: 
Protesters Win in Dalian? 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asiapacific/china/110815/china-protests-dalian; 
Watts, Jonathan. China Orders Petrochemical Plant Shutdown after Protests, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/14/china-petrochemical-plant-shutdown-protest;Watts, 
Jonathan. "Chinese Chemical Plant under Threat as Muifa Reaches China, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/08/muifa-storm-typhoon-reaches-china; Watts, Jonathan. 
Tens of Thousands Protest against PX Chemical Plant in Northern China, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/14/china-protest-against-px-chemical-plant; all 
accessible until December 31, 2015.  
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one could easily find that there must be some social activists who had done researches about 
the Xiamen PX protests since many elements were very similar: the text message sent 
among Dalian people stated “(the Dalian PX program) is like an atomic bomb placed on 
Dalian land (Xiaman Island), the people in Dalian (Xiamem) will be living in Leukemia and 
deformed children ever since!”, exactly borrowed from the text message circulated among 
Xiamen citizens four years ago. The protesters wore similar preprinted shirts, signs, and 
slogans to that of Xiamen. Blog posts also show that during the week following the 8 August 
accident, Dalian people were increasingly talking about the 2007 protest in Xiamen.  
                There were also other social activists or even NGOs. For Instance, lawyers from 
the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims openly expressed their support of 
protesters. Bai Yansong, the major anchor from CCTV, had posted a message on the Sina 
Micro blog (Weibo) revealing his investigative program about the Dalian PC program was 
canceled. When his micro blog was frozen, he created a new account and criticized 
government infringement on “the public information sphere.”479 He was regarded as a social 
activist too. 480 
                  4.1.4 Scholarly studies 
                  Because Dalian PX protests, to some extent, marked a new stagy for China’s 
government-state relationship at a time of economic updating and restructuring, rampant 
environmental and growing public awareness for participation and good governance, 
scholars of public administration, political science and legal studies had made Dalian PX 
protest an ideal case for academic studies. Some scholars explained the Dalian (as well as 
the Xiamen) PX program protests from the perspective of NIMBY, movements and protests 
against industrial or other production fallibilities that are potentially risky and dangerous for 
the neighborhood. 481 Academic studies of the protest had further exposed the Dalian PX 
program under spotlight, and also constituted  pressure for the follow-ups of the program. 
Anyway, the Dalian government undertook to relocate the PX program four years ago.  
                                                        
479 Global Nonviolent Action Database, Chinese middle class protesters challenge chemical plant in 
Dalian, 2011.  
480 Ibid.  
481 William Glaberson, Coping in the Age of NIMBY, New York Times, 1988-7-19. Chinese scholars’ 
analysis of the Xiamen and Dalian PX incident were intensive. See Wang Na and Li Hao, Reflections on 
PX Movement: A Perspective from NIMBY Movement, Guanghua Law Studies, the 7th series, p30-40.    
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                  4.2 Interaction Pattern  
                  The Dalian PX protest was conducted in a concentrated manner. After the 
protective dike was washed away by tropical tides on the morning of August 8, the danger of 
the Dalian people was impending since the greatest danger,  the Muifa had not come. There 
was a general anxiety among the Dalian people. Because popular resentment about the 
stigmatized PX program was strong, and the Xiamen PX protest was naturally regarded as a 
model for Dalian’s protest, mass media, public opinion, social activists, scholars and 
Xiamen dwellers had a common goal and consensus to drive the PX program out of Dalian, 
therefore the societal forces had functioned in a coordinated and organized manner, making 
their engagement of the government centralized.  
 
               4.3 Rationality 
               Involvement by media, protesters, social activists and scholars were made in a 
rational manner. Though at the very beginning, there was confrontation between workers 
from the Fujia Dahua Company and journalists, those improper actions were taken by the 
Fujia Dahua Company, journalists, as part of the societal forces were not responsible for 
that. International media reported that there may be minor confrontation, a few plastic water 
bottles thrown at riot police.482 
4.4 Sensitivity  
According to the criterions stated in the introduction, sensitivity is evaluated based 
on whether there is loss of human life, whether the government is mainly reasonable for the 
occurrence of the event, and whether the event has to do with the regime legitimacy and has 
a major effect on social stability. The Dalian PX protest didn’t lead to human life loss, the 
government was not mainly responsible for the event and it didn’t have an apparent 
relationship with regime legitimacy or social stability. Therefore, the sensitivity of the event 
was low.  
                5.  Similar Protests, Different Result  
                                                        
482 Environmental activism in China: Poison protests, the Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21526417/print, 2015-12-12.   
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                 The Wukan land protest and the Dalian PX protest respectively stand for the 
successful and unsuccessful cases in policy changes driven by societal forces. The author 
will first compare the two cases to see what makes societal involvement successful or not, 
and will then compare the Wukan Land protest with the Qian Yunhui case, which mainly 
focused on Qian’s death, and was closely related to the land protests he led, while the local 
government had settled the case within the context of the continuing land dispute instead of 
a normal “traffic accident” as it had claimed. The author will also compare Dalian’s PX 
protest will the Xiamen PX protest in the hope that comparison between the two movements 
may reveal an mechanism or model that ensures policy implications in societal participation.  
              Societal involvement in Wukan land protest and the Dalian PX protest have many 
aspects in common. In terms of societal forces involved, both protests had involved 
traditional mass media, social activist, scholars and NGOs had also appeared in both cases, 
professionals were absent in both cases. In terms of media, new media and international 
media had played more evident role in exposure of the event, social motivation and creating 
public opinion and international pressure.  Both cases had involved a large group of 
stakeholders, the 12,000 Wukan villagers and the 12,000 Dalian protesters, supported by 
more Dalian dwellers. Societal forces had functioned in a concentrated and consistent 
instead of fragmented or even inner consuming manner.  
               However, the Wukan land protests and the Dalian PX protest are different in three 
ways: rationality of societal involvement, sensitivity and area of the protests. In the Wukan 
case, societal involvement was rational yet with controllable confrontation. The villagers, as 
the major stakeholder, had confronted with the riot police under leadership of the Temporary 
Representatives Committee. While in the Dalian PX protest, societal forces involved in a 
rational way. The Wukan case was highly sensitive because of fierce confrontation, loss of 
human life, and the special timing, while the Dalian PX issue was emergent but not 
sensitive. The issue  were different: the Wukan incident arose from land seizure while the 
Dalian incident from environmental concern. Area difference may determine the sensitivity 
of the issues and further determine the willingness and resolution of both societal forces and 
government.   
 
               1. What Really Matters?  
               Then did  the differences in rationality of interaction, sensitivity and areas of issue 
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determined the different results? Hardly. Though these factors affect the scope and degree of 
societal influence on the decision-making process, they can’t explain the multiple cases. The 
six cases analyzed by this research respectively come from the area of legal injustice, 
environmental issues and land disputes, societal involvement in half of them failed while the  
other half were successful. If we assume that rational engagement tend to be more effective 
as proved by the Xiamen PX protest, then it can’t explain why societal involvement in 
Wukan land protest was so successful. Anyway, the Wukan protest was one of the most 
contentious movements over the past decade. Both the Wukan land protest and Qian Yunhui 
case were highly sensitive, but societal involvement in the former case was successful while 
the latter was unsuccessful. In the less sensitive cases of Sun Zhigang and Dalian PX, the 
results of societal involvement vary.  
             There are also other technical details that may affect the result of societal 
involvement. A comparison of the Xiamen PX Protest and the Dalian PX Protest may shed 
some light. The two programs were very similar in many aspects, as will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. Firstly, both programs were major industrial investment that were 
supposed to contribute to the local economic development and job creation, and therefore 
were supported strongly by local government, since the latter needed such programs to 
ensure the annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Production (GDP). Secondly, societal 
involvement was quite similar in many ways. Though with minor differences, both Xiamen 
and Dalian local dwellers had been intensively involved in the protests, social activists, 
scholars, professionals, traditional media and new media had played an active role. Societal 
involvement was rational and concentrated. Because both cases belong to the environmental 
protection sector, the sensitivity of the issues remains similar.   
                 However, the result of societal involvement is different. The Xiamen PX protests 
were by far China’s most successful case of societal involvement in the environmental 
protection sector, and in all sectors too. The society had successfully forced the Xiamen 
government to relocate the program far from Xiamen at low cost (less confrontation, no 
death, no serious punishment afterward); while the societal involvement in Dalian PX 
incident failed to force the program to really suspend its production and relocate even after 
four years had passed.  
 
                2. “Real Conditions”  
                 As far as the two cases are concerned, the timing and location of the two 
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programs counts. The Xiamen PX began to arouse public interest in March 2007 while 
construction of its industrial park only started four months ago, while the Dalian PX 
program had finished construction in 2009 and by the time of the protest, it had been 
producing PX for two years with an annual production capacity of 70, 0000 tons after 
expansion. Prof. Zhao and her colleagues had completed an  early research and proposed the 
new location while Dalian later found it very difficult to fulfill its early commitment 
(somewhat hastily made to resolve the protest) since the Dalian and neighboring area are 
densely populated. More importantly, Xiamen is a beautiful tourist city somewhat 
environmentally vulnerable for mega chemical programs, while Dalian was a leading 
industrial base aiming at building itself into China’s largest petrochemical center. Different 
priorities had also contributed to different results.  
                Then what factors made the Wukan case successful while the Dalian PX protests 
less successful or unsuccessful? To some extent, whether societal involvement could lead to 
a meaningful result is not decided by the smart strategies they employ, neither do they have 
such a strategy, societal involvement in protests are often spontaneous and unorganized, 
though there are often social activists involved in advocating, organization and coordination 
work.  
                3. Level of Leadership Intervention  
                Intervention of leadership from higher-level government proved to be vital for the 
settlement and success of societal involvement. In the Wukan case, the villagers had 
protested against illegal land deals four roughly two years before the major group incident 
broke out on September 21, 2012. However, their protests didn’t bring considerable results 
even in the following three months until Deputy Party Secretary Zhu Mingguo’s visits of the 
village on December 21. Interaction between government and societal forces went on benign 
track after intervention of provincial leaders. In the Dalian PX protest, the incident cooled 
down after the Mayor appeared on the People’s square and announced an immediate halt to 
production and a decision of relocation in the morning with official confirmation in the 
afternoon. This is also true with Sun Zhigang’s case (where national leaders urged 
Guangdong provincial government to conduct a thorough investigation), the Xiamen PX 
incident (intervention of top leaders from municipal and provincial government).  
                 The opposite is also true. Two other failed cases, Qian Yunhui’s death and Bobai 
County protest, where decision-making was made at county level (Bobai County and Yue 
Qing city, a county-level city). Though the Wen Zhou government (upper level government 
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of Yueqing) had sent directives to the Yueqing government and police authority, the 
Wenzhou municipal government didn’t really get involved in the decision-making of the 
investigation.  
                 However, involvement of higher-level government cannot explain why the Dalian 
government later failed to fulfill its promises. To some extent, the goal of the protests on 
August 14 was successful, since the Dalian government had undertaken to stop production 
and relocate the PX program. The question is, why no follow-ups? Even when the Dalian 
government knows failing to relocate the PX program will undermine government 
credibility and may bring unexpected consequences once another accident appear. 483 
 
                  4. Interest Group (s) 
                  Besides the real difficulties of relocating the Dalian PX program, such as funding 
and a suitable location, the Fujia Dahua Company may be the major barrier for the 
relocation. According to the official webpage of the company, Fujia Dahua is a joint venture 
established only in 2006 by the private company Fujia Group and the state-owned company 
Dahua Group with Fujia as the controlling shareholder (55%). 484 This was quite tricky, 
since the private company Fujian was only established in 1998 and almost had no 
experience and business in petrochemical industry before 2005. While the Dahua Group had 
been one of the more influential state-owned petrochemical companies, as a listed company 
at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, it was quite strange that Dahua Group should seek 
partnership with Fujia Group, let alone make it a controlling shareholder. Actually, there was 
news that the joint venture was a “forced marriage” proposed by a top leader from the 
Dalian Municipal government, who once opposed the idea of a sole investment by the 
Dahua Group.485 The news also revealed “it is known to all in Dalian that the brother of this 
leader has close relationship with the Fujia Dahua”, and “some of the stakeholders have 
official background”. 486  
                Though the Fujia Dahua was a leading private company with numerous titles, its 
                                                        
483  This is quite likely since the gasoline pipe explosion in late 2010 had endangered the PX 
program, just one year before the dike damage. On December 6, 2014, fire broke out because of 
gasoline leakage. See “Fire Broke out for Gasoline Leakage in One of China’s Largest PX program, 
http://www.chinanews.com/sh/2014/12-07/6852369.shtml, 2015-12-12. 
484 Homepage of Fujia Dahua company, http://house.runsky.com/node_23166.htm, 2015-12-12.  
485 The Myth of Fujia Dahua’s Background, Difficulties for Relocation of Dalian PX Program, 
http://finance.qq.com/a/20110811/000248.htm, 2015-12-12. 
486 Ibid.  
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real economic might was still not comparable with state-owned enterprises. It only squeezed 
into the Top 500 Service Companies in 2010. However, the company had won very strong 
support from the Dalian Municipal government and Liaoning provincial governments whose 
top leaders all had visited the company. 487 The company received a special subsidy of RMB 
50 million provided by national debt, and had expanded its share within the Fujia Dahua 
from 51% to 81.5% before the protest, while the share of Dahua Group had declined to less 
than 20%. 488 Thus, it is very hard to explain why such private company could receive so 
much favorable treatments.  
                The strong government support of Dalian and Liaoning provincial government 
was partially because the joint venture Fujia Dahua PX program was China’s largest 
petrochemical company and important tax payer, also because its ties with leaders from 
Dalian and its perceived relationship with central government. This is the major reason to 
explain why Bai Yansong’s investigative report was suddenly canceled after the he 
announced it in the parade. Normally, even Dalian government leaders have no right to do 
this. It can help to explain why the workers from the Fujia Dahua dared to attack CCTV 
journalists when deputy secretary-general of Dalian Municipal government, and Head of 
Police Authority of the Jinzhou Development Zone were present, who even failed to 
persuade the company to let the CCTV journalists in and they were attacked too. Within the 
Chinese context, it was probably because the Dalian PX program, the Fujia group especially, 
had special ties with and special support from an even higher-level government, 489 the 
details of which the author may not clarify here.  
                  In the former analysis, the Dalian government’s break of its former commitment 
to relocate the PX program is understandable. Without support from superior (even national) 
level government, even the Dalian municipal government would have to think twice. Given 
economic growth had been the central task for local governments, the latter were often very 
reluctant to make compromises in environmental and land protests. Since those 
environmentally problematic programs were often mega investments (this is especially true 
with China’s 15 PX programs) while those rural land seizures were often made by major 
construction or industrial programs, which were in the interest of the local government.  
                                                        
487  Yan Haoze, Wang Weijia, The Former and Present Life of the Fujia Dahua PX Program, 
http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/08/1003391.html,2015-12-12.  
488 Ibid.  
489 The Public Wins in Dalian, Chemical & Engineering News, Sept. 26, 2011. The report mentioned 
that the program may “have background” from top leadership.  
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                 Therefore, interest groups are an important variable that affect the result of 
societal involvement in decision-making. In fact, interests help to explain all six cases 
covered in by this research. As analyzed  earlier, the family plan system had its function as a 
powerful interest group that had protractedly delayed the adjustment of the notorious “One 
Child Policy” and limited the result of the Bobai County protest against the policy. While in 
the Qian Yunhui’s case, the Yueqing Power Plant served as the interest group that had played 
a neglected yet potentially epochal role. In the Xiamen PX incident, the Tenglong Fangting 
Company under the Xianglu Group, as a Taiwanese investment, had endeavored to keep the 
program in Xiamen, and later relocated part of its investment to Dailian under the name of 
Yisheng, very close to the Fujia Dahua program. 490 While in the Wukan land protest, the 
Wukangang Development Co., Ltd, the Yidazhou Company and several other developers 
had been involved in the many land deals with the corrupted village committee. Even in the 
Sun Zhigang’s case, the local C&R station policemen and civil affairs workers, had created 
an interest network that was probably against abolishment of the system.  
                Generally speaking, societal involvement was more fruitful when the interest 
groups were less powerful (the Wukan case, Sun Zhigang case) and less fruitful or even 
unsuccessful when the interest group were more powerful (the Yueqing Power Plant in Qian 
Yunhui Case and the Fujia Dahua Group in Dailian PX Protest) with the exception of the 
Xiamen PX protest where societal involvement was very successful while the interest group 
was equally influential and powerful.  Admittedly, the term “successful” or “powerful” is in 
a relative meaning.   
                 And those “interest groups” were closely connected with political power. The 
“interest groups” in Sun Zhigang’s case and the Bobai protest, namely the faulted C&R 
stations and the family plan system were part of the political regime. While the Fujia Dahua 
Company had strong political support (though its controlling stakeholder, the Fujia Group is 
a private company, the Fujia Dahua joint venture was directly managed by the Dalian State 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) while the Yueqing Power Plant, as part 
of the Zhejiang Energy Group, is a powerful state-owned enterprise. In Wukan’s case, there 
were no influential state-owned enterprises involved or dominating the process. This may 
help explain why the societal forces in the Wukan protest were successful.  This can also 
help to explain why Xiamen PX protest was successful even when the Xianglu Group is a 
                                                        
490  Yan Haoze, Wang Weijia, The Former and Present Life of the Fujia Dahua PX Program, 
http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/08/1003391.html,2015-12-12. 
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very powerful and influential investment group. Because even though the Xiamen 
government and Fujian province support this investment, they were not directly involved in 
the program economically, because the program was a Taiwanese investment. The 
comparison also indicates that involvement of societal forces may be more successful when 
they are opposed to foreign investment while less successful when they are opposing a state-
owned company or government branch.   
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Conslusion   
Fundamental transformations have taken place in Chinese society ever since the Reform and 
Opening-up in late 1970s. This is especially true in the past decade when sustained 
economic growth, deepened reform and opening-up and intensive international exchange 
changed China’s relationship with the outside world, and reshaped the relationship between 
China’s state and its society. This empirical study aims to review China’s social changes 
from 2002 through 2012 by analyzing the interactions between the emerging societal forces 
and China’s political decision-making system through six major public incidents, and further 
evaluates the institutional, behavioral and policy implications of societal involvement in 
China’s decision-making. Societal forces are defined as a temporary coalition of societal 
entities (individuals, organizations or groups) who share common interests, purposes and 
values that are differentiated from decision-making entities (government) yet hope to 
influence the decision-making process often via pressure politics. By adopting the term 
“societal forces”, the author hopes to examine how society can, within an authoritarian 
regime, still influence the decision-making process when  civil society is underdeveloped 
and channels for institutional and regular participation are absent. The research regards 
decision-making as a unitary and systematic response to societal involvement.  
    Involvement of societal forces in China’s decision-making is not institutional or 
conventional; it is possible only in a certain context. At the global level, Chinese decision-
making has been under increasing international scrutiny via internationalization of domestic 
politics, the Chinese government is becoming reluctant to use repressive means against 
societal pressure. At the CCP level, it has evolved from being a pioneer of the proletariat to a 
pioneer of the Chinese nation, as interpreted by the three representatives (the CCP forever 
represents advanced productivity, advanced culture and interest of the vast majority of 
people), and further to national rejuvenator incarnated in Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream. The 
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severe domestic and international challenges the CCP faces helped reshape its new source of 
legitimacy by performing new tasks in economic development, better governance and 
international prestige. The decentralization, pluralism and professionalism of the CCP, 
intraparty democracy nurtured by generation change and factional politics helped bringing 
greater social autonomy. At one end of the societal level, the burgeoning middle class and 
their growing political consciousness created a “critical realm” for strong societal forces as 
well as a limited “public sphere” typical for civil society.  
   The author has the conviction that the three factors are very important in that they 
made societal involvement in decision-making possible. Those contextual changes are 
partially a result of globalization; partially a result of the CCP’s self-adjustment to domestic 
and international environmental changes. It also revealed China’s changed relations with the 
outside world.  Societal involvement and participation in decision-making are expected to 
expand as China is increasingly integrated into the world system.  
                  Institutions, governmental behaviors and polices are three facets of the political 
system and are also three major criterions to evaluate the structure and process of the 
system. This research examines the three facets and tries to establish a causal-effect 
relationship between societal engagement and changed institutions, governmental behaviors 
and policy output. By doing so, the dissertation provides a general picture of the degree and 
scope of China’s political development, and also may clarify the implications of societal 
involvement for China’s political future. 
  The study is based on the author’s closely documented observations, and face-to-
face interviews conducted intensively on six public incidents between 2002 and 2012: the 
Sun Zhigang case that forced the abolishment of the Custody and Repatriation system 
(2003); the Bobai County family plan protests that stopped the violent family plan campaign 
but failed to lead to further discussion or institutional revision of the family plan policy 
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(2007); the Xiamen PX protest that successfully urged the Xiamen government to relocate 
the program to coastal Gulei Peninsula (2007); the Qian Yunhui case where societal 
investigation failed to figure out the truth of the suspicious death of a village headman who 
had organized villagers to protest against the local government’s land seizure, and the 
government’s behavior remained repressive, arbitrary and uncooperative(2010); the Wukan 
land protest in 2011 that successfully forced local government, under direct leadership of 
provincial government, to change its policy on social organizations, village autonomy, and 
market-oriented land policy, and successfully settled the land dispute and which was deemed 
a new model for settling land disputes, and; the 2011 Dalian PX protest that urged the 
government to suspend production and relocate the Dalian PX program, while the 
government failed to carry out the plan four years after the decision of relocation was made. 
The author chooses to evaluate the societal involvement in decision-making during 
major public incidents for several reasons. Firstly, Chinese society over the past decades was 
characterized by numerous group incidents; dealing with those incidents had become an 
integral part of the decision-making process. Secondly, different from the prolonged routines 
and bureaucratic procedures, decision-making during public incidents is often fast and 
intensive, and therefore is relatively easier to track and analyze. Intensive and timely media 
reports often help create a certain degree of transparency which is rare for China but 
convenient for scholarly analysis. Thirdly, public incidents often mean opportunities for 
societal involvement to make a difference in decision-making that can hardly be expected 
under normal circumstances.    
     The six cases are all large-scale societal protests joined by mass media, social 
activists, professionals, scholars and other societal forces. Each of the cases had intensive 
domestic and international media exposure. The six cases respectively took place in the area 
of legal injustice (Custody and Repatriation System in the Sun Zhigang Case and Family 
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Planning Policy in the Bobai County Protest), environmental crisis (Xiamen and Dalian PX 
Protests), and land–related disputes (in Wukan and Qian Yunhui), whereas the three areas 
are exactly the three major causes for social conflicts in the past ten years.  
   The six cases are geographically representative: the Bobai County family planning 
protest took place in China’s rural area of inland Guangxi province; Xiamen and Dalian are 
relatively developed coastal cities, Wukan and Yueqing (Qian Yunhui case) are rural areas of 
the developed coastal provinces, while Guangzhou is a metropolitan city with huge 
population migration.  .  
                More importantly, the six cases had led to distinctive effects of societal 
involvement that allow the author to draw meaningful conclusions through comparison of 
the six cases. Three of the six cases, namely, the Sun Zhigang case, Xiamen PX protest, and 
the Wukan land protest, are examples where societal involvement had led to positive results 
while the other three cases, namely, the Bobai County family planning protest, the Dalian 
PX protest, and the Qian Yunhui incident, are examples where societal forces were deeply 
involved without bringing positive effects. By comparing the successful and failed cases, the 
author examines under what conditions and in what way positive or negative results are 
achieved, and therefore may shed light on some of the reasons for China’s contentious 
politics. 
               The  six cases show different features in terms of societal forces involved, the 
pattern of interaction between societal forces and government, the rationality of the 
interaction, the sensitivity of the issue, and the effects of societal involvement.  
  Societal forces: Who Matters 
Thorough studies of the six cases indicate that social activists, mass media, public 
opinion, professionals and scholars had arisen as the major societal forces active in public 
incidents, pushing for a change in China’s political decision-making. However, their roles 
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vary from one to the other.  
               Mess Media: Among all the societal forces, mass media and public opinion proved 
to be the most essential and almost indispensible societal forces. In all the three successful 
cases, the Sun Zhigang case, the Xiamen PX protest and the Wukan protest, media exposure 
was often the watershed for the development of the cases. Before the news was released via 
media, the stallholders were hardly forthcoming.   After the news release and public opinion 
was formed, societal involvement began to be reinforced and the positive effects began to 
appear after media exposure and increased coverage. Sun Zhihang’s family had protested 
hopelessly until the Southern Metropolis Daily reported Sun’s death and made it known 
nationwide; In the Xiamen PX incident, Xiamen citizens’ awareness was aroused and 
organized only after the China Business Journal reported Zhao Youfen’s anti-PX bill to the 
National Political Consultative Conference on March 18, 2007, Zhao’s bill had even failed 
to make a difference before it was reported.  One of the major reasons for success of 
Wukan’s protests was the intensive involvement of international media and its use of new 
media.  
New media, such as blogs, BBS, Internet-based communities, and cell phone 
messages had played a very important role in the case of the Xiamen and Dalian PX 
protests, the Qian Yunhui case and Wukan land protest. Xiamen and Dalian PX protests had 
both intensive traditional media and new media coverage, while the Qian Yunhui case and 
Wukan protests relied more on new media and international media because the two cases 
were both too sensitive for traditional media.   Because Sun Zhigang’s case took place in 
2003 when China’s information industry was still at its initial stage with a relatively small 
proportion of Internet and cell phone users, the role of new media was not evident. 
Traditional media from other localities proved to be more important than local traditional 
media since they were under censorship by the local government. A journalist from the 
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Southern Metropolis Daily later had trouble with the municipal and provincial government 
for its role in the Sun Zhigang’s case and its earlier report of severe acute respitory 
syndrome (SARS).  
The Bobai County protest didn’t have sufficient media exposure either in traditional 
media or in new media, and therefore had not formed a nationwide public opinion. It is 
probably because the protests took place in the relatively underdeveloped villagers and 
townships of the isolated Bobai County that the protests failed to attract sufficient attention 
from media from other provinces while its local protesters failed to use new media in all 
other cases. It may also be because the protests only lasted for three days before they were 
settled down. Insufficient media exposure was one of the major reasons for the failure of 
successful involvement.  
As an opposite example, the Dalian PX protest and the Qian Yunhui case indicated 
that intensive media exposure couldn’t ensure success of societal involvement. The Dalian 
PX protests had intensive domestic and international exposure; because Dalian is an open, 
coastal middle class society with a large proportion of Internet and cell phone users, new 
media was also very active. It was regarded as an unsuccessful case as the Dalian municipal 
government didn’t fulfill its commitment to relocate the Dalian PX program. However, the 
Dalian government’s slowness in follow-ups couldn't be attributed to societal involvement. 
The protestors had urged the Dalian government to take the decision of suspended 
production and relocation. Therefore, the protests before and on August 14 was in a way 
successful.   
Involvement of traditional media, either in the form of newspapers and TV programs, 
especially mainstream central media is often very influential and symbolic. Sun Zhigang’s 
case and Xiamen’s PX protest were reported by central media; Qian Yunhui’s case was 
reported by China Central Television (CCTV) whose interview of the witnesses aimed to 
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prove Qian’s death was “an accident”; the CCTV canceled well-known anchor Bai 
Yansong’s report about the Dalian PX program. Whether the mainstream media reports an 
incident and how it reports the incident to some extent indicates the effect of societal 
involvement.  
Social Activists: No group incidents happened spontaneously all of a sudden. The 
role social activists played were not significant yet indispensible in the societal involvement 
of decision-making. In all of the three successful cases and the three unsuccessful cases, the 
role of social activists seemed no different to the Internet-based community and chat rooms, 
connecting and coordinating protesters, organizing protests. However, stronger leadership of 
social activists tended to render more positive results. In the Xiamen PX protest and Wukan 
land protest, the social activists had a strong and stable leadership. Sun Zhigang’s case was a 
bit different since it was one of the earliest societal involvements。 Because there was a 
general sympathy for Zhigang and his family, many people helped them without strong 
support from social activists as compared to the three failed cases of the Bobai County 
family planning protest (altogether 28 social activists were arrested, mostly local farmers 
and small business owners) and Qian Yunhui’s death investigation (all investigation teams 
were led, organized or participated by social activists), and the Dalian PX protests (unnamed 
organizers of the protests).  
 Scholars: The role of scholars is obvious in almost all group incidents, especially 
that of legal scholars and public intellectuals. Scholars played a decisive role in two of the 
three successful cases: the constitutional review requested by the three law graduates and the 
five leading law professors was decisive for the final abolishment of the C&R system in Sun 
Zhigang’s case; and in the Xiamen PX protest, the Professor Zhao Yufen and her colleagues 
had conducted research and the bill she and other 104 senior members from the National 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC) proved decisive for the whole anti-PX 
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campaign. However, the role of scholars was not evident in the Wukan land protest. Among 
the three failed cases, the scholars’ role was absent in the Bobai County’s family planning 
protest, while in the Qian Yunhui case, scholars’ involvement was in-depth and broad. 
However, their involvement failed to make a difference. The scholars’ role in major reform 
and long-term legal and institutional reforms are evident and indispensible for their 
knowledge and vision. Other societal forces may not have similar effects.  
        Professionals: Professionals provide key support for societal involvement. All three 
successful involved professionals. In the Xiamen PX and Sun Zhigang’s cases, professionals 
had provided reliable evidence based on which, the society and the government could 
negotiate for a compromise, given that the mistrust between the government and society had 
been very strong. In the Wukan case, there was one social activist, Xue Jinbo who died 
suspiciously during police detention; however a third-party autopsy491 confirmed that in fact, 
death was caused by heart disease. In the failed case of Qian Yunhui, technicalities of the 
truck and the medical-legal autopsy of Qian Yunhui’s body may have provided key evidence 
about the real cause of Qian’s real death. However, the organization failed to figure out the 
speed of the truck before it killed Qian, and since it was the organization designated by 
Yueqing police, the latter may have influenced the result of the review. Qian’s family 
refused to do an autopsy of Qian’s body because his family didn’t expect it to bring a 
positive result. A few well-known lawyers and a former police officers also participated in 
the investigations of Qian’s death. The study revealed that professionals are very important 
once they provide key evidence. It also indicated that lawyers had been very active societal 
forces as professionals, while their role was often constrained by the political system. This 
                                                        
491 Sun Yat-sen University Hospital (the same hospital who provided medical-legal assistance to Sun Zhigang’s 
family in 2003) was commissioned to do the autopsy that basically confirmed social activist Xue Jinbo died of 
heart disease but proposed it do a further evaluation. Because of the tension between both the societal forces 
and government no suggestion of of human rights abuses (police torture) was made, or the professionals’ role 
in the Wukan case, which was not obvious. But the test helped to relieve the public mistrust of government 
since later Xue’s family accepted government compensation.   
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could also be proved by the most recent sentence of well known human rights lawyer Pu 
Zhiqiang.  
        NGOs: Different from Western society, the role of the NGOs was absent because of the 
CCP’s vigilance against NGOs and its tight control over them. But in the Xiamen PX 
protests and Wukan land protest, NGOs made their presence known Xiamen’s PX NGOs 
had been active as organizer, coordinator and even decision-making organ for Wukan 
village. NGOs legitimized the collective leadership of the Temporary Council of 
Representatives, optimized the policy choice and helped form a unitary policy towards the 
government that proved vital. Divisions between leadership and the grassroots were one of 
the key reasons for societal failure in engaging the government. The Wukan Women’s 
Association was also active during the protest and it was even claimed illegal together with 
the Temporary Council of Representatives, but later the decision was canceled under social 
pressure. In a later phase of the protest, the director of the New Enlightenment Institute, Mr. 
Xiong Wei, a senior social activist was involved in the general election under government 
supervision. It also displayed that the Guangdong government was more open-minded. 
 The Main Stakeholders: Actually, though all six cases had the involvement of 
different parties, the role of the main stakeholders and non-stakeholders was different. 
Stakeholders refer to societal forces that had direct interest in the protest. In Sun Zhigang’s 
case, the stakeholders were exactly Sun’s family; in the Xiamen and Dalian PX protests, the 
city dwellers were the main stakeholders; in the Qian Yunhui and Wukan land disputes, the 
villagers were the main stakeholders. In the Bobai County family planning protests, 
stakeholders were protesters from the 10 townships where protests against township 
government took place. Most of the incidents were joined by national and international 
societal forces (media for instance), however, societal involvement was often mainly 
conducted by the main stakeholders. What kind of main stakeholders often decide the 
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features of the interaction and somewhat determine the result of the interaction. Societal 
involvement proved more rational and effective when the main stakeholders have more 
resources, knowledge, and experience to engage the government. In the Xiamen PX protest 
and Dalian PX protests, good results were achieved because their main stakeholders were 
middle class. Due to the lack of participation of other societal forces, the Bobai County 
protest didn’t bring any significant changes with government policy or behavior, let alone 
adjustment of the family planning policy. This was very interesting compared with Sun 
Zhigang’s case. Involvement of very weak stakeholders (Sun’s poor family) but joined by 
strong societal forces, could still lead to very good result, while very strong stakeholders, 
joined by a few other societal forces could still be unsuccessful.  
 
 Varied Salience of Societal Forces in Different Stages:  
Initial stage: social activists: Societal involvement is a dynamic process. In different 
stages, the salience of societal forces may change. At the initial stage, often the social 
activists prove to be important. In the Xiamen and Dalian PX incidents, the Wukan Land 
protest and the Qian Yunhui’s protest, the main stakeholders, under leadership or support of 
social activists, had protested for months, Qian Yunhui himself was a social activist before 
his death. In the Bobai County family planning policy protest, secret contact work (chuan 
lian) by social activists before the first protest on May 17 morning had incited more protests 
in nine other townships within the following two days and reached its peak on May 19. 
Before a major incident that could lead to media coverage and arouse public interest, social 
activists played a leading role. And understandably, many social interest conflicts and 
smaller protests didn’t develop into major incident, not because the conflicts were solved, 
but because there were no strong or “qualified” social activists.  
         Media coverage after the accident or major event: When something unusual happens 
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either a major accident or loss of human life, media reports and coverage would be 
essentially and important. After the Dalian protective dike was damaged, the breakout of the 
Wukan protest and the Bobai County family planning protest, Sun Zhigang’s miserable 
death and Qian Yunhui’s suspicious death，the public were exposed to the unusual events 
and therefore  most importantly, it helped bring more societal forces in (scholars, 
professionals, etc.), and arouse the interest of the public and helped create a strong public 
opinion. At this stage, traditional media reports are often more influential than reports by 
new media, domestic media is often more desirable than international media. Because of 
media censorship, new media is becoming more important and effective. The Wukan protest, 
Qian Yunhui’s death the Xiamen and Dalian’s PX protest were all disclosed by the Internet-
based BBS, blogs, Internet community, and chatting rooms, when things became clearer, 
Internet WebPages often started to report news about the events. And if the issue is not 
sensitive and censorship is not strict, traditional newspaper and TV programs will follow, 
and then public opinion will be shaped. 
At the initial stage of media involvement, if there was no report of the event by 
traditional media, exposure to new media must be huge in numbers and intensive in 
frequency. Influential WebPages or popular internet communities are preferable. Timely 
updating is necessary since readers prefer the whole story instead of fragmented, isolated 
and somewhat “irrelevant” information. If there are onsite pictures to prove the event took 
place, or if there are preliminary analysis by insiders, the event would be more likely to be 
covered by an influential Webpage or traditional media.  
The most recent trend is that mobile-based real time social media (Chinese versions 
of Facebook and Twitter, WeChat or the latter via client service) are gaining momentum 
because of tightening web controls (real name registration, deletion of news, sensitive 
words) by the present administration and the lack of credibility of Internet based news. In 
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the Tianjin explosion that pulled a whole stock area into the ground and killed over a 
hundred people, news and pictures about the fire were circulated via mobile-based WeChatt 
for hours before the first news came out via the Chinese Web (most of the pictures were 
taken by locals onsite with short analysis and comment and many also came from onsite 
reports of international media). In the most recent public incident incited by the suicide of a 
middle school girl in Jin Chang of Gansu province, the news first came and circulated via 
WeChat and circulated on the internet.  
Without being reported or exposed via traditional media or new media this often 
leads to the failure of bringing in more societal forces and even failure for the involvement, 
this is probably one of the reasons for the unsuccessful level of involvement in the Bobai 
County family planning protests.  
Professionals: At this stage, professionals may be necessary in some of the cases, 
especially when there are deaths and accidents; technical reports by professionals are often 
desirable. Involvement of professionals and media are often co-related and mutually 
reinforcing. With reliable technical reports by professionals, the media, especially traditional 
media will provide more reliable reports and analysis and will create stronger public opinion 
and exert greater pressure for the government.   
           Scholars: As indicated in the earlier analysis, the role of the scholars is more salient 
in legal and institutional reform issues instead of immediate solutions or emergency 
responses to a major public incident. Therefore, in the later stage of the incidents and in 
major institutional and legal issues, scholars have greater say. Actually, most of the cases 
indicated in this study were later covered by academic research and theoretical discussions. 
Scholars do have a role as public intellectuals who may also publish some articles, posing 
questions, having interviews and even getting involved in advocating jobs and becoming 
part of the public opinion. However, their role is not as evident in pushing for major legal or 
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institutional reforms.  
             Major factors: Involvement patterns, rationality, and sensitivity. In terms of 
interaction patterns, both the Xiamen PX protest and the Wukan land protests and the early 
phase of the Dalian PX protest had proved the importance of coordination, consistency and 
concentration in societal engagement. In the failed case of the Bobai County family protest, 
societal forces were involved in decision-making in a concentrated way, while in the Qian 
Yunhui case, their involvement was very decentralized and fragmented. This involvement 
pattern has partially hindered them from getting closer to the truth behind Qian’s death. 
However, under condition of limited access to key information because of government 
manipulation, it is understandable that they should have very different opinions and 
interests. Even if they were involved in a well-coordinated and collaborative manner, their 
findings would be limited. Further explanation will be made in the later part of the 
conclusion.   
             The relevance of sensitivity to the effects of societal participation remains unclear. 
Societal involvement succeeded in the highly sensitive issue of the Wukan land protest and 
failed in the equally highly sensitive issue of the Qian Yunhuicase. This was also true with 
less sensitive issues of Xiamen (successful) and Dalian PX protest (unsuccessful) and 
medium sensitivity issue of Sun Zhiang case (successful) and the Bobai County family 
planning protest (unsuccessful). The Xiamen PX Plant Incident can be considered as a 
unique example where concentrated participation of professionals, social activities, new 
media, ordinary Xiamen citizens, and other societal forces had led to major behavioral 
changes of the Xiamen municipal government.  
              In terms of rationality, societal forces as well as the Xiamen government had 
demonstrated rationality in the Xiamen PX plant incident, based on which a commendable 
society-government interaction was achieved by engaging the government in a very 
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constructive manner. Societal forces, centered by within-regime scientists Zhao Youfen and 
her colleagues, have effectively changed governmental behavior from power and arrogance 
to responsiveness and further initiative; from repressive to cooperative to democratic; from 
information withholding to openness and finally to transparency. Rationality in Sun 
Zhigang’s case remained neutral, since it was in the social justice sector and none of the 
societal forces engaged were stakeholders. While Wukan’s protests appeared very 
antagonistic, prolonged and even dangerous, the author defines the Wukan case as rational 
with controllable antagonism. The villagers, under strong leadership of the Temporary 
Council of Representatives, adopted the “escalation strategy” as leverage to bargain with 
the government. The research also tentatively finds that controllable antagonism supported 
by large-scale participation could also be safe and effective, and different from the previous 
assumption of rationality and constructive engagement rendering the best results.  
             In the three unsuccessful cases, social involvement in the Bobai County family 
planning protests, mainly by local protestors, was violent. Confrontation and attacking of 
government buildings, overturning and burning of official automobiles appeared in all Bobai 
County’s 10 townships where large-scale protests took place. Violence by protesters had 
successfully stopped the local government’s harsh implementation of the family planning 
policy, but also justified government repression. Most importantly, involvement by the local 
forces in an antagonistic manner failed to bring any positive results. In the Qian Yunhui 
case, serious confrontation took place once between villagers and riot police when the latter 
wanted to take Qians’ body away. Subsequent involvement of villagers and other societal 
forces were all conducted in rational manner.   
              As to rationality, one thing must be clarified: in the Wukan land protest, Qian 
Yunhui case and Bobai County family planning protest, confrontation and even violence 
occurred. However, the confrontation and violence took place between the main 
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stakeholders and local government, and the involvement of all other societal forces 
remained rational and peaceful. The rationality of cases was summarized and evaluated in 
terms of societal forces as a whole since the government needed to make its decisions with a 
systematic response to the societal forces as a whole.  
  What Else Matter? Regional disparity 
     The effects of societal involvement showed geographical differences. The three 
successful cases all took place in the metropolitan city of Guangzhou, the middle-class 
coastal city of Xiamen and the rural Wukan village in Guangdong province. This may not 
reveal the whole picture since the three failed cases also covered middle-class coastal 
Dalian, the rural village of Zhaiqiao (in Qian Yunhui case) and Bobai County in China’s 
underdeveloped western Guangxi. However, if we review many other cases mentioned 
earlier in this study, (the Wengan protest in Southwestern China’s Guizhou, the Violent 
Protest in Shishou of central inland China’s Hubei, the great chemical explosion in Tianji 
and the most recent public incident in Jinchang in Northwestern China’s Gansu, and the PX 
protest in Maoming in South China’s Guangdong, and Eastern China’s Ningbo). protests in 
relatively developed coastal areas tend to be more concerned with land disputes, 
environmental protection and labor disputes, which are basically problems brought by 
urbanization and industrialization, while public incidents in less developed inland areas 
often resulted from minor accidents, but fueled by rumors in the context of problematic 
government behaviors and societal mistrust on government. Many of the group incidents 
from less developed inland areas were actually anger-venting incidents where a minor 
accident helped to incite and release the long-harbored anger of society in the government. 
Societal protests in less developed inland areas tend to be more violent and contentious than 
coastal areas while the result of societal involvement in government decision-making of 
coastal areas tends to be more rational, skillful and effective because both the society and 
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the government have more resources, better knowledge and experience, and are more open-
minded to compromise. However, the analysis is a tentative evaluation on a comparative 
basis, to be further testified by more cases and in-depth analysis.   
            Level of Leadership Intervention: The intervention of leadership from higher-level 
government proved to be vital for settlement and success of societal involvement. In the 
Wukan case, the villagers had protested against illegal land deals for roughly two years 
before the major group incident broke out on September 21, 2012. However, their protests 
didn’t bring considerable results even in the following three months until Deputy Party 
Secretary Zhu Mingguo’s visits to the village on December 21. Interaction between 
government and societal forces went on a benign track after intervention of provincial 
leaders. In the Dalian PX protest, the incident cooled down after the mayor appeared in the 
People’s square and announced an immediate halt to production and the decision to 
relocation in the morning with official confirmation in the afternoon. This is also true with 
Sun Zhigang’s case (where national leaders urged Guangdong provincial government to 
conduct a thorough investigation), the Xiamen PX incident (intervention of top leaders from 
municipal and provincial government).  
          The opposite is also true. Two other failed cases, Qian Yunhui’s death and the Bobai 
County protest; decision-making was made at county level (Bobai County and Yue Qing 
city, a county-level city). Though the Wen Zhou government (upper level government of 
Yueqing) had sent directives to the Yueqing government and police authority, the Wenzhou 
municipal government didn’t really get involved in the decision-making of the investigation.  
          Therefore, there seemed to be a tendency that the top-down approach of decision-
making still prevailed with the Chinese government. Zhao Youfen from the NPPCC is a 
scholar, but also a member of the intellectual elite as well as political elite (members of the 
NPPCC enjoy certain benefits in salary, housing, medical care and other social welfare 
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equivalent to certain levels of officials).  Zhao (and her colleagues) engaging the Xiamen 
government could partially be regarded as an interparty discussion that increased the success 
of the Xiamen PX protest. The many protests, though started from the bottom, and had to 
involve higher ranking officials if it were to be successful (as is the case in Wukan).    
            However, involvement of higher-level government can’t explain why the Dalian 
government later failed to fulfill its promises. To some extent, the goal of the protests on 
August 14 was successful, since the Dalian government had undertaken to stop production 
and relocate the PX program. The question is, why no follow-ups? Even when the Dalian 
government knows failing to relocate the PX program will undermine government 
credibility and may bring unexpected consequences once another accident occurs.  
           “Real Conditions”: timing, strategy and location: As long as the six cases are 
concerned, there are also many technical details that may make a difference in the level of 
the societal involvement. Wukan’s success may be partially attributed to the crucial timing 
before the 18th Party Congress when political stability remained the top priority for the 
country and the provincial leaders’ prospects and therefore governmental willingness to 
make a compromise was strong; News of the Xiamen PX program was released not long 
before the annual NPC and NPPCC conference when Prof. Zhao was able to make use of the 
opportunity to initiate the bill with the other 104 NPPCC members. The Xiamen PX protest 
was organized four months after construction started, while the Dalian PX program had 
produced PX for two years and had its production capacity expanded. Prof. Zhao 
successfully found an alternative location for the Xiamen PX program, while it was fairly 
difficult for Dalian to found such an alternative since the Dalian and neighboring area are 
densely populated. More importantly, Xiamen is a beautiful tourist city somewhat 
environmentally vulnerable to mega-chemical programs, while Dalian is a leading industrial 
base aimed at building itself into China’s largest petrochemical center. Different priorities 
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have also contributed to different results. All contributed to the success and failure of 
societal involvement.  
            What Really Matters? Interest Group: Success and failure in societal involvement 
could be better explained by taking into account the emerging interest groups behind the 
state-society narrative and that the coalition between power and business are what really 
hindered societal involvement from making a difference in government decision-making. 
Interest groups are very effective in explaining all cases covered by this research. The 
violent protests by Bobai County people against the family planning campaign waged by 
local government stopped the local government’s harsh implementation of the family 
planning policy. However, violent protests wouldn’t shake the questionable family planning 
policy even though it was already under harsh criticism and that there were already many 
scientific studies by domestic and international demographical scholars that proved the 
absurdity of the policy. However, the family planning system had functioned as a powerful 
interest group that had protractedly delayed the adjustment of the notorious “One Child 
Policy” and limited the result of the Bobai County protest against the policy.  
 In Sun Zhigang’s case, the faulted C&R stations and its over 800 stations all over 
China had become a profit-seeking facility for grassroots level policeman, civil service 
workers and other affiliates (assistants, doctors, criminal cabals, brokers between police 
stations and victims, to name a few), a lesser “interest group” for short. The system was 
abolished partially because the “interest group” is small and local, without influential 
government departments or “system) (xi tong) involved. The Fujia Dahua Company had 
strong political support (though its controlling stakeholder, the Fujia Group is a private 
company, the Fujia Dahua joint venture was directly managed by the Dalian State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission) from even higher-level leadership than 
Liaoning provincial leaders. This may help to explain why the Dalian government undertook 
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to relocate the program while later being unable to fulfill the commitment. The Yueqing 
Power Plant, as part of the Zhejiang Energy Group, was a powerful state-owned enterprise 
that appeared to have been involved before in Qian’s death, however they disappeared from 
public eye during the investigation. The role was suspicious and mysterious. Behind the 
Wukan’s case, there were no influential state-owned enterprises involved or dominating the 
process. This may help explain why the societal forces in the Wukan protest were 
successful. This can also help to explain why the Xiamen PX protest was successful even 
though the Xianglu Group is a very powerful and influential investment group. Though the 
Xiamen government and Fujian province supported this investment, they were not directly 
involved in the program economically, because the program was a Taiwanese investment. 
The comparison also indicates that involvement of societal forces may be more successful 
when they are opposed to foreign investment while less successful when they are opposing a 
state-owned company or government branch. 
  To conclude, societal involvement was more fruitful when the interest groups were 
less powerful (the Wukan case, Sun Zhigang case) and less fruitful or even unsuccessful 
when the interest group were more powerful (the Yueqing Power Plant in Qian Yunhui Case 
and the Fujia Dahua Group in Dailian PX Protest); Another important finding is that societal 
involvement was more successful when the interest group had large foreign investment 
(Xiamen PX, Wukan land protest) while societal involvement was less successful or 
unsuccessful when the “interest group” was a large state-owned cooperation(Yue Qing 
Power Plant in Qian Yunhui Case) or large cooperation with strong governmental or official 
background (Fujia Dahua PX program in Dalian PX protest). This finding helps to explain 
the Xiamen PX protest where societal involvement was very successful while the interest 
group was equally influential and powerful. Admittedly, the terms “successful” or 
“powerful” are relative. 
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Those “interest groups” were closely connected with political power and therefore 
created the ubiquitous phenomenon of crony capitalism that had constrained societal forces. 
Anyway, compared with the coalition of economic and political power, societal forces are 
too weak. Crony capitalism is not what this study hopes to address. However, the finding of 
crony capitalism (interest groups) being the real constraint for societal involvement is 
significant since it challenged the conventional wisdom of the market economy leading to 
democratization since economic development will nurture the middle class that demands 
more political freedom and rights. This research partly proved the findings of Bruce Dickson 
about the cozy relationship between entrepreneurs and political leaders that had effectively 
co-opted the emerging business class to support the political order instead of becoming a 
pro-democracy agent, let alone side with the societal forces against the government.  
Originality and limitation: This study reviewed the role of societal forces in China’s 
decision-making within the time frame of 2002-2012. It analyzed the interaction between 
societal forces and the government in six cases selected from a selection of public incidents 
that respectively cover legal injustice, environmental protection and land disputes. The six 
cases are geographically representative and had institutional, behavioral and policy 
implications. By evaluating the results of each case and making a comparison between 
successful and unsuccessful cases, the author has drawn tentative conclusions on what 
societal forces are involved; in what form, and under what conditions societal involvement 
can be more or less successful in decision-making.   Through in-depth analysis, the 
dissertation was able to determine what societal forces are definitely playing a role in the 
various group incidents, the way they function and their implications in changed institutions, 
government behaviors and policies. 
Through the six cases and many other group incidents until the present, the study 
was able to illustrate the policy making process in times of emergencies and under strong 
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societal pressure within the changed domestic and international context, allowing it to make 
the latest assessment about Chinese societal and political developments. The author 
endeavors to theorize the mechanisms through which society interacts with the government 
and makes a difference in the latter’s decision-making institutions, behaviors, and policies, 
in an authoritarian state where a civil society and a mature middle class are absent.  
However, the limitations of the research are apparent. The studies were purely 
confined to China’s experience under a very specific context, the conclusion of which may 
not fully explain the practices of other cultures, given the differences in the political system, 
economic development and cultural traditions. Since the conclusions of the study were 
drawn from societal participation in terms of social incidents, it failed to review the 
mechanism for conventional and regular participation in routine decision-making, knowing 
that the interaction patterns and the effect may be different in normal and abnormal times. 
The research regards the political system as a unitary player and decision-making as a 
unitary process, therefore it may fail to take into account the important factors within the 
decision-making regime and the process; and for obvious reasons, many important details 
during the decision-making process were evaluated but many more details remain unknown 
and may have been important in the analysis. 
  Future Plan: In the coming years, the author intends to expand the existing 
research to cover more cases and establish a database of China’s public incidents within a 
broader spectrum, based on which more reliable conclusions may be drawn. The author also 
hopes to cover some cases of societal participation in decision-making during conventional 
decision-making to see the similarities, differences, and defining features of the two types of 
involvement. The author will also, if the opportunity arises, incorporate China’s crony 
capitalism, and social stratification and their implications for societal participation in 
decision-making.  
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